Attia v. Oura Ring, Inc. et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PETER ATTIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
OURARING INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 23-cv-03433-HSG (LJC)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
RETAIN CONFIDENTIALITY
DESIGNATIONS
Re: Dkt. No. 196
Before the Court is Plaintiff Peter Attia’s motion to retain the confidentiality designations
of portions of nine documents. ECF No. 196. The matter is fully briefed and suitable for
resolution without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the parties’
arguments, the record in this case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court GRANTS
Plaintiff’s motion. The portions of the documents at issue may remain designated as confidential.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the overall factual and procedural history
and provides the following summary to contextualize its ruling. There is a stipulated Protective
Order in effect in this case. ECF No. 68. The Protective Order provides that the parties may
designate sensitive material as “Confidential” or “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only”
(AEO). In relevant part, the Protective Order defines “Confidential information or items” as
“information (regardless of how it is generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that
qualify for protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).” Id. § 2.2. Rule 26(c), in turn,
allows for protective orders to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense.” The Protective Order establishes procedures for challenging
confidentiality designations. ECF No. 68 § 6.
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 1 of 7

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
On February 4, 2026, Defendants Oura Ring, Inc. and Oura Health Ltd. (collectively,
Oura) challenged Plaintiff’s confidentiality designations of nine documents Plaintiff had
designated as Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only (AEO). Plaintiff later agreed to remove
the AEO designations from the documents and proceeded to designate select portions of each
document as confidential. See ECF No. 196-1 (Yu Decl.) ¶ 7. The parties’ instant dispute is about
whether portions of these nine documents (the “Designated Material”) may remain confidential.
The Designated Material falls into two camps. Exhibit I is a spreadsheet of Plaintiff’s
subscriber counts for each month between 2018 and 2025 for Plaintiff’s YouTube account, Twitter
account, Instagram account, and weekly newsletter. It includes both his monthly subscriber
counts for each platform and the month-to-month change in subscribers. Plaintiff seeks to keep
columns B and C, which show the of and monthly increase of subscribers to his newsletter,
confidential. See ECF No. 194-10; Yu Decl. ¶ 5. Exhibits A through H are email correspondence
between Plaintiff, his brother Paul Attia, Andrew Klaber, Lacey Stenson, and various Oura
shareholders and third parties. Of these exhibits, Exhibit D though G are versions of the same
email thread and all include a chart listing various Oura investors. The chart includes the
investor’s contact information and a “Notes” column describing the financial relationships and
personal dynamics between various investors. See Yu Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff seeks to keep email
addresses and other contact information in Exhibits A through H confidential. See ECF No. 194-1
(Hamilton Decl.) ¶¶ 2-15. He also seeks to keep the “Notes” column of Exhibits D through G
confidential. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) provides, in relevant part, that a “party or any person
from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court where the action is
pending . . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” District courts have “broad
discretion . . . to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is
required.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).
“For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 2 of 7

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). “Broad allegations of harm,
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.”
Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Cipollone v.
Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)). “A party asserting good cause bears the
burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific prejudice or harm
will result if no protective order is granted.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
“If a court finds particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the
public, then it balances the public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is
necessary.” Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211. Factors to consider in weighing the public and private
interests include:
(1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; (2) whether
the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an
improper purpose; (3) whether disclosure of the information will
cause a party embarrassment; (4) whether confidentiality is being
sought over information important to public health and safety; (5)
whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote
fairness and efficiency; (6) whether a party benefitting from the order
of confidentiality is a public entity or official; and (7) whether the
case involves issues important to the public.
Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995); see In re Roman Cath.
Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (directing courts in the
Ninth Circuit to consider the Glenmede factors). These standards apply to motions to continue or
enforce protective orders, and the burden of proof remains “with the party seeking protection.” In
re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424 (quoting Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1211 n.1); see
Qualcomm Incorporated v. Apple Inc., 18-mc-80134, 2021 WL 879817, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9,
2021); Muench Photography, Inc. v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 12-cv-01927, 2013 WL 4475900, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Exhibit I
Plaintiff argues that public disclosure of the subscriber information in columns B and C of
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 3 of 7

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Exhibit I would cause him particularized harm. See ECF No. 196 at 7. In support, Nick Stenson,
“Head of Digital” for Plaintiff’s podcast, attests that this subscriber information for Plaintiff’s
newsletter has never been made public and disclosing it “could provide competitors with
information about [Plaintiff’s] most successful content strategies” by revealing which topics
“generate the strongest audience response” or which guests “drive the greatest engagement.” ECF
No. 196-14 ¶¶ 4-6. These “specific examples” of harm that would result if columns B and C were
made public are sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden under Rule 26(c). Beckman Indus., 966
F.2d at 476 (internal quotations omitted); see Muench, 2013 WL 4475900, at *4 (finding
defendant’s explanation that disclosure of print production, sales figures, and profit margins to
competitors could allow competitors to use defendant’s business strategies sufficient to meet
particularized harm standard); Todd v. Tempur-Sealy Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-04984, 2015 WL
1006534, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015).
Plaintiff next argues that the balance of public and private interests weighs in favor of
keeping this information confidential. ECF No. 196 at 10-11. Again, the Court agrees. While it
is doubtful that disclosure of this information would cause Plaintiff “embarrassment,” disclosure
would reveal aspects of Plaintiff’s confidential business strategies and thus implicate his privacy
interests. In re Roman Cath. Archbishop, 661 F.3d at 424 n.5. Given that Oura already has access
to the confidential information, it is not apparent that Oura seeks de-designation for a “legitimate
purpose,” and disclosing the information to the public would not further “fairness and efficiency”
in this case. Id. The information is not “important to public health and safety,” Plaintiff is not a
public entity or official, and, although Plaintiff and Oura are relatively well known, this case is, at
core, a contract dispute with minimal bearing on “issues important to the public.” Id.
Accordingly, the public interest in disclosure does not outweigh Plaintiff’s interest in keeping the
information confidential.
Oura advances the somewhat specious argument that columns B and C of Exhibit I cannot
be kept confidential because Plaintiff already filed the information contained therein publicly in
his previous lawsuit in the Western District of Texas. See ECF No. 229 at 3. Plaintiff’s complaint
in that lawsuit alleged that, as of November 2022, his newsletter reached an audience of over
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 4 of 7

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
250,000. See Attia v. Ouraring Inc., No. 22-cv-1142, ECF No. 1-2 at 29 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 4,
2022). It did not disclose historic subscriber data or month-to-month changes in his newsletter
subscribers. Disclosing a point-in-time estimate of how many people accessed Plaintiff’s
newsletter did not waive confidentiality as to the detailed subscriber data in Exhibit I. Moreover,
Oura has not explained how it would be prejudiced if the subscriber information at issue was kept
confidential. Plaintiff’s request to keep columns B and C of Exhibit I designated as confidential is
accordingly granted.
B. Exhibits A-H
Plaintiff argues that his, his associates’, and various third parties’ contact information
contained in Exhibits A through H must remain confidential. He explains that disclosure of this
information “would subject” Plaintiff and third parties “to spam and solicitation messages that
would disrupt their professional activities.” ECF No. 196 at 8-9. This is sufficient to establish
particularized harm. See Yaniv v. Loc. 4811, Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am., No. 25-cv-00819, 2026 WL 221789, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2026)
(finding that “public disclosure of the personally identifiable information of non-parties would
result in particularized harm to those individuals”). For the reasons explained above, the public’s
interest in disclosure of the contact information at issue does not outweigh Plaintiff’s and third
parties’ interest in keeping this information confidential.
Oura raises four arguments why the contact information should be de-designated. None of
them move the needle. First, Oura argues that contact information for Plaintiff, Lacey Stenson,
Paul Attia, and Andrew Klaber may not be kept confidential as it was already filed publicly on the
docket at ECF No. 156. See ECF No. 229 at 3. But ECF No. 156 was filed publicly by Oura, not
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has since moved to seal ECF No. 156. Oura cannot use its own failure to
follow sealing protocols in this case as a basis to claim that Plaintiff waived confidentiality.
Second, Oura argues that Plaintiff does not have standing to assert that third parties’ contact
information should remain confidential. See ECF No. 229 at 4. Courts regularly allow parties to
keep nonparty information confidential without concerns regarding standing, and Oura provides
no support for their claim that a rigid standing requirement applies. See Yaniv, 2026 WL 221789,
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 5 of 7

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
at *1; Chavez-Deremer v. Coway USA, Inc., No. 24-cv-08156, 2025 WL 3704376, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 22, 2025); 3D Sys., Inc. v. Wynne, No. 21-cv-1141, 2024 WL 1122377, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 14, 2024). The Court sees no reason to impose such a standard here. Third, Oura argues that
Plaintiff did not personally attest to the harm he would experience if his contact information was
made public. ECF No. 229 at 4. They provide no explanation why the Court should impose such
a requirement, and the Court declines to do so. Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration and the
explanation in the motion are sufficient. Lastly, Oura argues that as Plaintiff did not show he was
harmed by disclosure of his contact information when it was available publicly at ECF No. 156,
his claim that he will be harmed going forward if the information is de-designated is speculative.
ECF No. 229 at 4. This argument does not address the harm to third parties if their contact
information were to be disclosed. Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff’s contact information was
disclosed on one publicly filed document for a handful of months does not show that he will not
be subjected to “spam and solicitation messages” if his contact information is de-designated across
the board. ECF No. 196 at 8-9. Plaintiff’s request to keep the contact information in Exhibits A
through H designated as confidential is accordingly granted.
Plaintiff also argues that the “Notes” column of Exhibits D through G must remain
confidential, as it includes third parties’ private financial information and “sensitive personal
information,” including commentary on personal relationships and allegiances between Oura’s
investors and board members. ECF No. 196 at 9-10. Oura does not specifically argue that this
information must be de-designated. The undersigned takes Oura’s failure to develop or present
any argument for de-designation as a concession that this material may remain confidential. See
John-Charles v. California, 646 F.3d 1243, 1247 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (deeming issue waived where
party “failed to develop any argument”). Plaintiff’s request to keep the “Notes” column of
Exhibits D through G is accordingly granted.
//
//
//
//
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 6 of 7

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion to retain the confidentiality designations for Exhibits A through I is
accordingly granted. The parties are reminded of their obligation under the Protective Order to
“attempt to resolve each [confidentiality] challenge in good faith” before seeking judicial
intervention. ECF No. 68 § 6.2.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 22, 2026
LISA J. CISNEROS
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:23-cv-03433-HSG Document 294 Filed 04/22/26 Page 7 of 7