Akilov v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KOMROM MARUFOVICH AKILOV,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden of
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-CV-3831 JLS (BJW)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Komron Marufovich Akilov’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). 	Also before the Court
is Respondents Christopher LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center), Todd
Lyons’s (Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal
Operations), Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security), and
Pamela Bondi’s (U.S. Attorney General) (collectively, “Respondents”) Return to Habeas
Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Tajikistan, alleges that he has been detained by the United
States 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security’s 	(“DHS”) 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since February 6, 2025,
when he was arrested while walking to his car. Pet. ¶ 5. On August 14, 2023, Petitioner
entered the United States through the CBP One application at the San Ysidro Port of Entry
to seek asylum. Id. ¶ 39. On September 25, 2023, Petitioner was released on humanitarian
parole. 	Id. 	On January 31, 2024, an Immigration Judge terminated removal proceedings
against Petitioner to allow him to pursue his asylum claim. Id. ¶ 41. Petitioner thereafter
applied for affirmative asylum. Id. ¶ 43. Petitioner now alleges that his detention violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. ¶¶ 52–72.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Ret.
at 2–6. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims
arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings. 	Ret. at 5. 	The Court
disagrees.
Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions
that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,
2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). 	Section 1252(g) “does not
prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion
connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’
objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their
constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Rather, Petitioner is challenging his
re-detention without notice or justification. 	Traverse at 3. 	Petitioner is enforcing his
“constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the
legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). 	Therefore, §
1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.
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II. 	Due Process
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a
hearing violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶ 72. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and
constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 6. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted
humanitarian parole. 	Pet. ¶ 4. 	Petitioner is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking
admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in the United States since August 2023. Id.
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¶ 3. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk
and has attended his court hearings. Traverse at 1–4. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant
for admission” at the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody. 	See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4
(“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his humanitarian
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parole. 	“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause]
protects.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 	Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and
providing for his family and continuing the asylum process. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471
at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free
to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Traverse at 6. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner
should be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).
Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,
has work authorization, and has filed an asylum application. 	Traverse at 13. 	“Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to
present 	evidence 	of 	materially 	changed 	circumstances—namely, 	evidence 	that 	the
noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d
at 1760. 	Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their
response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his parole. 	See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not
received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is
high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5
(quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).
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Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas
corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due
process grounds).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. 	The Court
ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the
reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to
determine whether detention is warranted. 	The government shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight.1 The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by
January 16, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released. 	As this concludes the
litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 9, 2026
1 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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