Babae v. Albarran et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ALI KANOUNO BABAE,
Petitioner,
v.
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-11836
ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 3
Before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”). On October 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and an Ex
Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking his release from custody and to enjoin
Defendants from re-detaining him absent prior notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Dkt. No. 3.
For the following reasons, the TRO is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
According to the record before the Court, Petitioner affirmatively applied for asylum with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in 2017. Babae Decl. (Dkt. No.
3-2). During what he understood to be a routine biometrics appointment for his work permit
renewal, Babae was informed by an ICE officer that he was brought in for an unspecified felony
charge. Mahajan Decl. (Dkt. No. 3-3). No further information was provided to Babae or his
counsel regarding any felony charge, and he was detained. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the
standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2017). Thus, a party seeking a temporary restraining order must establish “[1] that he is likely
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to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
“[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits – a lesser
showing than likelihood of success on the merits – then a preliminary injunction may still issue if
the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are
satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up)
(emphasis in original). “[W]hen the Government is the opposing party,” the final two factors
“merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555
U.S. at 22. A “TRO ‘should be restricted to . . . preserving the status quo and preventing
irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a [preliminary injunction] hearing, and no
longer.’ ” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 779 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S.
423, 439 (1974)).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his
ongoing detention violates his procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody, and the Due Process Clause
entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing before an immigration judge prior to any arrest or detention.
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030-36 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (applying the three-part test
established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) to similar circumstances). That the
government has not sought to detain Petitioner over the past nine years while his immigration
applications have been pending reflects a determination by the government that he was neither a
flight risk nor a danger to the community, and Petitioner has a strong interest in remaining at
liberty unless he no longer meets those criteria. On this record, no evidence indicates that
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Petitioner no longer meets that criteria, and thus Petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on
the merits.
Petitioner has also demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of
temporary relief. His interest in freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty that
[the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of
erroneous deprivation was total: he received no process of any kind, and no neutral decisionmaker
has ever found that he poses a danger or flight risk. The likely unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty that Petitioner faces is an immediate and irreparable harm. Further, “[i]t is well established
that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’ ”
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d
990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir.
2005). “[I]t follows inexorably from [the] conclusion” that Petitioner’s detention without a
hearing is “likely unconstitutional” that he has “also carried [his] burden as to irreparable harm.”
Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995.
The final two Winter factors, the balance of the equities and public interest, also weigh
heavily in favor of granting temporary relief. “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding
procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the
costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Jorge M. F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv
01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (cleaned up); see Melendres, 695
F.3d at 1002 (“[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s
constitutional rights.” (quotation omitted)); Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.
2005) (“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been
violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”). Meanwhile, the
potential harm to the government is minimal. The Government, at most, faces a short delay in
detaining Petitioner if it ultimately demonstrates his detention is necessary to prevent danger to the
community or flight. See Jorge M. F., 2021 WL 783561, at *3; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05071,
2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025). The government is not “harmed in any
legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S.
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Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Faced with “a conflict between
[administrative] concerns and preventable human suffering, [the Court has] little difficulty
concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872
F.3d at 996) (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)). The balance of
hardships thus tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor.
A TRO immediately releasing Petitioner is appropriate to return him to the status quo. E.
Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 932 F.3d at 779. The status quo refers to “the last uncontested status
which preceded the pending controversy.” Doe v. Noem, 778 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1166 (W.D.
Wash. 2025) (quoting GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000)).
That is the moment prior to Petitioner’s likely illegal detention. See Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25
cv-00663, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025) (granting a temporary restraining
order requiring immediate release of the petitioner back to home confinement from custody, as a
restoration of the status quo). Because Petitioner satisfies all requirements for temporary
injunctive relief and such relief is necessary to restore the status quo, the TRO application is
granted as detailed below.
The requirements for issuing a TRO without notice are met here. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(b)(1). Petitioner’s filings set out specific facts showing that immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage may result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Additionally, counsel states that she contacted counsel at the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Northern District of California on October 13, 2026. See Dkt. No. 3-1; see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B).
Finally, the Court exercises its discretion under Rule 65(c) to dispense with the filing of
bond. “[T]here is no realistic likelihood of harm to the [Respondents] from enjoining [their]
conduct.” Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, no security is
needed to ensure that Respondents will be reimbursed for “costs and damages sustained by . . .
hav[ing] been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
//
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Petitioner’s application is GRANTED to preserve the status quo pending further
briefing and a hearing on this matter.
(2) Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner immediately from Respondents’
custody and ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner without notice and a
pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Respondents are ENJOINED from
removing Petitioner from this judicial district, and, if they have already transferred him, are
ORDERED to return him to this judicial district. Respondents are PROHIBITED from removing
Petitioner from the United States until these proceedings have terminated.
(3) During the pendency of the habeas proceedings, Respondents are ENJOINED AND
RESTRAINED from moving Petitioner from the jurisdiction.
(4) Respondents shall provide a status report confirming Petitioner’s release by 10:00 a.m.
on October 14, 2026.
(5) Respondents are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE at a hearing in the courtroom of the
assigned judge, or as otherwise ordered by that judge, at 10:00 a.m. on October 22, 2026, why a
preliminary injunction should not issue. Respondents may file a written response no later than
October 19, 2026, and Petitioner may file a reply by no later than noon on October 21, 2026. The
assigned judge may modify this schedule as appropriate.
(5) This Order shall remain in effect until 6:29 a.m. on October 28, 2026, or as otherwise
directed by the Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 14, 2026, at 6:30 a.m.
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN
United States District Judge
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