Cart Driver-Highlands, LLC v. Society Insurance

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-02397-KAS
CART DRIVER-HIGHLANDS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIETY INSURANCE, a mutual company,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This insurance dispute arises from water damage sustained by the building in
which Plaintiff operates. Defendant, Plaintiff’s insurer, denied coverage for Plaintiff’s
losses on at least four bases. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Declaratory Judgment Claim [#28] (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) and
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Declaratory Judgment Claim
[#39] (“Defendant’s Motion”). The parties filed Responses [#29, #41] in opposition to each
other’s motions and Replies [#33, #44] in support of their own. The Court has reviewed
the parties’ briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable law. For the foregoing reasons,
Plaintiff’s Motion [#28] is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion [#39] is GRANTED.
I. 	Background
According to the undisputed summary judgment evidence,1 Plaintiff Cart Driver-
Highlands, LLC operates a restaurant located at 2239, 2241, and 2445 W. 30th Avenue
1 In briefing the cross motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted two Statement of
Material Fact tables, in compliance with the Court’s practice standards. See KAS Civ. Practice
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in Denver (the “Premises”). Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 1. The Premises is a two-story building,
and Plaintiff’s leased portion is located on the ground floor. Compl. [#3] at ¶¶ 10-11.
Mainline West Municipal Securities, LLC (“Mainline”) occupies the second floor of the
Premises. Id. at ¶ 12; Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 17.
In 2019, Plaintiff hired a contractor to perform renovation work on the Premises
before it opened for business. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 16. The scope of the project included
plumbing work underneath the building, including work on sewer pipes serving the
Premises. Id. ¶¶ 25-26; Fact Table [#33-1] ¶ II. Plaintiff would later allege in its complaint
that the plumbing work was “negligent” and “defective.” Compl. [#3] ¶¶ 37, 38, 43, 53;
Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 36.
After noticing a foul odor in the Premises for some time, in the fall of 2023, Mainline
hired an individual to investigate the source of the smell. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶¶ 37-43.
The investigator discovered that raw sewer water had accumulated in a crawl space
underneath a stairwell that connected Plaintiff’s and Mainline’s units. Id. ¶¶ 19, 30. The
cause of the sewer leak was an uncapped or improperly capped sewer pipe. Id. ¶ 19. A
restoration company pumped out roughly 5,000 gallons of raw sewer water that had
accumulated under the stairwell, and Plaintiff resumed conducting business shortly
thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 20, 45; Compl. [#3] ¶ 33. However, the odor soon returned. Fact Table
[#44-1] ¶ 22.
Upon further investigation, Plaintiff discovered that additional pipes underneath its
kitchen were “pouring water” into the crawlspace. Id. ¶ 24. The parties’ Fact Table
Standards (V)(10); see also Fact Table [#33-1]; Fact Table [#44-1]. Because the later-filed Fact
Table [#44-1] was completed with the benefit of additional discovery, the Court will primarily rely
on that table to ascertain the undisputed facts, except where otherwise noted.
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incorporates an allegation from Plaintiff’s complaint, in which Plaintiff alleged that four or
five defective plumbing lines from the kitchen were “cracked or completely broken just
below floor level,” that “[w]astewater was seen leaking at the time of discovery,” and that
the lines appeared to be leaking “from exposure to the same harmful conditions resulting
from the defective plumbing . . . based on the accumulation of wastewater in the
crawlspace.” Id. ¶ 24; Compl. [#3] ¶ 43. Plaintiff was forced to close its business until the
full scope of damage could be assessed and repaired. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 24. It was
unable to reopen until January 2025. Pl.’s Motion [#28] at 7.2
Plaintiff filed a property loss claim with Defendant, which Defendant denied, citing
at least six policy exclusions. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 23; Pl.’s Ex. 9, Coverage Denial Letter
[#28-10]. Plaintiff sued, asserting the following claims for relief against Defendant: (1)
declaratory judgment; (2) breach of insurance contract; (3) common law bad faith; and
(4) statutory bad faith. Compl. [#3] at 9-12.
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim,
asserting either that the policy’s plain language required Defendant to indemnify it or that
an ambiguity in the policy required judgment in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff’s briefing focused
on one particular exclusion in the policy, which the Court will refer to as the “Water
Exclusion.” See Pl.’s Ex. 2, Ins. Policy [#28-3] at 36, § I(B)(1)(g). Plaintiff argued that,
although on first glance, the Water Exclusion might appear to bar its claim, it does not
when read in the context of the policy as a whole. See generally Pl.’s Motion [#28].
Defendant filed a Response [#29] in which it argued that the Water Exclusion bars
Plaintiff’s claim. Response [#29] at 9-13. Defendant further asserted that at least four
2 Citations to page numbers refer to the numbering stamped at the top of each page by the Court’s
CM/ECF docketing system, not to the filing’s original page numbering.
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other exclusions bar Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 7-9, 13-15. Plaintiff objected, in part, on the
ground that Defendant’s additional arguments amounted to an improper cross motion for
summary judgment. Reply [#33] at 8-9.
Plaintiff’s objection on that front was effectively mooted by Defendant’s filing of a
cross motion for summary judgment. Def.’s Motion [#39]. In the motion, Defendant
renewed its argument that the Water Exclusion bars Plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 10-14.
Defendant further argued that Plaintiff’s claim is excluded under the policy because
(1) the loss commenced before the policy period; (2) the loss falls within an exclusion for
continuous seepage or leakage of water over a period of 14 days or more; and (3) the
loss falls within an exclusion for damage caused by negligent or faulty work.3 Id. at 7-10,
14-17.
II. 	Legal Standards
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
The purpose of a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment is to assess whether trial
is necessary. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
a court resolves factual disputes and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmovant. Chase Mfg., Inc. v. Johns Manville Corp., 84 F.4th 1157, 1168 (10th Cir.
3 In its Motion [#39], Defendant cites a third exclusion for damage resulting from neglect but makes
no substantive argument concerning the same. Compare Motion [#39] at 14-15 (identifying the
exclusion), with id. at 17 (propounding arguments concerning only the continuous seepage
exclusion and the negligent work exclusion). Accordingly, the Court will not consider the neglect
exclusion.
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2023). However, the “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A factual dispute is
genuine if the evidence could enable a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party,
and a fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing
substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The burden is on the movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). If the movant
carries the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of a lack of evidence, the burden
shifts to the nonmovant to put forth sufficient evidence for each essential element of his
claim such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 256.
When the movant does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, the “movant
may make its prima facie demonstration [of the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact] simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an
essential element of the nonmovant's claim.” Adler, 144 F.3d at 671.
B. 	Interpretation of Insurance Policies Under Colorado Law
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice of law principles of the state in
which it sits to determine what substantive law applies. Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
104 F. Supp. 3d 1232, 1235 (D. Colo. 2015). “In Colorado, insurance policies are
generally interpreted under the law of the state where the policy was issued[.]” Id. “The
interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law that is appropriate for summary
judgment.” Lua v. QBE Ins. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1092 (D. Colo. 2019); see also
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Govinda, LLC v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 545 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1169 (W.D. Okla. 2021)
(“Interpreting 	insurance 	policies 	and 	determining 	policy 	rights 	and 	obligations 	are
questions of law, appropriate grist for the summary judgment mill.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Colorado 	courts 	apply 	traditional 	principles 	of 	contract 	interpretation 	when
construing the terms of an insurance policy. N.H. Ins. Co. v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 128
F.4th 1337, 1345 (10th Cir. 2025). Insurance policies “must be given effect according to
the plain and ordinary meaning of their terms.” Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d
1039, 1051 (Colo. 2011) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation). “Courts must
read the contract as a whole and give the contract terms their plain and ordinary meaning
unless a contrary intent is evidenced from the policy.” AdHealth, Ltd. v. PorterCare
Adventist Health Sys., 135 F.4th 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2025). If the policy is “susceptible
to 	more 	than 	one 	reasonable interpretation,” 	then 	“the 	coverage 	provisions 	are
ambiguous” and must “be construed against the insurer as the drafter of the policy.” Todd
v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1098 (D. Colo. 2024).
“In determining the plain and ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance policy,
the Colorado Supreme Court has eschewed the use of ‘technical readings’ and instead
looks to ‘what meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would attach to’ a policy term.”
Sullivan v. Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am., 842 F. App’x 251, 254 (10th Cir.
2021) (quoting Bailey, 	255 	P.3d 	at 	1051). 	This 	so-called 	“doctrine 	of 	reasonable
expectations” provides that “courts will not enforce an exclusion provision ‘where an
ordinary, objectively reasonable person would, based on the language of the policy, fail
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to understand that he or she is not entitled to the coverage at issue.’” Todd, 713 F. Supp.
3d at 1098 (quoting Bailey, 255 P.3d at 1050)).
“The policyholder bears the burden of demonstrating coverage under an insurance
policy.” Bertisen v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 3d 883, 890 (D. Colo.
2024). “If the insured satisfies their burden, the burden shifts to the insurer ‘to prove the
applicability of an exclusion from coverage.’” Id. (quoting Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 960 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2020)). “If the insurer meets
this burden and demonstrates that an exclusion applies, the burden then shifts back to
the insured to show an exception to the coverage exclusion.” Id.
III. 	Analysis
A. 	The Policy Period Exclusion
Defendant issued the subject Businessowners Policy to Plaintiff with property
coverage of $2,375,000 and liability coverage of $1,000,000 per occurrence. Fact Table
[#44-1] ¶ 4; Pl.’s Ex. 2, Ins. Policy [#28-3] at 6-7. The policy is subject to a policy period
of January 20, 2023, to January 20, 2024, and the property loss portion of the policy
further provides that it only “cover[s] loss or damage commencing . . . [d]uring the policy
period shown in the Declarations.” Fact Table [#44-1] ¶¶ 3, 34; Pl.’s Ex. 2, Ins. Policy
[#28-3] at 4, 44 § I(F)(4)(a)(1).
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed
facts establish that the damage commenced prior to the operative policy period. Def.’s
Motion [#39] at 7. For support, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s complaint, in which Plaintiff
alleged that it “discovered” that the plumbing subcontractor who performed the renovation
work in 2019 “negligently capped the old sewer line with an inadequate slip-on sewer cap
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during the Remodel.” Compl. [#3] at 6 ¶ 37. Plaintiff further alleged that the raw sewer
water “had been emptying” underneath the Premises “[a]s a result of [the subcontractor’s]
negligent and defective plumbing work.” Id. at 6 ¶ 38. Defendant further cites a March
2020 email from Mainline’s Chief Financial Officer to Plaintiff’s manager that a “musty
smell,” fruit flies, and dampness were present in the area near the stairwell in question.
Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 29; Def.’s Ex. C, Email [#29-4]; Def.’s Ex. D, Request for Admission
2 [#29-5]. The email further stated that the CFO tried to find a crawlspace entrance in
hopes of looking underneath the floor with no success and asked Plaintiff’s manager to
discuss the issue further. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 29; Def.’s Ex. C, Email [#29-4]. The
stairwell referenced in the March 2020 email stood directly above where the uncapped
sewer pipe was later discovered. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 30. Defendant argues that these
undisputed facts show that the leak commenced, at the latest, in March 2020, and is
therefore not covered under the operative policy. Def.’s Motion [#39] at 10.
Plaintiff first responds that its claim arose at the time it was discovered—in the fall
of 2023. Pl.’s Response [#41] at 4. For support, Plaintiff cites to the definition of an
“occurrence” in the liability coverage portion of the policy, which means “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.” Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 57; Pl.’s Ex. 2, Ins. Policy [#28-3] at 64 § (II)(F)(13).
Plaintiff also directs the Court’s attention to two cases—each of which interpret the
meaning of an “occurrence” within commercial general liability insurance policies. See
Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 P.3d 798, 802 (Colo. 2007) (“An occurrence
sufficient to trigger coverage under an occurrence policy need not be sudden, but must
be a specific accident or happening within the policy period. . . . A long term exposure to
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a harmful condition that results in damage or injury may be an occurrence.”); United Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC, 633 F.3d 951, 959 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The
physical 	manifestation 	of 	damage 	and 	not 	improper 	installation 	or 	other 	faulty
workmanship is the trigger for coverage.”). But Plaintiff does not pinpoint how Hoang and
United Fire are squarely analogous to this case, where it is undisputed that Plaintiff
submitted a first-party claim for property insurance benefits under a policy that explicitly
limited coverage to damage commencing during the policy period. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶
21.
Instead, this case is more akin to York v. Safeco Insurance Company of America,
540 F. Supp. 3d 1049 (D. Colo. 2021), which concerned a plaintiff’s claim for property
insurance benefits for residential property damage. Plaintiff purchased the residence in
question, and her property insurance policy took effect on the day of closing. Id. at 1051.
The policy limited coverage to “losses occurring during the policy period.” Id. That same
afternoon, water infiltrated the home after a hailstorm. Id. Plaintiff tried, unsuccessfully, to
stop the sale. Id. at 1052. She later filed a claim for property damage to the roof, windows,
and exterior stucco based on purported hail damage from the storm. Id. at 1052-53. The
claims adjuster concluded that “there was no hail damage to the exterior of the residence,
but there was substantial wear and tear.” Id. at 1052. The court held that the plaintiff failed
to create a triable issue of fact because there was insufficient summary judgment
evidence to link the home’s roof, window, and stucco damage to the hailstorm that
occurred on the first day of the policy period. Id. at 1055; see also Starr Surplus Lines Ins.
Co. v. Cushing Hosp., LLC, 527 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1340-41 (W.D. Okla. 2021) (finding
for the insurance company where the evidence showed that damage from water intrusion
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upon a building’s first-floor slab predated the operative policy period, which included an
exclusion for damages which “first existed . . . prior to the inception date of this policy”).
Plaintiff cannot invoke the definition of an “occurrence” in the liability coverage section of
the policy to circumvent the property coverage section’s plain language limiting recovery
to those damages commencing during the policy period.
Plaintiff’s second argument, however, is evidentiary in nature. Plaintiff argues that,
even if the policy is limited to damages commencing during the policy period, a “musty”
smell is not the same as a “sewage” smell, and that a “musty smell” in an area does not
prove, as a matter of law, that a sewer leak existed underneath the area at that time. Pl.’s
Response [#41] at 9. On this point, the Court agrees. According to the undisputed facts,
the defective plumbing work performed in 2019 caused water to leak into the crawlspace
for “an unknown period prior to discovery” and “no one knows precisely when the leaks
began.” Fact Table [#44-1] ¶¶ 24, 58 (emphasis added). Defendants present some
evidence that might allow a reasonable jury to infer that it began no later than March
2020. However, a reasonable jury might not be persuaded that a “musty smell” is sufficient
to prove that standing water existed underneath the floor at that time. “Where different
ultimate inferences may properly be drawn, the case is not one for summary judgment.”
Webb v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 336, 339 (10th Cir. 1976).
Therefore, Defendant’s Motion [#39] is denied on the basis that the damage
commenced before the operative policy period.
B. 	The Continuous Seepage Exclusion
Although reasonable juries could reach different conclusions concerning whether
the leak commenced in 2023, or at some point before then, no reasonable jury could find,
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based on the undisputed evidence, that the leak commenced and caused the extensive
damage that it did in less than 14 days.
The exclusion section of the policy begins: “We will not pay for loss or damage
caused by or resulting from any of the following[.]” Pl.’s Ex. 2, Ins. Policy [#28-3] at 37 §
(I)(B)(2). Section (2)(n) excludes “[c]ontinuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water,
or the presence or condensation of humidity, moisture or vapor, that occurs over a period
of 14 days or more.” True, the parties agree that “no one knows precisely when the leaks
began.” Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 58. But in arguing that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists as to this exclusion, Plaintiff asks the Court to infer that the leaks could have begun
and caused the significant damage that they did in less than 14 days’ time.
“No genuine issue of material fact exists unless the evidence, construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th 1183, 1200
(10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “And while [the Court]
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, an inference is
unreasonable if it requires a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders [the
factfinder’s] findings a guess or mere possibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
No reasonable jury could return a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor on the question of
whether the leak commenced 14 days or less from its detection. In other words, such an
inference is unreasonable in light of the following facts:
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• 	The plumbing subcontractor who failed to cap or inadequately capped the
sewer line in question did so no later than December 2019. Fact Table [#44-
1] ¶ 27.
• 	In March 2020, Mainline’s CFO told Plaintiff’s manager that a “musty smell,”
fruit flies, and dampness were present near the stairwell that stood directly
above the uncapped sewer pipe. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
• 	Mainline’s CFO testified that, after the 2020 email, he experienced musty
smells and sewage smells that “had become pervasive at times throughout
the building.” Def.’s Ex B, Caselli Depo. [#39-3] at 33:23-24; Fact Table
[#44-1] ¶ 40.
• 	Mainline’s CFO testified that, “at certain a point, and I think this is like
summer of ‘23, the changing table in one of [Plaintiff’s] bathrooms would
just be completely foul. So the exact same smell that we were having
upstairs. That is when Cart Driver, you know, the manager started asking
us about the smell.” Def.’s Ex B, Caselli Depo. [#39-3] at 38:8-14; Fact
Table [#44-1] ¶ 42.4
• 	In October 2023, Mainline “noticed a sewage odor” that was “strongest in
the stairwell area between the first and second floors.” Fact Table [#44-1]
¶ 17.
4 Plaintiff disputes the deposition testimony as “inadmissible hearsay lacking in sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness” pursuant to F.R.E. 801(c) and 807. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 42.
However, at trial, Mainline’s CFO would be able to testify to what he and other Mainline officials
experienced regarding the noxious odors and interactions he had with Cart Driver officials about
the odors. That testimony would not be hearsay.
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• 	Also in October 2023, the sewage smell became “so untenable” that
Mainline hired a smell detective. Id. ¶ 18.
• 	On or around November 9, 2023, Mainline and Plaintiff discovered “raw
sewer water” in the crawlspace from the improperly capped sewer pipe. Id.
¶¶ 19-20; Pl.’s Ex 5, Insurance Claim [#28-8] at 1.
• 	Roughly 5,000 gallons of raw sewer water had accumulated under the
stairwell and the restaurant’s dining room floor by November 2023. Compl.
[#3] ¶ 33; Plaintiff’s Motion [#28] at 6.
• 	Plumbing lines from the restaurant’s kitchen were later discovered to be
cracked or broken “from exposure to the same harmful conditions resulting
from the defective plumbing . . . based on the accumulation of wastewater
in the crawlspace.” Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 24; Compl. [#3] ¶ 43.
Based on these facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer that the leak was isolated to the
14 days preceding its discovery—in other words, no earlier than October 26, 2023. See
GeoMetWatch Corp., 38 F.4th at 1200; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Browning, 839 F.
Supp. 1508, 1510 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (“When assessing the evidence, but not weighing it
. . . [i]mplausible inferences can be rejected.”).
Plaintiff’s statements of additional material fact do not persuade the Court
otherwise. Plaintiff presents evidence that, in 2025, Mainline discovered that one of its
bathrooms was not properly vented. Fact Table [#44-1] ¶ 52. The lack of proper venting
meant that sewer gas was “likely burping back into the bathroom through the shower and
sink drains” whenever the toilet was flushed. Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiff argues that it could have
been the “burps” of sewer gas in the bathroom, and not the 5,000 gallons of standing
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sewer water underneath the building, producing the odors in the stairwell and surrounding
areas leading to the leak’s discovery. Again, the Court will not entertain unreasonable
inferences in determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Defendant has met its burden to show that an exclusion applies, and Plaintiff fails
to show an exception to the coverage exclusion. Bertisen, 710 F. Supp. 3d at 890.
Defendant’s Motion [#39] is granted on the basis that the damage resulted from a
continuous seepage of water that occurred over a period of 14 days or more. Because
the Court concludes that Plaintiff is not entitled to coverage, its Motion [#28] seeking a
declaration that it is entitled to the subject coverage necessarily fails.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims for breach of insurance contract (Claim 2), common law
bad faith breach of insurance contract (Claim 3), and statutory bad faith breach of
insurance contract (Claim 4) fail as a matter of law and, therefore, Defendant is entitled
to summary judgment on each of those claims. See 5333 Mattress King LLC v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 683 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1200 (D. Colo. 2023) (finding the defendant was entitled
to summary judgment on each of the plaintiff’s claims where the at-issue insurance policy
did not provide coverage for the plaintiff’s damages) (citing MarkWest Hydrocarbon, Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009); Markel Ins. Co. v.
Hollandsworth, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1160 (D. Colo. 2019)).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED as follows:
• 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#28] is DENIED.
• 	Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [#39] is GRANTED.
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• 	The Clerk of Court is directed to enter summary judgment in this case in
favor of Defendant Society Insurance and against Plaintiff Cart Driver-
Highlands on all claims.
• 	The Final Pretrial/Trial Prep Conference set for June 16, 2026, and the Jury
Trial set to commence on July 20, 2026, are VACATED.
Dated: March 30, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
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