Bell #212285 v. Hakeman et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Richard Cortez Bell,
Plaintiff,
v.
K. Hakeman, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-03377-PHX-SHD (JZB)
ORDER
Pending is pro se Plaintiff Richard Cortez Bell’s third Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint and Exceed Complaint Page Limit, Pursuant to Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, (“Third Motion to Amend”), (Doc. 43). The Magistrate Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Third Motion to Amend be
denied. (Doc. 51.) Bell filed an Objection to the R&R, (Doc. 52), which is fully briefed,
(Doc. 59). The Magistrate Judge ordered Defendant Hakeman to respond to Bell’s Second
Amended Complaint by January 19, 2026. (Doc. 51 at 10.) Hakeman filed two Motions
to Stay the responsive pleading deadline until after the Court’s ruling on the pending R&R.
(Docs. 54 and 71.) For the reasons set forth below, Bell’s objections will be overruled,
the R&R will be adopted, and the Third Motion to Amend will be denied. Hakeman’s
Motions to Stay will be granted, and a new deadline for responding to Bell’s Second
Amended Complaint will be set.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 27, 2024, Bell filed his initial Complaint. (Doc. 1.) The original
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Complaint asserted claims against Defendants Hakeman, Freeland, Wofford, and Bender.
(Id. at 2.) On April 17, 2025, the Court dismissed Defendants Wofford, Freeland, and
Bender, as well as Bell’s claim that, as a chronic care patient struggling with diabetes and
weight gain, he required “special care, treatments, and medication.” (Doc. 7 at 6–7.) On
June 2, 2025, Bell filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the original Complaint, (“First
Motion to Amend”). (Doc. 9.) On July 8, 2025, Defendant Hakeman, the sole remaining
Defendant, filed an answer to Bell’s original Complaint, and shortly thereafter the Court
issued a Rule 16 Case Management Order. (See Docs. 12, 13.) The Case Management
Order set a deadline of October 10, 2025, for Bell to seek leave to amend his Complaint.
(Doc. 13 at 1.) On July 29, 2025, Bell filed a second Motion for Leave to Amend, (Doc.
19 (“Second Motion to Amend”)), and the Court therefore denied the First Motion to
Amend as moot a month later, (Doc. 26). In his Second Motion to Amend, Bell sought to
add new Defendants and reassert a previously dismissed claim. (Docs. 19, 20.)
On October 14, 2025, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendation
recommending that Bell’s Second Motion to Amend proceed in part. (Doc. 28.) On
December 11, 2025, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge was adopted
in part and rejected in part. (Doc. 41.) The Court ordered that Bell’s Second Amended
Complaint be filed, but denied Bell’s request to add Dr. Ivens as a defendant. (Id.)
On December 16, 2025, Bell filed his third Motion for Leave to Amend, (Doc. 43).
Soon thereafter, on January 5, 2026, the Magistrate Judge entered the R&R at issue here,
recommending denial of Bell’s Third Motion to Amend for four reasons: (1) Bell sought
leave to amend more than two months after the amendment deadline without any
explanation for the delay or argument that he was diligent in seeking amendment, (Doc. 51
at 6); (2) Bell was not in fact diligent, (id. at 7); (3) Bell’s new amendment attempts to
assert new theories known to him from the outset of the case, (id. at 7–8); and (4) courts in
the District of Arizona have found even minor delays in seeking amendment untimely for
lack of good cause, (id. at 8).
Bell objected to each ground identified in the R&R, arguing that extenuating
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circumstances excused his failure to meet the amendment deadline. (Doc. 52 at 3–5.)
Defendant Hakeman replied, arguing that Bell’s objections should be overruled for two
reasons. First, they fail procedurally because they constitute an impermissible “general
objection.” (See Doc. 59 at 2–3.) Second, they fail on the merits because Bell failed to
establish diligence, and therefore good cause. (See id. at 3–5.) Separately, Hakeman also
moved for relief from the responsive pleading deadline ordered by the Magistrate Judge to
avoid duplicative effort if Bell’s Third Motion to Amend was granted. (See Docs. 54 and
71.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Review of Report and Recommendation
A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When any party
has filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations, the
district court’s review of the part objected to is to be de novo. Id. If, however, no objections
are filed, the district court need not conduct such a review. Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003). Objections must be specific. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
“[G]eneral, non-specific objections” are not sufficient to require the District Court to
“conduct de novo review of the entire R & R.” Sullivan v. Schriro, 2006 WL 1516005, at
*1 (D. Ariz. 2006).
B. Good Cause Under Rule 161
Under Rule 16, a court must issue a scheduling order, and that scheduling order
“must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and
file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). “Once the district court had filed a pretrial
scheduling order pursuant to [Rule 16] which established a timetable for amending
pleadings that rule’s standards control[].” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
1 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge set forth in detail the standards applicable under
the circumstances, and Bell did not object to those standards. Accordingly, I generally
adopt those standards and restate them with minor modifications below.
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F.2d 604, 607–08 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that following entry of scheduling order,
“Rule 15 does not provide the standards by which we consider [a plaintiff’s] motion to
amend”). Accordingly, “[w]hen a party seeks to amend its pleading after the date specified
in the scheduling order has passed, the party must first satisfy the requirements of Rule 16,
and then must demonstrate amendment is proper under Rule 15.” Acosta v. Austin Elec.
Servs. LLC, 325 F.R.D. 325, 328 (D. Ariz. 2018) (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608).2
“Under Rule 16, a court may only modify a scheduling order for ‘good cause.’” Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). “A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive
with an inquiry into the propriety of the amendment under Rule 15.” Morgal v. Maricopa
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 459 (D. Ariz. 2012) (cleaned up) (emphasis in
original). “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith
of the party seeking to interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party,
Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking
the amendment.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In other words, the focus of the inquiry is on
the moving party’s reason for seeking modification of the case schedule. See Morgal, 284
F.R.D. at 459 (citing C.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975,
984 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Courts within the Ninth Circuit apply a three-part test to determine whether a party
acted diligently:
To demonstrate diligence under Rule 16’s “good cause” standard, the movant
may be required to show the following: (1) that he was diligent in assisting
the court in creating a workable Rule 16 order; (2) that his noncompliance
with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding his diligent
efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not
have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16
scheduling conference; and (3) that he was diligent in seeking amendment of
the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not comply with the
order.
Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 460 (cleaned up). The good cause inquiry “ends, however, if the
2 The standard for leave to amend is set forth in the December 11, 2025 Order (Doc.
41) and need not be repeated here.
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party seeking the amendment has not shown diligence.” Cano v. Schriro, 236 F.R.D. 437,
439 (D. Ariz. 2006), aff’d, 269 F. App’x 755 (9th Cir. 2008). “The existence of prejudice
to the opposing party might supply additional reasons to deny a motion.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Bell Has Failed to Establish Diligence and Good Cause
Bell filed his Third Motion to Amend on December 16, 2025, more than two months
after the October 10, 2025 amendment deadline set forth in the scheduling order. (Doc. 13
at 1.) Accordingly, because Bell seeks amendment after the deadline to do so, he must
satisfy both Rules 15 and 16. See Acosta, 325 F.R.D. at 328. He has not done so, and
therefore his Objection will be overruled and the R&R adopted.3
Bell effectively makes five arguments in his Objection: (1) that he did not have the
scheduling order in his possession because it was seized by prison staff, (Doc. 52 at 3); (2)
that he would have sought amendment sooner but it was the Magistrate Judge’s fault that
the October 14, 2025 Report and Recommendation on Bell’s Second Motion to Amend
(“October 2025 R&R”) was entered after the amendment deadline, (id.); (3) that on
December 8, 2025 he sought but was improperly denied an extension of the case deadlines,
(id. at 2–3); (4) that judicial economy supports amendment of his complaint, (id. at 4); and
(5) that my recent decision in Hodge v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 2025 WL 2898392 (D.
Ariz. 2025), which the Magistrate Judge cited in the R&R, is distinguishable, (id. at 4–5).
Bell’s arguments—viewed separately or together—fail to demonstrate that he acted
diligently in seeking to amend his complaint before the October 10, 2025 amendment
deadline. With respect to his assertion that he lost possession of the scheduling order, Bell
does not say when he lost possession of it, does not claim he was unaware of the
amendment deadline before it expired, and has litigated under that order since it was put in
place. In any event, even accepting his assertion as true, Bell does not explain why he
could not have asserted the facts and claims set forth in his latest proposed amended
3 Because Bell’s objections fail on the merits, it is unnecessary to address Hakeman’s
argument that they constitute an improper “general objection.”
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complaint in any of his prior proposed complaints. Put another way, he has not shown that
his delay in seeking amendment was “because of the development of matters which could
not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling
conference.” Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 460 (cleaned up).
Additionally, Bell’s contention that he would have sought amendment sooner but
for the timing of the October 2025 R&R also fails. Nothing procedurally prevented Bell
from filing his Third Motion to Amend before the October 10, 2025 deadline—indeed, he
filed his Second Motion to Amend while his First Motion to Amend was pending, (see
Doc. 41 at 2 n.2), establishing that he knew how to timely seek amendment. Alternatively,
if Bell believed he needed a ruling on his Second Motion to Amend before proceeding, the
diligent course would have been to move to extend the amendment deadline before it
expired. He did not. Instead, he waited more than two months after entry of the October
2025 R&R to file his Third Motion to Amend, undermining any contention that the
Magistrate Judge’s timing, rather than Bell’s own delay, caused his failure to comply with
the scheduling order.
Likewise, although Bell complains that he was improperly denied an extension of
case deadlines in December 2025—an issue not properly before me—he fails to explain
why he waited to file his motion to extend until nearly two months after entry of the
October 2025 R&R. This further reflects a lack of diligence. See id. (identifying third
factor in diligence analysis as whether the party seeking relief under Rule 16 “was diligent
in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that he could not
comply with the order” (cleaned up)).
Bell’s judicial economy arguments—including his assertion that he is “willing and
prepared to accept the court’s ultimate ruling on the Third Proposed Amended complaint
even if it is adverse” because “[it’s] not like [Bell] will be precluded from filing a new
separate lawsuit to sue [Dr.] Ivens and assert his additional claim against all Defendants”—
are immaterial to the diligence analysis under Rule 16. Accordingly, these arguments will
also be rejected.
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Finally, although Bell argues against application of Hodge to the facts of this case,
he does so nominally and fails to actually distinguish that case. In Hodge, I quoted binding
precedent from the Ninth Circuit stating that “even under the liberal Rule 15 standard late
amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the
theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause
of action.” 2025 WL 2898392, at *3 (cleaned up) (quoting Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.,
232 F.3d 1271, 1295 (9th Cir. 2000)). Bell does not argue that he was unaware, at the
inception of the case, of the facts underpinning the new legal theory he now seeks to
assert—indeed, he acknowledges that he seeks to assert new legal theories based on factual
allegations related to those previously asserted. (See Doc. 52 at 4.) Accordingly, Hodge
is squarely on point and supports the denial of his Third Motion to Amend.4
B. Hakeman’s Motions to Stay
For the reasons set forth in Hakeman’s stay motions (Docs. 54 and 71), I agree that
there is good cause to grant the stay requests. Now that Bell’s request to amend his
complaint is being denied, I will require Hakeman to respond to the operative complaint
within fourteen days of this order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bell has failed to establish good cause and diligence sufficient to warrant relief
under Rule 16. He therefore will not be granted leave to amend his complaint.
Furthermore, now that it is clear that his Second Amended Complaint is the operative
complaint, Hakeman will be ordered to respond to it.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 51) is adopted, and
the Objection (Doc. 52) is overruled.
///
4 Because I find that Bell has failed to show the good cause and diligence required
under Rule 16, I do not address whether he has also met the standard for amendment under
Rule 15.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bell’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint,
(Doc. 43), is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Hakeman’s Motions to Stay, (Docs.
54 and 71), are granted. Hakeman shall respond to Bell’s Second Amended Complaint,
(Doc. 42), no later than fourteen (14) days after entry of this Order.
Dated this 12th day of June, 2026.
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