Singh v. Bondi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-01234-PAB
MANPREET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD BLANCHE, 1 in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of the United
States,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, 2 in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention
Facility,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Manpreet Singh’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Request for Order to Show Cause [Docket No. 1].
Respondents filed a response. Docket No. 7.
I. BACKGROUND 3
Petitioner is a 33 year old citizen of India. Docket No. 1 at 6, ¶ 24. Petitioner
entered the United States on December 31, 2024 and was detained. 4 Id. at 7, ¶ 29;
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Todd Blanche is
automatically substituted as a party in this action.
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Markwayne Mullin is
automatically substituted as a party in this action.
3 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
4 Petitioner does not allege the exact date that he was initially detained in his
habeas petition. See generally Docket No. 1. However, petitioner attaches a document
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Docket No. 1-9 at 2. On January 1, 2025, he was given a Notice and Order of
Expedited Removal. Id., ¶ 30. On January 31, 2025, petitioner was issued a Notice to
Appear, charging him as a noncitizen present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled, and vacating the prior Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Id.,
¶ 31. On February 4, 2025, petitioner was released on his own recognizance pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 8, ¶¶ 32-33. Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protections under the Convention Against Torture. Id., ¶ 34. On
December 20, 2025, petitioner was detained during a scheduled appointment with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Id., ¶ 35. From the time of his initial
release on recognizance to his current detention, petitioner committed no criminal
offenses, incurred no new immigration violations, and remained in compliance with all
reporting requirements. Id., ¶ 36. Petitioner is detained at the Denver Contract
Detention Facility. Id., ¶ 38.
On March 24, 2026, petition filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See
generally id. Petitioner argues that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
and that he is thus entitled to release or a bond hearing. Id. at 14-18, ¶¶ 57-68.
Alternatively, petitioner argues that his parole was unlawfully revoked. Id. at 18-22,
¶¶ 69-81. On March 30, 2026, an immigration judge denied petitioner’s applications for
asylum and withholding and his application for relief under the Convention Against
Torture. Docket No. 7 at 2. However, petitioner is not yet subject to a final order of
removal. Id. at 2-3.
to his habeas petition stating that petitioner was apprehended on December 31, 2024.
Docket No. 1-9 at 2. The Court therefore presumes that petitioner was detained upon
entering the United States.
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II. ANALYSIS
The parties disagree on whether petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226 or 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Docket No. 1 at 14-18, ¶¶ 57-68; Docket No. 7 at 3-7.
Petitioner contends that his detention is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) because
§ 1226(a) applies to the detention of noncitizens, like petitioner, who previously entered
and are now residing within the United States. Docket No. 1 at 10, ¶ 46. Because he
believes that § 1226 applies, petitioner argues that respondents must either release him
or provide him with an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 24, ¶ 86. Respondents,
however, contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens like petitioner
who are “present in the United States and have not been admitted.” Docket No. 7 at 5.
Respondents claim that petitioner is therefore not entitled to a bond hearing and is
subject to mandatory detention. 5 Id.
On many occasions, this Court has analyzed whether § 1225 or § 1226 applies
to petitioners who were detained when already present in the United States without
inspection and who face removal proceedings. See Cruz v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00312-
PAB-NRN, 2026 WL 766689, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2026); Moncada-Hernandez v.
5 Respondents also argue that petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) because, upon being re-detained, his status “reverted back to the status he
previously held: an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b).” Docket No. 7 at 3. Respondents, however, do not explain why they believe
petitioner was previously held under § 1225(b). Petitioner submits evidence indicating
the opposite, that he was released “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section 236
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Docket No. 1-10 at 2. “Section 236 of the INA
is codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226.” Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-
03439-NYW, 2026 WL 35227, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026). Thus, the Court finds that
petitioner was initially detained pursuant to § 1226, not § 1225(b). Moreover, even if
petitioner was initially detained pursuant to § 1225(b), that does not necessarily mean
petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b) upon his re-detention. See Rafibaev v.
Noem, No. 26-cv-00461-PAB, 2026 WL 607559, at *3-5 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026).
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Trump, No. 26-cv-00436-PAB, 2026 WL 472744, at *2-3 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2026); De
La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 16,
2026); Alfaro Orellana v. Noem, No. 25-cv-03976-PAB, 2025 WL 3706417, at *2-4 (D.
Colo. Dec. 22, 2025); Florez Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03697-PAB, 2025 WL
3677019, at *1-4 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025). Each time, the Court has ruled that the
petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226. Id.
Respondents acknowledge that the Court has previously analyzed this issue,
conceding “the facts of this case are not materially distinguishable . . . for purposes of
the Court’s decision on the legal issue of whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” Docket No. 7 at 6. Respondents state that they
submit an abbreviated response “to conserve resources and expedite this Court’s
consideration of this case, while preserving legal arguments and reserving all of
Respondents’ rights including the right to appeal.” Id. at 4. Respondents note that a
decision in this district rejecting respondents’ position has been appealed to the Tenth
Circuit. Id. at 5 (citing Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, 2025 WL
2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025)). “Respondents acknowledge that until the Tenth
Circuit rules on this issue, the Court’s prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to
reach the same result here if the Court adheres to that decision, as the facts of this case
are not materially distinguishable from that case for the purposes of the Court’s decision
on the legal issue of whether petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2).” Id. at 5-6. Respondents incorporate by reference the legal arguments
that respondents presented in Mendoza Gutierrez, the case which was appealed to the
Tenth Circuit. Id. at 6.
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The Court has analyzed the response that was submitted in Mendoza Gutierrez.
See Mendoza Gutierrez, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR, Docket No. 26 (D. Colo. Sept. 16,
2025). Not finding any additional relevant arguments that the Court has not already
addressed in its past orders on this issue, the Court will grant the habeas petition for the
same reasons as it did in Alfaro Orellana, which respondents acknowledge does not
materially differ from the present case. Docket No. 7 at 4. Because there is no
evidence that petitioner has been provided a bond hearing, his current detention
violates § 1226(a). The Court will grant the habeas petition on the § 1226 claim and will
order respondents to provide petitioner a bond hearing within seven days of the date of
this order. 6
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Manpreet Singh’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Request for Order to Show Cause [Docket No. 1] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that respondents shall provide petitioner with a bond hearing under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven days of the date of this Court’s order. It is further
6 Because the Court will grant the habeas petition on the basis of the 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) claim, it will not reach petitioner’s other claims. See Hernandez v. Baltazar,
No. 1:25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (“the Court
declines to adjudicate Petitioner's due process claim on the merits at this time because
the Court grants the relief Petitioner seeks based on the applicability of § 1226(a)”).
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ORDERED that, within five days of petitioner’s bond hearing, the parties shall
file a status report indicating whether the bond hearing was held and whether bond was
granted or denied.
DATED April 7, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
______	__ _____________________
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