USA v. Likens

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Cody Christian Likens,
Defendant.
No. CR-25-01354-001-TUC-AMM
(MSA)
ORDER
On December 19, 2025, Magistrate Judge Maria S. Aguilera issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court deny self-represented Defendant
Cody Christian Likens’ Motion to Suppress.1 (Doc. 66.) Likens filed objections to the
R&R, and the Government filed a response.2 (Docs. 72, 78.) For the reasons discussed
below, the Court will overrule Likens’ objections and adopt the R&R.
I. Background
On October 3, 2024, Likens was stopped for driving on a suspended license. (Doc.
45 at 14, 17–18.) Specifically, that evening around 7:00 p.m., Officer Kristofer Brandstrom
of the Oro Valley Police Department (“OVPD”) received a broadcast from OVPD dispatch
1 Likens was represented by counsel when he filed his motion on August 3, 2025. However,
following a November 20, 2025 Faretta Hearing, Likens’ Motion for Self-Representation
was granted. (Doc. 52.) Attorney Saul Huerta has been appointed as his advisory/standby
counsel. (Id.)
2 In Likens’ objections to the R&R, he requests the Court permit him to file supplemental
objections once he receives full disclosure from the Government. (Doc. 72 at 2.) At the
status conference on January 20, 2026, the Court granted in part his request. (Doc. 84.)
Likens filed supplemental objections to the R&R, and the Government filed a response.
(Docs. 91–92.)
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that an anonymous 911 caller reported Likens was driving a vehicle with a suspended
license. (Id. at 5–6.) Officer Brandstrom testified that the dispatchers independently
verified Likens’ license was in fact suspended. (Id. at 7, 50.)
Around 9:30 p.m. that evening, a second dispatch broadcast alerted that Likens was
driving on a suspended license. (Id. at 7.) The second broadcast was an “Attempt to Locate”
(“ATL”) that included Likens’ name, a description of the vehicle he was driving (a
“homemade truck with a flatbed”), and his last seen location. (Id. at 7–8.) Officer
Brandstrom testified that although the second broadcast did not show dispatchers
independently verified Likens’ suspended license as they had done with the first broadcast,
it is his understanding that it would not have been possible for Likens to have his license
reinstated in the short, after-business-hours timeframe from 7:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. (Id. at
15–16.) In any event, shortly after the second broadcast, Officer Brandstrom saw a vehicle
matching the description and near the last seen location. (Id. at 11–12.) Officer Brandstrom
positively identified Likens as the driver through the truck’s open driver’s side window
because Officer Brandstrom had previously cited Likens for driving with a suspended
license in April 2024. (Id. at 13, 30–31.) After identifying Likens, Officer Brandstrom then
activated his emergency equipment and his body-worn camera and stopped Likens’ vehicle
for driving on a suspended license at approximately 9:49 p.m. (Id. at 14–17.)
Around 10:00 p.m., after confirming Likens’ driver’s license was suspended,
Officer Brandstrom placed Likens under arrest for driving on a suspended license. (Id. at
17–18, 59.) At 10:03 p.m., Officer Brandstrom directed that the vehicle be towed because
it is OVPD “practice and policy” to tow vehicles after arrests or if the vehicle presents a
traffic hazard. (Id. at 18–19, 59.) Officer Brandstrom testified that because the vehicle was
“on the side of Oracle Road at an uphill in a dark lit area” it would not have been safe to
leave the vehicle there. (Id. at 19.) Other officers arrived at the scene, OVPD Officer
Fletcher called the tow truck, and another officer conducted a canine sniff of the vehicle.
(Id. at 19–20.) According to Officer Brandstrom’s testimony, the officers then conducted
an inventory search consistent with OVPD policy for vehicles that are stored or impounded.
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(Id. at 28.) Officer Brandstrom further testified that he is familiar with the OVPD policy
504.5 on inventory searches that requires officers to conduct a “fair accounting and a fair
inventory of all items currently present in the vehicle at the time,” including in closed or
locked containers. (Id. at 25–27.) During the inventory search, officers opened a secured
container in the bed of the truck and found an unregistered rifle and unregistered silencer
without a serial number. (Id. at 20–21; Doc. 3.) Thereafter, Likens was indicted on two
counts of possession of unregistered firearms and one count possession of a firearm without
a serial number in violation of 28 U.S.C §§ 5845(a), 5861(d), (i), 5871. (Doc. 3.)
On August 13, 2025, Likens moved to suppress the weapons asserting his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when the officer stopped his vehicle without reasonable
suspicion and conducted an inventory search based on pretext. (Doc. 26.) On October 27,
2025, the Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on Likens’ motion. (Doc. 39.) After
hearing evidence in the matter, the Magistrate Judge issued her R&R recommending that
Likens’ Motion to Suppress be denied. (Doc. 66.)
II. Legal Standard
A district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a
magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district
judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.”).
Any objection must be “specific” to the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 59(b)(2). Failure to object to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate
judge “waives a party’s right to review.” Id.
III. Discussion
Likens argues the R&R should not be adopted because its analysis “depends on
disputed chronology and dispatch-knowledge findings.” (Doc. 72 at 1.) In so arguing,
Likens seeks the Court either grant his motion or decline to adopt the R&R and remand
“for a limited evidentiary hearing focused on: (a) dispatch/PSAP/CAD audit and event-
history data, (b) complete 911 and radio audio for Call 1 and Call 2, (c) native logs and
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metadata necessary to resolve stop inception and claimed ‘verification,’ and (d)
tow/impound/inventory chronology and policy compliance . . . .” (Id. at 2.) For the reasons
discussed herein, Likens’ objections are overruled, and his request for remand is denied.
a. Officer Brandstrom had reasonable suspicion to stop Likens’ vehicle.
Likens objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Officer Brandstrom had
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. (See Doc. 72 at 4–6; Doc. 91 at 2–5.) He argues
the evidence does not support a finding that dispatch independently verified his suspended
driver’s license before the stop. (Doc. 72 at 4; Doc. 91 at 3.) Specifically, Likens asserts
the following evidence does not show the dispatcher verified his suspended license before
the stop: the “CAD notes,” radio log, call transcript, database query during the first call
window, and radio traffic. (Doc. 91 at 3.) He argues that instead the time stamps show the
verification did not occur until after the seizure. (Doc. 72 at 4.) Likens further emphasizes
that the “CAD” and radio records do not reflect Officer Brandstrom was involved in the
first call, and he argues that therefore Officer Brandstrom did not act on “collective
knowledge.” (Doc. 91 at 3.) In this vein, Likens argues Officer Brandstrom’s time stamped
activity show the R&R relied on an “[o]bjectively [i]mpossible” timeline, asserting he first
marked “enroute” at 21:49:06, logged the traffic stop at 21:49:09, made his “first MDC
query” at 21:49:38–39, and later made his first radio transmission. (Doc. 91 at 4.) He
concludes these are not administrative errors but errors that are dispositive. (Doc. 72 at 6.)
He further asserts that absent independent verification, the anonymous tip does not support
reasonable suspicion. (Doc. 72 at 5; Doc. 91 at 3.)
Law enforcement officers may conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle or person
if they are aware of facts leading to a “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot.
See United States v. Arvizo, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “[R]easonable suspicion exists when
an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when considered with objective and
reasonable inferences, form a basis for particularized suspicion.” United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (2000) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981)). “The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.”
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United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013).
Upon review, the Court finds Officer Brandstrom had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop of Likens’ vehicle. The first broadcast reported that Likens was seen
driving with a suspended license, and Officer Brandstrom testified that dispatch reported
that it had in fact confirmed Likens’ license was suspended. (Doc. 45 at 7, 16, 50.) The
second broadcast, less than three hours later, reported Likens was driving with a suspended
license, and gave his name, a description of the vehicle he was driving, and his last seen
location. (Id. at 7–8.) Officer Brandstrom received both broadcasts, and he saw a truck
matching the description near the last seen location less than thirty minutes after the second
broadcast. (Id. at 11–12.) After driving next to the truck, Officer Brandstrom identified
Likens through the open driver’s side window, as he had previously cited him for driving
with a suspended license. (Id. at 13, 30–31.) Before activating his emergency lights, Officer
Brandstrom ran a records check on Likens which displayed Likens’ photo. (Id. at 14–15,
49–50.) Officer Brandstrom then pulled Likens over, confirmed his license was suspended,
and placed him under arrest for driving on a suspended license. (Id. at 17–18.)
Here, the Court “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances,’” which includes
dispatch’s first broadcast confirming Likens’ suspended license, the second broadcast
describing the truck and the relevant location, Officer Brandstrom identifying Likens’ in
the truck, and the records check before the stop. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078 (quoting
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273); see also United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970 (9th Cir.
2013) (“It is not our province to nitpick the factors in isolation but instead to view them in
the totality of the circumstances.”). Importantly, Officer Brandstrom could reasonably rely
on the OVPD dispatcher’s first broadcast that Likens’ driver’s license was suspended.3 See
3 Likens also objects that Officer Brandstrom incorrectly testified this broadcast was coded
as an ATL, when the records show it was coded as “Suspicious Activity.” (Doc. 91 at 2.)
Defendant argues characterizing the call as an ATL “materially inflates its legal
significance by implying verified illegality and formal dissemination.” (Id.) The R&R
addressed this argument and found that a discrepancy in how the call was logged is an
administrative error that is “not the type of conflict or contradiction that warrants rejection
of [Officer Brandstrom’s] testimony.” (Doc. 66 at 4.) The Court agrees with the R&R and
finds the coding of the first broadcast does not change the legal analysis. As such, Likens’
objection is overruled.
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United States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
dispatcher's knowledge is properly considered as part of our analysis of reasonable
suspicion.”). Based on that broadcast and the totality of the circumstances, Officer
Brandstrom was reasonable to suspect Likens was committing a crime as Arizona law
prohibits a person from driving on a public highway while that person’s driver’s license is
suspended. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-3473(A).
Moreover, even if the dispatcher had been mistaken as to the status of Likens’
driver’s license, Officer Brandstrom’s reasonable and good faith belief of that fact could
still support reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1096 n.1
(9th Cir. 2000) (“A factual belief that is mistaken, but held reasonably and in good faith,
can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.” (citing United States v. Wallace, 213
F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000))); United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding the officers’ mistake of fact that the rental car had been missing for more
than forty-eight hours did “not defeat the officers’ reasonable suspicion”).
Finally, because the Court finds that Officer Brandstrom could have reasonably and
in good faith relied on the dispatcher’s first broadcast indicating a license check had been
conducted, Likens’ request to re-open the evidentiary hearing to address, in significant part,
dispatch “audit and event-history data,” the 911 calls, and “native logs and metadata” to
confirm the dispatcher’s “verification” is both unnecessary and irrelevant.4 See Wallace,
213 F.3d at 1220.
As such, the Court finds the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Likens’ objections are overruled, and his request for remand for a “limited evidentiary
hearing” is denied.
4 Likens also seeks to re-open the evidentiary hearing to “focus on”
“tow/impound/inventory chronology and policy compliance . . . .” (Doc. 72 at 2.) Likens
provides no new basis as to why this additional information is relevant to whether
reasonable suspicion existed to stop his vehicle or to his claim that the inventory search of
his vehicle was a “pretext.” At best, he simply renews his argument that an alternative to
impoundment was available. (Id. at 7.) This Court concurs, however, with the Magistrate
Judge that because the officers had a proper community caretaking purpose in towing the
truck, they were not required to exercise their discretion in the way most favorable to
Likens. (Doc. 66 at 5–6.)
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b. Officer Brandstrom’s decisions to tow the vehicle and conduct an inventory
search were valid.
Once a stop has been made, an inventory search is valid if it is conducted “in
conformance with the standardized procedures of the local police department and in
furtherance of a community caretaking purpose, such as promoting public safety or the
efficient flow of traffic.” United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citing United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012)).
Defendant objects to the vehicle’s impoundment and inventory search as
unreasonable because a “less obtrusive caretaking option was immediately available.”
(Doc. 72 at 7.) Here, the truck was parked on an uphill slope in a dark area. (Doc. 45 at
19.) Officer Brandstrom reasonably determined the vehicle presented a traffic hazard, and,
according to the community caretaking doctrine, he followed OVPD policy in conducting
the inventory search before the vehicle was towed. See United States v. Caseres, 533 F.3d
1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008). As explained in the R&R, the OVPD officers were not required
to address the traffic hazard posed by the vehicle in the manner most favorable to Likens.
(Doc. 66 at 6.)
Likens also objects that the stop was unlawfully prolonged. (Doc. 72 at 6.) Likens
was arrested about ten minutes after the stop was initiated. (See Doc. 45 at 12, 59.) The
Court finds no factual basis to support a finding that the traffic stop was unlawfully
prolonged.
As such, Likens’ objections are overruled.5
IV. Conclusion
The Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 66), Defendant’s
objections (Doc. 72), the Government’s response (Doc. 78), Defendant’s supplemental
5 Likens also objects to the indictment’s marking him as a “fugitive.” (Doc. 72 at 8.)
However, as the indictment issued long after the stop and search at issue here, any objection
relating to his “fugitive” status is irrelevant and thus overruled. Finally, Likens appears to
broadly object that the evidence obtained was fruit of the poisonous tree. (Id.) While this
objection is not specific, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2), the Court finds
nonetheless that because the stop and inventory search were valid, the weapons discovered
in the search were not tainted. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983) (a valid
inventory search is “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement”).
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objections (Doc. 91), the Government’s response (Doc. 92), Defendant’s motion (Doc. 26),
the parties’ briefs (Docs. 29, 32, 44, 54–55), and the record. Upon a de novo review of the
objected to portions of the R&R, and clear error review of the unopposed portions, the
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s findings and adopts the R&R.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED. (Docs. 72, 91.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is
ADOPTED. (Doc. 66.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
(Doc. 26.)
Dated this 12th day of February, 2026.
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