Edmonds v. Hernandez

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FRESNO DIVISION
In re
ANITA MARIE FERGUSON,
Debtor.
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Case No. 	24-13407-B-7
IRMA EDMONDS, Chapter 7
Trustee,
Plaintiff,
v.
MANUEL COCHRAN HERNANDEZ,
Defendant.
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Adv. Proc. No. 25-01006-B
Docket Control #FW-2
MEMORANDUM RULING ON MOTION TO RESET HEARING
ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
—————————————————————————————
Gabriel J. Waddell, Fear Waddell, P.C., for Irma Edmonds, Chapter
7 Trustee, Movant/Plaintiff.
No Appearance for Defendant Manuel Cochran Hernandez.
—————————————————————————————
RENÉ LASTRETO II, Bankruptcy Judge
Introduction
In a bankruptcy case referred to a bankruptcy court by a
district court, any party to the case or proceeding may, by
motion and for cause shown, ask the district court to withdraw
the reference as to the case or proceeding in whole or in part.
28 U.S.C. § 157(d). 	A party may also request that the bankruptcy
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court stay the proceeding pending the district court’s decision
on the motion to withdraw the reference. 	Fed. R. Bankr. P.
5011(c). 	A bankruptcy court has discretion whether to grant the
stay. Id.
Before the court is a procedural motion which raises the
question whether such a stay granted by this court in the above-
styled adversary proceeding should be modified to permit the
court’s scheduling and determination of a dispositive motion in
this adversary proceeding (“the Motion to Reset” or “the
Motion”). 	After review of the Motion and the basis for issuing
the stay, the Motion to Reset will be denied without prejudice.
Pertinent Facts
Chapter 7 Trustee, Irma Edmonds (“Trustee”) filed this
adversary proceeding against defendant Manuel Cochran Hernandez
(“Defendant”) on February 4, 2025 (Doc. #1). The Defendant
answered the complaint but did not consent to this court’s
jurisdiction. (Doc. #15). 	The Debtor in the underlying Chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding is Anita Marie Ferguson (“Debtor” or
“Ferguson”).
The court issued a scheduling order in due course. (Doc.
#18). 	Among other deadlines set in the order, dispositive
motions were to be heard no later than January 28, 2026. Except
for a narrow change to the discovery cutoff, the parties
proceeded in accord with the scheduling order.
In her complaint, Trustee alleges that the Debtor granted
Defendant a joint tenancy interest with her in a residential
property in Clovis, California more than two years before the
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bankruptcy case was filed. (Doc. #1). 	Trustee alleges Defendant
paid no consideration for the transfer. 	Trustee also alleges the
transfer was both constructively and actually fraudulent under
California State Law – Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439.05 and 3439.04
respectively. 	Id. 	Trustee seeks that the property or its value
be transferred to the estate. 	Id.
Defendant answered by denying the allegations of fraudulent
transfer. Doc. #15. 	Defendant also raised two affirmative
defenses. 	First, Defendant alleged he was a transferee in good
faith and for reasonably equivalent value. 	The alleged value
furnished was supplies, equipment, labor, and the materials to
repair damages to the property allegedly at the hands of Debtor’s
sister. Id. 	Second, Defendant alleged failure to allege facts
with sufficient particularity upon which relief could be granted.
Id. 	Notably, Defendant demanded a jury trial and did not consent
to the Bankruptcy Court entering a final judgment. Id. 	Also,
Defendant did not file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case.1
On December 17, 2025, Trustee filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (“the Summary Judgment Motion”). Docs. ##24-32.
Eleven days later, Defendant filed a Motion for Withdrawal
of the Reference (“the Withdrawal Motion”) of this adversary
proceeding pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). Docs. ##34-39.
Contemporaneously, Defendant filed a Motion to Stay the Adversary
Proceeding (“the Motion for Stay”) pending the District Court’s
determination on the motion to withdraw the reference. 	Docs.
##43-44. 	Plaintiff opposed the Motion for Stay. Docs. ##45-46.
1 Only one claim for $66,419.00 was filed by Carolyn Poyorena based on an
alleged judgment. 	The claim filing deadline was June 23, 2025. 	See Docket
generally.
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After considering the Motion for Stay and opposition, the
court issued an order staying the proceedings on December 31,
2025. Doc. #48.
This Motion to Reset followed fourteen days later. Docs.
##51-54.
Arguments Presented by the Parties
Trustee makes three arguments supporting the Motion. 	First,
Trustee contends she was not given reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard in opposition to the stay resulting in a
denial of due process. 	Second, judicial economy and efficiency
will be achieved if the court decides the Summary Judgment Motion
or issues a report and recommendation to the District Court. 	She
goes on to assert that a ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion
will determine whether a trial is even necessary and that
consideration of withdrawal of the reference is premature.
Third, “mandatory” withdrawal of the reference under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(d) is not applicable to this dispute notwithstanding
Defendant’s constitutional arguments.2
Defendant has not timely opposed this motion. 	Rather,
Defendant, through counsel, contends that, because the stay order
is already in effect, he is under a legal disability to oppose
the motion because the motion violates the stay. 	Instead,
Defendant submitted two letters to the court and its clerk urging
///
2 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel advised the court that Defendant has
withdrawn “mandatory withdrawal” of the reference as a basis for Defendant’s
Motion and that the Withdrawal Motion is proceeding on “discretionary
withdrawal” grounds only.
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the motion and supporting papers be stricken by either the court
or the clerk as violating the stay order.
In the absence of a formal opposition, Plaintiff nonetheless
filed a reply. Doc. #59. 	She urges that the stay order is
interlocutory and subject to revision for good cause. 	She also
reiterates her contention that it is more efficient to have the
Bankruptcy Court rule on the Summary Judgment Motion
notwithstanding the pending Withdrawal Motion. Id.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) since this
civil proceeding arises both under Title 11 and in a case under
Title 11. 	While this matter is statutorily “core” under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) and the district court has referred this
matter to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the pending
Withdrawal Motion may affect this court’s jurisdiction. 	At
present, this court has jurisdiction to reconsider its own
orders. 	See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
ANALYSIS
I
The stay order is interlocutory and can be
reconsidered by this court
A court’s grant or denial of a stay pending determination of
a motion for withdrawal of reference as authorized by Bankruptcy
Rule 5011(c) is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor is the
withdrawal decision itself. In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 180, 185 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that it would be anomalous to allow an
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interlocutory appeal from a stay decision while barring an appeal
from a decision on the Motion to Withdraw Reference.) 	See also
Abney v. Kissel Co. (In re Kissel Co.), 105 F.3d 1324, 1325, (9th
Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal of district court’s denial of
motion to withdraw the reference and adopting the reasoning of
Lieb); Security Farms v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 124
F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997) (“An order to withdraw the
reference is interlocutory. 	However, the rule in this Circuit is
that once a final judgment is entered, an appeal from an order
that would otherwise be interlocutory is then appealable.”).
As long as a district court has jurisdiction over a case, it
possesses the inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind,
or modify an interlocutory order for cause if the court deems
that cause to be sufficient. 	City of L.A. Harbor Div. v. Santa
Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).3 	As long as
there is sufficient cause, this court can modify, reconsider or
rescind the stay order.
Reference to Fed. R. Bankr. P. §§ 9023 and 9024 in the stay
order does not limit this court’s power. 	An order to rescind an
interlocutory order over which the court has jurisdiction is
within a court’s inherent powers, and it is rooted firmly in the
common law and is not abridged by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. City of L.A., 254 F.3d at 887(holding that the
district court could rescind a previous order certifying an
interlocutory appeal before the appellate court acted).4
///
3 A bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court. 	28 U.S.C. § 151.
4 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. 	Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9024 incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
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Nor does Law of the Case Doctrine disable this court from
modifying the stay order for good cause. The Law of the Case
Doctrine precludes the court from reconsidering an issue
previously decided by the same court, or a higher court, in the
same case. 	Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 833
(9th Cir. 1982). 	The doctrine applies to a court’s explicit
holdings and those decided by necessary implication. 	Thomas v.
Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993)(dismissal order). See
also U.S. v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 949 (9th Cir. 2004) and cases
cited therein. 	The Law of the Case Doctrine is discretionary and
is in no way a limit on the court’s power prior to entry of final
judgment in the case to revisit, revise, or rescind any
interlocutory orders it has issued in that case. 	City of L.A.
Harbor Div., 254 F.3d at 888.
While courts are generally urged to adhere to the Law of the
Case Doctrine, it is “not an inexorable command.” Id. (quoting
Hanna Boys Ctr. V. Miller, 853 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Thus, if there is good cause, this court is free to modify the
stay order provided it has not lost jurisdiction over this
adversary proceeding. 	At present, the court retains jurisdiction
over this adversary proceeding and thus can modify the stay order
provided good cause is shown. 	That said, for the reasons set
forth below, the Trustee has not shown good cause for
modification of the stay order at the present time.5
///
5See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(made applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 7054) though, as indicated above, Rule 54(b) does not constrain this
court in modifying the stay order, and similarly provides that until entry of
a final judgment, other orders can be modified.
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II
The Trustee’s Due Process Rights Were Preserved.
Trustee argues that since the stay was issued very shortly
after the application, she was not given reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard as required in contested matters under
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(a). Doc. #53 (Trustee’s Memorandum of
Authorities) at pg. 7 (citing Barrientos v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 633 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2011)). 	Trustee argues that
the Motion for Stay was a contested matter and the resultant stay
order violated Bankruptcy Rules and prevented the Trustee from
asserting due process rights. 	The court disagrees.
First, the order staying the proceeding was issued on
December 31, 2025, three days after the Motion for Stay was filed
and two days after the “preliminary” opposition was filed. 	The
Trustee did oppose, and the court ruled thereafter. 	Both notice
and opportunity to be heard were afforded to the Trustee, though
admittedly the response time was shorter than usual due to
exigent circumstances described more fully below.
Second, Trustee has filed and the court has considered this
Motion to Reset notwithstanding the stay. In other words, Trustee
has had the opportunity to have the court revisit the stay order.
The Trustee has shown no prejudice.
Third, the Trustee’s reliance on “reasonable notice” and
opportunity to be heard under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014(a) is
misplaced. 	11 U.S.C. § 102(1) provides:
“After notice and a hearing” or similar phrase –
(A) means after such notice as appropriate in the
particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a
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hearing as is appropriate in the particular
circumstances; but
(B) 	authorizes an act without an actual hearing if
such notice is properly given and if –
(i) 	such a hearing is not requested timely by
a party interest; or
(ii) there is insufficient time for a hearing
to be commenced before such act must be done,
and the court authorizes such act.
The “particular circumstances” warranted the quick issuance
of the stay. Defendant had preserved his right to jury trial and
did not consent to the Bankruptcy Court finally adjudicating this
adversary proceeding. 	The filing of the Summary Judgment Motion
necessitated the Defendant’s filing of the Withdrawal Motion. 	A
motion to withdraw the reference is timely if it is brought
promptly as possible in light of the developments in the
bankruptcy proceeding. 	Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 1007, fn. 3
(quoting In re Baldwin United Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 754 (S.D. Ohio
1985)).
The deadline for Defendant to file opposition to the Summary
Judgment Motion was fast approaching, and the Motion itself was
filed just prior the two-week holiday season. 	Given Trustee’s
choice to file the Summary Judgment Motion when she did, there
was insufficient time to allow a fully noticed motion and
briefing as normally required by LBR 9014-1(f)(2)(A).
Fourth, Barrientos described the difference between
adversary proceedings, contested matters, and applications. 633
F.3d at 1189-1190. 	Barrientos held the remedy for violating a
discharge is contempt which can be initiated by a motion under
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. Id. at pg. 1191. Barrientos does not
analyze the interplay between 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) and Fed. R.
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Bankr. P. 9014(a). 	At least one bankruptcy court has issued a
stay under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5011(c)-(d) sua sponte. 	In re
Warren, 125 B.R. 128, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990)(stay issued
after bankruptcy court recommended abstention and remand of a
non-core matter to state court).
III.
The Stay Order was Properly Issued.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5011(c) provides:
A motion filed [to withdraw the reference] does not
stay proceedings in a case or affect its
administration. 	But a bankruptcy judge may, on proper
terms and conditions, stay a proceeding until the
motion is decided.
A bankruptcy court has the discretion to stay the proceeding
until the withdrawal motion is decided. 	The bankruptcy court’s
order may impose proper terms and conditions. 	That is what
occurred here.
The stay order:
1. 	Temporarily suspended the response deadline for
filing opposition and reply to the Trustee’s
Summary Judgment Motion;
2. 	Removed the scheduled hearing on the Summary
Judgment Motion from calendar;
3. 	Vacated certain deadlines and hearing dates set
under the court’s Scheduling Order to accommodate
the stay;
4. 	Provided for the stay to be automatically lifted if
the district court later denies the Withdrawal
Motion and provides a procedure for the parties to
reset the Summary Judgment Motion and related dates
should that occur; and
5. 	Provided for modification of the stay order.
///
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Defendant had the burden to establish that a stay under the
circumstances would be appropriate. 	In re Matterhorn Grp. Inc.,
No. 2:10-cv-02849-GEB; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122939 *5(E.D. Cal.
November 5, 2010)(denying request to stay a contract rejection
motion and sale motion because movants did not establish the
necessary factors and did not first seek a stay before the
bankruptcy court.) 	To establish that the stay should be granted,
the moving party must show (1) a likelihood that the pending
motion for withdrawal of the reference will be granted; (2)
irreparable harm to the movant if the stay is not granted; (3)
that the opponent would not be substantially harmed by the stay,
and (4) that the public interest is served by granting the stay.
Id. 	Defendant met his burden as discussed below.
1. Likelihood the pending motion for withdrawal of the
reference will be granted.
Trustee virtually concedes that withdrawing the reference is
appropriate and the Withdrawal Motion should be granted. Doc.
#53, p.8. 	Trustee quarrels with the timing of the reference
withdrawal, arguing that the court should either decide the
Summary Judgment Motion or issue a report and recommendation
regarding it prior to withdrawal.
A motion to withdraw the reference must be heard by the
district court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5011.
Trustee’s assertions about the timing of the Withdrawal Motion
are at bottom suggestions or arguments that should be made to the
district court on how to rule on that motion when the district
court considers it. Doc. #53, pp. 8-11. 	The bankruptcy court
///
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does not decide whether and when the reference will be withdrawn.
This factor supports issuance of the stay.
2. Irreparable harm to the movant.
From his first pleading, Defendant has emphatically not
consented to the Bankruptcy Court entering a final judgment in
this adversary proceeding. Doc. #15. Defendant has also demanded
a jury trial. Id. 	Withdrawal of the reference is required in
instances where a defendant who is entitled to a jury trial does
not consent to such trial being conducted in the bankruptcy
court. 	Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 128-29 (4th
Cir. 1993). 	Trustee seems to ignore the lack of consent and
argues Defendant’s jury trial right – also conceded (Doc. #53 p.
8) – is the sole basis for withdrawal of the reference. 	It is
not.
To be sure, only claiming a jury trial right does not
require immediate transfer to the district court. 	In re
Healthcentral.com, 504 F.3d 775, 787 (9th Cir. 2007). 	However,
this Defendant has neither filed a proof of claim nor explicitly
or even impliedly consented to this court’s jurisdiction to enter
a final order. 	See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575
U.S. 665 (2015).
The fact that the Defendant intended to file a motion for
withdrawal of the reference was never concealed. In fact, the
Scheduling Order (Doc. #18) set a “final status conference” for
February 25, 2026, and ordered that any motion to withdraw the
reference be filed before then. 	The court was not surprised by
the filing of the Withdrawal Motion, and neither should the
Trustee have been.
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The trigger event for the filing of Defendant’s Withdrawal
Motion and Motion for Stay was Trustee’s Summary Judgment motion
filed on December 17, 2025. 	True enough, the request for stay
frustrated the scheduling and hearing of the Summary Judgment
Motion. 	But the potential harm suffered by Defendant if he was
prevented from having the district court determine which court
may decide such dispositive motions is self-evident.
No party disputes Defendant’s right to have the reference
withdrawn here. 	A “comprehensive” summary judgment motion, if
granted, has the potential of precluding a trial by jury.
Defendant wants that decision made by the District Court. 	True,
the District Court may direct that this court either decide the
Summary Judgment Motion or else submit a report and
recommendation for de novo review. 	But that is the District
Court’s decision to make as part of its disposition of the
Withdrawal Motion, not this court’s.
While a ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion that is
favorable to the Trustee may mean that the underlying dispute
never goes to trial, that does not affect the question of who
decides which court will make that ruling. The answer to that
question is: the District Court.
Admittedly, Defendant could have elected to wait until after
the court decided the Summary Judgment Motion before filing the
Withdrawal Motion. 	But the Defendant had control of that timing
as limited by the Scheduling Order. 	Since the Scheduling Order
had a cutoff for hearing dispositive motions, Trustee was
required to file the Summary Judgment Motion when she did.
Defendant then had to exercise his right to request the District
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Court act before the Summary Judgment Motion could be decided and
that right would have been lost if the stay was not issued.
Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 107, n. 3.
Defendant’s deadline to oppose the Motion for Summary
Judgment was quickly approaching – January 7, 2026, under LBR
7056-1(b). 	Without some relief, Defendant’s right would be
irreparably harmed. 	Since there is nothing Defendant has done
that is inconsistent with asserting his right to move for
withdrawal of the reference, his right to do so would have been
irreparably lost if the court had ruled on summary judgment in
the Trustee’s favor. This factor militates in favor of the
issuance of the stay.
3. Trustee would not be substantially harmed by the stay.
Trustee has identified no harm in having the Motion for
Summary Judgment determined after the District Court’s ruling on
the Motion for Withdrawal of the Reference. 	No exigency or other
circumstance has been established suggesting that the bankruptcy
estate will suffer any harm by any delay caused by the Withdrawal
Motion. Certainly, the Trustee provides no example of permanent
harm. Obviously, a delay in administration might be viewed as
harmful by the Trustee, but consideration of the alternative
scenarios evidences no unique harm at all.
If the District Court determines that it wishes to decide
the Summary Judgment Motion itself, there will likely be delay.
But delay would be equally certain if this court decides the
Summary Judgment Motion. A ruling favorable to the Trustee could
result in an appeal by the Defendant, with that appeal delaying
administration of the estate until the appeal is resolved by the
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District Court or Bankruptcy Appellate Panel as an appellant
would elect. 	The potential for appeal is just as speculative as
Trustee’s “scenarios” argued on the motion.
Of course, if the court denies Trustee’s Summary Judgment
Motion, there would be no appeal, but there would still be a
delay as the reference would then be withdrawn before the trial
would proceed before the District Court.
Likewise, if the District Court rules that this court should
hear the Summary Judgment Motion but issue a report and
recommendation subject to de novo review, delay will still ensue,
as the losing party can object to the findings. 	Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 9033. 	The District Court would then need to review the
findings and objections and there would be a delay before the
District Court rules. 	Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9033(c).
In other words, under virtually any scenario, delay is
inevitable. No unique harm or substantial harm is suffered by the
Trustee or the bankruptcy estate by issuance of the stay.
When asked about harm at oral argument, counsel for the
Trustee candidly admitted that under any scenario, there will be
some delay, but the Trustee suggested that if this court rules on
the Summary Judgment Motion or issues a report and
recommendation, it could slightly shorten the delay. 	Counsel
also stated, admittedly without evidence, that as more delay
occurred, the value of the asset at issue in the underlying
adversary proceeding – a home – may diminish. 	That harm is
speculative at best.
Plus, under Fed. R. Bankr. 5011(d) if Trustee wishes, the
Trustee could ask the District Court to modify the stay,
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potentially in a way that affects which court is going to decide
the Summary Judgment Motion. 	That option is certainly available
but may be of limited usefulness given the pending Withdrawal
Motion.
In short, this factor favors the stay.
4. Public interest is served by granting the stay.
The public interest is served by efficient and prompt
resolution of disputes. 	This is pertinent in a bankruptcy case
because often creditors and debtors each need swift relief or
determination of rights. 	But this adversary proceeding is a
fraudulent conveyance case between the Trustee asserting creditor
rights under California State Law and a non-debtor transferee.
It is a private dispute that does not seem to affect public
rights.
If there is a public interest in prompt resolution, it
cannot eclipse Defendant’s rights to ask the District Court to
rule how this dispute – which is statutorily core but
constitutionally non-core – shall be determined. Executive
Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014). 	The public
interest is also served by preservation of trial rights before
the correct tribunal.
This factor is neutral or slightly favors the stay.
Therefore, the stay was properly issued as authorized by
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5011(c).
///
///
///
///
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IV
Trustee’s Contention that Efficiency Compels this Court
to Decide the Motion for Summary Judgment is Inapplicable.
Trustee’s most salient argument is that, since the District
Court will likely direct this court either to decide the Motion
for Summary Judgment or else issue a report and recommendation,
hearing dates should be reset and the proceedings continue in
this court.
This court will not be pretentious on the issue. 	Trustee’s
argument, bolstered by numerous citations to district court
decisions from this District, overlooks the fundamental law. 	The
district court makes the reference withdrawal decision and
decides what proceedings, if any, the bankruptcy court can hear.
It is not the bankruptcy court’s call to make.
Furthermore, a close examination of the cases cited by
Trustee do not even establish a basis for the relief Trustee
requests in this motion. 	The Bell v. Lehr cases are
illustrative. 	Bell v. Lehr (“Bell I”), 2014 WL 526406 *4 (E.D.
Cal., February 7, 2014) and Bell v. Lehr (“Bell II”), 2015 WL
4602895 *2 (E.D. Cal., July 19, 2015). 	There, the District Court
initially denied the motion to withdraw the reference before any
summary judgment litigation occurred and noted withdrawal might
be appropriate later (Bell I). 	Two years later, the reference
was withdrawn after the bankruptcy court certified that the pre-
trial proceedings were concluded. 	No mention was made of a
motion for summary judgment decided by the bankruptcy court.
(Bell II).
///
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The other cases also are of limited application. See In re
Sunergy CA, LLC, 2023 WL 3582674 *2-3 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2023)(it
was premature to withdraw the reference even when a motion to
dismiss was pending, but the motion to withdraw the reference
could be renewed when the pre-trial proceedings are concluded as
found by the Bankruptcy Court); In re Konark Ranches, LLC, 2022
WL 2079090 *3-4 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2022) (same, though no motion
to dismiss was pending and the motion for withdrawal of the
reference was made shortly after the complaint was answered); In
re Stanford Chopping, Inc., 2024 WL 4906107 (E.D. Cal. November
27, 2024)(denying motion to withdraw the reference without
prejudice because it was “more efficient for pre-trial matters in
this action to be conducted before the Bankruptcy Court” but not
specifically mentioning dispositive motions).
There are also cases where a district court either withdrew
the reference before dispositive motions were decided or ordered
the bankruptcy court to hear dispositive motions but issue a
report and recommendation. 	See In re Casimiro, 2006 WL 1581897
*6 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) (holding “efficiency” counsels
withdrawal of the class action to the District Court); In re Te
Velde, No. 1:19-cv-00520-KES (E.D. Cal. August 15, 2019)
(District Court Docket #18) (order denying motion to withdraw
reference but requiring bankruptcy court to issue a report and
recommendation on dispositive motions.)
In short, the district court has the discretion to decide
how dispositive motions are to be resolved, not the bankruptcy
court. 	The Trustee’s efficiency arguments require this court to
///
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speculate as to what the district court may decide, which is
something this court cannot and will not do.6
CONCLUSION
Though the Trustee does not prevail on this motion, the
court will not foreclose the Trustee from bringing this motion
again should developments occur that change the status of this
litigation. 	As the court has discussed and for the reasons
outlined in this Memorandum Ruling, even if this court elected to
hear the Summary Judgment Motion and issue a report and
recommendation, it would do little to shorten the time before
ultimate resolution of the case, as the District Court would
still need to review any objections to such a report. Other
developments may also change the case’s status and provide a
stronger basis for granting the Trustee’s requested relief. But
as things stand now, the Trustee has not shown such relief is
necessary or appropriate.
The Trustee’s Motion to Reset the Hearing Dates for the
Summary Judgment Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.7 	A
conforming order shall issue.
Dated: 	By the Court
René Lastreto II, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
6 Trustee’s argument that mandatory withdrawal is unavailable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(d) likewise is an issue to be taken up by the District Court and is not
addressed here. 	See Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 1008 (mandatory withdrawal of
the reference requires “material consideration of non-bankruptcy Federal
law.”) 	But see fn. 2 	above.
7 The foregoing are the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
pursuant Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. 	Any finding of fact that is deemed a
conclusion of law is adopted as a conclusion of law. 	Any conclusion of law
deemed a finding of fact is adopted as a finding of fact.
Feb 18, 2026
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Instructions to Clerk of Court
Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment
The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or
other court generated document transmitted herewith to the
parties below. 	The Clerk of Court will send the Order via the
BNC or, if checked 	, via the U.S. mail.
Irma Edmonds
2501 West Shaw Ave., Suite 124
Fresno, CA 93711
Gabriel J. Waddell
7650 North Palm Ave., Suite 101
Fresno, CA 93711
Bruce D. Leichty
625-A 3rd St
Clovis, CA 93612
Filed 02/18/26 Case 25-01006 Doc 63