Hodge v. NAPA Genuine Auto Parts

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Najib A Hodge,
Plaintiff,
v.
NAPA Genuine Auto Parts, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-02242-PHX-JAT
ORDER
There are two Defendants in this case: NAPA Genuine Auto Parts (“NAPA”) and
DoorDash, Inc. Default has been entered against NAPA for failing to answer or otherwise
defend. (Doc. 26). On January 22, 2026, DoorDash, Inc. moved to compel arbitration and
stay this case. (Doc. 29).
Following the entry of default against NAPA, Plaintiff moved for entry of default
judgment. (Doc. 28). Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $16,383,350.00. (Id.) For
this Court to enter default judgment, it must weigh the factors in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d
1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s motion fails to address the Eitel factors.
Additionally, even if the Eitel factors favor the entry of default, this case is
complicated by the fact that there is another, non-defaulted Defendant who is defending.
First, this Court should not enter default if another defendant is defending the same claims.
In re First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 532-33 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not
address why this prohibition on mid-case default does not apply in this case.
Next, this Court cannot enter a partial judgment (a judgment that addresses less than
Case 2:26-cv-03101-JAT Document 28 Filed 01/23/26 Page 1 of 2

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all claims against all defendants) unless the Court certifies there is “no just reason for
delay.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Generally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that a district court should not certify there is no just reason for delay under Rule 54(b) and
enter a partial judgment when the whole case arises from the same set of facts. See Gomez
v. EOS CCA, CV 18-2740-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. Aug. 12, 2020) (discussing at length when
Rule 54(b) certification is justified). Plaintiff does not address why the entry of a partial
judgment in this case is appropriate.
As a result, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment against NAPA will be
denied, without prejudice to refiling the motion and addressing all of the foregoing. The
Court will not put any deadline on refiling because Plaintiff may determine that the
foregoing cases require him to wait until the claims against DoorDash, Inc. are resolved
before moving for default judgment against NAPA. If Plaintiff decides to refile his motion
before the claims against DoorDash, Inc. are resolved, DoorDash, Inc. may respond
to/oppose the entry of default judgment if DoorDash, Inc. wishes to argue that its litigation
position would be adversely impacted by the entry of default judgment against NAPA.
Thus,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 28) is denied
without prejudice. 1
Dated this 22nd day of January, 2026.
1 In future filings, both parties must acknowledge that this is not a single Defendant case.
Specifically, while the Court will not take up the substance of DoorDash’s pending motion
in this Order, the Court notes that DoorDash seeks the relief of “an order compelling
Plaintiff Najib Hodge [] to submit his claims in the above-captioned matter to mandatory
and binding arbitration, and staying this action pending arbitration.” (Doc. 29 at 1)
(emphasis added). Upon the Court’s quick review of DoorDash’s motion, DoorDash seems
to fail to acknowledge there is another Defendant in this case and how that Defendant’s
presence impacts the appropriate remedies.
Case 2:26-cv-03101-JAT Document 28 Filed 01/23/26 Page 2 of 2