Godoy v. Gunther

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Paul Godoy,
Petitioner,
v.
Jason Gunther,
Respondent.
No. CV- 25-01203-PHX-JJT (ESW)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On July 29, 2022, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California to a 72-month term of imprisonment for felon in
possession of a firearm and distribution of methamphetamine and aiding/abetting in
violation of federal law. (Doc. 11-2 at 12.) On August 26, 2022, Petitioner was
committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. (Id.) 	Petitioner’s projected
release date is February 27, 2027. (Id.)
Pending before the Court are Petitioner’s “Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241” (the “Petition”) (Doc. 1) and Respondent’s Return and Answer
(Doc. 11) that requests dismissal of this matter. For the reasons explained herein, the
undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice.
I. DISCUSSION
The Petition concerns the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), which provides a means
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for federal inmates to earn time credits to be applied toward their sentences.1 	In its
August 21, 2025 Screening Order (Doc. 5), the Court dismissed Ground One of the
Petition and required Respondent to answer Ground Two. 	Ground Two asserts that
Petitioner is entitled to receive earned time credits from the date his sentence was
imposed. (Doc. 1 at 8.)
On September 15, 2025, Respondent filed its Return and Answer (Doc. 11).
Respondent recounts that Petitioner’s projected release date is February 27, 2027. As of
July 25, 2025, Petitioner has earned 340 total days of FSA time credits. (Doc. 11-2 at 7,
¶ 24.) Respondent asserts that the Court should dismiss the Petition as unripe because
Petitioner’s “remaining term of imprisonment exceeds his [earned time credits]” and
Petitioner therefore “is not eligible to have those [earned time credits] applied to his
sentence computation[.]” (Doc. 11 at 17.) Petitioner did not file a Reply and the time to
do so has passed.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
to “actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” 	Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 477 (1990). Two components of the Article III case-or-controversy requirement are
the “closely related” concepts of standing and ripeness. 	Bova v. City of Medford, 564
F.3d 1093, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Colwell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
558 F.3d 1112, 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009)).
To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is “concrete
and particularized,” that can be fairly traced to the defendant’s action, and that can be
redressed by a favorable decision of the court. 	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992). 	“While standing is primarily concerned with who is a proper party
1 	The 	FSA 	created 	an 	evidence-based 	recidivism 	reduction 	program 	that
incentivizes inmates to participate in and complete programs and productive activities by
awarding them certain time credits. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). To apply these earned time
credits, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was required to develop a risk and needs
assessment system within 210 days after enactment of the FSA. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). On
January 19, 2022, the BOP implemented its final agency rules regarding the earning and
awarding of time credits under the FSA. 	See 87 Fed. Reg. 2,705-01, 2022 WL 159155
(codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 523.40-523.44).
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to litigate a particular matter, ripeness addresses when litigation may occur.” 	Lee v.
Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). 	“[I]n many cases,
ripeness coincides squarely with standing’s injury in fact prong.” 	Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 	“[B]ecause the
focus 	of 	[the] 	ripeness 	inquiry 	is 	primarily 	temporal 	in 	scope, 	ripeness 	can 	be
characterized as standing on a timeline.” Id.
For example, “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v.
United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “If the contingent
events do not occur, the plaintiff likely will not have suffered an injury that is concrete
and particularized enough to establish the first element of standing.” 	Bova, 564 F.3d at
1096 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 	The ripeness doctrine is designed “to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects
felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” 	Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807- 08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1967)).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), earned time credits can be applied toward
prerelease custody or supervised release only when accumulated credits are equal to the
remainder of the prison term. 	See also Tumbaco v. Birkholz, No. 2:23-CV-10663-FMO-
AJR, 2024 WL 4744025, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (explaining that where “a
prisoner alleges they were denied time credits under the FSA, the ripeness requirement is
not met until favorable disposition of their claim would result in immediate release”).
Petitioner has a projected release date of February 27, 2027, approximately 480 days
from the date of this Report and Recommendation. 	(Doc. 11-2 at 12.) Petitioner’s
accrued earned time credits of approximately 340 days are not equal to the remainder of
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his prison term.2 	(Doc. 11-2 at 7, ¶ 24.) Respondent therefore correctly asserts that
Petitioner is yet not eligible for application of the earned time credits and the Petition is
not ripe. (Doc. 11 at 15-16.) Petitioner has failed to establish an “immediate injury” that
would be redressed by the relief that he seeks. See Ford v. Chapman, 371 F. App’x 513,
514 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that regardless of whether § 2241 petitioner’s release date
was computed on the basis of the BOP’s interpretation of the good time credit statute or
the petitioner’s interpretation, the petitioner’s release was not imminent and the petitioner
therefore “failed to establish an ‘immediate injury’ that would be redressed by the relief
that she seeks”); Markley v. James, No. 21-3067-JWL, 2021 WL 1736859, at *4 (D. Kan.
May 3, 2021) (denying § 2241 petition where the petitioner failed to show current
eligibility for the application of credits under the FSA); Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d
310, 312 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction over § 2241
petitioner’s claim challenging the BOP’s calculation of good time credits where the
petitioner did not claim that he was eligible for immediate release, describing the claim as
“temporally distant and speculative nature” and explaining that the claim was not ripe
because the prisoner had not established that he would sustain immediate injury that
could be redressed by the relief requested); Rubinov v. Pliler, No. 21-CV-4397 (LJL),
2021 WL 5567826, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2021) (finding that § 2241 petitioner’s
claim asserting applicability of FSA time credits was ripe as the petitioner was asserting
that he “is currently being imprisoned when in fact he should not be,” but noting that “if a
petitioner were seeking to having time credits applied so that his projected release date
would be moved up to another temporally distant date, that would be another matter”).
It is recommended that the Court grant Respondent’s request (Doc. 11 at 1) to
dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) without prejudice.
2 To reiterate, the 340-day calculation is as of July 25, 2025. 	(Doc. 11-2 at 7, ¶
24.) 	Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner has accrued additional earned time credits
since that date (ten days of earned time credits per thirty days served), Petitioner is still
well below the statutory threshold needed for release. 	28 C.F.R § 523.42(c)(1) (“For
every thirty-day period that an eligible inmate has successfully participated in EBRR
Programs or PAs recommended based on the inmate’s risk and needs assessment, that
inmate will earn ten days of FSA Time Credits.”).
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II. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court grant Respondent’s request (Doc. 11 at
1) to dismiss the Petition (Doc. 1) without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and
leave to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED because Petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 	Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)
should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 	The parties shall have
fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to
file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.
6, 72. 	Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the
objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
District Court without further review. 	See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 	Failure to file timely objections to any factual determinations of
the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of
the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007).
Dated November 4, 2025.
Honorable Eileen S. Willett
United States Magistrate Judge
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