Pan v. Bondi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00599-SBP
BAIZHUANG PAN,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE et al.,1
Respondents.
ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
Before the court is Petitioner Baizhuang Pan (“Petitioner”)’s Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 1 (“Petition”). For the reasons outlined below, the court
respectfully GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The court finds that the relevant facts are not in dispute and provides a brief summary of
those facts below. In doing so, the court draws heavily on the factual background set forth in the
response to the court’s February 25, 2026 order, filed at ECF No. 11 (the “Response”).
Petitioner is a citizen of China. ECF No. 1 at 2. Respondents, each sued exclusively in
their official capacities, are Todd Blanche, the acting Attorney General of the United States;
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Blanche, the current acting Attorney
General of the United States, is substituted for former Attorney General Pamela Bondi, and Mr.
Markwayne Mullin, the current Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, is substituted
for former Secretary Kristi Noem in this action.
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Robert Guadian, the Field Office Director for the Colorado Field Office for U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Markwayne Mullin, the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security; and Juan Baltazar, the Warden of GEO Group Aurora Inc. (collectively,
“Respondents”). See Petition ¶ 15. Petitioner entered the United States in 2000 as a conditional
resident, but on December 16, 2008, was convicted of Conspiracy to Commit Pimping in
violation of Colorado Revised Statute § 18-7-206 and was subsequently sentenced to prison.
Johnson Declaration, ECF No. 11-1 ¶ 4.
On March 22, 2010, after Petitioner had been released from prison, ICE officers
encountered Petitioner and determined that he was subject to removal from the United States. Id.
¶ 7. Accordingly, he was detained pending resolution of his removal proceedings. Id. On the
same day, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against
Petitioner. Id. ¶ 8. The Notice to Appear charged Petitioner with being deportable from the
United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(A), (J), and (K)
(an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission). Id.
On May 4, 2010, Petitioner appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Id. ¶ 9. The IJ
ordered Petitioner removed to China. Id. Both parties waived their right to appeal, and the IJ’s
removal order became immediately administratively final. Id. Petitioner was then detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Id. ¶ 10. On August 3, 2010, ICE released Petitioner from custody
on an order of supervision (“OSUP”). Id. ¶ 13.
On September 18, 2025, ICE officers arrested Petitioner in Centennial, Colorado when he
appeared for a routine check-in with ICE. Id. ¶ 14; see Petition at 3. Petitioner was taken into
custody in order to effectuate his removal from the United States. Johnson Declaration ¶ 14.
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Petitioner’s release on an OSUP was revoked and he was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
On October 10, 2025, ICE submitted a travel document request to the government of
China on behalf of Petitioner. Id. ¶ 16. On November 25, 2025, ICE served Petitioner with a
Notice of File Custody Review, which advised him that ICE will review his custody status and
potential for release on an order of supervision. Id. ¶ 17. The notice also advised Petitioner of the
criteria that ICE will consider when deciding whether to release or continue to detain him. Id.
Additionally, the notice advised Petitioner that he can submit documents in support of his
release. Id. On or about December 13, 2025, Petitioner requested a personal interview regarding
his custody status. Id. ¶ 18. On December 15, 2025, ICE conducted a personal interview with
Petitioner, whereby he was given the opportunity to make a statement and provide
documentation relevant to his custody review. Id. ¶ 19. On February 12, 2026, a panel
recommended that Petitioner remain detained pending removal, as he failed to meet the criteria
for release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(e). Id. ¶ 20. Petitioner remains detained pending adjudication
of the travel document request submitted by ICE to China and Petitioner’s removal from the
United States. Id. ¶ 23.
In his Petition, Petitioner contends, inter alia, that Respondents cannot demonstrate a
significant likelihood that he will be removed to China in the reasonably foreseeable future, that
his detention has now extended beyond applicable constitutional limits, and that accordingly, his
continued confinement violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights pursuant to Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Petition at 7. As a result, he requests that the court order his
immediate release under appropriate conditions of supervision. Id.
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II. 	ANALYSIS
Here, there is no dispute that Petitioner’s initial detention was permitted by 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), that the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this
section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the
United States within a period of 90 days,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), or that “[d]uring the
removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). There is also no
dispute that certain aliens who are “ordered removed . . . may be detained beyond the [90-day]
removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). And there appears to be no dispute that since Petitioner
was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), he falls into this category of aliens who may
permissibly be detained beyond the 90-day removal period. However, the parties also do not
appear to dispute that pursuant to Zadvydas, there is a six-month period under which detention is
presumptively reasonable and does not violate due process in this context, but that beyond this
point, detention is not presumptively reasonable. See 533 U.S. at 701.
This is where the parties diverge. Petitioner’s stance is that his detention has since
exceeded any constitutionally permissible period of time. Petitioner argues that the six-month
period established in Zadvydas applies to him and that the seven months he spent in detention in
2010 should count towards this six-month period. Petition at 4. Respondents do not dispute that
the six-month period established in Zadvydas applies, but they argue, inter alia, that Petitioner’s
detention has not yet exceeded six months because he had only been in detention for
approximately five months when he filed his petition with this court. Response at 7-8. In doing
so, Respondents imply that the seven months Petitioner already spent in custody should not
count towards the six-month limit; however, Respondents fail to address this point directly.
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“[T]here is no dispute that in the aggregate, Petitioner’s detention has exceeded the
presumptively reasonable six-month period for effectuating his removal established by the
Supreme Court in Zadvydas.” Santacruz Macias v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-01046-SKC, 2026 WL
865174, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2026) (emphasis added). And while the court acknowledges
that “district courts in the Tenth Circuit are split regarding whether the six-month Zadvydas
removal period must be successive,” Tran v. Baltazar, 26-cv-00940-CNS, 2026 WL 764002, at
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2026), as a whole, “district courts more often conclude that a detainee’s
periods of detention should be considered together in determining whether the detention has
exceeded the presumptively reasonable time under Zadvydas.” Aguilar v. Noem, 25-cv-03463-
NYW, 2025 WL 3514282, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2025) (collecting cases). “Courts have even
reached the same conclusion where, as here, there is a significant gap between periods of
detention.” Tran, 2026 WL 764002 at *3.
In the absence of any direct argument from Respondents otherwise, the court agrees with
the logic underlying the majority position. “[A] uniform rule that counts and sums prior time in
detention is appropriate. It is, after all, liberty at issue.” Abuelhawa v. Noem, No. 4:25-cv-04128,
2025 WL 2937692, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025); see also Aguilar, 2025 WL 3514282, at *3
(citing Abuelhawa). “Holding otherwise would permit the federal government to ‘detain
noncitizens indefinitely by continuously releasing and re-detaining them.’” Aguilar, 2025 WL
3514282, at *3 (quoting Siguenza v. Moniz, No. 25-cv-11914-ADB, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (D.
Mass. Sept. 25, 2025)). And “under Zadvydas, expiration of the presumptively reasonable six-
month detention period does not mandate a noncitizen’s release; detention may continue ‘until it
has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
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foreseeable future.’” Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “Expiration of the six-month
period simply requires the Government to rebut a petitioner’s showing that ‘there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ assuming the petitioner
makes that showing.” Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Accordingly, the court agrees
with Petitioner that the seven months he has already spent in detention counts towards the six-
month presumptively reasonable period established in Zadvydas.
And regardless, the court notes that Petitioner, who was re-detained by ICE on September
18, 2025, has now contemporaneously been detained by Respondents for more than six
consecutive months (in addition to the seven months he spent in detention previously).
Respondents offer no argument or source of law supporting the idea that even though Petitioner
has now indisputably been detained for over six months straight, because this occurred shortly
after Petitioner filed his Petition, the court cannot grant Petitioner the relief he requests as a
result. Accordingly, in the absence of any argument otherwise, the court finds that this provides
an alternative, independent ground upon which to conclude that Petitioner’s detention now
exceeds the presumptively reasonable period.
Respondents also argue that even if Petitioner has been detained for more than six
months, his detention nonetheless remains permissible because he has not met “his burden under
Zadvydas” to show that there is no significant likelihood that he will be removed in the
“foreseeable future.” Response at 9. And Respondents additionally argue that if Petitioner has
made such an initial showing, Respondents have sufficiently rebutted this showing by showing in
turn that his removal is significantly likely in the foreseeable future. Id.
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The court disagrees. “As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Respondents have
misstated Petitioner’s burden under Zadvydas.” Aguilar, 2025 WL 3514282, at *4. Petitioner is
not required to “show that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future,”
as Respondents suggest, but rather must provide “good reason” to believe that his removal is not
significantly likely in the “reasonably” foreseeable future. See id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701). “This distinction is not a matter of semantics, but an important clarification of Petitioner’s
burden at this stage.” Id.; see Cruz Medina v. Noem, 794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 379 (D. Md. 2025) (“to
shift the burden of production to the government Mr. Cruz Medina need not prove that ‘there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ but rather must
articulate a ‘good reason to believe’ that removal is unlikely in the reasonable foreseeable
future.”); Siguenza, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (distinguishing between providing “good reason”
to believe that removal is not significantly likely and “establish[ing]” that removal is not
significantly likely).
Indeed, this standard is not especially high. “Petitioner’s burden may be met by, inter alia,
showing ‘the existence of either institutional barriers to repatriation or obstacles particular to his
removal.’” Aguilar, 2025 WL 3514282, at *4 (quoting Dusabe v. Jones, No. 24-cv-464-SLP,
2024 WL 5465749, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 486679 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2025)). “Courts have found this burden satisfied where, for
example, a habeas petitioner shows that some impediment precludes removal to their country of
origin.” Id. (collecting cases).
As stated above, Respondents are attempting to remove Petitioner to China, his country
of origin. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that “[p]ublic reporting confirms that removals to China
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are relatively infrequent and require significant diplomatic coordination,” that “[i]n calendar year
2025, ICE conducted only three removal flights to China, representing a decrease from prior
years,” and that “[t]here is no evidence that travel documents have been secured for [Petitioner]
or that China has affirmatively agreed to accept him in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Petition at 3. Petitioner also notes that Respondents have not provided him with any removal
date. Id. at 5. Respondents answer that these factors do “not mean that removal is not
significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future,” that “in recent months, the
government of China has approved travel document requests for individuals like Petitioner,” that
in those months, “ICE has successfully conducted removals to China,” and that “ICE has
submitted a travel document request to the government of China on behalf of Petitioner.”
Response at 8-9. And Respondents also argue that even if Petitioner has sufficiently provided
good reason to believe that his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future, Respondents have made a sufficient rebuttal showing that his removal is significantly
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future because “other noncitizens have [ ] received travel
documents and been removed to China in recent months.” Id. at 9.
The court finds that Petitioner has sufficiently provided good reason to believe that his
removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future in the form of obstacles
particular to removal to China, while Respondents have not sufficiently rebutted this
demonstration. In particular, the court notes that the apparent paucity of removal flights to China,
which Respondents do not dispute—even if, as Respondents argue, some number of removals
have been conducted within the last few months—strongly supports Petitioner’s reasoning here.
And the court also finds it relevant that there is no evidence that travel documents have been
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secured for Petitioner or that China has affirmatively agreed to accept him, which clearly
represents an obstacle to Petitioner’s removal. The court therefore finds that Petitioner has met
his burden here.
Meanwhile, other courts in the Tenth Circuit have concluded that there is no evidence that
ICE will succeed in deporting a petitioner in the reasonably foreseeable future where all that is
known is that ICE is “taking steps” to remove the petitioner by working to obtain travel
documents and where ICE has successfully deported other individuals to the same country of
origin in recent months. See, e.g., Tran, 2026 WL 764002 at *3; Chen v. Carter, No. 26-3026-
JWL, 2026 WL 890227, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 1, 2026) (rejecting similar arguments regarding
detention pending deportation to China); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at
*2 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025) (same). “Such facts simply demonstrate that Petitioner’s removal is
possible. But the mere chance of removal within an unspecified period of time is not the same as
a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Tran, 2026 WL 764002
at *3 (cleaned up) (citing Siguenza, 2025 WL 2734704 at *3). Moreover, “[u]nsubstantiated
assertions that the government will pursue removal are insufficient to satisfy [Respondents’]
burden.” Pena-Gil v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-03268-PAB-NRN, 2025 WL 3268333, at *4 (D. Colo.
Nov. 24, 2025) (citing Siguenza, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3). And it is relevant that Respondents
do not indicate that China has even acknowledged Respondents’ latest request for Petitioner’s
travel documents. See Tran, 2026 WL 764002 at *4. Indeed, “[n]o further details are given
concerning any communications from China; thus, it is unknown whether and when petitioner’s
identify will be verified and China will issue a travel document.” Chen, 2026 WL 890227, at *2.
“Nor does the declarant or respondents discuss any issues particular to petitioner’s case, such that
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the likelihood and timing of the receipt of a travel document and petitioner’s removal might be
assessed.” Id. “In light of this, Respondents’ representation that ICE has recently successfully
removed other noncitizens to [China] does not convince the Court that the same will be true for
Petitioner any time soon, particularly given the absence of any representation that the
circumstances leading to those other noncitizens’ removals are also present here.” Tran, 2026
WL 764002 at *4. The court accordingly concludes that Respondents have not sufficiently
rebutted Petitioner’s demonstration that he has good reason to believe his removal is not
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Finally, Petitioner requests relief in the form of the court granting his Petition and
“order[ing] his immediate release under appropriate conditions of supervision.” Petition at 6.
Respondents do not contest that, having reached the findings set forth above, the court should
grant the relief Petitioner requests here. Accordingly, in the absence of any argument from
Respondents to the contrary, the court finds that Petitioner may be released immediately under
appropriate conditions of supervision. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
Since the court finds that it is able to grant the relief Petitioner requests on the above
grounds, the court need not reach any other arguments for relief raised by Petitioner.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s Petition is granted.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court respectfully GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, and orders Respondents to release Petitioner within one day of the
date of this Order under appropriate conditions of supervision. Respondents are also ordered to
file a status report in order to certify compliance within ten days of the issuance of this Order.
DATED: 	BY THE COURT:
______________________________
Susan Prose
United States Magistrate Judge
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