Milner v. Dodd et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ERIK RANDALL MILNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DUSTIN DODD, et al.,
Defendants.
ERIK RANDALL MILNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NAPA EMERGENCY WOMEN’S
SERVICES (NEWS), et al.,
Defendants.
Case Nos. 25-cv-03350-JSC
25-cv-03428-JSC
ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Re: Case No. 3:25-cv-03350-JSC, Dkt. Nos.
15, 22, 24, 60, 65;
Case No. 3:25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. Nos. 25,
30, 37.
In two cases, Erik Milner, proceeding in forma pauperis without attorney representation,
sues Napa County Child Welfare Services (“CWS”), Napa County Health & Human Services
(“HHSA”), the Napa Valley Police Department, the Napa County Probation Department (“Napa
Probation”), Napa Emergency Women’s Services (“NEWS”), Aric Bright, Dustin Dodd, Jose
Velasquez, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, Matthew Lipscomb, Nick Toscani, and Pete Peirsig for
federal constitutional violations and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. (Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC, Dkt. No. 1;
Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1.)1 Now pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions
1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) in Case No. 25-cv-03350-
JSC, unless otherwise noted; pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top
of the documents. Mr. Milner also filed a habeas petition in Case No. 25-cv-06193, and Ms.
Dawson has brought similar claims against similar defendants in Case Nos. 25-cv-01923-JSC and
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to dismiss Mr. Milner’s original complaints, (Dkt. Nos. 15, 22, 24; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC,
Dkt. Nos. 25, 30), and strike his amended complaints, (Dkt. No. 60; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC,
Dkt. No. 37.) Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions, the Court determines oral
argument is not required, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the December 18, 2025
hearing, and GRANTS Defendants’ motions, dismisses Mr. Milner’s initial complaints with leave
to amend, and strikes Mr. Milner’s amended complaints.2
As to his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, Mr. Milner does not include sufficient facts to plausibly
allege (1) any individual Defendant violated his Eighth, Fourteenth, or First Amendment rights;
(2) NEWS is a state actor; and (3) the local government Defendants had a municipal policy,
practice, or custom which was the moving force behind constitutional violations. As to his RICO
claim, Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a pattern of racketeering activity, an injury to his
business or property, or each Defendant’s role in the enterprise.
BACKGROUND
I. CASE NO. 3:25-CV-03350-JSC
A. Complaint Allegations
On August 31, 2023, Officers Dustin Dodd and Pete Peirsig left Mr. Milner locked in a
police car without air conditioning for over two hours and “ordered a forced blood draw” without
a signed warrant while he was unconscious. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 7.) Because three versions of a
warrant exist: one unsigned from August 31, 2023, one signed on September 5, 2023, and one
signed on September 19, 2023, “the Napa Police laundered warrants after illegal searches.” (Id. at
5.) Karen Roberts witnessed the mistreatment and gave a statement, but Mr. Milner’s lawyer
“never interviewed or called [her] to testify.” (Id.) Later that day, Mr. Milner was placed in an
interview room while unconscious, ignored when he asked for a lawyer, and not given water or
medical help although he “was slumped over the desk for hours.” (Id. at 6.)
Meanwhile, Amanda Dawson was hospitalized for a “traumatic brain injury” and
3:25-cv-09369-JSC.
2 The Court also GRANTS Mr. Milner’s motion for leave to file an opposition to the motion to
strike. (Dkt. Nos. 65 (motion), 66 (opposition)).
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questioned by Officer Velazquez, and although she “did not consent to medical release” and was
“administered fentanyl and morphine right before the interview,” the officers “used her
statements.” (Id. at 6, 8.) On body camera footage, an officer said he “had an ‘in’ with hospital
staff” and “mocked someone who had allegedly [b]een sexually assaulted,” but “[t]his footage was
not given to [Mr. Milner’s] defense before trial.” (Id. at 6.) The same day, Officers Toscani and
Lipscomb entered Mr. Milner’s residence and seized his truck without a warrant. (Id.)
On October 19, 2023, CWS employee Martha Jimenez, Officer Lipscomb, and Officer
Toscani removed Mr. Milner’s and Ms. Dawson’s son without a warrant, despite Officer
Lipscomb’s prior statement they would not do so. (Id.) Because Mr. Milner and Ms. Dawson
were “never convicted of any child-related crime,” and “[p]rior claims were ruled unfounded,”
“CPS took [their] child with no emergency or new evidence” and “acted on fake and incomplete
information.” (Id. at 6, 8.)
On December 20, 2024, Mr. Milner’s probation was “revoked without cause,” “warning,
hearing, or new violation.” (Id. at 6.) On December 24, 2024, Mr. Milner filed a motion to vacate
his sentence, and, the same day, a retaliatory warrant was issued . (Id.)
In addition, the nonprofit “NEWS, which receives federal funding under FVPSA and
VAWA, falsely advertises that its services are voluntary,” including on “federal grant documents.”
(Id. at 6, 9.) Ms. Ramirez and CWS “forced [Ms. Dawson] into NEWS programming” and
“requir[ed] her to sign releases giving access to her medical and drug test info” “under threat of
losing custody of [their] child.” (Id. at 6, 10.) Mr. Milner “was not required to participate in
NEWS programming, but [he] was still court-ordered to pay them money as part of [his] release
conditions.” (Id. at 6.)
Mr. Milner also alleges Defendants “[u]sed [a] fake search to cover up illegal actions,”
“tampered with” and hid body camera footage and other evidence, used Ms. Dawson’s hospital
statements, “file[d] false charges,” “took [his] blood with no signed warrant,” and “filed and filled
out two other versions after the fact to justify it.” (Id. at 8.) He was then “prosecuted using
multiple fake warrant[s].” (Id. at 9.) In addition, Mr. Milner “was denied fair access to evidence,”
including Ms. Roberts’s testimony. (Id. at 8.) His public defender Mr. Bright “did nothing to
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stop” the due process violations. (Id.) Mr. Milner ultimately “lost [his] child, [his] rights, [his]
time, and any chance at a fair trial.” (Id. at 9.)
Furthermore, “every time [Mr. Milner] filed something in court to fight [his] case like a
motion in probation or motion for a sentence review they hit [him] with [something] new . . .
usually within 24 to 72 hours of [] filing.” (Id. at 12.) These were not “based on new violations,”
but instead “just retaliation to punish [him] for exercising [his] rights.” (Id.) For example, Mr.
Milner’s probation was revoked, he lost access to his child, and he was “targeted for using the
court system.” (Id.)
B. Procedural History
On April 15, 2025, Mr. Milner sued Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Jose Valasquez, Nick
Toscani, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, Aric Bright, Napa Probation, CWS, and NEWS for violations
of his Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) CWS, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, and Napa Probation moved to dismiss, and
then filed an amended motion also on behalf of Aric Bright. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 22.) The City of
Napa, the Napa Police Department, Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Jose Velasquez, Matthew
Lipscomb, and Nick Toscani also moved to dismiss and strike Mr. Milner’s complaint or for a
more definite statement. (Dkt. No. 15.) NEWS also filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 24.)
Because Mr. Milner did not file a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court
ordered him to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Dkt.
No. 30.) Mr. Milner responded and filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a
temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. Nos. 31, 32.) The Court denied
Mr. Milner’s habeas petition because it sought release from detention, a form of relief not
available in a section 1983 action. (Dkt. No. 42.) And, as Mr. Milner remained incarcerated, the
Court extended his time to oppose the motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 55.)
Instead of filing an opposition, Mr. Milner filed an amended complaint against the City of
Napa, Dustin Dodd, Pete Peirsig, Nicholas Toscani, Matthew Lipscomb, the Napa County District
Attorney’s Office, Aric Bright, CWS, and NEWS for violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to commit fraud and falsify
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judicial documents under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1519; RICO; and the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729. (Dkt. No. 56.) CWS, Martha Jimenez Ramirez, and the Napa County District
Attorney’s Office moved to dismiss or strike Mr. Milner’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 60.) Mr. Milner
filed a sur-reply addressing the earlier motions to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 61.) He also sought leave to
file an opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss or strike at Docket No. 60. (Dkt. Nos. 65, 66.)
II. CASE NO. 3:25-CV-03428-JSC
A. Complaint Allegations
First, Mr. Milner alleges NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha Jimenez
Ramirez coerced Mr. Milner by “explicitly threatening Plaintiff and family members with loss of
child custody and reunification services unless they signed mandatory Release of Information
(ROI) forms.” (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Second, Defendants “repeatedly
misrepresented NEWS services as voluntary in publicly available communications while
simultaneously mandating participation and exchanging coercive communications via electronic
and postal means.” (Id.) Third, “Defendants submitted false statements and misleading
information to Napa County Superior Court.” (Id.) Fourth, “Defendants misused and
misrepresented federal and state funds . . . by fraudulently claiming voluntary client participation,
while simultaneously mandating participation under threats.” (Id. at 4.)
B. Procedural History
On April 17, 2025, Mr. Milner sued NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha
Jimenez Ramirez under RICO. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants moved to
dismiss. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. Nos. 25, 30.) As Mr. Milner was incarcerated, the
Court twice extended his time to oppose the motions to dismiss. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC,
Dkt. Nos. 31, 33.) Instead of opposing the pending motions, Mr. Milner filed an amended
complaint, adding Aric Bright, Dustin Dodd, Nicholas Toscani, Matthew Lipscomb, Pete Peirsig,
Jose Velasquez, the City of Napa, and the Napa Valley Police Department as defendants, and
asserting violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to commit fraud and falsify judicial documents under 18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1343, and 1519; RICO claims; and violations of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
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(Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 34.)3 CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha Jimenez
Ramirez then moved to strike or dismiss Mr. Milner’s amended complaint. (Case No. 25-cv-
3428-JSC, Dkt. No. 37.) Mr. Milner did not oppose this motion.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTIONS TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINTS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a party “may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course” within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
County Defendants4 move to strike Mr. Milner’s amended complaints in both cases. (Dkt.
No. 60; Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt No. 37.) County Defendants served their motions to
dismiss on June 16, 2025 and September 12, 2025, respectively, and Mr. Milner filed his amended
complaint on October 20, 2025—more than 21 days later. (Dkt. Nos. 22, 56; Case No. 25-cv-
03428-JSC, Dkt Nos. 30, 34.) Mr. Milner also did not obtain Defendants’ consent or the Court’s
leave before filing his amended complaint.
The Court therefore GRANTS County Defendants’ motion to strike Mr. Milner’s amended
complaints.
II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS INITIAL COMPLAINTS
A. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must include a “short and plain
statement of [each] claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, the court “must take all of the factual
3 This amended complaint is identical to the amended complaint filed at Case No. 25-cv-03350-
JSC, Dkt. No. 56.
4 In Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC, County Defendants include Aric Bright, CWS, Martha Jimenez
Ramirez, and the Napa County District Attorney’s Office. (Dkt. No. 60.) In Case No. 25-cv-
03428-JSC, County Defendants include CWS, HHSA, Napa Probation, and Martha Jimenez
Ramirez. (Dkt. No. 37.)
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allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. However, this presumption does not apply to
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Id. Ultimately, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” in other words, to
“allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (cleaned up). When a plaintiff files a complaint without representation by a lawyer,
the Court must “construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any
doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Section 1983 Claims
“42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under color of
state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Jones v. Williams, 297
F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). “Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the
vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by government officials.” Id. To state a Section
1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege a government official (1) acted “under color of state law,” and
(2) “the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition, “[i]n order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under
section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.”
Id. Therefore, a plaintiff must allege a specific government official’s actions caused his injuries.
See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,
633 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties
and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have
caused a constitutional deprivation.”). As an initial matter, all of Mr. Milner’s constitutional
claims are insufficiently pled because he does not identify which Defendants took each specific
action to violate his constitutional rights.
1. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Mr. Milner sues Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr. Toscani, Napa, the Napa Police Department,
and Napa Probation for violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
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punishment based on his treatment on August 31, 2023. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.)
“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protections [do] not attach until after conviction and
sentence.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989). “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is
appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally
associated with criminal prosecutions.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). So,
“[c]onditions of confinement claims raised by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than under the Eighth Amendment.” Veaver v. Honea,
No. 2:20-CV-02554-CKD P, 2021 WL 369438, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2021) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Mr. Milner alleges Defendants locked him in a patrol car “for over two hours with no air
conditioning,” did not provide water or medical help, left him unconscious in an interview room
for 2.5 hours, and “forcibly” drew his blood. (Dkt. No. 1 at 7.) However, Mr. Milner does not
allege Defendants’ actions took place after he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison,
which is necessary to plead an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. To the
extent Mr. Milner challenges conditions of confinement which occurred before his criminal trial,
he must instead bring a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim.
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Eighth Amendment claim with leave to amend.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim: False Evidence and
Improper Legal Procedure
Next, Mr. Milner sues Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr. Toscani, Napa, the Napa Police
Department, Napa Probation, Mr. Lipscomb, Ms. Ramirez, and Mr. Bright for violating his
Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsifying evidence, using a “fake search to cover up illegal
actions,” improperly using statements from Ms. Dawson, filing false charges, and taking his blood
without a warrant. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) He also claims he was denied “proper legal procedure” and
“fair access to evidence,” including when Defendants blocked Ms. Roberts from testifying and
“acted on fake and incomplete information to remove [his] child.” (Id.) And he alleges Mr.
Bright “did nothing to stop this whole system treating [him] like [he] was guilty before trial
punished [him].” (Id.)
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There is a Fourteenth Amendment “due process right not to be subjected to criminal
charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.”
Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). “To prevail on a § 1983
claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately
fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.”
Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). “To establish the second
element of causation, the plaintiff must show that (a) the act was the cause in fact of the
deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury would not have occurred in the absence of the
conduct; and (b) the act was the ‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause’ of the injury, meaning that the
injury is of a type that the reasonable person would see as a likely result of the conduct in
question.” Id. (citation omitted).
Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a fabricated evidence claim because he has not
identified the deprivation of liberty which occurred—perhaps a criminal sentence or the loss of his
child—and included facts from which the Court can infer Defendants’ actions caused such
deprivation of liberty. And, to the extent Mr. Milner challenges the legal process, he must allege a
particular legal proceeding in which he was denied legal process. Mr. Milner’s complaint also
fails to specify which Defendants fabricated particular pieces of evidence or followed improper
legal processes.
As to Mr. Milner’s claim against Mr. Bright, Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged Mr.
Bright specifically acted to violate his constitutional rights, as opposed to failing to stop others’
constitutional violations. Furthermore, “a public defender does not act under color of state law
when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding.” See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). So, Mr. Milner cannot state
a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Mr. Bright.
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment claim based on false
evidence and improper legal procedures with leave to amend, except as to the claim against Mr.
Bright which is dismissed without leave to amend.
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3. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Privacy Claim
Mr. Milner sues Ms. Ramirez, CWS, NEWS, Napa Probation, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Peirsig, Mr.
Toscani, and Mr. Lipscomb for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy including by
collecting his blood and seizing his truck without a warrant and using Ms. Dawson’s statements in
the hospital and NEWS documents. (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.)
“While there is no generalized right to privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized a
privacy right against certain kinds of governmental intrusions under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Parents for Privacy v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1075,
1092 (D. Or. 2018). However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition, . . . and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). So, a plaintiff must include a “careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 721 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Mr. Milner has not alleged enough facts explaining the type of liberty interest affected for
the Court to infer that liberty interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. To the extent Mr. Milner seeks to challenge police officers’ searches as unreasonable, he
may instead be able to plead a Fourth Amendment claim. See Deryan v. Glover, No. 2:23-CV-
000063-MKD, 2023 WL 6120908, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2023) (“The Fourth Amendment,
[however], provides a right to privacy, including a right to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches.”).
In addition, to the extent Mr. Milner alleges Defendants violated the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), “HIPAA itself provides no private right of
action” under which he may sue. See Webb v. Smart Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081
(9th Cir. 2007).
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim with leave to
amend.
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4. Fourteenth Amendment Family Integrity Claim
Mr. Milner next sues Ms. Ramirez, CWS, NEWS, and Mr. Lipscomb for violating his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to “family integrity and fair process,” including by forcing Ms.
Dawson “into federally funded programs by threatening to take [their] child.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 10.)
“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be separated from their
children without due process of law except in emergencies.” Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487
F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Officials violate this
right if they remove a child from the home absent information at the time of the seizure that
establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury
and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mr. Milner alleges “CPS took [his] child with no emergency or new evidence.” (Dkt. No.
1 at 6.) However, to support his claim there was “no emergency” or “evidence,” Mr. Milner only
states he and Ms. Dawson were “never convicted of any child-related crime” and “[p]rior claims
were ruled unfounded.” (Id.) These facts are not sufficient to plausibly allege Defendants lacked
reasonable cause to remove his child and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr.
Milner also cannot bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim based only on officials’ threats to
remove his child.
In addition, to the extent Mr. Milner seeks to assert claims under the Family Violence
Prevention Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10408, or the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, he may
not do so. See Thompson v. Washington, No. C04-2554L, 2005 WL 2045886, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 25, 2005) (“[T]he Family Violence Prevention Services Act contains no private right of
action.”); Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The
FCA [] does not authorize a [plaintiff] to prosecute a § 3729 violation pro se.”)
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth Amendment family integrity claim with
leave to amend.
5. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Mr. Milner also sues the Napa Police Department, Napa Probation, Mr. Dodd, and Mr.
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Toscani for retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.)
“[T]he First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff must allege an official “acted with a retaliatory
motive” to cause a plaintiff’s injury, meaning “the adverse action against the plaintiff would not
have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” Id. at 398-99. A plaintiff must therefore plead the
absence of probable cause or non-retaliatory motives for an official’s actions. See Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006).
Mr. Milner alleges every time he filed a motion for probation or sentence review, there was
“retaliation to punish [him] for exercising [his] rights.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 12.) However, he has not
specified when he exercised a right, what right he exercised, and how each particular Defendant
retaliated against him. Furthermore, although he alleges a retaliatory warrant was issued after he
filed a motion to vacate his sentence, (Dkt. No. 1 at 6), he does not identify which Defendant
issued the warrant. And, he has not included facts which support a plausible inference the
individual Defendants who retaliated against him had no probable cause for the actions they took
and instead acted with retaliatory motive.
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s First Amendment retaliation claim with leave to
amend.
6. Claims Against NEWS
NEWS moves to dismiss all claims against it because it is a nonprofit and not a state actor.
To state a federal constitutional claim, a plaintiff must allege facts which show a
deprivation by a person acting under color of state law. See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee
Secondary Sch. Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Generally, private parties do not act
under color of state law. See id.; see also Single Moms, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 331 F.3d 743,
746-47 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The United States Constitution protects individual rights only from
government action, not from private action. Only when the government is responsible for a
plaintiff’s complaints are individual constitutional rights implicated.”). Courts consider three
factors in deciding whether private parties act under color of state law. See Jackson v. East Bay
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Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-12
(1982)). First, there must be a “sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged
action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the State
itself.” Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, the nexus must be
such that the State “has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” Id. (citations
omitted). Third, the entity must have exercised powers “that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State.” Id. at 1005 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Mr. Milner’s allegations NEWS “receives federal funding” are insufficient to show NEWS
is a state actor. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) See Jackson, 980 F. Supp. at 1357 (“Extensive case law
establishes that a private doctor or hospital cannot be deemed a state actor merely because they are
recipients of state or federal funding.”). His allegations CWS “forced” Ms. Dawson “into NEWS
programming,” and a court “ordered [him] to pay them money as part of [his] release conditions”
are also insufficient to plausibly allege NEWS is a state actor. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) See Pasadena
Republican Club v. Western Justice Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1170 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[M]erely
contracting with the government does not transform an otherwise private party into a state actor.”).
So, the Court dismisses Mr. Milner’s constitutional claims against NEWS because Mr.
Milner has not plausibly alleged NEWS is a state actor. However, the Court gives Mr. Milner
leave to amend because NEWS has not shown it is impossible for Mr. Milner to allege it is a state
actor. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court should grant
leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the
allegation of other facts.”).
7. Claims Against Local Governments
CWS, Napa Probation, the City of Napa, the Napa Police Department, and NEWS also
seek to dismiss Mr. Milner’s claims against them because, to the extent they are local
governments, Mr. Milner has not sufficiently alleged a Monell claim.
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts
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the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must
first show his constitutional rights were violated by an individual defendant who was a local
government employee. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person
has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the
departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite
beside the point.”) Because as explained above, Mr. Milner has not alleged any individual officer
violated his constitutional rights, his constitutional claims against local government Defendants
also fail.
However, a plaintiff must also “establish that the local government had a deliberate policy,
custom, or practice that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation [he] suffered.”
AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
“[G]enerally, a single instance of unlawful conduct is insufficient to state a claim for municipal
liability,” but it may be sufficient “where fault and causation were clearly traceable to a
municipality’s legislative body or some other authorized decisionmaker.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of
San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Although Mr. Milner alleges
Eighth, Fourteenth, and First Amendment claims against several governmental entities, he has not
identified a particular Napa County or Napa City policy, custom, or practice and explained how it
led to the constitutional violations.
So, local government Defendants’ motions to dismiss claims against them are granted with
leave to amend.
C. RICO Claim
A civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to plaintiff’s ‘business or
property.’” See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To conduct or participate directly or indirectly
in the conduct of such an enterprise, one must participate in the operation or management of the
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enterprise.” Flores v. Emerich & Fike, 416 F. Supp. 2d 885, 912 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (cleaned up;
quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993)). And, to show a pattern of
racketeering activity, a plaintiff must show “the racketeering predicates are related, and that they
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d
1529, 1535 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up). Furthermore, a plaintiff must allege a “racketeering
activity” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), which includes:
“[A]ny act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a
controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in Section 102 of
the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State Law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.” §
1961(1)(A). Also included are any of more than twenty types of
conduct indictable under enumerated provisions of the United States
Code, ranging from mail fraud and wire fraud, through robbery and
extortion, to white slave trade. § 1961(1)(B). Finally, a “predicate act”
may also be established by any offense involving fraud “connected
with” a bankruptcy case, “fraud in the sale of securities,” or any act
related to a controlled substance or listed chemical “punishable' under
federal law.” § 1961(1)(C).
See Flores, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 911. In addition, “[t]o demonstrate injury for RICO purposes,
plaintiffs must show proof of concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable intangible
property interest.” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Personal injuries are not
compensable under RICO.”).
Mr. Milner has not plausibly alleged a RICO claim against NEWS, CWS, HHSA, Napa
Probation, and Ms. Ramirez. As predicate acts, Mr. Milner alleges Extortion and Coercion, Mail
and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the Court, and Federal Grant Fraud. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt.
No. 1 at 3-4.) As to all four activities, Mr. Milner alleges “[t]hese predicate acts occurred
repeatedly (more than twice within ten years).” (Id. at 4.) However, he needs to also allege the
acts were related because they had “the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not
isolated events.” H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3575(e)); see also Sever, 978 F.2d at 1535 (requiring “the racketeering predicate[] [acts] [be]
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity”). Mr. Milner’s
RICO claim also fails because he does not allege any facts supporting his claim he suffered
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“financial harm,” and so has not alleged an injury under RICO. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt.
No. 1 at 4.) See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of [RICO] . . . may sue.”); see also Ove, 264 F.3d at 825 (requiring “proof of concrete
financial loss”). And, rather than allege “Defendants” violated RICO, Mr. Milner must identify
the specific individuals who were involved in the enterprise and explain how each of them was
involved. (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) See Franco v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, No. C 10-04768 WHA, 2012 WL 1980799, at *10 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (“A
plaintiff is required under RICO to allege for each particular defendant the specific ‘racketeering
activity’ committed by the defendant.” (citation omitted)).
As claims grounded in fraud, Mr. Milner’s claims of Mail and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the
Court, and Federal Grant Fraud must be pled with particularity. Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b), a plaintiff must allege claims “grounded in fraud” with particularity. See Kearns
v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Rule 9(b) particularity
requirements to RICO claims). Particularity requires specifying “the who, what, when, where, and
how of the misconduct charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the purportedly
fraudulent statement, and why it is false.” United States ex rel. Anita Silingo v. WellPoint, Inc.,
904 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). Mr. Milner only alleges “Defendants”
“misrepresented” NEWS services or federal and state funds, or “submitted false statements and
misleading information.” (Case No. 25-cv-03428-JSC, Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) He does not specify
which Defendants made what statements, at what time, and why those statements were false or
misleading. So, he has not pled the Mail and Wire Fraud, Fraud on the Court, and Federal Grant
Fraud predicate acts with the necessary particularity.
So, Mr. Milner’s RICO claim is dismissed with leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss all of
Mr. Milner’s claims in his initial complaints with leave to amend, except Mr. Milner’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim based on false evidence and improper legal procedures is dismissed without
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leave to amend as to Mr. Bright. Mr. Bright is not considered a state actor so Mr. Milner may not
make constitutional claims against him. The Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike
Mr. Milner’s amended complaint.
Several Defendants move in the alternative for a more definite statement of Mr. Milner’s
pleading. (Dkt. No. 15.) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite
statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.”). Because the Court has granted
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, it DENIES this motion. However, if Mr. Milner files an amended
complaint, he must specify each legal claim he asserts, the facts supporting each claim, and the
exact defendants against which he asserts each claim.
Mr. Milner may file a single amended complaint in Case No. 25-cv-03350-JSC consistent
with this Order. Mr. Milner should include all claims and defendants from both his cases that he
wishes to pursue in that complaint and should not file an amended complaint in Case No. 25-cv-
03428-JSC. Mr. Milner’s deadline to file an amended complaint is January 17, 2026. If he does
not file an amended complaint by that date, judgment will be entered in Defendants’ favor and
against Mr. Milner on all claims.
Finally, as Mr. Milner is proceeding without counsel, the Court directs his attention to the
Handbook for Pro Se Litigants, which is available along with further information for the parties on
the Court’s website located at http://cand.uscourts.gov/proselitigants. Mr. Milner may also contact
the Legal Help Center via telephone: (415)-782-8982, or email: fedpro@sfbar.org for free
assistance regarding his claims.
This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 15, 22, 24, 60, and 65 in Case No. 3:25-cv-03350-JSC,
and Docket Nos. 25, 30, 37 in Case No. 3:25-cv-03428-JSC.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 12, 2025
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States District Judge
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