Reza Arciniega v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-04888-PAB
LUIS MARIO REZA ARCINIEGA,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, Warden of the Denver Contract Detention Facility, Aurora, Colorado,
in his official capacity,
GEORGE VALDEZ, Field Office Director, Denver Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in his
official capacity,
DAVID VENTURELLA, Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his
official capacity, and
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, in his official capacity,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Luis Mario Reza Arciniega’s
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] and Petitioner-Plaintiff’s
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 2].
Respondents filed a response. Docket No. 8.
I. BACKGROUND1
Petitioner entered the United States multiple times since 1988 on an H2B visa.
Docket No. 1 at 7, ¶ 18. Petitioner’s last entry was in 2007 and petitioner has lived in
the United States continuously since 2007. Id. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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(“ICE”) detained petitioner on March 16, 2010 and subsequently released petitioner on a
$5,000 bond. Id. ICE initiated removal proceedings against petitioner by issuing a
Notice to Appear. Id. In 2015, an immigration court administratively closed petitioner’s
removal proceedings. Id. Since his release, petitioner has reported to ICE through
regular check-in appointments. Id. On July 22, 2026, ICE re-detained petitioner and
placed him in detention without notice, process, changed circumstances, or a pre-
deprivation hearing. Id. at 8, ¶ 19. ICE did not articulate any changed circumstances
that justified the revocation of petitioner’s bond. ICE has since attempted to justify the
re-detention of petitioner through events that occurred prior to petitioner’s 2010 release
on a $5,000 bond. Id., ¶ 20.
On October 1, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a
motion for a temporary restraining order. See generally id.; Docket No. 2. Among other
things, petitioner claims that his re-detention violates his due process rights. Docket
No. 1 at 23-25, ¶¶ 60-64. Petitioner seeks his immediate release. Id. at 27. On
October 13, 2026, respondents filed a response, indicating that they “are not submitting
a brief in opposition to the Petition.” Docket No. 8 at 1-2. Respondents assert that, “if
the Court does grant the Petition, the appropriate relief would be an Order directing the
Respondents, within seven days of this Court’s order, release Petitioner from detention.”
Id. at 2.
II. ANALYSIS
The Court considers petitioner’s due process claim. Pursuant to Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), a court considers the following in weighing a due
process claim:
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Given that a “person’s physical freedom is the most elemental of liberty interests,” see
Granillo Chavarria v. Baltazar, 824 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1174 (D. Colo. 2026) (internal
quotation and citation omitted), the first factor weighs in favor of petitioner.
Relevant to the second factor is the fact that petitioner was previously released.
In releasing petitioner in 2010, the respondents necessarily determined that petitioner
was not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Ekenge v. Baltazar, 26-cv-
00630-SBP, 2026 WL 617341, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2026). Respondents do not state
why petitioner’s release on bond was revoked. See generally Docket No. 8. Where
respondents have provided no change in circumstances that alters the initial
determination that petitioner is not a danger to the community or a flight risk, there is a
significant risk of the erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty interest. See Ekenge,
2026 WL 617341, at *5 (finding that the “risk of erroneous deprivation is also
considerable” where “[i]t appears to be undisputed that Petitioner was previously
released after it was determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk”);
Perez-Cifuentes v. Warden, Denver Contract Detention Center Denver Field Office
Director, No. 26-cv-02371-NRN, 2026 WL 1733489, at *3 (D. Colo. June 16, 2026)
(finding that “the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable” where petitioner was
previously released on his own recognizance and respondents “do not contest, that at
the time of his detention, there had not been a material change in circumstances”)
(alteration, internal quotation, and citation omitted); Uzcategui v. Brooksby, 2026 WL
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622751, at *11 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2026) (finding that the second Mathews factor weighs in
favor of petitioner because “civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose
and effect’ is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen
presents a risk of flight or danger to the community,” “Federal Respondents do not
contend that [petitioner] is or was a flight risk or a danger to the community,” and
petitioner was previously released on parole) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001)). “A re-detention, without any individualized assessment, leads to a high
risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual’s liberty interest.” Orellana v. Noem, 807
F. Supp. 3d 745, 754 (W.D. Ky. 2025). The Court finds that the second Mathews factor
weighs in favor of petitioner.
Regarding the third factor, “the government clearly has an interest in enforcing
immigration laws, but [the government’s] interest in detaining petitioner without a
warrant, notice to appear, or any justifiable reasonable explanation for [his] detention is
low.” See Uzcategui, 2026 WL 622751, at *11 (internal quotation and citation omitted);
cf. L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1185 (D. Colo. 2024) (“It would stand to
reason if a noncitizen was neither a flight risk nor dangerous, there would be no
government or public interest in detention.”). Furthermore, the Court finds that the fiscal
and administrative burdens associated with evaluating whether a change in
circumstance justifies petitioner’s re-detention is low when compared to petitioner’s
interest in being free from the erroneous deprivation of his liberty. See Ekenge, 2026
WL 617341, at *5 (“The Government’s interest in re-detaining non-citizens previously
released without a hearing is low and any costs are far outweighed by the risk of
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erroneous deprivation of the liberty interest at issue.”) (alterations and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of petitioner.
Pursuant to Mathews, the Court finds that petitioner’s due process rights were
violated. Respondents provide no argument to the contrary. They also do not contend
that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community or provide a reason for the
revocation of petitioner’s release. Thus, the Court will grant the habeas petition and
order petitioner’s immediate release with the same conditions of release that were
imposed during petitioner’s initial release. 2 See Perez-Cifuentes, 2026 WL 1733489, at
*3, *5 (“As to the appropriate remedy, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to
immediate release. Petitioner was released from the custody of the [Office of Refugee
Resettlement] in 2021 and he has since remained at liberty relying on that
determination” and ordering that respondents may “not impose any additional
restrictions” on petitioner) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Murzi v. Noem, No.
26-cv-00359-CNS, 2026 WL 395111, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 12, 2026) (“Immediate release
is the appropriate remedy. To be released on conditional parole/own recognizance,
there must be a finding that the immigrant does not pose a risk of flight or danger to the
community and Respondents do not otherwise argue that Petitioner poses such risk or
danger” and ordering that respondents “may not impose any conditions of release or
supervision that were not imposed in the original grant of parole”) (internal quotation
and citation omitted); Ekenge, 2026 WL 617341, at *7 (“other courts have found that . . .
releasing a petitioner immediately remains the appropriate approach, at least where no
2 Because the Court will grant the habeas petition on the basis that respondents
violated petitioner’s due process rights, it will not consider petitioner’s other claims.
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evidence has been provided that the petitioner violated the conditions of his release
pursuant to an OREC or similar status, [or] where little or no evidence has been
provided in support of respondents’ claims as to what the petitioner’s conditions of
release are”); Sidqui v. Almodovar, 823 F. Supp. 3d 364, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2026) (“in light
of the Government’s failure to provide Petitioner any individualized process either prior
to or contemporaneous with the deprivation of his liberty, which was formerly granted by
the Government, and the Government’s inability to point to any evidence of risk of flight
or danger,” finding that petitioner’s immediate release is the appropriate remedy).
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Luis Mario Reza Arciniega’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Petitioner-Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 2] is DENIED as moot. It is further
ORDERED that respondents shall release petitioner from custody within 48
hours of the issuance of this order pursuant to the conditions of petitioner’s initial
release. It is further
ORDERED that respondents shall file a status report within four days of the
issuance of this order confirming that petitioner was released from custody.
DATED October 14, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
_________________________
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