Murdock v. Meta Platforms, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ZANE MURDOCK,
Plaintiff,
v.
META PLATFORMS, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-05230-RFL
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
STRIKE AND GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 6, 18
Plaintiff Zane Murdock, who is representing himself, sued Defendant Meta Platforms for
allegedly violating antitrust laws by restricting Murdock’s Facebook business account. Meta has
moved to dismiss Murdock’s complaint in its entirety, arguing among other things that Murdock
lacks antitrust standing and fails to state a claim. Murdock has opposed, and additionally moved
to strike Meta’s reply brief as procedurally improper. For the reasons described below,
Murdock’s Motion to Strike is DENIED and Meta’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Murdock’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. This order assumes the reader’s
familiarity with the facts of the case, the applicable legal standards, and the parties’ arguments.
Motion to Strike. Murdock argues that Meta’s reply brief excludes procedural
information required under the Civil Local Rules, improperly uses the term “Sherman Act,” and
introduces new citations and arguments. Murdock also argues that Meta improperly served him
both electronically and by mail when Murdock preferred to receive only electronic service.
These are not valid reasons to strike the reply brief. First, Murdock’s claims under 15 U.S.C.
Sections 1 and 2 are brought under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., CoStar Grp., Inc. v. Com. Real
Est. Exch., Inc., 150 F.4th 1056, 1068 (9th Cir. 2025). Second, Meta did not raise new
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arguments—it merely explained that it was not raising an argument that Murdock mentioned in
his opposition. (See Dkt. No. 17 at 5–6 (all citations to ECF pagination).) And third, though
nothing in the rules prohibited Meta from serving Murdock through the mail alongside its
electronic service, Meta has agreed to use only electronic service going forward at Murdock’s
request. (See Dkt. No. 19 at 6.) Finally, to the extent the Reply contained procedural errors,
Murdock has not shown that these errors caused him to suffer any prejudice. See New York City
Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 667 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[Motions to strike]
should only be granted if the matter has no logical connection to the controversy at issue and
may prejudice one or more of the parties to the suit.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Murdock’s motion to strike is therefore denied.
Antitrust Standing. All of Murdock’s claims are for antitrust violations. Murdock must
therefore show antitrust standing in order to pursue his claims. Because he has not alleged
antitrust injury, he has not sufficiently alleged antitrust standing.
Standing is threshold question. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992).
A plaintiff may only bring claims in federal court for which they have standing under Article III
of the Constitution. “To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. U.S.A., 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation modified). When
a private plaintiff seeks to bring antitrust claims, the “private plaintiff must [additionally] show
that it is a proper party to pursue the claim—a requirement known as antitrust standing.” City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 20 F.4th 441, 448 (9th Cir. 2021). Courts assess five factors to
determine if a private plaintiff has antitrust standing: (1) “the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged
injury . . .; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the speculative measure of the harm; (4) the risk of
duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in apportioning damages.” Id. at 455. Of these,
“the first factor—antitrust injury—is mandatory.” Id. at 456. This is because the “antitrust laws
were not created to allow individuals to recover for injuries to businesses, or for businesses to
recover for individual injury.” Dean v. Meta Platforms Inc., No. 25-CV-10597-NC, 2026 WL
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406027, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2026). To show antitrust injury, a plaintiff must allege, among
other things, “injury to the competitive process” itself. Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth,
515 F.3d 883, 902 (9th Cir. 2008). It is not enough to allege harm to an individual competitor.
See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F. App’x 554, 556 (9th Cir. 2008).
Murdock alleges that Meta unlawfully restricted his Facebook business account, which in
turn restrained his “access to trade or commerce.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4.) While this may have hurt
Murdock’s ability to compete in the market, Murdock does not allege that Meta harmed
competition itself. Courts routinely find that the restriction of a single account is insufficient to
show antitrust injury. See, e.g., Dean, 2026 WL 406027, at *1, 3 (no antitrust injury where the
defendant disabled a plaintiff’s platform); 618Media Dijital Hizmetler Ltd. Sirketi v. Apple Inc.,
No. 5:24-CV-02952-EJD, 2025 WL 2614983, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025) (no antitrust injury
where the defendant terminated an app developer’s account); see also Pickering v. Amazon.com
Inc., No. C24-0592, 2025 WL 1159099, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2025) (“More
fundamentally, the conduct that Pickering complains about—a failure to process a refund for one
consumer—cannot plausibly constitute harm to competition as a whole in the relevant market,
which is the type of harm that antitrust laws are intended to prohibit.”). Because Murdock has
not alleged antitrust injury, his claims must be dismissed for lack of antitrust standing.
Failure to State a Claim. Even if Murdock had sufficiently alleged antitrust injury, he
has not sufficiently pleaded a claim under either Section 1 or Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Dismissal is also required on this basis.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” 15
U.S.C. § 1. A plaintiff must plead four elements to state a Section 1 claim: “(1) a contract,
combination or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is
intended to restrain or harm trade; (3) which actually injures competition; and (4) harm to the
plaintiff from the anticompetitive conduct.” Name.Space, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned
Names & Numbers, 795 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). Murdock alleges
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generally that Meta “conspires to restrain” his access to trade, but he does not allege that Meta
conspired with any other person or business entity. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Nor does he allege that the
challenged conduct stems from Meta’s contract with another person or entity. Murdock must
plead more than conclusory allegations to support the “contract, combination, or conspiracy”
prong. Murdock has therefore failed to state a claim under Section 1.
Murdock has also failed to state a claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2
makes it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2. To state a Section 2 claim, a plaintiff must allege “(a) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power; and (c) causal antitrust injury.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d
974, 990 (9th Cir. 2020). This means that a plaintiff must allege “both that a ‘relevant market’
exists and that the defendant has power within that market.” Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Off.
Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). “A threshold step in any antitrust case is to accurately
define the relevant market, which refers to the area of effective competition.” Qualcomm, 969
F.3d at 992 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Murdock has not identified a relevant market in his Complaint. Nor has Murdock
sufficiently alleged that Meta willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power. Murdock has
therefore failed to state a claim under Section 2.
Because Murdock’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of standing and failure to state
a claim, the Court does not reach Meta’s additional arguments.
Conclusion. Murdock’s Motion to Strike is DENIED and Meta’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Murdock
wishes to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, he must
do so by November 13, 2026. Murdock is advised that the Court cannot refer to prior pleadings
to make an amended complaint complete. Any amended complaint must be complete in itself,
including all claims and parties, because it replaces the previously filed complaint. See Ferdik v.
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Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). If no amended complaint is filed by that date, the
claims will remain dismissed with prejudice, and the case will be closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge
Dated: October 15, 2026
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