Ordaz v. Flowers

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
REBEKAH ORDAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CARYN FLOWERS,
WARDEN OF FCI DANBURY,
Respondent.
No. 3:26-cv-467 (SRU)
ORDER ON ORDAZ’S SECTION 2241 PETITION
Pro se petitioner, Rebekah Ordaz, is a sentenced inmate in the custody of the federal
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). She is currently housed at FCI Danbury.1
Ordaz has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 1. In her petition, Ordaz challenges the BOP’s
decision not to reduce her sentence by 12 months after she successfully completed the
Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”). Id. at 2. The respondent, Caryn Flowers, who
serves as Warden of FCI Danbury, opposes Ordaz’s habeas petition and moves for dismissal of
Ordaz’s petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Resp. to Show Cause Order and Mot. to
Dismiss, Doc. No. 11.
I have carefully considered the parties’ submissions and the record.2 For the following
reasons, Flowers’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, is GRANTED, and Ordaz’s habeas petition,
Doc. No. 1, is DISMISSED.
1 See BOP, Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (Register Number 19643-030) (last visited Oct. 13,
2026). I may take judicial notice of content on the BOP’s Inmate Locator website. See United States v. Rivera, 466
F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (D. Conn. 2020).
2 I consider the record to include material from Ordaz’s federal criminal case, of which I may take judicial notice.
See Castro v. Flowers, 2026 WL 1601850, at *1 n.3 (D. Conn. June 4, 2026) (taking judicial notice of documents in
habeas petitioner’s federal criminal case) (citing Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006), and
Global Network Communications, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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I. 	Background
Ordaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine
and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine. Judgment, United States v. Ordaz, 4:19-cr-00156-004 (S.D. Iowa), Doc. No.
395, at 1. At sentencing, Ordaz received a sentence enhancement for possessing “a dangerous
weapon (including a firearm)” at the time of the offense. See Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Doc. No. 1, at 30 (BOP Regional Director’s response to Ordaz’s grievance appeal indicating that
Ordaz received the weapon enhancement). After applying that sentence enhancement, the court
sentenced Ordaz to a term of imprisonment of 140 months, to be followed by five years of
supervised release. Judgment, United States v. Ordaz, 4:19-cr-00156-004 (S.D. Iowa), Doc. No.
395, at 2–3.
While serving her sentence at FCI Danbury, Ordaz filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In her petition, Ordaz alleges that the BOP refused to reduce
Ordaz’s sentence by twelve months after she successfully completed the Residential Drug Abuse
Program (“RDAP”). Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 1, at 6. In response, Flowers
argues that the petition should be dismissed because Ordaz failed to: (1) state a claim that she
remains in custody in violation of federal law; and (2) properly exhaust her administrative
remedies before filing her petition. See Resp. to Show Cause Order and Mot. to Dismiss, Doc.
No. 11, at 4, 8.
Because I agree with Flowers that Ordaz has failed to state a claim that she remains in
custody in violation of federal law, I dismiss the petition without considering whether Ordaz
properly exhausted her administrative remedies. See, e.g., Boehm v. Pullen, 2024 WL 126939, at
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*1 n.1 (D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2024) (dismissing petition for failure to establish merits of a due
process claim without considering respondent’s exhaustion argument).
II. 	Legal Standards
a. 	General Habeas Standard
A federal prisoner may file a habeas petition if she is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A writ of
habeas corpus under § 2241 is available to a federal prisoner who does not challenge the legality
of [her] sentence, but challenges instead its execution subsequent to [her] conviction.” Carmona
v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, habeas petitioners may seek relief under section 2241 to challenge “such matters as
the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner’s sentence by prison officials, prison
disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash,
245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Flowers asserts that the BOP’s refusal to reduce Ordaz’s sentence after Ordaz completed
RDAP may not be challenged via a section 2241 petition. Resp. to Show Cause Order and Mot.
to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, at 5. I disagree. A petition under section 2241 is an “appropriate
vehicle” to challenge a BOP decision regarding a prisoner’s eligibility for early release based on
completion of RDAP. Wilson v. Baird, 2012 WL 2154209, at *3 (D. Conn. June 13, 2012).
As the petitioner, Ordaz “bears the burden of proving that [she] is being held contrary to
law; and because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, [she] must satisfy [her] burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir.
2011).
b. 	Materials to Consider under Rule 12(b)(6)
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Flowers moves to dismiss the habeas petition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Resp. to
Show Cause Order and Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, at 1. When deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), I must accept the material facts alleged in the petition as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, and decide whether it is plausible that the
petitioner has a valid claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
Because Ordaz filed her petition pro se, I must also construe her filings “liberally” and interpret
them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court may consider the facts alleged in the
complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by
reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted). “When presented with matters outside the pleadings that are not properly
considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court can either elect to exclude documents and
rule on a motion to dismiss, or consider the documents and ‘convert the motion to one for
summary judgment and give the parties an opportunity to conduct appropriate discovery and
submit the additional supporting material contemplated by Rule 56.’” Peterson v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 2023 WL 4363239, at *2 (2d Cir. July 6, 2023) (summary order) (quoting Chambers,
282 F.3d at 154). On the other hand, “a court may consider extrinsic materials on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion without converting it to a [motion for summary judgment] if the materials are
either (1) integral to the complaint, or (2) facts appropriate for judicial notice.” Ferry v. Mead
Johnson & Co., LLC, 514 F. Supp. 3d 418, 427 (D. Conn. 2021) (citing Global Network
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Communications, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006), and Chernosky v.
Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 2018 WL 529956, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2018)).
Flowers submitted a declaration from a BOP paralegal as part of her response to my
Order to Show Cause. See Ex. A to Resp. to Show Cause Order and Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No.
11-1 at 1-6. That declaration is accompanied by several “attachments,” including Ordaz’s
criminal judgment, BOP program statements and procedures, and Ordaz’s RDAP and
administrative remedy records. See id. at 7. I may take judicial notice of Ordaz’s criminal
judgment and BOP program statements and procedures without converting the motion to dismiss
to one for summary judgment. See United States v. Rivera, 466 F. Supp. 3d 310, 313 (D. Conn.
2020) (taking judicial notice of BOP inmate locator information); Nicholson v. Murphy, 2003
WL 22909876, at *7 n.2 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2003) (observing that “[c]ourts have taken judicial
notice of the BOP Program Statements”). I may not rely on the BOP paralegal’s declaration,
however, without converting the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Francis v. Commissioner of Correction, 2021 WL 3773302, at *2 (D. Conn. Aug. 25, 2021)
(converting motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment because petitioner submitted a
sworn declaration in response to the motion to dismiss).
Although some courts have concluded that some BOP records are considered “integral”
to a habeas petition and that a court may therefore consider those records without converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, I need not rely on the BOP records
submitted by Flowers because Ordaz has submitted relevant records herself. See, e.g., Zenquis v.
Pullen, 2023 WL 2931585, at *4 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 2023) (considering “records relating to
[p]etitioner’s exhaustion of remedies” because “the petition attache[d] and relie[d] on [those]
records” and those records were “integral” to the section 2241 petition); see also Pet. for Writ of
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Habeas Corpus, Doc. No. 1 at 30. Because I may decide the motion to dismiss on the merits
based on the records Ordaz has submitted with her petition, I will not consider the materials
Flowers has submitted with her motion and will decide the motion without converting it to a
motion for summary judgment. See Green v. McLaughlin, 480 F. App’x 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2012)
(summary order) (holding that conversion was not required where court “clearly chose to
exclude the additional material attached to the defendants’ motion to dismiss” and did not cite to
materials other than the complaint); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that if “the court simply refers to supplementary materials, but does not rely on them or
use them as a basis for its decision, the 12(b)(6) motion is not converted into a motion for
summary judgment”); Cancel v. Amakwe, 551 F. App’x 4, 6 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)
(holding that conversion of motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment “appear[ed] to have
been unnecessary” when magistrate judge referenced additional material but “did not rely on the
documents for its ultimate recommendation”).
III. 	Discussion
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP “may reduce by up to one year the prison
term of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony, if the prisoner successfully completes a
substance abuse program.” Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 232 (2001). RDAP is a qualifying
substance abuse program. See United States v. James, 151 F.4th 28, 43 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned
up) (noting that RDAP “is an intensive drug treatment program run by the BOP for federal
inmates with documented substance abuse problems”). “The BOP has sole discretion to
determine an inmate’s eligibility for RDAP, as well as to grant or deny sentence reductions upon
successful completion of the program[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Lopez, 531
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U.S. at 239-40 (emphasis in original) (agreeing with the BOP that the BOP “‘may,’ but also may
not, grant early release” to an inmate under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)).
“As an exercise of the [BOP] Director’s discretion,” inmates “are not eligible for early
release” if they “have a current felony conviction for . . . [a]n offense that involved the carrying,
possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives (including any explosive
material or explosive device)” or “[a]n offense that, by its nature or conduct, presents a serious
potential risk of physical force against the person or property of another[.]” 28 C.F.R.
§ 550.55(b). The prisoner’s “current felony conviction” need not be for a weapon offense,
however, because the BOP may “tak[e] account of preconviction conduct” in determining
whether a prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) and its
implementing regulations. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 242. That means that even if a prisoner was not
convicted of a weapons offense, the prisoner may still be ineligible for a sentence reduction if the
prisoner’s sentence was enhanced because the prisoner carried, possessed, or used a dangerous
weapon in the commission of the charged offense. See id. at 236, 244 (holding that the BOP
properly denied RDAP sentence reduction to prisoner whose sentence for a drug conviction was
enhanced because he “possessed a firearm in connection with his offense”); Lasorsa v. Menifee,
182 F.3d 900 (2d Cir. 1999) (summary order) (affirming district court’s denial of habeas petition
submitted by prisoner whose sentence was enhanced by his possession of a firearm at the time
that drugs were found in his residence).
Here, Ordaz “successfully completed” the RDAP program. Pet. for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. No. 1, at 6. The BOP then determined that Ordaz was ineligible for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), because Ordaz’s presentence report “recommended,
and the [sentencing] court adopted, a two-point Special Offense Characteristic (SOC)
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enhancement for weapons at the time of sentencing.” 	Id. at 30. According to the BOP, that
weapon enhancement rendered Ordaz “ineligible for early release consideration because” it
“presented a potential risk of physical force against the person or property of another and
involved the possession of a dangerous weapon.” Id.
“[T]he Supreme Court has upheld the BOP’s discretion to determine the eligibility of
inmates for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) and categorically exclude prisoners
based on a special offense characteristic described in 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii).” Wilson,
2012 WL 2154209, at *4. Accordingly, I conclude that Ordaz has not sufficiently alleged that
the BOP abused its discretion in violation of the Constitution or federal law by denying her a
sentence reduction. See id. (concluding that the BOP did not abuse its discretion by denying
RDAP sentencing reduction to prisoner who had earlier received a sentence enhancement
because her offense involved the carrying, possession, or use of a dangerous weapon); see also
Hartman v. Zickefoose, 2007 WL 1097081, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2007) (same); Popperwill v.
Baird, 2012 WL 1143651, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 4, 2012) (same). Accordingly, Ordaz’s habeas
petition fails to state a claim that she “is being held contrary to law.” Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at
158.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Flowers’ Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 11, is GRANTED, and
Ordaz’s habeas petition, Doc. No. 1, is DISMISSED.
The Clerk is instructed to close this case.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 13th day of October 2026.
/s/ Stefan R. Underhill
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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