Carlson et al v. CoBank

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02402-SKC-TPO
KIMBERLY CARLSON, and
PATRICK STANSBERRY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COBANK,
Defendant.
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 42)
This case arises from Defendant CoBank’s decision to terminate Plaintiffs
Kimberly Carlson’s and Patrick Stansberry’s employment. Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs assert
claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Colorado Anti-
Discrimination Act and contend CoBank discriminated against them based on their
religious beliefs. Id. They seek to recover “back pay plus bonuses, reinstatement or
front 	pay, 	pre-judgment 	and 	post-judgment 	interest, 	punitive 	damages, 	and
compensatory damages.” Id. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because this matter arises under Federal law, and it has supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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Before the Court is CoBank’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 42. The
Motion is fully briefed. Dkts. 44 (Response), 48 (Reply). The Court has carefully
considered the Motion and related briefing, the exhibit attachments, the entire case
file, and the applicable law and legal authorities. No hearing is necessary. Because,
when considering the undisputed material facts, no reasonable jury could conclude
CoBank discriminated against Plaintiffs, CoBank’s Motion is GRANTED.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The purpose of summary judgment is to assess whether a trial is necessary.
White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is
appropriate “when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant
bears the “responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
If the movant meets this burden, then the nonmoving party must identify material
facts showing there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at 324. A fact is “material” if it
has the potential to affect the outcome of a dispute under applicable law. Ulissey v.
Shvartsman, 61 F.3d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1995). An issue is “genuine” if a rational
trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Adams v.
Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000). In performing
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this analysis, the factual record and any reasonable inferences from it are construed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
Even when a party fails to appropriately respond to the request for summary
judgment and its purportedly undisputed facts, the Court is nevertheless obligated
to ensure the movant has satisfied the standard under Rule 56. As the Tenth Circuit
explained in Perez v. El Tequila, LLC, 847 F.3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 2017), “in
granting summary judgment based upon a failure to respond, a district court must
still determine that summary judgment is appropriate.” See also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 2010 amendment.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), when parties assert that a fact is genuinely
disputed, they must support the assertion with citations to specific parts of the record.
When they fail to, the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of deciding
the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Additionally, in reference to motions for summary
judgment, this Court’s Standing Order for Civil Cases directs that general references
to record materials are insufficient where the cited document exceeds one page. See
SKC S TANDING O RDER CIV. § C.4.4. When the document contains multiple pages, the
Court requires the parties to make specific references to the evidence. Id. As the
Standing Order says, a “specific reference” means reference to page numbers, line
numbers, paragraph numbers, or any combination of these to assist the Court in
locating the pertinent materials. Id. Because Plaintiffs did not follow Rule 56(e)(2) or
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the Standing Order, CoBank contends, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiffs’ response
fails to create any genuine dispute of material fact.1 Dkt. 48, p.2.
“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” Gross v.
Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotations
omitted). The Court has no obligation to scour the record in search of evidence to
support a party’s factual assertions. And where Plaintiffs have directed the Court to
broad-swath record citations, the Court has ignored them because they equate to no
citation at all. See id. (“Without a specific reference, [courts] will not search the record
in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant evidence. . . .”) (cleaned up);
see also Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The district
court was not obligated to comb the record in order to make [the plaintiff’s] arguments
for him.”). Because Plaintiffs have not made adequate record citations in opposing
1 For example, in response to CoBank’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,
Plaintiffs make unsupported arguments or only general references to the evidence.
See Dkt. 49. Plaintiffs neither cite to any page or paragraph numbers, nor do they
specifically quote any portion of the record that would guide the Court on how these
documents create disputed issues of fact. They instead make broad assertions
regarding the purported disputes and cite whole exhibits—like citing, “Exhibits A-
D”—without providing specific references. See, e.g., Dkt. 49, ¶20. And in their
Response Brief, Plaintiffs fail to reference any portion of the Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts and reference only their own exhibits, to include citation to an
“Exhibit G” which is not found in the record. This roughshod approach leaves it to the
Court and CoBank to speculate on what portion of Plaintiffs’ multiple exhibits could
possibly support their arguments. That is not the Court’s function. In addition,
Plaintiffs frequently engage in strawman arguments wherein they purportedly
dispute CoBank’s fact, but do not directly address the factual contention and instead
inject tangential issues into the response. See, e.g., Dkt. 49, ¶¶12, 20, 27.
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CoBank’s assertions of fact, the Court accepts the following facts, which CoBank
appropriately supported by competent evidence and specific record citations, as
undisputed:
In January 2020, Plaintiffs were employed by CoBank as Senior Project
Managers in the enterprise project management office. Dkt. 49, ¶1. Prior to the
COVID-19 pandemic, which began early in 2020, Plaintiffs regularly worked at
CoBank’s Denver office. Id. at ¶2. When the pandemic started, however, CoBank
allowed many of its employees, including Plaintiffs, to work remotely. Id. at ¶3.
Following the release of COVID-19 vaccinations in 2021, CoBank required its
employees to be vaccinated as part of its return-to-office initiative. Id. at ¶4. CoBank
provided exemptions for employees who could not be vaccinated due to disability or
sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at ¶5. For those exempt employees, CoBank
created 	protocols 	for 	working 	in 	the 	office 	including 	wearing 	a 	mask, 	social
distancing, and periodic testing (“safety protocols”). Id. at ¶8. And to create more
workplace flexibility, CoBank recategorized its employees based on those who were
(1) required to work in the office full-time; (2) given a set schedule for a combination
of remote and in-office work; (3) permitted to work primarily from home with periodic
in-office requirements; and (4) allowed fully remote work. Id. at ¶9.
Plaintiffs 	were 	classified 	under 	the 	third 	category, 	and 	their 	manager
determined they were required to attend a monthly meeting in person but could
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otherwise work remotely. Id. at ¶¶11-12. No employees in Plaintiffs’ work group were
permitted full remote work. Id. at ¶13.
After CoBank notified its staff that employees would be required to return to
work consistent with their job classifications, Plaintiffs submitted letters from their
attorney and requests for exemption from the vaccination requirement. Id. at ¶¶15-
16, 18-19. They based their requests on their religious opposition to the COVID-19
vaccine and their contention that the vaccine was created with the use of aborted
fetal tissues. Id. at ¶¶18-19. In their letters and requests, Plaintiffs did not specify
any religious opposition to the safety protocols.2 Id. at ¶19. CoBank granted Plaintiffs
a religious accommodation to the vaccine requirement but informed them they would
be required to comply with the safety protocols for in-person work. Id. at ¶20. Even
so, Plaintiffs’ attorney told CoBank he would tell his clients they could continue to
work from home. Id. at ¶21.
2 In their response, Plaintiffs contend this fact is disputed because their attorney
“clearly state[d] objections to the mandates/protocols of vaccine, mask, testing and
temperature checks.” Dkt. 49, ¶19. But this argument does not directly address
CoBank’s position that Plaintiffs never identified a religious objection to the safety
protocols. While they may have objected to the masking, social distancing, and testing
requirements, Plaintiffs never specified any opposition based on their religious
beliefs. Moreover, Plaintiffs support their position with only general citations to
Exhibits C and D. But these exhibits contain multiple letters and Plaintiffs do not
direct the Court to any specific letter or its content. The Court nevertheless reviewed
these exhibits and agrees with CoBank that Plaintiffs’ only expressed religious
objection was to the vaccine. That religious objection has no relationship to the safety
protocols. The only reason Plaintiffs gave for opposing the safety protocols was their
belief they had been successful at their jobs while working remotely.
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On December 24, 2021, CoBank informed Plaintiffs’ attorney it would not be
offering full-time telework as an accommodation for employees who sought vaccine
exemptions and that those employees would need to report to work when required.
Id. at ¶23. CoBank was specific that Plaintiffs were expected report to the office when
required and comply with the safety protocols, and if they did not, Plaintiffs could be
subject to disciplinary action. Id. at ¶24. After Plaintiff Stansberry (via his attorney)
again stated he would continue to “utilize his accommodation and work from home,”
CoBank explained that the vaccine accommodation did not include full-time telework
and Plaintiff Stansberry was required to report to the office. Id. at ¶¶25-26. CoBank
also noted there was no indication Plaintiff Stansberry’s desire to work from home
was related to his religious beliefs. Id. at ¶27. Plaintiffs’ attorney did not respond to
this letter. Id. at ¶28.
In February 2022, Plaintiffs’ Manager, John Ley, directed Plaintiff Stansberry
to report to the office for an in-person meeting. Id. at ¶29. Plaintiff refused to attend
in person based on his apparent belief that his vaccine accommodation included full-
time telework. Id. at ¶¶30-31. Both Plaintiffs attended the February meeting
remotely. 	Id. 	at 	¶¶32. 	Thereafter, 	CoBank 	informed 	Plaintiffs’ 	attorney 	that
notwithstanding their vaccine exemption, Plaintiffs were required to report to work
in person as required by their manager. Id. at ¶33. CoBank further informed
Plaintiffs’ attorney that the next on-site meeting was scheduled for March 24, 2022,
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and if Plaintiffs did not attend, CoBank would terminate their employment. Id. at
¶35.
Despite this warning, Plaintiffs did not attend the March meeting in person.
Id. at ¶36. 	Accordingly, CoBank terminated their employment because of their
failure to comply with the directive that they report to work consistent with their job
classification and their manager’s requirements. Id. at ¶37.
This lawsuit followed. Dkt. 1.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Plaintiffs’ claims against CoBank are based on their contention that CoBank
failed to accommodate their religious beliefs by refusing to permit them full-time
remote work. They also contend CoBank retaliated against them for making this
request by giving Plaintiff Stansberry negative performance reviews, refusing to
transfer Plaintiff Carlson to another department where she could work remotely, and
ultimately terminating their employment. They bring their claims under Title VII,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 24-34-402, et seq., which are evaluated under the same standards. See Agassounon
v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 688 F. App’x 507, 509 (10th Cir. 2017) (analyzing CADA
discrimination and retaliation claims under the same legal standards as Title VII).
In its Motion, CoBank contends that based on the undisputed evidence, no jury
could conclude it failed to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs or that it retaliated
against them for seeking religious accommodations. The Court agrees.
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A. 	Failure to Accommodate
Under Title VII, it is unlawful “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate 	against 	any 	individual 	with 	respect 	to 	his 	compensation, 	terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). An employer must
“reasonably 	accommodate” 	an 	employee’s 	religious 	practice 	unless 	such
accommodation would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.” Id. § 2000e(j). To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate,
the plaintiff must show “(1) the employee has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts
with a job requirement, (2) the employee informed the employer of this conflict; and
(3) the employer fired the employee for failing to comply with the job requirement.”
Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 549 (10th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs contend they told CoBank of their religious opposition to both the
vaccine requirement and the safety protocols. According to their allegations, CoBank
initially granted them an accommodation of full-time telework but then arbitrarily
revoked the accommodation and required them to report to the office once a month
and abide by the safety protocols. Dkt. 1, ¶¶13-15, 30-32, 29-30 (count one), 39-40
(count 	one).3 	They 	contend, 	therefore, 	that 	CoBank 	engaged 	in 	religious
3 Count One of the Complaint does not continue numerically from the previous
background section, which ends at paragraph 44, and instead starts at paragraph 27.
To the extent citation is necessary, the Court cites the allegations consistent with the
numbering used in the Complaint.
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discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. But the undisputed material facts tell a
different story.
1. 	Safety Protocols
First, with respect to the safety protocols, CoBank argues there is no genuine
dispute regarding whether Plaintiffs ever told CoBank they were religiously opposed
to masking, social distancing, or testing, such that they required an accommodation
for their religious beliefs. Dkt. 42, pp.7-9. In response, Plaintiffs fail to directly
address any of the undisputed facts CoBank cites in support of its position. Plaintiffs
instead simply argue they did in fact inform CoBank and then cite multiple, and
sometimes all, exhibits in their entirety. This is insufficient to create disputed issues
of fact and is reason enough to grant the Motion.
Nevertheless, 	the 	Court 	reviewed 	these 	materials 	and 	has 	made 	some
observations. In Plaintiffs’ individual declarations, they each state that after learning
about the vaccine requirement and safety protocols, they “knew that complying with
any of them would be against [their] sincerely held religious beliefs.” Dkt. 44-1, ¶10;
Dkt. 44-2, ¶12. According to Plaintiff Stansberry, he “began communicating [his]
objections directly to CoBank beginning with a letter directly to CoBank’s CEO, Tom
Halverson.” Dkt. 44-1, ¶10. Plaintiff Carlson attests she communicated her objections
through counsel. Dkt. 44-2, ¶12. They each further declare that after completing the
religious accommodation request forms for the vaccines, CoBank granted their
requests and allowed them to work from home full time. Dkt. 44-1, ¶11; Dkt. 44-2,
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¶13. Plaintiffs’ declarations, however, do not create a disputed issue of fact on this
matter.
“It is well-settled that a district court’s assessments of the admissibility and
probative value of affidavits at the summary-judgment phase involve, at bottom,
evidentiary determinations.” Ellis v. J.R.’s Country Stores, Inc., 779 F.3d 1184, 1201
(10th Cir. 2015). Consequently, their admissibility is committed to this Court’s sound
discretion. Id. To that end, “[a]ffidavits must contain certain indicia of reliability.” Id.
“Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment
proceedings; they must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or
surmise.” Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004) (cleaned
up).
Concerning Plaintiff Stansberry, it is not clear from his declaration whether
he is referring to the letters his attorney sent CoBank or to a letter that he wrote
himself. Having reviewed the correspondence in the record, the Court was unable to
find any letter directly from Plaintiff Stansberry to CoBank’s CEO. The only
communications in the record written by Plaintiffs are their letters dated September
11, 2021, to Deb Bose (Dkts. 43-10, 43-11) and their individual exemption requests
(Dkts. 43-12, 43-13). But these communications only discuss Plaintiffs’ religious
opposition to receiving the vaccine. Id. There is no mention of the safety protocols in
any of these documents. Id.
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Similarly, the communications from Plaintiffs’ attorney to CoBank only discuss
Plaintiffs’ religious opposition to the vaccines. See Dkt. 44-3, pp.2-4; Dkt. 44-4, pp.4-
6. Counsel’s letter on behalf of Plaintiff Carlson does not mention the safety protocols
at all (Dkt. 44-4, pp.4-6), and in the letter regarding Plaintiff Stansberry, his stated
objection to masking, social distancing, and testing is based on his belief that he had
“been able to satisfy his full-time job duties” via telework (Dkt. 44-3, pp. 4).
Because 	Plaintiffs’ 	declarations—that 	they 	told 	CoBank 	about 	religious
objections to the safety protocols—are unsupported, if not contradicted, by the record
evidence, the Court concludes they have no probative value on this issue. Therefore,
the Court finds the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiffs never informed
CoBank of a religious objection to the safety protocols. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”); Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir.
2004) (“self-serving statements in affidavits without factual support in the record
carry no weight on summary judgment”) (emphasis in original). Consequently,
CoBank is entitled to judgment in its favor on Plaintiffs’ claim that it failed to
accommodate their religious opposition to the safety protocols.
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2. 	Vaccine Requirement
Turning to Plaintiffs’ religious objection to the COVID-19 vaccine requirement,
Plaintiffs admit their requests for an exemption from the vaccine requirement were
granted in November 2021. Dkt. 44, p.5; see also Dkt. 49, ¶20. They contend, however,
that the original accommodation to their vaccine objection was full-time remote work,
which CoBank arbitrarily revoked without engaging in the interactive process. These
contentions are unavailing.
There is no evidence supporting that CoBank ever offered full remote work as
an accommodation for employees opposed to vaccination. Rather, the undisputed
facts show CoBank initially allowed employees to work remotely as a response to the
spreading COVID-19 pandemic. Dkt. 49, ¶3. It is further undisputed that CoBank’s
accommodation for those with disabilities or religious opposition to the vaccine was
to mask, social distance, and complete periodic testing, when required to come to
work. Id. at ¶5. Indeed, Plaintiffs were aware their vaccine accommodation did not
include full-time telework because CoBank’s attorney specifically informed their
counsel of this. Dkts. 43-16, pp.2-3; 43-18, p.2; 43-20, p.2. And Plaintiffs were
permitted to continue working from home—after their accommodation requests were
granted—only because CoBank deferred its return to office plans several times. Id.
at ¶22; see also Dkt. 43-4, ¶8.
Importantly, 	while 	Title 	VII 	requires 	employers 	to 	make 	reasonable
accommodations for their employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs, “[i]t does not
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require employers to accommodate the religious practices of an employee in exactly
the way the employee would like to be accommodated. Nor does Title VII require
employers to accommodate an employee’s religious practices in a way that spares the
employee any cost whatsoever.” Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J of Adams & Arapahoe
Ctys., 735 F.2d 388, 390–91 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“We find no basis in either the statute or its
legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable
accommodation.”). And where an employer has offered a reasonable accommodation,
“the 	employer need not 	further show 	that 	each 	of 	the 	employee’s 	alternative
accommodations would result in undue hardship.” Id.
Other than Plaintiffs’ argument they could perform their jobs successfully from
home, 	they’ve 	offered 	no 	evidence 	that 	CoBank’s 	safety 	protocols 	were 	an
unreasonable 	accommodation 	to 	their 	religious 	objections 	to 	the 	vaccine. 	The
undisputed 	evidence 	shows 	that 	following 	Plaintiffs’ 	request 	for 	a 	religious
exemption, CoBank agreed they would not have to receive the COVID-19 vaccine and
could instead wear masks, social distance, and periodically test for COVID-19. This
accommodation eliminated any religious conflict for the Plaintiffs regarding the
vaccine, 	and 	therefore, 	it 	was 	reasonable. 	Cf. 	Breshears 	v. 	Oregon 	Dep’t 	of
Transportation, No. 2:22-cv-01015-SB, 2023 WL 136550, at *3 (D. Or. Jan. 9, 2023)
(rejecting mask requirement as a basis for a Title VII claim); Leake v. Raytheon Techs.
Corp., No. CV-22-00436-TUC-RM, 2023 WL 2242857, at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 27, 2023)
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(same for safety conditions for vaccination-exempt employees); Schmidt v. City of
Pasadena, No. LA CV21-08769 JAK (JCx), 2023 WL 4291440, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
8, 2023) (same for testing requirements). See also Telfair v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 934 F.
Supp. 2d 1368, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 2013), aff'd, 567 F. App’x 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“An
accommodation is reasonable as a matter of law, if it in fact eliminates a religious
conflict in the workplace[.]”).
CoBank is entitled to judgment in its favor on this claim.
B. 	Religious Discrimination – Retaliation
Regarding their claim for retaliation, Plaintiffs contend that although CoBank
granted 	their 	request 	for 	a 	religious 	accommodation 	from 	vaccination, 	“when
Plaintiffs continued to raise their concerns and objections to the additional Mandates,
Defendants began to engage in its pattern of discrimination and retaliation aimed
directly at Plaintiffs.” Dkt. 44, pp.8-9. According to Plaintiffs, this retaliation
consisted of requiring them to report to the office once per month and comply with
the 	safety 	protocols, 	giving 	Plaintiff 	Stansberry 	poor 	performance 	reviews,
preventing 	Plaintiff 	Carlson 	from 	transferring 	departments, 	and 	ultimately
terminating their employment.
To state a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, a “plaintiff must
make a showing that (i) he was engaged in protected activity, (ii) he suffered an
adverse employment action, and (iii) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency
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LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir. 2011). In the Tenth Circuit, “an adverse
employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities,
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858
F.3d 1307, 1316 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In its Motion, CoBank addresses only the vaccine accommodation requests and
argues it did not retaliate against Plaintiffs because of those requests. Dkt. 42, pp.13-
21. But, based on the Court’s review of the Complaint (Dkt. 1) and Plaintiffs’ response
to the Motion (Dkts. 44, 49), it is clear the protected conduct at issue is not Plaintiffs’
request for a vaccine accommodation;4 rather, the protected conduct alleged is
Plaintiffs’ purported request for a religious accommodation from the safety protocols.
In their Response, Plaintiffs frame the issue in this case as being forced “to
choose between their sincerely held religious beliefs and keeping their job.” See, e.g.,
Dkt. 44, pp.10-11. But such a choice could not apply to the vaccination requirement
because, in accommodation of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, CoBank did not require
Plaintiffs to get the vaccine. Thus, the only conflict in this case is Plaintiffs’ refusal
to return to the office once a month, and when returning, comply with CoBank’s safety
protocols. To be sure, Plaintiffs confess as much in their response where they state
4 While Plaintiffs were opposed to both the vaccination requirement and the safety
protocols, only their opposition to vaccination was based on religion. But throughout
the Complaint and Response, Plaintiffs attempt to bootstrap their objections to the
safety protocols to their religious accommodation request regarding vaccination by
simply referring to them en masse as “Defendant’s COVID-19 Mandates.”
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that the “vaccination mandate . . . is not at issue in this case,” and only “the [Return
to Office] Mandates are at issue in this case.” See Dkt. 49, ¶¶55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64.
However, this Court has already found Plaintiffs did not express any religious
opposition to either the safety protocols or the requirement to work in person once a
month. 	See 	Section 	A.1., 	supra. 	Therefore, 	no 	reasonable 	jury 	could 	conclude
Plaintiffs engaged in protected activity in this regard, and any retaliation claim based
thereon necessarily fails.
C. 	Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
In their third claim under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, Colo. Rev.
Stat. §§ 24-34-402 et. seq., Plaintiffs contend CoBank violated the statute when it
failed to offer them reasonable accommodations and terminated them based on their
religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccination requirements and safety protocols.
Dkt. 1, ¶¶63-74. These, however, are the same contentions made in Plaintiffs’ Title
VII claims. Because these statutes are analyzed under the same legal standards,
Agassounon, 688 F. App’x at 509, the Court concludes CoBank is entitled to judgment
on Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, IT IS ORDERED:
1. 	Defendant 	CoBank’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	(Dkt. 	42) 	is
GRANTED and the claims against it are dismissed;
2. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of CoBank, which is
entitled to an award of its costs.
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DATED: November 7, 2025
BY THE COURT:
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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