Murek v. Albarran et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARIUSZ MUREK,
Plaintiff,
v.
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-cv-10719-PCP
ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 3, 13, 15
Petitioner Mariusz Murek is a native and citizen of Poland who has lived in the United
States for over nine years. He entered lawfully on a tourist visa but stayed in the country for a
period greater than permitted under the terms of his visa and after the visa’s expiration in May
2026. He was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on September 20, 2026,
while waiting to board a domestic flight at San Francisco International Airport. Mr. Murek filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking his
release, contending that he was detained in violation of his procedural and substantive due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. That same day, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
requiring his release, enjoining the government from re-detaining him without notice and a pre-
detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and ordering the government to show cause why
a preliminary injunction should not issue. At the preliminary injunction hearing, the parties agreed
that the Court could rely upon the preliminary injunction record to determine whether Mr. Murek
is entitled to the ultimate relief he seeks—issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants the requested writ and prohibits the government from re-detaining
Mr. Murek without first providing him with a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
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BACKGROUND
Mr. Murek is a 40-year-old native and citizen of Poland. He was issued a B-1/B-2 visa
(commonly referred to as a “tourist” visa) on May 20, 2016. See Exhibit 1, Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, Dkt. No. 3. The visa expired on May 17, 2026. According to his passport, he
was admitted to the United States on June 26, 2016, and authorized to stay until December 25,
2016. Id. Mr. Murek was admitted again on February 2, 2017, and he was authorized to stay until
May 2, 2017. Id. He has remained in the United States since his last entry on February 2, 2017. Id.
The government suggests, and Mr. Murek does not dispute, that since February 2, 2017, Mr.
Murek has not had contact with any government agency.
Mr. Murek lives with his wife and nine-month-old son, who is a U.S. citizen, in Petaluma,
California. He works as a property manager and handyman, and he is the sole source of financial
support for his wife and son. Mr. Murek has committed a “minor traffic infraction” but otherwise
has no criminal history in the United States or elsewhere in the world.
On September 20, 2026, Mr. Murek was detained by ICE at San Francisco International
Airport while waiting to board his flight to Phoenix, Arizona. His counsel subsequently filed a
habeas petition and an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause
why a preliminary injunction should not issue. See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Dkt.
No. 3. Later that day, another judge of this Court issued a temporary restraining order requiring
Mr. Murek’s release, enjoining the government from re-detaining him without notice and a pre-
arrest hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, and ordering the government to show cause why a
preliminary injunction should not issue. See Order Granting Petitioner’s Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. No. 4. Mr.
Murek was released from immigration custody at approximately 7:16 p.m. on September 21, 2026.
See Status Report, Dkt. No. 9.
During the show cause hearing, the government asserted that ICE had offered to release
Mr. Murek if he posted a $4,000 bond. The Court requested supplemental briefing regarding the
factual basis for that assertion and its legal significance. The government subsequently filed a
supplemental brief correcting its prior statement and stating that ICE had determined that Mr.
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Murek should be held without bond. Respondent’s Supplemental Brief, Dkt. No. 17, at 1.
The Court’s temporary restraining order was originally set to expire at 10:00 p.m. on
October 4, 2026. At the hearing on this matter, the Court extended the temporary restraining order
by 14 days, so that it now expires at 10:00 p.m. on October 18, 2026. The parties have agreed that
the Court can treat their briefing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue as the response
and traverse on the merits of Mr. Murek’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Two statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, provide for the detention of noncitizens or
“aliens” pending removal proceedings. Under § 1225, a noncitizen “who ‘arrives in the United
States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as ‘an applicant for
admission.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)).
Such individuals are subject to mandatory detention unless an exception applies. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b). For noncitizens like Mr. Murek who are “already in the country,” § 1226 similarly
permits detention “pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. But
unlike § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), § 1226 affords the government significant discretion with respect
to detention. After arresting a noncitizen “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” the
government “may continue to detain the arreste[e]” until a final removal decision is made or “may
release” them on “bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–(2). Release is available,
however, only if “the alien ... demonstrate[s] to the satisfaction of [an] officer that such release
would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8). If a noncitizen wishes to contest the initial
custody determination—i.e., the denial or amount of bond—he has a right to do so before an
immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1). Immigration judges must deny bond
unless “an alien ... demonstrate[s], by clear and convincing evidence, that release would not pose a
danger to other persons or to property” and “that the alien is likely to appear for any scheduled
proceeding or interview.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(3).
The Court must grant a writ of habeas corpus to Mr. Murek if he is or will be “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see also
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Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (concluding that federal district courts have
jurisdiction to issue such relief). Mr. Murek contends that his initial detention and threatened re-
detention violate his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Because the first issue is dispositive for the reasons set forth below, the Court need not at this time
consider Mr. Murek’s substantive due process claim.
“Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. July 14, 2025); see also Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989) (explaining the two-step inquiry for procedural due process claims). If Mr. Murek
establishes that he has a protected liberty interest, the Court must balance three factors to
determine whether he was entitled to a hearing prior to being detained, or whether the post-
detention review procedures set forth in § 1226 are sufficient to satisfy due process. Those three
factors are (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
ANALYSIS
I. Mr. Murek has a protected liberty interest in avoiding immigration detention.
As noted above, the first step of the procedural due process analysis requires considering
whether Mr. Murek has any interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. The answer to that
question is clearly yes.
The Due Process Clause protects all persons in the United States, including noncitizens,
from deprivations “of life, liberty, or property” by the federal government “without due process of
law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Once a
noncitizen “enters the country, … the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
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United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.” Id. at 693. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long recognized that after a noncitizen
“gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence
his constitutional status changes,” and as such, he “has a right to due process.” Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903)
(distinguishing noncitizens entitled to due process from those “who ha[ve] been here for too brief
a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our population”). Put another way,
“[noncitizens] who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings[.]” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107, 140 S.Ct. 1959.
Mr. Murek has certainly “established connections in this country,” id., sufficient to make
him “a part of our population,” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 101. Mr. Murek was given permission to
enter the United States on a tourist visa 10 years ago. After his last entry into the country in
February 2017, Mr. Murek built a life and a community here over the course of more than 9 years.
He has a wife and a nine-month-old son, who is a U.S. citizen, and they all reside together in
Petaluma, California. Mr. Murek works as a property manager and handyman, and he is the sole
source of financial support for his wife and son. He has “develop[ed] ties,” Landon, 459 U.S. at
32, in Petaluma, where he shoulders financial responsibility for his wife and young U.S. citizen
son and has spent nearly a decade building connections to this country. Mr. Murek is therefore
entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment.
The government contends that Mr. Murek lacks a protected liberty interest because it has
never previously decided to release him or refrained from detaining him. Response to Order to
Show Cause, Dkt. No. 13, at 6–9. But that argument ignores that any form of detention constitutes
a deprivation of liberty. It is true that “courts in this district consistently hold that when a
noncitizen is released pending civil removal proceedings, the noncitizen has a protected liberty
interest in remaining out of immigration custody.” Llanes Tellez v. Bondi, 826 F. Supp. 3d 1141,
1149 (N.D. Cal. 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 26-1003, 2026 WL 2445624 (9th Cir. June 17,
2026) (collecting cases). But those cases merely recognize an additional protected interest that
must be considered as part of the due process analysis. They do not suggest that in the absence of
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that additional interest the loss of liberty resulting from detention is not in and of itself a
deprivation of liberty for constitutional purposes. Nor could they, given the Supreme Court’s
recognition that “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690.
Mr. Murek’s protected liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody could
therefore be taken away only if the government’s procedure for doing so complied with the
requirements of the Due Process Clause.
II. The Mathews factors all favor providing Mr. Murek with a pre-detention hearing.
As noted above, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), identifies three factors that
must be balanced in determining what procedures due process requires with respect to the
deprivation of a protected interest:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. at 335. Each of these three factors supports the conclusion that Mr. Murek was and is entitled
to a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker before being re-detained.
A. Mr. Murek’s private interest is substantial.
As explained above, Mr. Murek has a substantial interest in remaining out of custody.
Indeed, his interest in remaining free “from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint [] lies at the heart of the liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment. Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690. The Court must be “careful not to ‘minimize the importance and fundamental
nature’ of the individual’s right to liberty.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (quoting
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)). Mr. Murek lived free in the United States for
almost a decade, and he has a substantial interest in remaining in his home, continuing his
employment, caring for his young son, and providing the sole means of financial support for his
family. See Garro Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (holding that a
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petitioner had “an interest in remaining in her home, continuing her employment, providing for
her family, obtaining necessary medical care, maintaining her relationships in the community, and
continuing to attend her church”); Chiguil Chiguil v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-1844 DAD CSK, 2026
WL 913195, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Chiguil
v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-01844-DAD-CSK (HC), 2026 WL 983134 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026)
(noting that “[t]he duration of petitioner’s freedom prior to his detention elevates and underscores
his interest in liberty”).
The government argues that Mr. Murek “no due process right to a pre-deprivation hearing”
because he is “subject to detention under § 1226(a),” and the Ninth Circuit held in Rodriguez Diaz
v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), that the procedures provided under § 1226(a) are
constitutionally adequate notwithstanding the absence of any pre-detention hearing. Response to
Order to Show Cause, Dkt. No. 13, at 9. But Rodriguez Diaz did not hold that all noncitizens
facing removal under § 1226(a) have no due process right to a pre-detention hearing. Instead, it
held only that a noncitizen previously detained under § 1226(a)—i.e., a noncitizen who was
previously unable to demonstrate that they posed no flight risk or threat to the community—does
not have the constitutional right to a second bond hearing when the only changed circumstance
since their first bond hearing is the duration of their detention.
To be certain, it may be that the post-detention bond hearing provided under § 1226(a)
provides constitutionally sufficient due process for those noncitizens who are detained relatively
soon after their arrival in the country. Mr. Murek’s circumstances, however, are different. He has
lived for nearly a decade in the United States without incident. Except for a minor traffic
infraction, Mr. Murek has no criminal history here or anywhere else in the world. See Amended
Petition, Dkt. No. 2, at 1. There is no indication that Mr. Murek poses a flight risk or a danger to
the community. Accordingly, Mr. Murek’s private interest in retaining his liberty is significant.
B. The risk of erroneous deprivation and value of additional safeguards are high.
If Mr. Murek were re-detained pursuant to § 1226, he would be entitled to a post-arrest
bond hearing before an immigration judge. But that hearing would only be provided after he had
already been detained and thereby deprived of his liberty. As such, even if a post-detention bond
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hearing would be available, there would remain a substantial risk that the government had
erroneously deprived Mr. Murek of his liberty without a valid basis.
“[W]here ... the petitioner has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing,”
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high.” Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801,
2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (citation modified). That is because “neither
[p]etitioner nor [r]espondents had an opportunity to determine whether any valid basis exists for
[his] detention.” Oliveros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-07117-BLF, 2025 WL 2677125, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2025). There are only two such bases for civil immigration detention: to prevent flight or
to protect against danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The government has
offered no evidence suggesting that Mr. Murek’s detention would serve either purpose. In fact, the
record before the Court suggests the opposite. The government previously granted Mr. Murek a
tourist visa and, upon arrival to the United States, made a determination that he was admissible.
Mr. Murek has no criminal record aside from a minor traffic infraction, and he is the sole means of
financial support for his wife and young son. It is therefore unlikely that Mr. Murek poses any
threat or flight risk. See Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01424, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 1, 2021).
Given the absence of any evidence justifying Mr. Murek’s detention, there is a significant
risk that the deprivation of his liberty in the time between his arrest and any post-arrest bond
hearing under § 1226 would be entirely unjustified. Providing Mr. Murek with the procedural
safeguard of a pre-detention hearing would have significant value in helping ensure that any future
detention has a lawful basis. The second Mathews factor thus strongly weighs in Mr. Murek’s
favor.
C. The government’s countervailing interest is minimal.
The government’s countervailing interest in detaining Mr. Murek without a pre-deprivation
hearing is minimal. The government may have “a strong interest” in detaining noncitizens during
the pendency of removal proceedings as needed to “protect[] the public from dangerous criminal
aliens,” or to prevent flight and thereby “increase the chance that ... the aliens will be successfully
removed.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 515 (2003)).
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But the government has not shown, nor attempted to show, that Mr. Murek poses a flight risk or
danger to the community. And while the government may in some circumstances have a strong
interest in providing only a post-detention bond hearing where it cannot determine prior to
detention whether the noncitizen poses a threat to the public or a flight risk, Mr. Murek’s lengthy
time in the United States, well-established family and social connections, and lack of a meaningful
criminal record demonstrate that the government has no strong interest in detaining Mr. Murek
before evaluating whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Whether or not this
government interest might tilt the third factor in the government’s favor in other cases, it has no
significant weight here.
Finally, the costs associated with providing a pre-deprivation hearing would have likely
been nominal. See Singh v. Andrews, 803 F.Supp.3d 1035, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“In immigration
court, custody hearings are routine and impose a minimal cost.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The third Mathews factor therefore also strongly weighs in Mr. Murek’s favor.
* * *
In sum, as applied to the specific circumstances of Mr. Murek’s case involving an
individual who entered the country lawfully, has developed deep connections within the United
States over several years of residence therein, and has no significant criminal record, all three of
the Mathews factors favor providing him with a hearing prior to any deprivation of his liberty. He
is therefore entitled to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. And because he has demonstrated
success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable injury to his constitutional rights in the absence
of injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favor such relief, Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008), Mr. Murek is entitled to a permanent
injunction prohibiting the government from re-detaining him without first providing him with a
pre-detention bond hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Mr. Murek’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and permanently enjoins the government from re-detaining Mr. Murek without first
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providing him with a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. Mr. Murek
must be provided with at least seven days’ notice of any such bond hearing. The government may
re-detain Mr. Murek only if, at such a bond hearing, the government bears its burden of
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Murek is a danger to the community or a
flight risk and that no conditions other than detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms.
This order does not address the circumstances in which the government may detain Mr. Murek in
the event he becomes subject to an executable final order of removal.
This order resolves all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
P. Casey Pitts
United States District Judge
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