Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-3688-SKC-SBP
DENIS ALEMAN HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
Petitioner 	Denis 	Aleman 	Hernandez 	is 	a 	citizen 	of 	Honduras 	who 	is
currently being detained at the Aurora Contract Detention Facility. Dkt 1, ¶2.
Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in August 2015 and has
resided here continuously since then. Id. at ¶3. Mr. Aleman Hernandez applied for
asylum on January 11, 2018, and his application is still pending. Id. He owns his
own roofing company and is the sole provider for his wife, who is an undocumented
noncitizen, and his two children, who are both U.S. citizens. Id. at ¶25.
When Mr. Aleman Hernandez was fulfilling his obligation to attend his
asylum interview at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Dallas Field Office on September 15, 2025, he was arrested by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. Id. at ¶¶3, 21. On October 6, 2025, he was transferred to,
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and has remained at, the Aurora facility. Id. at ¶24. He is being held without bond
purportedly pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).1
Mr. Aleman Hernandez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on
November 17, 2025, seeking an order from this Court directing Respondents to
provide him with a bond hearing within seven days of this Order. Dkt. 1. He
contends he is subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. This
Court ordered Respondents2 to respond to the Petition within seven days of service
and show cause why it should not be granted. Dkt. 5. Respondents filed their
Response on December 11, 2025 (Dkt. 8-2), and the parties jointly requested
expedited consideration of the Petition. Dkt. 8.
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 2241 of Title
28, which authorizes it to issue a writ of habeas corpus when a person is “in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon
the legality of that custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “[T]he
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Id.
1 Petitioner states he has not yet requested a bond hearing because it would
presumptively be denied based on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ opinion in
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Dkt. 1, ¶28.
2 “Respondents” 	refers to Juan Baltazar, the Warden of the Aurora Contract
Detention Facility; Robert Hagan, the Field Office Director of the Denver ICE Field
Office; Kristi Noem, the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland
Security; Todd Lyons, the Acting Director of ICE; and Pamela Bondi, the United
States Attorney General.
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Noncitizens may properly challenge the lawfulness of their detention through habeas
proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001).
The Court has considered the Petition, the Response, the various attachments,
and the governing law. Because Petitioner’s challenge is fundamentally legal in
nature, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. For the reasons
shared in the following discussion, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. 	The Removal Processes
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
established two main processes for removing noncitizens who are deemed ineligible
to enter or remain in the United States. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020). The “usual removal process”—commonly referred to as
“Section 240”—involves an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, where
a noncitizen may “attempt to show that he or she should not be removed.” Id. at 108.
These are adversarial proceedings where noncitizens have the right to hire counsel,
examine the evidence against them, present their own evidence, and cross-examine
witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)–(B). These proceedings are recorded, often take
months to resolve, and upon a decision by an immigration judge, are appealable to
the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1240.15. The BIA order is, in
turn, appealable to a U.S. Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
The second process provides for expedited removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
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Under this provision, noncitizens who satisfy two criteria may be subject to expedited
removal. 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(1). 	Under 	the 	first 	criterion, 	the 	noncitizens 	are
“inadmissible” to the United States because they either lack proper entry documents
or they engaged in fraud or willfully misrepresented a material fact on their
application for admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). The second criterions provides
that the noncitizens fall into at least one of two categories: (1) they are “arriving in
the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision”); and
or (2) they “have not been admitted or paroled” into the United States and have “not
affirmatively shown” to an immigration officer’s satisfaction that they have been
“physically 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States 	continuously 	for 	[a] 	2-year 	period
immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the 	determination 	of 	inadmissibility[,]” 	id.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (“Designation Provision”).
In contrast to the usual removal process, “the expedited removal order is
usually issued within a few days, if not hours.” Make the Rd. New York v. Noem, No.
25-cv-190 	(JMC), 	2025 	WL 	2494908, 	at 	*3 	(D.D.C. 	Aug. 	29, 	2025). 	In 	these
proceedings, noncitizens typically have no opportunity to review the evidence against
them 	or 	prepare 	a 	defense. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b)(2)(iii). And there is almost no opportunity for judicial review. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(A).
B. 	The Detention of Noncitizens
The Immigration and Nationality Act contemplates two options for detaining
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noncitizens pending removal proceedings. Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-03094-
CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025). The first, § 1225, enumerates
the 	procedures 	by 	which 	the 	government 	must 	detain 	certain 	“applicants 	for
admission” into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). An “applicant for admission”
is a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrived in the United States.” Id. The INA defines “admission” as “the lawful entry
of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization by the
immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Section 1225(b) requires the detention
of two groups of “applicants for admission.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2). To the first
grouping, § 1225(b)(1), supra, applies to noncitizens who (1) are inadmissible because
they 	lack 	proper 	documentation 	or 	because 	they 	engaged 	in 	fraud 	or 	willful
misrepresentations 	in 	their 	applications, 	and 	(2) 	fall 	within 	the 	“Arriving
[Noncitizen] Provision” or the “Designation Provision.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(iii)(II). To the second grouping, § 1225(b)(2) applies “in the case of [a noncitizen] who
is an applicant for admission, [where] the examining immigration officer determines
that [the noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Noncitizens detained under
§ 1225, no matter which grouping, are not entitled to bond hearings. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).3
3 Under narrow circumstances the detained noncitizens may be temporarily paroled.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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Section 1226, by contrast, authorizes the detention of noncitizens “already in
the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289
(emphasis added). It provides “that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,
[a noncitizen] may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
[noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis
added). This section further states—with exceptions for noncitizens with certain
criminal 	charges—the 	Attorney 	General may 	release 	a 	noncitizen 	on 	bond or
conditional parole. Id. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). Critical here, “[f]ederal regulations provide
that [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of
detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).
ANALYSIS
The issue before the Court is whether Respondents are lawfully detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention requirement, as they claim,
or whether § 1226(a) applies, and therefore, entitles Petitioner to a bond hearing. Mr.
Aleman Hernandez urges this Court to join the growing number of federal district
courts to have rejected the Government’s recently adopted interpretation regarding
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s applicability and have instead held that “the law still means what it
always has meant.” Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL
3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (Appendix A (collecting majority cases)).
Respondents contend Mr. Aleman Hernandez is properly detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2) 	because 	§ 1225’s 	plain 	text 	clearly 	applies 	to 	all 	“applicants 	for
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admission” regardless of whether they recently arrived in the United States or, like
Petitioner, entered without inspection and have lived here continuously for more than
two years. Dkt. 8-2, pp.7-9. Respondents believe their interpretation of the statutory
scheme is supported by the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281
(2018). They further argue that Mr. Aleman Hernandez’s due process rights have not
been violated because he is entitled to only the process provided in § 1225.
The Court is not persuaded by these arguments.
A. 	Interpreting the Text of § 1225 and § 1226
Like the other district courts that have considered the issue, the Court’s
analytical starting point is the text of the statute. If that language is “clear and
unambiguous,” then “[the Court’s] duty is simply to enforce the statute that Congress
has drafted.” Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1103 (10th Cir. 2019). The
words of the statute are given “their ordinary meanings, considering both the specific
context in which the word is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”
In re Taylor, 899 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). If “the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire
beyond the plain language of the statute.” United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989).
1. 	Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
The pertinent language of § 1225 states:
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[I]n the case of [a noncitizen] who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that [a noncitizen] seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
[noncitizen] shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of
this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).4
Respondents argue Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” because he is a
noncitizen who is present in this country but has not been admitted. Dkt. 8-2, p.6
(citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287). Even accepting this as true, § 1225(b)(2)(A)
requires more than simply being an applicant for admission. It also requires the
applicant to be “seeking admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to
be admitted.” Id. Further, being an applicant for admission does not necessarily
equate with “seeking admission.” As the Southern District of New York aptly
explained:
Applicant for admission . . . 	doesn’t require an application of any sort.
All that’s needed is presence without admission—in other words, it
applies to the great number of undocumented immigrants who currently
live here. By contrast, ‘seeking admission’ might mean something more
than that—some active desire or process toward admission.
. . .
What, 	then, 	does 	it 	mean 	to 	‘seek 	admission?’ 	The 	INA 	defines
‘admission’ as ‘the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.’ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). And ‘entry,’ which is undefined, can be given its
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. That meaning is ‘entering
into ... (a country),’ which is ‘to come or go in.’ In a more specific legal
context, it also means going into a place. And ‘seeking’ is written in the
present-progressive tense, which ‘is used to refer to an action or a state
that 	is 	continuing 	to 	happen.’ 	Putting 	that 	all 	together, 	‘seeking
4 Respondents do not contend § 1225(b)(1) applies to Petitioner.
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admission’ requires a noncitizen to continue to want to go into the
country.
J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
2025) (cleaned up) (emphasis in original) (citing Supreme Court precedent, the Oxford
English Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, and Merriam Webster Online). Under
this plain language, § 1225(b)(2)(A) cannot apply to Petitioner because “you can’t go
into a place where you already are,” and Petitioner has been here for over ten years.
Id.
Respondents dismiss the preceding analysis and point this Court to another
portion of the statute that reads: “[noncitizens] who are applicants for admission or
otherwise seeking admission” shall be inspected by immigration officers. Dkt. 8-2, p.6
(citing 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(a)(3)). 	Under 	this 	language, 	Respondents 	contend 	a
“noncitizen can seek admission simply by meeting the definition of an applicant for
admission, or can ‘otherwise’ seek admission by directly applying for admission.” Id.
(emphasis in original). But suggesting that “applicant for admission” is coterminous
with “otherwise seeking admission” commits several interpretive errors. First, it
isolates this language from the rest of the provision. When read in its entirety, it is
clear Respondents have quoted only a portion of a longer list of noncitizens subject to
inspection. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (also including noncitizens seeking readmission and
noncitizens seeking transit through the U.S.).
Second, 	Respondents’ 	interpretation 	runs 	contrary 	to 	the 	ordinary
understanding of lists that use the word “or” when listing things. The word “or” is
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customarily used in the “disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given
separate 	meanings.” 	Loughrin 	v. 	United 	States, 	573 	U.S. 	351, 	357 	(2014).
Respondents’ explanation of this clause would read the word “or” to mean “including.”
No canon of construction would allow such a conflation of distinct terms. Id.
Third, Respondents’ construction “[invites] surplusage into the statute. That
Congress chose to include this additional phrase—‘seeking admission’—not once but
(according to the government) multiple times suggests that it must mean something
distinct.” 	J.G.O., 	2025 	WL 	3040142, 	at 	*3. 	Thus, 	Respondents’ 	statutory
interpretation is not persuasive. See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F.Supp.3d 771,
781 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (finding noncitizens who are present in the country for years
may technically be considered an “applicant for admission” because they are a
noncitizen present in the United States who has not been admitted but this is “not
interchangeable” with a determination that a noncitizen is “seeking admission”).
Respondents also rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jennings v.
Rodriguez and contend that the Supreme Court’s explanation regarding the scope of
§ 1225 should guide this Court’s analysis. Dkt. 8-2, pp.4-10. The Court agrees
Jennings is instructive, but not for the reasons Respondents suggest.
As an initial matter, Respondents’ theory is largely undercut by the fact that
the Supreme Court’s discussion in Jennings regarding §§ 1225 and 1226 considered
an entirely different question of law. There, the Court was asked to determine
whether noncitizens who were indisputably subject to the mandatory detention
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provisions of §§ 1225(b)(1), 1225(b)(2), or 1226(c), were entitled to “periodic bond
hearings,” and whether the detention of noncitizens under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) is
limited to a six-month period. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286. In concluding those
provisions contained no time limits, the Supreme Court “said nothing about whether
persons like [Mr. Aleman Hernandez] were subject to those provisions in the first
place.” Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4304 (NRM), 2025 WL 2829511, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025).
Respondents next contend that the Supreme Court’s 	characterization in
Jennings of § 1225(b)(2) as a “catchall” necessarily means that any applicant for
admission who does not fall within the “Arriving [Noncitizen]” or “Designation”
provisions of § 1225(b)(1)—whether they are seeking admission or not—are subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Dkt. 8-2, p.8. But the Supreme Court was
more specific than that. It said, as this Court does, that § 1225(b)(2) applies to
“[noncitizens] 	seeking 	admission into 	the 	country.” 	Jennings, 	583 	U.S. at 	289
(emphasis 	added). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	also 	notably 	said 	§ 	1226 	applies 	to
“[noncitizens] already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”
Id. (emphasis added). The Court—like the myriad others to have addressed this same
argument—is not persuaded by Respondents’ analysis of Jennings.
2. 	Section 1226
Section 1226 states in pertinent part:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, [a noncitizen] may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is
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to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection
(c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested [noncitizen]; and
(2) may release the [noncitizen] on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing 	conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole. . .
8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a)(1), (2). The plain language of this provision is much broader with
respect to whom it applies and permits immigration authorities—subject to the
exception in §1226(c)—to detain or release any noncitizen “pending a decision on
whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed.” Id.
Section 1226(c) then “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] who may
not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis in original).
Under this subcategory, noncitizens who fall “into one of several enumerated
categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities” are not eligible for
release and must be detained without bond. Id. “Importantly, the plain text of section
1226(c) requires detention for certain noncitizens who are ‘deportable’ (meaning they
were previously admitted to the United States) as well as certain noncitizens deemed
‘inadmissible’ 	(meaning 	they 	have 	not 	been 	admitted 	to 	the 	United 	States).”
Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 30, 2025) (emphasis in original).
Relevant here, § 1226(c) requires detention for any noncitizen
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who is deemed inadmissible because he is ‘present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled’ under section 1182(a)(6)(A) and ‘is
charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed,
or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements’ of
certain crimes.
Id. (quoting § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii)) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court has recognized that when Congress creates exceptions to
a statute’s applicability, it “proves” that absent those exceptions, the statute is
generally applicable. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393, 400 (2010). If this were not the case, the exception would have no purpose.
Id. Consequently, the plain language of § 1226(c) is further support that the default
discretionary bond procedures in § 1226(a) apply to noncitizens who are (1) present
in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and (2) have not been
implicated in any of the enumerated crimes set forth in § 1226(c). Bostock, 2025 WL
2782499, at *17; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (Attorney General may release noncitizen
on bond “except as provided in subsection (c)”).
If, however, the Court were to accept Respondents’ strained interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)—that all applicants for admission, no matter how long they have resided
here, are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)—what then would be
the purpose of § 1226? A person “cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under
§ 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.” Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp.3d at
485. Respondents’ interpretation would effectively read § 1226 out of the INA.
So, Respondents instead suggest § 1226 would apply to those noncitizens “who
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have been admitted (such as noncitizens who were admitted on a visa, and then
overstayed).” Dkt. 8-2, p.10. “But there is no indication that Congress intended § 1226
to be limited only to visa overstays.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475,
490 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). To be sure, “[i]f Congress had wished to enact the transformation
of the immigration detention system [in the way Respondents] contend it did—
requiring the detention of millions of people currently living and working in the
United States—then it would have said so more clearly.” Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499,
at *24.
Examining the plain language of §§ 1225 and 1226, as well as their context in
the greater statutory scheme, supports this Court’s conclusion that when read
together, these sections “cover [noncitizens] presenting at arrival (under § 1225) and
then everybody else (under § 1226).” J.G.O., 2025 WL 3040142, at *4 (emphasis
added). Mr. Aleman Hernandez, as a longtime resident of the United States, is
covered with “everybody else.”
B. 	Other Factors
Because the plain text of the statute supports this Court’s conclusion that Mr.
Aleman Hernandez is unlawfully detained pursuant to § 1225, the Court need not
extend its inquiry beyond this analysis. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 at 240–
41. Nevertheless, the Court briefly addresses the recent legislative history and the
longstanding agency practices that further support its conclusion.
In January of this year, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended
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8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Prior to its amendment,
§ 1226(c) required the detention of noncitizens “present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled” who had committed certain offenses such as crimes of
moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). The Laken Riley Act expanded the list of
offenses to include “burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, assault of a law enforcement
officer, . . . or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another
person.” Id. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court were to accept Respondents’ theory, the
Laken Riley Act amendments would have no legal effect because those same people
would already be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 even without the
additional commission of a crime. Such a conclusion is untenable. Stone v. INS, 514
U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends
its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”).5
In addition to these recent legislative amendments, the Court also notes
Respondents’ statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s implementing
regulations. Loa Caballero v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at
*7 	(D. 	Colo. 	Oct. 	22, 	2025). 	“Though 	not 	binding, 	‘interpretations 	issued
contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which have remained consistent
5 The Court is also persuaded by the opinions from those district courts who have
engaged in extensive analysis of the statute’s full legislative history. These analyses
are even more reason for this Court to join the majority of district courts to have
reviewed these issues and found as the Court does here. See e.g., Barco, 2025 WL
3295903, at **7-9; Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499 at *23; Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, No.
1:25-CV-01228 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025).
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over time, may be especially useful in determining the statute’s meaning.’” Id.
(quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)).
Pertinent here, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c), which corresponds to § 1225(b)(2), states
that it applies to “Arriving [noncitizens] placed in proceedings under section 240 of
the Act or [noncitizens] referred for an asylum merits interview under § 208.2(a)(1)(ii)
of 	this 	chapter.” 	This 	regulatory 	language 	mirrors 	the 	statutory 	language 	of
§ 1225(b)(2) except it replaces “applicant for admission . . . seeking admission” with
“any arriving [noncitizen].” Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) with 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c).
Indeed, the “regulation appears to contemplate that applicants seeking admission are
a subset of applicants ‘roughly interchangeable’ with ‘arriving [noncitizens].’” Cordero
Pelico v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-07286-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2822876, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2025) (quoting Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11613-BEM, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *6 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025)). In turn, “[a]rriving [noncitizens]” are specifically
defined by regulation as applicants for admission “coming or attempting to come into
the United States at a port-of-entry.” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (emphasis added).
This language plainly cannot apply to Mr. Aleman Hernandez, who already
resides in the United States and has for ten years. See Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-
01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *15 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (explaining that
Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225 is “inconsistent with . . . decades of agency
practice”); Chang Barrios v. Shepley, No. 1:25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2772579, at
*9 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[I]t would contravene decades of precedent to adopt the
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position that any noncitizen present in the country without admission is subject to
mandatory detention without bond hearing. . . . Until recently, the Executive Branch
applied § 1226(a) to noncitizens without documentation already present in the United
States.”).
C. 	Due Process and Administrative Procedures Act
Because the Court grants Mr. Aleman Hernandez’s request for relief on the
statutory basis that his detention under § 1225 is unlawful, and therefore, he is only
properly detained under § 1226, the Court declines to address Peitioner’s due process
and Administrative Procedures Act claims at this time. If, following the entry of this
Order, Respondents fail to provide Mr. Aleman Hernandez with a bond hearing as
required, Petitioner may renew his due process and APA claims.
* 	* 	*
In his Petition, Mr. Aleman Hernandez did not request an order of release and
instead only requested an order compelling a bond hearing. For the reasons shared
above, Denis Aleman Hernandez’s Petition for Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.6
IT IS ORDERED Respondents shall provide Mr. Aleman Hernandez with a
bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS of the date of this Court’s
order.7
6 To the extent Petitioner’s Counsel seeks an award of attorney’s fees, she must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Local Rules of Practice for this District.
7 In so ordering, the Court makes no comment regarding whether Petitioner is
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents shall file a status report within TEN
DAYS of the date of this Court’s order to certify compliance. The status report shall
include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if
bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a), 	and 	to 	preserve 	the 	Court’s 	jurisdiction, 	Respondents 	SHALL 	NOT
REMOVE Petitioner from the District of Colorado or the United States unless or until
this Court or the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacates this Order.
DATED: 	December 23, 2025.
BY THE COURT
_____________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
ultimately entitled to release on bond or whether the provisions of § 1226(c) are
applicable.
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