Howell v. Santander Consumer USA Holdings Inc. et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RICHARD CECIL HOWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC., et
al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-05588-JD
ORDER RE ARBITRATION AND
STAY
This case has traveled a tortuous path. Pro se plaintiff Richard Cecil Howell, who
describes himself as a “Sui juris, Jus imperii, Living-Spirit flesh and blood Man of Mu’ur-
Pawmunkey lineage,” has a second amended complaint (SAC) on file against defendants
Santander Consumer USA Inc. and several individuals. Dkt. No. 26. The case was originally
assigned to a magistrate judge, after which Howell filed a declination to magistrate judge
jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 5. It was then assigned to a district judge, re-assigned to a magistrate judge,
re-re-assigned to a district judge, and then sent back to the magistrate judge previously assigned.
See Dkt. Nos. 7, 11, 12.1 The magistrate judge entered several orders relating to service of
summons, granting Howell in forma pauperis (IFP) status, screening the adequacy of the claims in
connection with IFP review, and denying Howell’s motion for summary judgment. See Dkt.
Nos. 13, 14, 17, 25, 28, 30, 38. The magistrate judge permitted the SAC to go forward. Dkt.
No. 28. The case was re-assigned to this Court in January 2026. Dkt. Nos. 49, 50.
Because Howell declined consent, magistrate judge jurisdiction was not established under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Consequently, to the extent the magistrate judge filed dispositive orders, they
are properly deemed to be reports and recommendations to the Court. See In re DMCA Subpoena
1 The last assignment to the magistrate judge was filed on October 25, 2024, without an ECF
docket number.
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United States District Court
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to Reddit, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881-82 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The Court has independently
reviewed all of the orders, and concludes they were properly determined and will remain in place.
Turning to Howell’s claims, the SAC runs to 45 pages with exhibits, and is a rambling
array of allegations interspersed with “maxims” and legal citations. Reading the SAC with the
generosity afforded to pro se litigants, see Daniels v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 25-CV-05137-JD,
2025 WL 2960149, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025), Howell disputes his obligation to make
payments to Santander under a contract to finance the purchase of a car. See Dkt. No. 26 at 2.
The finance agreement, which is attached as an exhibit to Santander’s motion for arbitration,
indicates that Howell signed the contract in May 2022 to buy a used Volkswagen Jetta. Dkt. No.
46-1.2 Howell says that Santander “violated California’s consumer protection laws by placing
‘borrowers’ with subprime credit into auto loans it knew carried an acceptably high probability of
default.” Dkt. No. 26 at 2 (emphasis in original). This theory appears to come from a settlement
in 2020 between the State of California and Santander with respect to its consumer finance
practices. See id. ¶ 16. The SAC indicates that Howell believes he has been relieved of payments
for the reasons underlying the settlement. The SAC alleges that Santander has violated the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by refusing “to provide
verification/validation of the debt,” id. ¶ 18, and several state and federal consumer protection
laws. Howell asks for $1.5 million in damages and other relief. Id. at Prayer ¶ B.
Another complication in the SAC is that the plaintiff is identified as “the Richard Cecil
Howell, Estate Trust,” and not Howell individually. Id. ¶ 13. The nature of the ostensible trust is
entirely unclear in the SAC. In light of Howell’s pro se status, the Court construes the trust to
mean Howell as an individual.
After a long detour through service problems that are not relevant here, Santander waived
service of the summons in late 2025 and promptly filed a request to compel arbitration of
Howell’s claims in January 2026. See Dkt. No. 41 (waiver); Dkt. No. 46 (arbitration motion).
2 The Court takes judicial notice of the agreement and arbitration clause. Fed. R. Evid. 201;
Keller v. Chegg, Inc., Case No. 22-cv-06986, 2023 WL 5279649, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15,
2023).
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Santander did not challenge the plausibility of the SAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), even though the magistrate judge left that possibility open in a second IFP screening
order. Dkt. No. 28.
The grounds for arbitration are straightforward. Howell disputes his obligation to make
payments under the finance agreement, and the contract assigns all such disputes to arbitration.
As the arbitration clause states:
Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise
(including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision,
and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or
our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or
relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this
vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship
(including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign
this contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral,
binding arbitration and not by a court action.
Dkt. No. 46-1 at ECF p. 8.
The clause provides that the arbitration will be held in the federal district where Howell
resides or where the contract was executed, both of which are in this District. Id. Howell will not
be required to travel far for the arbitration. The clause also states that Santander will pay for
arbitration fees of up to $5,000, and more if legally required to. Id. Howell will pay fees only if
they exceed $5,000 without responsibility on Santander’s part, or if the arbitrator orders
reimbursement in whole or part if the claim is determined to be frivolous. Id.
The existence and terms of the arbitration clause were highlighted in the finance
agreement. The agreement is captioned at the very top with “Retail Installment Sale Contract --
Simple Finance Charge (With Arbitration Provision)” in bolded and capitalized letters. Id. at ECF
p. 4. The arbitration clause is presented on a separate page with the caption “Arbitration
Provision,” again in bold and all caps, followed by three bullet points also in bold and capitalized
letters that summarize, in plain language, the bilateral obligation to arbitrate disputes. Id. at ECF
p. 8. Howell signed the page with the arbitration clause, and initialed the agreement pages
individually. Id. passim.
The clause is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (FAA). Id. at
ECF p. 8. Under Section 4 of the FAA, the Court’s role “is limited to determining whether a valid
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arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”
Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). If the party
seeking to compel arbitration establishes both factors, the Court “must order the parties to proceed
to arbitration only in accordance with the terms of their agreement.” Id. “Any doubts about the
scope of arbitrable issues should be decided in favor of arbitration.” Williams v. Eaze Sols., Inc.,
417 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (same).
Santander says that both conditions are amply satisfied. This is for good reason. The
claims in the SAC fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration clause in that Howell disputes
his obligation to make payments to Santander under the finance agreement.
There is no evidence that the clause is in any way invalid or unenforceable. Strictly
speaking, Howell did not file an opposition to the arbitration motion. Rather, a document
captioned “Judicial Notice” was ostensibly filed by an individual identified as “Asim Najee-
Asmar: family of [Howell] Bey,” who says he is the son and “Counsellor-at-Law” for plaintiff
Howell, “a corporate vessel of the ‘Social Security Cestui que Trust.’” Dkt. No. 55.3 The
document is a largely incomprehensible miscellany of “maxims,” random case quotes, and
commentary that is of no relevance to the question of arbitration. To give some flavor of this, the
document features an “honest service questionnaire for Judge James Joseph Donta [sic],” which
asks whether the Court will “disobey” the United States Constitution, among other inquiries, and
offers dictates for how the Court should conduct judicial business. Id. at 7-16. It lists the Court’s
California State Bar number and says that the Court “rescinded his nationality to become a foreign
agent in order to hold public office.” Id. at 11. It states that it was sent “in the peace and love of
Jesus Christ, that you may repent and do good works worthy of the same.” Id. at 13.
None of this addresses arbitration pursuant to the contract Howell signed, or anything else
material here. There are a few scattered references to “no meeting of the minds,” id. at 15, and
“fraud in the execution,” id. at 2, but these comments are nothing more than asides made without
3 The signature page features Howell’s name, and so it is not clear who actually wrote the
document.
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any meaningful development with evidence or arguments. The Court’s independent view of the
record before it did not uncover a reason for concern along these lines.
Consequently, the SAC is sent to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. The case is
stayed pending further order. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. The parties will file a joint status report every 90
days beginning on August 3, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 24, 2026
JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge
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