Complot et al v. Citibank NA et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Oliver Complot,
Plaintiff,
v.
US Bank NA, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00255-PHX-SMB
ORDER
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Limited Rule 54(B) Revision and Leave to File Narrow
Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 68.) This motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons
noted below, the Court denies this motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in January, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint (FAC) was filed in February, 2025. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff then filed a
motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) in July, 2025 (Doc. 47) which
the Court denied. (Doc. 49.) Plaintiff filed a second motion for leave to file a SAC in
August, 2025. (Doc. 51.)
On September 26, 2025, the Court granted Defendants Credit Control’s, Defendant U.S.
Bank’s and Defendant LVNV’s motions to dismiss and granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for
leave to file a SAC in part as to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claims
against Credit Control and LVNV only. (Doc. 57.) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) claims against US Bank “because he cannot cure the above
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deficiencies by alleging new facts.” The Court determined that Plaintiff’s claim of accord
and satisfaction was not a well-pleaded factual allegation. (Doc. 57 at 11.) “Plaintiff has
not asserted any facts demonstrating an agreement with U.S. Bank where something of
value was exchanged in resolution of their debt and a subsequent execution of that
agreement. Moreover, in seeming concession that he did not enter an accord and
satisfaction with U.S. Bank, Plaintiff also states that he entered an accord and satisfaction
with LVNV who was collecting on the U.S. Bank debt.” (Id.) In that same order, Plaintiff’s
negligence claim was also dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 19.) The Court specifically
did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend his FCRA claims against U.S. Bank. The Court also
did not grant Plaintiff leave to amend state claims against U.S. Bank, Credit Control and
LVNV. (Id. at 22.) The Court gave Plaintiff the opportunity to draft a new SAC in
accordance with its order. (Id. at 22-23.)
On September 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the September
26, 2025 order. (Doc. 58.) The new SAC was filed on October 27, 2025. (Doc. 59.) In
November 2025, Defendants LVNV and Credit Control filed motions to dismiss again for
failure to state a claim. (Doc. 60, 62.) In response to these motions, the Court denied the
motion for reconsideration and granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motions
in an order issued on June 24, 2026. (Doc. 65.)
Plaintiff argued in this first motion for reconsideration that the Court erred in dismissing
the FCRA claims against U.S. Bank and in finding that his accord and satisfaction
argument was insufficient. Plaintiff cited quotes from the FAC that did not exist. The
Court expressed its concern that this was the result of generative AI. (Doc 65 at 4.) In the
June 24, 2026 order, the Court further noted that it only granted Plaintiff leave to amend
the FDCPA claims against Credit Control and LVNV. The SAC included other claims
(negligence per se, FCRA, breach of contract) that were summarily stricken. (Doc. 65 at
5.)
The Court then considered the accord and satisfaction claim in detail based on the
allegations in the SAC and found the allegations lacking. (Doc. 65 at 9-10) (“This is
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Plaintiffs second attempt to amend their Complaint, and yet they have failed to cure these
deficiencies despite the Court’s prior Order clearly noting that their FAC does not allege
any facts in support of their accord and satisfaction defense.”) The Court then dismissed
the counts in the SAC that corresponded to the accord and satisfaction theory and
specifically did so without leave to amend. (Doc 65 at 10) (emphasis in original.)
The Court notes that it filed this order on June 24, 2026. Plaintiff’s current motion for
limited Rule 54(b) revision was filed only 7 days later on July 1, 2026. Now Plaintiff seeks
leave to file omitted facts in this proposed Third Amended Complaint (TAC). He also
seeks to clarify his case citations and avows he will not use AI-generated language in the
future. He seeks also to reintroduce the FDCPA claims previously dismissed due to
insufficient pleading against both U.S. Bank (who has already been dismissed as a party)
and against Defendants LVNV and Credit Control. Plaintiff seeks to revive his FCRA
claim against U.S. Bank, his FDCPA/accord claim against U.S. Bank, his FCRA claim
against LVNV Funding, his negligence per se claims, and his breach of settlement contract
claims against LVNV and Credit Control.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54 states that when “an action presents more
than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party
claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly
determines that there is no just reason for delay.” This rule is designed to deal with “the
problem of piecemeal appeals.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, Note, 1946 Amendment.
“Rule 54(b) permits district courts to authorize immediate appeal of dispositive rulings
on separate claims in a civil action raising multiple claims . . . [it] relaxes the former general
practice that, in multiple claims actions, all the claims had to be finally decided before an
appeal could be entertained from a final decision upon any of them.” Gelboim v. Bank of
Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 (2015) (emphasis in original). There is nothing in this rule
that provides a basis for a motion to amend pleadings or to ask for reconsideration of any
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prior decisions. Therefore, the Court will consider this motion as a second motion for
reconsideration.
Motions for reconsideration under Local Rule 7.2(g) require a party to “point out with
specificity the matters that the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the
Court, any new matters being brought to the Court’s attention for the first time and the
reasons why they were not presented earlier, and any specific modifications being sought
in the Court’s Order.” While courts have “discretion to reconsider and vacate a prior
order,” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 (D. Ariz.
2003), such “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,” id., and “are appropriate only
in rare circumstances.” 333 W. Thomas Med. Bldg. Enters. v. Soetantyo, 976 F. Supp.
1298, 1302 (D. Ariz. 1995). Accordingly, “[a] motion for reconsideration should not be
used to ask the court to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or
wrongly.” Id. (citation modified). Instead, these motions are only appropriate where the
Court: “(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence; (2) committed clear error or the
initial decision was manifestly unjust”; (3) is presented with “an intervening change in
controlling law”; or (4) is otherwise presented with “other, highly unusual, circumstances
warranting reconsideration.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff has filed a Complaint, a First Amended Complaint, two
Second Amended Complaints and now a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 1, Doc. 8, Doc.
52, Doc. 59, Doc. 69.) The Court is cognizant that Plaintiff is pro se, and that his pleadings
should be construed liberally, however, the Court is “under no obligation to become an
‘advocate’ for or to assist and guide” Plaintiff. Weathington v. Hunter, 316 Fed. Appx.
603, 604 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has had three opportunities to amend his complaint and
still has not been able to sufficiently plead his accord and satisfaction theory to the
satisfaction of the Court. Unless he meets the strict criteria for a motion for
reconsideration, it borders on the vexatious to allow Plaintiff to continue to amend his
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pleadings. The Court turns now to the requirements for a motion for reconsideration.
The only “newly discovered evidence” alleged here is information that Plaintiff
thought he had included in a prior iteration of his complaint but did not. (Doc. 68 at 2-3.)
This additional information is based on what Plaintiff did in January 2024. (Doc. 68 at 6.)
This is not new information; it is information that could have been submitted to the Court
in any one of his prior pleadings. Plaintiff claims that the addition of this information will
meet the requirements to properly plead accord and satisfaction. He does not claim that
the Court committed a manifest error. He does not claim that there is new, intervening law
the Court should consider. He simply asks the Court to “rethink what the court had already
thought through.” 333 W. Thomas Med. Bldg. Enters., 976 F. Supp. at 1302. This is
insufficient to support another motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, any amendment made based on the allegations in the TAC would still be
insufficient to prove accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff claims that he tendered a partial
payment to U.S. Bank and that the bank accepted this partial payment. (Doc. 69 at 4-5, ¶¶
13-21.) Yet Plaintiff also alleges that the bank rejected his position “that the dispute
required U.S. Bank to stop ordinary account treatment.” (Doc. 69 at 6, ¶ 22.) Therefore,
there was no assent or meeting of the minds, and thus no accord and satisfaction. Hill-
Shafer P’ship v. Chilson Family Trust, 799 P.2d 810, 814 (Ariz. 1990). All of the claims
in the TAC, with the exception of count 2 (FDCPA violation against Defendants Credit
Control and LVNV for not ceasing communication), rely on Plaintiff’s accord and
satisfaction theory. Therefore, all of those claims remain insufficient. There is no basis
for reconsideration here.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Limited Rule 54(B) Revision and
Leave to File Narrow Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 68).
Dated this 1st day of October, 2026.
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