Quiroz-Leyva #348153 v. Arizona, State of

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Dora Alicia Quiroz-Leyva,
Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Thornell, et. al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-00765-PHX-JJT (DMF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
I. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and
recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 7 at 6).1
In March 2025, Petitioner Dora Alicia Quiroz-Leyva (“Petitioner” and/or “Quiroz-
Leyva”), who is currently serving an imprisonment sentence imposed by an Arizona state
court, filed a pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a
Person in State Custody (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). The Petition is directed to Petitioner’s
convictions and sentences for felony drug charges in Pinal County Superior Court, case
number CR2019-02960 (Id.).
On March 18, 2025, the Court dismissed the Petition and gave Petitioner 30 days to
1 Citation to the record as “Doc.” indicates documents as displayed in the official Court
electronic document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No.
CV-25-00765-PHX-JJT (DMF).
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file an amended petition naming a proper respondent (Doc. 5). Thereafter, Petitioner filed
her Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in
State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Amended Petition”) (Doc. 6). In the Amended
Petition, Petitioner names Ryan Thornell as Respondent and the Arizona Attorney General
as an additional respondent (Id.). The Court screened the Amended Petition, dismissed
Grounds One and Four of the Amended Petition without prejudice, and required an answer
to Grounds Two and Three (Doc. 7).
On July 7, 2025, Respondents filed their Limited Answer to Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Limited Answer”) raising affirmative defenses to Grounds Two and
Three of the Amended Petition (Doc. 10). Petitioner did not file a reply in support of
Grounds Two and Three of the Amended Petition.
On September 4, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to file a supplemental answer
addressing the merits of Ground Three of the Amended Petition and ordered that Petitioner
may file a reply to the supplemental answer within 30 days from the date of service of the
supplemental answer (Doc. 11). On October 2, 2025, Respondents filed their Supplemental
Answer (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a timely Reply to the Supplemental Answer (Doc. 13).
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Amended Petition be
dismissed and denied with prejudice, that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate this
matter, and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
II. STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. Underlying Events and Trial Court Proceedings
On direct appeal by Petitioner after a jury trial, the Arizona Court of Appeals
summarized the facts underlying Petitioner Quiroz-Leyva’s convictions and sentences in
Pinal County Superior Court, case number CR2019-02960:
In April 2019, Detective Nardelli stopped Quiroz-Leyva because she was
driving in the “fast lane” ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit on
Interstate 10 near Eloy, Arizona, at approximately 11:00 p.m. Nardelli spoke
with Quiroz-Leyva and determined, among other things, that she had been
untruthful about driving her vehicle across the border into Mexico and back
into Arizona. Quiroz-Leyva consented to a search of her car, and a deputy
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discovered a taped package containing between 2,600 and 2,800 fentanyl
pills and a plastic baggie containing 2.58 grams of methamphetamine.
(Doc. 10-2 at 86); see also State v. Quiroz-Leyva, No. 2 CA-CR 2023-0059, 2023 WL
6636193, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2023).2
Petitioner Quiroz-Leyva was charged by indictment in Pinal County with possession
of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale, transportation of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale,
and possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) (Doc. 10-1 at 3). Petitioner was
represented by appointed counsel in the trial court proceedings (Id. at 5, 10; Doc. 10-2 at
145, 193, 385, 461, 472).
Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found in her vehicle, asserting Detective
Nardelli did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the initial stop of Petitioner (Doc.
10-2 at 87-88, 144-190). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion
to suppress, finding reasonable suspicion (Id. at 87-89; Doc. 10-1 at 144-190, 185).
After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Petitioner as charged in the indictment (Doc.
10-1 at 5-8). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment on each charge to be
served concurrently (Id. at 10-16).
B. Direct Appeal
Through appointed counsel, Petitioner timely appealed (Doc. 10-2 at 2-3).
Petitioner was represented by counsel throughout her direct appeal proceedings, including
petition for review to the state supreme court (Id. at 5, 66, 92).
On direct appeal, Petitioner raised two issues: (1) that the trial court erred by
denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress because Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner
violated Petitioner’s federal and state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
seizures; Petitioner argued that Detective Nardelli lacked reasonable suspicion that
Petitioner had violated a traffic law, specifically A.R.S. § 28-721(B) which was Detective
2 The state court’s stated facts are entitled to the presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam) (“In habeas
proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be
correct . . . .”); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 763 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
argument that the statement of facts in an Arizona Supreme Court opinion should not be
afforded the presumption of correctness).
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Nardelli’s stated traffic violation for the stop, and therefore lacked reasonable suspicion
for stopping Petitioner; and (2) that Petitioner’s convictions for both possession of and
transportation of fentanyl violated Petitioner’s federal and state constitutional rights to be
free from double jeopardy because the possession crime is a lesser included offense of the
transportation crime (Id. at 5-37).
The state responded (Id. at 38-64). The state argued that there was reasonable
suspicion for Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner and that the reviewing court could
consider all traffic laws, not just the stated traffic law violation by the officer (Id. at 50-
60). Regarding the second issue raised by Petitioner on appeal, the state conceded that
Petitioner’s conviction for possession of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale is a lesser-
included offense of Petitioner’s conviction for transportation of a narcotic drug (fentanyl)
for sale, and therefore, agreed that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence for possession of a
narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale should be vacated (Id. at 60-61).
Petitioner replied, arguing that neither A.R.S. § 28-721(B) nor any other traffic law
provided reasonable suspicion for Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner (Id. at 66-83).
On October 12, 2023, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s
convictions and sentences for transportation of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale and
possession of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine) and vacated her conviction and
sentence for possession of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale (Id. at 85-90). In doing so,
the court of appeals concluded that Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner was supported
by reasonable suspicion that Petitioner violated A.R.S. § 28-721(B) and agreed with the
parties that possession of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale is a lesser-included offense of
transportation of a narcotic drug (fentanyl) for sale (Doc. 10-2 at 85-90). Regarding
reasonable suspicion for the top, the court of appeals reasoned:
Here, the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Quiroz-Leyva had
violated § 28-721(B). Detective Nardelli observed Quiroz-Leyva traveling
below the seventy-five mile-per-hour posted speed limit in the far-left lane
at approximately 11:00 p.m. and determined— based on his experience with
this particular roadway under similar conditions—that she was traveling
below the normal speed of traffic and posed a danger to herself and others.
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See Evans, 235 Ariz. 314, ¶ 8 (“a police officer views the facts through the
lens of his police experience and expertise,” and inferences drawn therefrom
owed deference (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996))). While the statute makes no reference to the posted speed limit,
Detective Nardelli’s comparisons to the posted speed limit in the area were
not his exclusive basis for determining that Quiroz-Leyva’s speed was below
the normal speed of traffic. He articulated that her speed would have been
safe in the right-hand lane, but not in the left-hand lane, where an
approaching motorist would typically be traveling significantly faster than
Quiroz-Leyva and might struggle to perceive her slower speed. Although
Quiroz-Leyva was not near other motorists at the time of the stop, Nardelli
testified that he had been aware of the traffic situation on the interstate,
including the general presence of other traffic on that roadway at that time
and the danger posed by Quiroz-Leyva’s speed and position. Altogether, we
cannot say that Nardelli lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Quiroz-Leyva or
that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
(Doc. 10-2 at 89).
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, raising the
single issue of whether “the plain language and purpose of A.R.S. § 28- 721(B) allow[s] a
police officer to stop a motorist traveling below the speed limit in the left of a highway in
the absence of other traffic in the area” (Id. at 92-110). On March 5, 2024, the Arizona
Supreme Court denied the petition for review (Id. at 112). On April 11, 2024, the court of
appeals issued the mandate (Id. at 114-15).
C. Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) Proceedings
In April 2024, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR notice in the trial court (Id. at 118-22).
After review, appointed counsel for Petitioner filed a notice with the trial court that there
was no colorable PCR claim. (Id. at 124-37). After Petitioner did not file a subsequent pro
se PCR petition, the trial court dismissed the PCR notice and proceedings (Id. at 139, 141).
Respondents could not find any evidence that Petitioner petitioned for review of the
dismissal (Doc. 10 at 5).
III. THESE HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
In March 2025, the Court dismissed the Petition which had initiated this matter a
few weeks before (Docs. 1, 5); the Court also granted Petitioner leave to file an amended
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petition naming a proper respondent (Doc. 5). Thereafter, Petitioner filed her Amended
Petition in which Petitioner names Ryan Thornell as Respondent and the Arizona Attorney
General as an additional respondent (Doc. 6).
The Court screened the Amended Petition, dismissed Grounds One and Four of the
Amended Petition without prejudice, and required an answer to Grounds Two and Three
(Doc. 7). In doing so, the Court construed the Amended Petition claims raised as follows:
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that her Fourteenth Amendment right to
“defend against charges” was violated. In Ground Two, Petitioner contends
the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her because “without
another vehicle in the area, [she] could not have been traveling less than the
normal speed of traffic.” Petitioner asserts “[t]he statute clearly does not
prohibit a driver from going less than the speed limit in the left[] or middle
lane of the highway [in the] absence of other traffic.” In Ground Three,
Petitioner claims her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure was violated. In Ground Four, Petitioner states, “motion
to suppress and vacate convictions and sentences was denied.”
(Id. at 2). Regarding dismissal of Counts One and Four, the Court explained:
Ground One of the Petition is not cognizable because it is entirely vague and
conclusory. See id. In the Supporting Facts for Ground One, Petitioner states
only, “Two federal district courts and at least four other states accepted and
considered the plain language[] and purpose of the statute” and “those courts
suppressed evidence for a violation of constitutional rights.” Petitioner does
not identify the statute or allege facts to support that her constitutional rights
were violated. Ground Four also is not cognizable because it does not identify
a violation of federal law; instead, Petitioner appears only to challenge the
state court’s denial of her motion to suppress and her motion to vacate her
convictions. Section 2254(a), 28 U.S.C., requires the Court to “entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that [s]he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 845 (9th
Cir. 2017) (noting that a petition may not be cognizable where the petitioner
fails to allege a federal claim). The Court will therefore dismiss Grounds One
and Four of the Petition without prejudice.
(Doc. 7 at 3). Regarding the answer to Grounds Two and Three, Court allowed that:
Respondents may file an answer that (a) is limited to relevant affirmative
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defenses, including, but not limited to, statute of limitations, procedural bar,
or non-retroactivity; (b) raises affirmative defenses as to some claims and
discusses the merits of others; or (c) discusses the merits of all claims. The
failure to set forth an affirmative defense regarding a claim in an answer may
be treated as a waiver of the defense as to that claim, Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198, 209-11 (2006), but an answer that is limited to affirmative
defenses on a particular claim does not waive any argument on the merits as
to that claim. If the answer only raises affirmative defenses, only those
portions of the record relevant to those defenses need be attached to the
answer.
(Doc. 7 at 5).
On July 7, 2025, Respondents filed their Limited Answer in which Respondents
raise affirmative defenses to Grounds Two and Three of the Amended Petition (Doc. 10).
In their Limited Answer, Respondents request that this Court deny the Amended Petition
and dismiss it with prejudice because Grounds Two and Three do not present cognizable
federal claims and are procedurally defaulted without excuse (Id.).
Petitioner did not file a reply to the Limited Answer.
On September 4, 2025, the Court issued an order observing:
Upon preliminary review of the record in this matter, including the Amended
Petition (Doc. 6) as well as the Limited Answer and attachments (Doc. 10),
it is necessary for Respondents to respond to the merits of Petitioner’s
Ground Three (Doc. 6 at 8), which the Court’s Screening Order described as
follows: “In Ground Three, Petitioner claims her Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated” (Doc. 7 at 2). In
doing so, Respondents should address applicability of Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), which held that “where the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at
his trial.” 428 U.S. at 494-95
(Doc. 11 at 1). The Court therefore ordered Respondents to file a supplemental answer
addressing the merits of Ground Three of the Amended Petition and also ordered that
Petitioner may file a reply to the supplemental answer within 30 days from the date of
service of the supplemental answer (Id. at 2).
On October 2, 2025, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer in compliance
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with the Court’s Order (Doc. 12). In the Supplemental Answer, Respondents argue that
the Amended Petition’s Ground Three claim fails given Stone v. Powell and also fails on
the merits (Id.).
Petitioner filed a timely Reply to the Supplemental Answer (“Reply”), in which
Petitioner urges the Court to consider the merits of her Ground Three claim (Doc. 13).
IV. DISCUSSION
Upon review, the Court continues to construe Petitioner’s Ground Two and Three
claims as previously construed in the Court’s Screening Order of the Amended Petition:
In Ground Two, Petitioner contends the arresting officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop her because “without another vehicle in the area, [she] could
not have been traveling less than the normal speed of traffic.” Petitioner
asserts “[t]he statute clearly does not prohibit a driver from going less than
the speed limit in the left[] or middle lane of the highway [in the] absence of
other traffic.” In Ground Three, Petitioner claims her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
(Doc. 7 at 2).
A. Procedural Default.
Arizona prisoners who have not been sentenced to the death penalty or life
imprisonment properly exhaust state remedies by fairly presenting claims to the Arizona
Court of Appeals in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 843-45 (1999); Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). A
petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly
pursuing the claims through the state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate post-
conviction relief. See Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010; Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38
(9th Cir. 1994); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). Fair
presentment of claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals requires a description of “both the
operative facts and the federal legal theory on which [a] claim is based so that the state
courts [could] have a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon [the] constitutional claim.” Castillo, 399 F.3d at 999 (quoting Kelly v. Small,
315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (first alteration in original)).
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Here, the Court rejects Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner’s Ground Two and
Three claims are unexhausted because Petitioner “did not fairly present any of them to the
Arizona Court of Appeals, let alone the Arizona Supreme Court” (Doc. 10 at 12). The state
court record plainly reflects that Petitioner did fairly present her Ground Two and Three
claims in the Arizona Court of Appeals, where she was required to fairly present them.
B. Habeas Relief is Not Available on Petitioner’s Ground Two and Three
Claims
1. State Law Claims Are Not Cognizable in Habeas
Title 28 United States Code Section 2254(a) requires the Court to “entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that [s]he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Clayton v.
Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a petition may not be cognizable where
the petitioner fails to allege a federal claim). “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie
for errors of state law.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Swarthout v.
Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011); Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1994)
(barring federal habeas review for alleged errors in interpretation and application of state
law absent “obvious subterfuge”).
Respondents argue that “Grounds Two and Three of Quiroz-Leyva’s [Amended]
Petition do not appear to raise cognizable federal questions” (Doc. 10 at 6, 7).
Respondent’s assert that Petitioner “fails to identify any federal law to support her claims
for relief” (Id. at 7). To the extent that the Amended Petition Ground Two and Three claims
are construed as purely state law claims, they are not cognizable on habeas review for
failing to allege a federal claim. Nevertheless, the Court construes both Petitioner’s
Ground Two and Three claims as exhausted claims that her federal constitutional rights
were violated. Specifically, her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Petitioner’s Ground Two claim is that A.R.S. § 28-721(B) did not
provide reasonable suspicion for Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner, and therefore the
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stop violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner’s Ground Three claim is that no
traffic law provided reasonable suspicion for Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner, and
therefore the stop violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Petitioner is pro se (in other
words, self-representing) in these habeas proceedings and she is an incarcerated litigant.
Indeed, Petitioner lacks right to counsel in these habeas proceedings at this and earlier
stages of the proceedings.3 Reasonable inference from the record before the Court is that
Petitioner’s current Ground Two and Three claims are her attempt to raise the arguments
raised by her counsel on direct appeal wherein Petitioner’s counsel argued Petitioner’s right
to be free from unreasonable seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution regarding Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner.
In construing Petitioner’s Ground Two and Three claims as federal claims regarding
Petitioner’s right to be free from unreasonable seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution regarding Detective Nardelli’s stop of Petitioner, the
Court must evaluate the claims under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
2. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), Precludes Habeas Relief
In Stone v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court held that “where the State has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” 428 U.S. at
494 (footnotes omitted). Under this standard, a reviewing court must only consider
“whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do
so or even whether the claim was correctly decided.” Newman v. Wengler, 790 F.3d 876,
880 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1996)).
3 Generally, appointment of counsel in habeas actions is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
and the special rules related to habeas petitions. A court may appoint counsel if necessary
for effective discovery or if an evidentiary hearing is held. 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rules 6 and
8. Beyond those enumerated circumstances, a court may exercise its discretion to appoint
counsel if it “determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2).
However, appointment of counsel is only mandatory where “the circumstances of a
particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process
violations.” Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Kreiling v. Field,
431 F.2d 638, 640 (9th Cir. 1970); Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1965));
Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993).
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The burden is on a petitioner to demonstrate that “the state court did not afford him an
adequate hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim . . . .” Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325,
1327 (9th Cir. 1993). In fact, Stone does not mandate that the state court must have
conducted an evidentiary hearing unless one is necessary for a full and fair hearing on the
Fourth Amendment claim. See Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding
that Stone was satisfied where the trial court rejected the claims without holding an
evidentiary hearing because it concluded the defendant’s version of the facts did not differ
from the officers, or that the allegations were too conclusory).
Arizona allows for the filing of pretrial suppression motions and the denial of a
motion may be appealed. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.1, 16.2; A.R.S. § 13-4031; State v. Nissley,
241 Ariz. 327, 330, 387 P.3d 1256, 1259 (2017). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a
defendant may fully litigate a suppression claim in the system provided by Arizona. See
Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that petitioner filed a
pre-trial motion to suppress, after an evidentiary hearing the court made factual findings
and limited the admissible evidence, and that decision was reviewed on appeal).
On habeas review, this Court looks only at whether the opportunity for a full hearing
was provided but does not examine whether the state court’s decision was legally correct.
See Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 899 (“The relevant inquiry is whether petitioner had the
opportunity to litigate his claim, not whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim
was correctly decided.”). In other words, inquiry into the quality of the state courts’ rulings
is not warranted under Stone v. Powell if the state’s procedures for deciding the question
were fair. See Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452, 455 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976); Abell v.
Raines, 640 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that federal court may not re-litigate
a Fourth Amendment claim even if it disagrees with the state court’s resolution); Caldwell
v. Cupp, 781 F.2d 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, Petitioner’s arguments in support of
suppression in the Amended Petition and Reply are not appropriately before this Court on
habeas review.
As reflected in the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion on direct appeal, Petitioner
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moved for, presented evidence regarding, and argued multiple bases to suppress in the
superior court (Doc. 10-2 at 87-89; 144-190). Petitioner appealed the superior court’s
denials of Petitioner’s suppression arguments, and the court of appeals denied Petitioner’s
arguments for suppression on the merits after careful analysis (Id. at 87-89). Review of
the state court proceedings unequivocally demonstrates that Petitioner had opportunity to
fully and fairly litigate Fourth Amendment claims in the state courts, and that she in fact
did so. See Moormann, 426 F.3d at 1053. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment claim of lack
of reasonable suspicion and associated arguments which were extensively litigated and
considered in the state courts include Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims as construed
in Grounds Two and Three of the Amended Petition. Thus, all Petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment claims in these proceedings are barred by Stone v. Powell.
Accordingly, pursuant to Stone v. Powell, all remaining claims of the Amended
Petition should be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that the Amended Petition be
dismissed and denied with prejudice and that this matter be terminated.
Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the District Judge’s
judgment, the undersigned recommends that a certificate of appealability be denied
because dismissal of Petitioner’s claims as set forth above is justified by a plain procedural
bar and reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable, because
Petitioner has not “made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right[,]”
and because jurists of reason would not find the Court’s rejection on constitutional grounds
of Petitioner’s claims to be “debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition (Doc. 6) be
dismissed and denied with prejudice and that the Clerk of Court be directed to terminate
this matter.
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IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be denied.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which
to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3)
provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and
Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated this 27th day of October, 2025.
Case 2:25-cv-00765-JJT Document 14 Filed 10/27/25 Page 13 of 13