Shirriel v. City of Berkeley et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court	
Northern District of California
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HANA SHIRRIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF BERKELEY, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-03314-MMC
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is defendants City of Berkeley and Janice Chin’s Motion, filed
September 11, 2026, “to Dismiss One Cause of Action in the First Amended Complaint,”
whereby defendants move to dismiss plaintiff Hana Shirriel’s (“Shirriel”) Sixth Cause of
Action, titled “Harassment in Violation of FEHA[,] (Gov. Code. § 12940(j)).”1 Shirriel has
filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. The Court, having read and
considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, deems the
matter appropriate for determination on the parties’ respective written submissions,
VACATES the hearing scheduled for October 23, 2026, and rules as follows.
DISCUSSION2
I. Harassment
The Court, in granting defendants’ prior motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of
Action as alleged in the initial Complaint, held Shirriel failed to plead conduct that
constituted harassment (see Order at 5:27-6:1) (listing as examples “slurs,” “derogatory
drawings,” “interfer[ence] with freedom of movement,” and “unwanted sexual advances”)
as opposed to “personnel management actions” (see id. at 6:19-21) (listing as examples
1 Defendants do not move to dismiss Shirriel’s remaining five Causes of Action.
(See Mot. at 2:7-11.)
2 In its order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action for
harassment in Shirriel’s initial complaint, the Court set forth in detail the factual
background underlying the instant action, which underlying facts remain unchanged. (See
Doc. No. 28 (“Order”) at 1:18-3:18.)
Case 3:26-cv-03314-MMC Document 38 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 3

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court	
Northern District of California
actions “taken…in connection with Shirriel’s work schedule, workplace accommodations,
and discipline related to Shirriel’s compliance with in-person work requirements”).
The First Amended Complaint realleges the same conduct the Court, in its prior
order, previously found constituted “personnel management actions” rather than
harassment (compare Doc. No. 30 (“FAC”) ¶ 87 with Doc. No. 1 (“Complaint”) ¶ 86),
which, in each such pleading, Shirriel characterizes as “abusive” (see FAC at 11:21; see
also Complaint at 11:3).
Although the FAC adds to the list of allegedly “abusive” conduct allegations that
defendants made “disparaging comments regarding [p]laintiff’s post-partum mental
health, mocking her medical restrictions as excuses, and minimizing her pregnancy-
related conditions as illegitimate or burdensome,” “[s]ubject[ed] [p]laintiff to personal
ridicule, severe scolding, and aggressive hostility during administrative and
accommodation interactions,” and “[q]uestion[ed] the legitimacy of [p]laintiff’s medical
diagnosis[,] pressuring her…to accept a lower-paying position” (see FAC ¶ 87), the FAC
fails to allege any new conduct in support thereof, namely, what was, in fact, said,3 in the
absence of which Shirriel’s conclusory characterizations are insufficient. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Accordingly, Shirriel’s Sixth Cause of Action is subject to dismissal.
II. Leave to Amend
Although Shirriel requests leave to plead “additional specific facts” (see Opp. at
8:4), the FAC, as defendants point out, “was her opportunity to be more specific” (see
Reply at 1:17-19), and Shirriel, despite the Court’s having detailed the deficiencies in her
prior allegations, has failed to offer any new underlying factual allegations whatsoever
3 The FAC’s sole example of such language is that defendants, in “[q]uestioning
the legitimacy of [p]laintiff’s medical diagnosis and pressuring her…to accept a lower-
paying position[,]…remark[ed] that she ‘should be happy’ with her existing role.” (See
FAC ¶ 87.) Such comment, however, does not rise to the level of harassing conduct.
Case 3:26-cv-03314-MMC Document 38 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 3

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court	
Northern District of California
(compare FAC ¶¶ 14-46 with Complaint ¶¶ 14-46). Under such circumstances, the Court
finds leave to amend is not warranted. See, e.g., Brown v. Fitzpatrick, 667 F.App’x 267
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding “district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [plaintiff’s]
amended complaint without leave to amend after providing [plaintiff] with one opportunity
to amend”); Fosselman v. Hidalgo, 599 F.App’x. 310 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding “district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying [plaintiff] further leave to amend after…first
amended complaint failed to cure the deficiencies”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby
GRANTED, and the Sixth Cause of Action is hereby DISMISSED without further leave to
amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
MAXINE M. CHESNEY
United States District Judge
Case 3:26-cv-03314-MMC Document 38 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 3