DAVIS v. DIXON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
TERRY T. DAVIS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:24cv145-MCR-HTC
RICKY DIXON,
Defendant.
_____________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Terry T. Davis, Jr., a Muslim prisoner proceeding pro se, contends
the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) regulation that prevents him from
growing a beard longer than one-half inch (the “beard policy”) violates the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).1 Doc. 1. 	Ricky Dixon,
the Secretary of the FDOC, has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the
beard policy does not impose a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise and,
even if it does, it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental 	interest 	with 	respect 	to 	Davis, 	considering 	his 	criminal 	and
disciplinary history. 	Doc. 36. 	Davis did not respond in opposition to the motion,
1 Although Davis also initially brought claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim. Doc. 28 (Report and Recommendation);
Doc. 31 (adopting order).
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despite being given the opportunity and advised of the consequences of failing to do
so.2 Doc. 37. After reviewing the FDOC’s motion, the evidence, and the relevant
law, the undersigned concludes the motion should be GRANTED, because while the
beard policy imposes a substantial burden on Davis’s religious exercise, the
undisputed evidence shows it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.
I. 	Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
fact.” 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). An issue of
fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law,
and it is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. 	Id. 	The Court must review the evidence, and all factual
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence, “in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” 	Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th
2 Specifically, the Court told Davis that if he failed to file a response to the motion for summary
judgment, the Court could consider the facts set forth in the motion as undisputed and enter
judgment in favor of the FDOC. Doc. 37 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), (e)(3)).
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Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). 	“If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences
arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.”
Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted).
II. 	Background
The FDOC’s beard policy states:
All inmates shall elect either to be clean shaven or to grow and maintain
a half-inch beard. 	Such a beard shall include all the hair that grows
naturally on the face and front of the neck, excluding eyebrows and
eyelashes. 	Inmates 	shall 	not 	display 	any 	other 	type, 	style, 	or
arrangement of hair on the face nor front of the neck. Inmates shall not
sculpt nor edge their beards. 	No numbers, symbols, letters, nor other
designs shall appear in inmate beards. Those male inmates who desire
to remain clean shaven shall be clipper shaved three times per week,
and those inmates who desire to grow a half-inch beard shall have their
beards trimmed three times per week with a clipper fitted with a half-
inch guard.
Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-602.101(4).
FDOC regulations also provide that “religious beliefs do not justify violation
of Department or institutional rules and regulations.” 	Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-
503.001(2)(c)2.
As a Muslim, however, Davis says he is required to trim his mustache and
grow at least a fist-length beard. He argues that by preventing him from growing a
beard, the beard policy violates his rights under RLUIPA. 	He seeks to enjoin the
FDOC from applying the beard policy to him.
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III. 	Discussion
RLUIPA provides that the government shall not “impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution … unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person … is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and … is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 	42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a). RLUIPA “sets out a burden-shifting framework. First, the plaintiff must show
that a government rule, regulation, practice, or policy substantially burdens his
exercise of religion. Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the defendant has the
burden of proving that the challenged directive is the ‘least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest.’” 	Dorman v. Aronofsky, 36 F.4th
1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 425 (2022)).
Here, the FDOC argues: (1) its beard policy does not impose a substantial
burden on Davis’s religious exercise; and (2) even if the policy does impose a
substantial burden, as applied to Davis, it is the least restrictive means of furthering
the FDOC’s compelling interests in security and safety. After reviewing the record,
the undersigned finds the beard policy does impose a substantial burden on Davis’s
religious exercise. However, the FDOC’s evidence entitles it to judgment because
it has shown that, based on Davis’s criminal and disciplinary history, the beard policy
is the least restrictive means of furthering the FDOC’s compelling interests.
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A. 	Substantial Burden
“An RLUIPA plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘his engagement in religious
exercise 	was 	substantially 	burdened 	by 	the 	law, 	regulation, 	or 	practice 	he
challenges.’” 	Sumrall v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., — F.4th —, 2025 WL 2599427, at *7
(11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2017)). “A
substantial burden places more than an inconvenience on religious exercise,” but
“pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or mandates
religious conduct can meet the mark.” Id. (cleaned up) (citing Thai Meditation Ass’n
of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile, 980 F.3d 821, 830 (11th Cir. 2020)).
Here, the FDOC argues its beard policy does not impose a substantial burden
on Davis’s religious exercise because growing a beard is not “fundamental” to his
practice of Islam.3 Doc. 36 at 12 (citing Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.
2007)). 	The FDOC notes that during his deposition Davis: (1) was not able to
identify any passage of the Quran that requires growing an unlimited length beard;
(2) did not identify growing a beard as a “core belief[] of Islam he follows,” or
indicate growing a beard was “how he applies the core beliefs”; and (3) said there
were “dispensations” if you could not follow certain tenets of Islam. Doc. 36 at 12-
13.
3 A RLUIPA plaintiff must also show “the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely
held religious belief,” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015), but the FDOC does not dispute
that Davis’s beliefs about growing a beard are sincere.
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However, the undersigned is not persuaded by the FDOC’s argument for two
reasons. First, despite the emphasis the FDOC places on whether growing a beard
is “fundamental” to Davis’s religion, RLUIPA broadly defines “religious exercise”
to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” 	42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). 	And the Smith v. Allen
case the FDOC relies on recognized that “courts are not to inquire into the centrality
of a particular religious tenet in undertaking the substantial burden analysis.” Smith,
502 F.3d at 1278.4
Second, a review of Davis’s deposition testimony reveals growing a beard is
“fundamental” to his religious beliefs. 	Davis explained: (1) Allah,5 through the
Quran, directs Muslims to follow the commands of the Prophet Muhammad; (2) if
Muslims do not obey those commands, they are disobeying Allah and living “in a
state of sin”; (3) in the Hadith, Muhammad commands Muslims to trim their
mustaches and let their beards grow; and (4) the Hadith indicate the shortest a
Muslim’s beard can be is fist length. 	Davis Depo. 32:2-11; 45:13-20 – 46:15.
Accordingly, Davis believes Allah requires him to grow at least a fist-length beard,
and if he fails to do so, he is disobeying Allah and committing a sin. See id. (stating
4 In Smith, the Eleventh Circuit stated: “In challenging that decision on appeal, Smith has presented
no evidence to demonstrate that a small quartz crystal was fundamental to his practice of Odinism,
such that the denial of the crystal effectuated any ‘more than an inconvenience on [his] religious
exercise.’” 502 F.3d at 1278.
5 Davis refers to “Allah” and “God” interchangeably in his deposition.
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“everything that Prophet Muhammad said is … divine revelation from God, so
therefore it must be followed” and “disobeying Allah is a sin”).
The FDOC also claims growing a beard is not “fundamental” to Davis’s
religious beliefs because he testified “there ‘are dispensations’ if you cannot follow
Islamic principles in the prescribed manner.” Doc. 36 at 13. The FDOC suggests
this testimony shows Davis’s beliefs “account for a circumstance where the ability
to grow a beard is restricted, as it is during his incarceration.” Doc. 36 at 13.
However, the dispensations Davis discussed in his deposition were all related
to an inability to comply with the dictates of Islam due to physical or mental
ailments, or medical necessity. First, he testified that Muslims pray in a prescribed
manner that involves standing, bowing, prostrating, and sitting, but if a Muslim is
confined “to a wheelchair or [does] not have the strength to stand for certain parts,
then there are dispensations for that”; Davis clarified that if a Muslim is not
physically incapable of praying in the prescribed manner, he must do so or he will
be punished for not following the command of God. Davis Depo. 25:14 – 26:1.
Second, Davis testified that a person with mental health issues or who was
“handicapped mentally” would be excused from following certain tenets of Islam
because “they’re not all the way there.” Davis Depo. 80:4 – 81:9. Davis explained
that in such situations, the person’s caretaker would be responsible for helping the
person follow Islam’s requirements, but in prison, the caretaker might be an officer
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or nurse who knows nothing about Islam. Id. (“So if they don’t know, and they’re
making this person shave, and this person not in a state of mind to, to know what’s
going on, then there’s no blame on him because the one that’s taking, taking care of
him doesn’t know the religion.”).
Third, Davis testified the only exception to the prohibition on beard shaving
was for a medical need; he explained it was permissible to shave a Muslim’s beard
if, for example, a doctor needed to do so to perform surgery, but the area shaved
would be limited to that which was medically necessary. Davis Depo. 49:11-16.
Accordingly, none of the “dispensations” Davis discussed suggest a prison
regulation such as the beard policy was a justifiable reason for not following the
tenets of his religion. To the contrary, Davis testified: (1) “[t]he only time we follow
the command of anything or anyone else, or any other law, is if it conforms with the
law that God prescribed”; and (2) “if you have a law and it contradicts anything in
Islam, we are obliged not to follow to that law.” Davis Depo. 26:2-7.
Moreover, a judge in this District previously concluded the FDOC’s beard
policy substantially burdened a Muslim plaintiff’s religious exercise even though the
plaintiff indicated he could shave if necessary for his health or safety. 	See Sims v.
Inch, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1275 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (finding the FDOC’s beard policy
imposed a substantial burden when the plaintiff’s “religion calls for a fist-length
beard all the time, with a narrow exception for circumstances that do not now exist”
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and noting “[t]he exception says very little about whether precluding [plaintiff] from
having the required beard substantially burdens his religion”); see also Holt, 574
U.S. at 362 (rejecting assertion that the burden on an inmate’s religious exercise of
growing a beard was “slight” because he testified his religion would “credit” him for
attempting to follow his religious beliefs, even if that attempt was unsuccessful,
because RLUIPA “applies to an exercise of religion regardless of whether it is
‘compelled’”).
Based on the foregoing, Davis’s testimony indicates that growing at least a
fist-length beard is fundamental to his religion. 	And because the FDOC’s beard
policy prevents Davis from growing a beard longer than one-half inch, the policy
imposes a substantial burden on his religious exercise under RLUIPA. See Holt, 574
U.S. at 361 (finding inmate “easily satisfied” his obligation of proving a substantial
burden because prison’s grooming policy required him to shave his beard in violation
of his religious beliefs or face disciplinary action); Thai Meditation Ass’n of Ala.,
Inc., 980 F.3d at 831 (“[I]t isn’t necessary for a plaintiff to prove … that the
government required her to completely surrender her religious beliefs; modified
behavior, if the result of government coercion or pressure, can be enough.”).
B. 	Compelling Governmental Interest and Least Restrictive Means
Because the beard policy imposes a substantial burden on Davis’s religious
exercise, the FDOC has the burden of demonstrating its refusal to allow Davis to
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grow a fist-length or longer beard is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling governmental interest. 	See 	42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (stating the
government shall not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise unless it
demonstrates the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest); id. at § 2000cc-5(2) (“The term ‘demonstrates’ means meets
the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.”).
The FDOC claims that preventing Davis from growing a fist-length or longer
beard furthers its interests in protecting institutional security and the safety of
inmates, staff, and the public. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized these interests
are compelling. See Smith v. Owens, 13 F.4th 1319, 1325 n.2 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting
the Eleventh Circuit has characterized “safety, security, and uniformity, minimizing
the flow of contraband, identification of inmates, hygiene, and cost” as compelling
interests); Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 944 (11th Cir. 2015) (“It is also beyond
dispute that the [the Alabama Department of Corrections] has compelling interests
in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety within its prisons and in the public’s safety
in the event of escapes and alteration of appearances.”).6
In addition, the FDOC has presented evidence from an expert that indicates
its beard policy furthers those interests. Brian Zawilinski has 27 years of experience
6 See also, Dotson v. Dixon, 2024 WL 426777, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2024) (“In sum, prison
security is paramount, and an inmate’s ability to conceal items that could be used either as a
weapon or a means of escape is of great safety and fiscal concern for the FDC.”).
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working in the Connecticut Department of Corrections, where there were no
restrictions on beard length. He states: (1) beards can be used to conceal or transport
contraband such as disposable razor blades, drugs, handcuff keys, or SIM cards; (2)
inmates with beards are more vulnerable because a beard can be used as a “face
handle” during altercations; (3) beards can become saturated with chemical agents,
increasing the risk of cross contamination to staff; (4) beards can be quickly shaved,
drastically changing an inmate’s appearance; (5) shaved beard hair can be given to
another inmate to alter their appearance or added to a mannequin to give it a more
lifelike appearance during an escape attempt; (6) some inmates are reluctant to let
staff physically search their beards, which can lead to confrontations between
inmates and staff; (7) the most effective way to search a beard is face-to-face, as it
can be visually and physically searched at the same time, but that puts staff at risk
of being attacked or spit on; and (8) a search from behind an inmate is not as effective
because staff’s view of the beard is restricted. Doc. 36-4 at 16-20.
Moreover, the FDOC has shown the beard policy is the least restrictive means
of furthering its compelling interests with respect to Davis. 	See Smith, 13 F.4th at
1328 (“For both the compelling interest and the least-restrictive-means prongs of its
strict scrutiny test, RLUIPA mandates an individualized inquiry.”) (cleaned up)
(quoting Tucker v. Collier, 906 F.3d 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2018)). 	Specifically, the
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FDOC’s evidence demonstrates Davis poses a significant risk to prison security
based on his extensive criminal and prison disciplinary history.
Davis pleaded guilty in December 2011 to shooting his cousin and is serving
a 25-year sentence for second-degree murder. Doc. 36-1; Davis Depo. 10:16 – 11:9.
He is currently classified as a close management inmate.7 Since entering FDOC
custody in January 2012, Davis has received 20 disciplinary reports (“DRs”). Doc.
36-6. Five of the DRs involved violent conduct toward correctional officers or other
inmates, including one incident where Davis used a weapon consisting of a razor
blade attached to a toothbrush to attack another inmate. Docs. 36-6 & 36-7.8 Eight
of the DRs involved the introduction or possession of contraband.9 Docs. 36-5 &
36-6.
7 See https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx. Close management is “the
separation of an inmate apart from the general population, for reasons of security or the order and
effective management of the institution, when the inmate, through his or her behavior, has
demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges
of others.” Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-601.800(1)(a).
8 Davis received: (1) a DR for aggravated battery on an inmate on June 19, 2015; (2) a DR for
battery on an inmate on December 12, 2018; (3) a DR for battery on an inmate on November 19,
2019; and (4) two DRs for battery on a correctional officer on March 9, 2022. Doc. 36-6 & 36-7.
The June 2015 aggravated battery involved the use of a razor blade attached to a toothbrush. Doc.
36-7. Davis also received a DR for spoken threats on July 28, 2019. Doc. 36-6.
9 Davis received: (1) a DR for unauthorized possession of a cellular/wireless device on July 19,
2013; (2) a DR for possession of tobacco on June 18, 2014; (3) a DR for unauthorized possession
of a cellular/wireless device on September 29, 2014; (4) a DR for unauthorized possession of a
cellular/wireless device on February 15, 2017; (5) a DR for unauthorized possession of a
cellular/wireless device on August 31, 2020; (6) a DR for introduction of contraband on August
10, 2025; (7) a DR for unauthorized possession of a cellular/wireless device on August 10, 2025;
and (8) a DR for unauthorized possession of a cellular/wireless device on August 21, 2025. Doc.
36-5 & 36-6.
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Indeed, less than four months ago, Davis was found guilty of DRs related to
contraband. 	During a strip search on August 10, 2025, Davis removed a black
package from his rectum which contained three miniature cell phones with three
charging cords. Doc. 36-5 1-28. Officials determined Davis had received the items
from a visitor.10 Id. Based on this incident, Davis was found guilty of two DRs, one
for introduction of contraband and one for possession of a cellular device. Id. Then,
on August 28, 2025, Davis was found guilty of possessing a cell phone that was
discovered in his mattress on August 21. Id. at 29-39.
Thus, as the FDOC notes, if it allowed Davis to grow a fist-length or longer
beard he could use it to conceal contraband such as tobacco, razor blades, or cell
phone charging cables—items his DRs show he has previously used or possessed.
In addition, unlike a half-inch beard, which can be visually inspected for contraband
in most instances (Doc. 36-4 at 19), a fist-length or longer beard would need to be
physically searched to ensure it is free of contraband since inmates “can manipulate
self-administered beard searches” (Doc. 36 at 7). 	Physical beard searches leave
correctional officers vulnerable to attack (Doc. 36-4 at 20), and Davis has a history
10 During the investigation of the DR, Davis submitted a written statement asserting “at no time
will any camera show that visitor Janese Smith pass or hand me anything.” 	Doc. 36-5 at 8.
However, in the statement, Davis did not deny possessing the contraband and Smith admitted she
gave Davis the cell phones. Id. at 10.
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of violent conduct directed toward both other inmates and correctional officers (Doc.
36-6).
Also, by failing to respond to the FDOC’s motion for summary judgment,
Davis has not identified any alternatives to enforcing the beard policy that are a less
restrictive means for the FDOC to further its interests. 	See Smith, 13 F.4th at 1326
(“[T]o satisfy the least-restrictive-means test of RLUIPA, the [defendant] was only
required ‘to prove that petitioner’s proposed alternatives would not sufficiently
serve its security interests.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 367);
see also, Smith v. Dixon, 2024 WL 5717479, at *3 (N.D. Fla. April 5, 2024)
(“‘requiring the [GDOC] to rebut alternatives’ that the plaintiff did not propose
‘would run afoul of basic rules of fair notice’”) (citing Knight, 796 F.3d at 1291-92).
Accordingly, based on Davis’s particular disciplinary history, which reveals a
propensity 	for 	both 	violence 	and 	possessing 	contraband, 	the 	FDOC 	has
demonstrated that preventing him from growing a fist-length or longer beard is the
least restrictive means of furthering its compelling governmental interest in safety
and security.11 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (“We do not read
11 Courts in this circuit have concluded the FDOC’s beard policy was not the least restrictive means
of furthering its compelling interests in several cases. 	However, unlike Davis, the prisoner
plaintiffs in those cases did not have a significant or recent prison disciplinary history. See Denson
v. Dixon, 2023 WL 5200482, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2023) (noting plaintiff had a “lengthy
disciplinary history with the FDOC” during his 45 years of incarceration but only three of the
disciplinary actions had occurred within the last decade); Sims v. Inch, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1274
(N.D. Fla. 2019) (noting the plaintiff had “been a near-model inmate” and had received only one
disciplinary report for nonviolent conduct related to a court proceeding in 13 years).
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RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s
need to maintain order and safety.”); see also Holt, 574 U.S. at 363 (stating RLUIPA
“requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied
through application of the challenged law to the person—the particular claimant
whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened”) (quoting
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726 (2014)); cf. Smith, 13 F.4th
at 1330 (“Given Smith’s criminal and disciplinary history, the testimony from
[witnesses], and the GDOC’s evidence of contraband being hidden in beards and
prior incidents where escaped inmates with beards shaved their faces to avoid
detection, the district court’s conclusion—that ‘it is plausible that allowing a close
security inmate like Smith an untrimmed beard could be dangerous for prison
security’—is not clearly erroneous.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the FDOC’s evidence, and the lack of evidence from Davis, the
undersigned concludes the FDOC has shown that applying the beard policy to Davis
is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests in safety and
security due to Davis’s extensive disciplinary history, which includes numerous
infractions related to violent conduct and contraband. 	Because a reasonable
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factfinder could not return a verdict in favor of Davis based on the evidence before
the Court, the FDOC’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.12
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That Secretary Dixon’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36) be
GRANTED.
2. 	That the clerk be directed to enter judgment in favor of Secretary Dixon
and close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 18 th day of November, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all
other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
12 At the summary judgment stage, “[w]hen the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that
party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its
motion with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.”
United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up).
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