BENTLEY v. REUDGEN

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
JUAN OMAR BENTLEY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:25cv184-TKW-HTC
OFFICER JASON REUDGEN,
Defendant.
________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Juan Omar Bentley, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendant
Reudgen, a guard at Mayo Correctional Institution (“Mayo CI”), violated his Eighth
Amendment rights by failing to protect him from an attack by another prisoner. Doc.
1. 	Defendant Reudgen filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 21), to which Bentley
responded (Doc. 26). Upon consideration, the undersigned respectfully recommends
the motion to dismiss be GRANTED.
I. 	Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To state a claim, Bentley must plead factual content which
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allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must
liberally construe pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972),
but conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are
not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
II. 	Background
Bentley was incarcerated at Mayo CI at the time of the events in the complaint
and classified as a low custody inmate. He was employed as a confinement orderly
and assigned to perform janitorial duties inside Charlie Dorm. Charlie Dorm is a
special housing unit that houses inmates found guilty of rule violations. 	Such
inmates are subject to 24-hour lockdown, receive meals in their cells, and must be
handcuffed and escorted between any destination.
While at work, Bentley observed Reudgen, a correctional officer in Charlie
Dorm, “trafficking a miniature cell phone and drugs inside the prison.” Doc. 1 at ¶
13. Bentley “solicited the Defendant for employment, membership inside the illicit
activity.” 	Id. 	Reudgen refused because Bentley was a known drug addict. Id. at ¶
14. 	Bentley then wrote a letter, “seeking to blackmail Defendant, threatening to
expose him if not allowed into the market” and stating, “If I can’t play, can’t nobody
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play.” Id. at ¶ 15. Reudgen responded “with intense anger, threatening to get rid of
Plaintiff, physical violence, to fuck him up, etc.” Id. at ¶ 16.
On July 1, 2024, Bentley was instructed to clean the second floor of Charlie
Dorm because it was shower, haircut, and shave night in Quad 2. Id. at ¶ 18. 	At
some point, Reudgen opened the cell of inmate Barton Hill (who had been placed in
disciplinary confinement for stabbing another inmate, id. at ¶ 26), for his roommate
to be taken to the shower. 	Id. at ¶ 27. 	In violation of Florida Department of
Corrections (“FDOC”) policy, Reudgen left the cell open without handcuffing Hill
or searching the cell for weapons. 	Id. at ¶¶ 21, 27 & 29.1 Hill then left the cell,
entered the secured catwalk and attacked Bentley with an eight-inch knife “seconds
after Defendant relinquished his cell door.” Id. at ¶¶ 19, 25-26. Bentley was taken
to outside emergency medical treatment for stab wounds to the head, neck, spinal
column, upper back and forearm, and also for a broken jaw. Id. at 19.
Bentley sues Reudgen in his individual and official capacities and alleges two
alternative theories of liability under the Eighth Amendment. In Claim I, he alleges
Reudgen was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm by failing to
protect him from an attack by inmate Hill. 	Doc. 1 at 9. 	In Claim II, he argues
1 Plaintiff alleges that prison officials “fabricated a maintenance report to avoid liability and
establish a false narrative concerning the assault” in which they claimed, “the cell door had
mechanical failure to excuse the incident.” Doc. 1 at ¶ 35. However, he has asserted no claims
based on this allegation.
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Reudgen “intentionally exposed Plaintiff to assault” by “knowingly releas[ing] Hill
from his cell for the sole purpose of assaulting Plaintiff.” Id. at 10.
III. 	Discussion
Reudgen has filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Bentley’s
official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Bentley fails to
state a claim for deliberate indifference; and (3) Bentley fails to state a claim of
intentionally inflicting excessive punishment. As explained below, the undersigned
agrees the official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that
Reudgen has failed to state a claim against Bentley in his individual capacity.
Specifically, even reading the allegations in the light most favorable to
Bentley, the complaint does not include facts sufficient to meet the objective or
subjective elements of a deliberate indifference, failure to protect claim under the
Eighth Amendment. 	There are no facts, for example, from which it can be
reasonably 	inferred 	that 	Bentley 	was 	exposed 	to 	either 	a 	generalized 	or
individualized substantial risk of harm, and even if there were, that Reudgen was
subjectively aware of that risk. 	Likewise, the complaint is devoid of any facts
showing that Reudgen and Hill conspired to harm Bentley or that Reudgen
intentionally left the cell open, such as would support an intentional excessive use
of force claim under the Eighth Amendment.
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A. 	Official Capacity Claims
As an initial matter, it is well-settled that a suit against a state employee in his
official capacity is actually one against the employer. Thus, Bentley’s claims against
Reudgen in his official capacity are treated as claims against his employer, the
FDOC, which is a state agency. 	See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits
against state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits
against the State.”). The “Eleventh Amendment protects a State from being sued in
federal court without the State’s consent.” 	Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308
(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004). This includes stage
agencies, such as the FDOC. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524-25
(11th Cir. 1990). 	Because Florida has not “waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity in federal civil rights actions,” Fincher v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Labor &
Emp’t Sec. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 798 F.2d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1986),
and Congress has not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 actions,
Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525, Bentley’s claims for monetary damages against Reudgen in
his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed.
B. 	Deliberate Indifference for Failure to Protect Bentley
In Claim I, Bentley alleges Reudgen was deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk of harm by failing to protect him from an attack by inmate Hill. Doc.
1 at 9. 	The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable
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measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To state an
Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a substantial
risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3)
causation.” 	Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016)). The first element – whether
a substantial risk of harm exists – is an objective element. See Caldwell v. Warden,
FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014).
The second element is subjective and requires a plaintiff to show the
defendant: “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2) disregarded
that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective recklessness” under
criminal law. Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024). “Subjective
recklessness” requires the defendant to be “actually, subjectively aware that his own
conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade,
106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
A plaintiff may establish a substantial risk of harm by alleging facts to show
he was exposed to an individualized threat of harm or a generalized threat of harm.
See Scott v. Dunn, 794 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1130 (M.D. Ala. 2023). 	“Individualized-
threat claims deal with specific threats made against a plaintiff, while general-threat
claims deal with factual allegations that conditions of confinement generally create
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a substantial risk of serious harm from inmate-on-inmate violence to the plaintiff.”
See id. (citing Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233–36 (delineating between types of threat)).
Here, the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that would plausibly show that
Bentley was at a substantial risk of either type of harm.
1. Generalized Threat of Harm
To allege a generalized threat based on dangerous conditions Bentley must
allege facts sufficient to show “an environment of longstanding and pervasive
attacks to which all prisoners in his situation are exposed,” Staley v. Owens, 367 F.
App’x 102, 107 (11th Cir. 2010), or “that the conditions of confinement themselves
generally posed a substantial risk of serious harm from inmate-on-inmate violence
to all inmates forced to live under those conditions.” Barefield v. Dunn, 688 F. Supp.
3d 1026, 1064, 66–67 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (explaining that this type of claim seeks
recovery for a defendant’s failure to ensure the prisoner’s “protection from the
general danger arising from a prison environment that both stimulated and condoned
violence”). 	For example, a generalized threat may be established by some
“combination of overcrowding, understaffing, inadequate supervision, presence of
contraband, and regular incidents of violence in a correctional setting.” 	Wells v.
McCovery, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1242–43 (M.D. Ala. 2025) (citing Marsh v. Butler
Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1029 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated on other
grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
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Here, the complaint contains no facts showing that the confinement conditions
at Mayo CI or in Charlie Dorm posed a generalized threat of harm to Bentley. There
are no allegations that the institution or the dorm, in particular, were understaffed,
that prisoners were unsupervised, routinely found with contraband, or had a history
of inmate-on-inmate violence. 	See Barefield, 688 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (finding
complaint contains many of the other recognized “specific features” that contribute
to an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence, including severe overcrowding
and the ability of inmates to move about the prison accessing unauthorized spaces
with little to no supervision). There are no facts showing the conditions of the dorm
or institution “were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his
future health or safety.” 	Id. at 1068. 	To the contrary, the complaint alleges the
opposite; Bentley states prisoners are “detained in state-of-the-art maximum security
prison cell[s]” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 26), that “it is highly abnormal” for Hill to have “gained
access to the secure catwalk” (id.), and that prisoners “are locked inside individual
cells and sequestered” and “receive meals in their cell and, must be handcuffed and
escorted between any destination.”2 Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
2 Although Bentley makes these allegations to show that Reudgen’s conduct in leaving the cell
door open is against policy and thus must have been intentional, a violation of a policy does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1984)
(allegation of violation of statutory or administrative provision did not provide the basis for a claim
of violation of a constitutional right) and Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1986)
(failure of prison officials to follow their own rules does not establish a constitutional violation),
and any inference that such violation was intentional or leaving the door open was “likely” to result
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Bentley’s conclusory statement that “[i]nmates are sentenced and condemned
to Charlie dorm for behavioral issues” and thus “Charlie dorm is objectively unsafe
above and beyond that inherent to everyday prison life” (Id. at ¶ 24) is insufficient
to state a generalized threat of inmate-on-inmate attack. See Gross v. White, 340 F.
App’x 527, 532 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Gross’ conclusory allegations about the deputies’
‘knowledge and/or access to knowledge’ about the danger potentially posed by the
inmate who attacked him do not state a claim for deliberate indifference.”); Pitts v.
Bullard, 	2021 WL 6689776, at *12 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2021), 	report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 211588 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 24, 2022) (finding
claims too conclusory were plaintiff “fails to identify any specific features of
Holman, its kitchen, or its population that make it particularly violent” and finding
plaintiff’s “sparse and generalized allegations simply do not demonstrate a level of
violence necessary to show an objectively substantial risk of serious harm or
Defendants’ deliberate indifference to such risk, as required by this circuit’s case
law”); see also, Brown v. Emmons, 2023 WL 12088014, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5697061 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3,
2024) (dismissing plaintiff’s failure to protect claim at screening because “plaintiff
in an assault is speculative at best. See Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015)
(discussing that a “mere possibility” of harm is not enough to state an Eighth Amendment claim
and that “the plaintiff must plausibly allege a strong likelihood of serious harm”).
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provides unadorned conclusory assertions that violence is ‘normal’ or ‘common and
uncontrolled’”).
2. 	Individualized Threat of Harm
Bentley has also failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Hill posed an
individualized risk of harm to Bentley. 	There are no facts, for example, showing
that Hill had previously threatened Bentley or that he has a known history of
engaging in violent, unprovoked attacks against other inmates. 	Although Bentley
contends that Hill was in disciplinary confinement for stabbing another inmate and
for violating prison rules, those general allegations are insufficient to show that Hill
posed a particularized threat to Bentley. 	See Hendrix v. Davenport, 2018 WL
3979482, at *7 (M.D. Ala. June 13, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 3978968 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 20, 2018) (a “generalized fear for his safety and
a potential threat of harm from inmate Unzell Tuck based only on his history of
violence against other inmates and his use of drugs do not provide an objective basis
on which to determine that inmate Tuck posed a serious risk of harm to Hendrix”);
Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that jail
officials’ generalized awareness that an inmate was a problem inmate who was prone
to violence was not enough to show that they were subjectively aware that he posed
a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff).
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Also, Bentley fails to provide any information about the other stabbing, such
as when it took place or why, and thus cannot show that the prior stabbing makes
Hill a substantial threat of harm to Bentley. See McDaniel v. Telfair State Prison of
Corr., 2026 WL 816031, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2026) (finding complaint failed to
state a claim because “Plaintiff does not provide any details about the circumstances
leading up to the fight with inmate Dontay or explain how, or even if, any Defendant
knew inmate Dontay posed a particularized threat to Plaintiff”), 	report and
recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 814339 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2026).
Moreover, even if Bentley had alleged facts sufficient to show Hill posed a
substantial risk of harm to him, Bentley has alleged no facts to show that Reudgen
was subjectively aware of that risk. 	See e.g., Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (Though
“Defendants’ clearly knew that Inmate Barnes was a ‘problem inmate’ with a well-
documented history of prison disobedience and had been prone to violence, . . .
before Defendants’ awareness arises to a sufficient level of culpability, there must
be much more than mere awareness of Inmate Barnes’s generally problematic
nature.”); Love v. McCloud, 2026 WL 816030, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2026)
(“Defendants cannot be liable for the July 30th attack when Plaintiff makes no
allegation any Defendant knew any Gangster Disciple posed a particularized threat
to Plaintiff”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Love v. McCoud, 2026
WL 814338 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2026).
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Simply put, even accepting Bentley’s allegation that Reudgen intentionally
left Hill’s cell open as true, Bentley would still be unable to state a claim for
deliberate indifference because the complaint contains no facts to show that Reudgen
knew if he left the cell open there was a “strong likelihood” that (1) Hill had a
weapon and (2) Hill would leave the cell and attack Bentley. 	See, e.g., Marbury,
936 F.3d at 1236 (Plaintiff must allege “that a prison official could have concluded
that a particular threat evidenced a substantial threat, rather than the mere possibility,
of serious harm.”). For the Court to make that inference, the Court would have to
infer, first, that Reudgen knew Hill had a weapon and, second, that Hill would attack
Bentley. Absent such improper inferences, the fact that Reudgen left the cell open,
“created nothing more than a ‘mere possibility’ of injury” to Bentley, which does
not support a claim for deliberate indifference. See Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x
719, 722 (11th Cir. 2014) (“despite the fact that he was in the midst of damaging
property, Hanley’s physical attack was unprovoked, suggesting that Hanley’s
behavior created nothing more than a ‘mere possibility’ of injury to Johnson”).
Thus, because Bentley has failed to show that he was exposed to a substantial risk
of either a generalized or individualized harm and that Reudgen was aware of that
risk, Claim I for deliberate indifference should be dismissed.
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C. 	Intentional Facilitation of Inmate-on-Inmate Attack
In Claim II, Bentley alleges that Reudgen intentionally left the cell door open
for the express purpose of facilitating an attack on Bentley. If proven, such conduct
would violate the Eighth Amendment because “gratuitously allowing the beating ...
of one prisoner by another serves no legitimate penological objectiv[e].” 	Farmer,
511 U.S. at 833 (alteration in original, internal quotation omitted). “Being violently
assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” 	Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted); Irving v.
Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2008) (By opening a cell door to allow one
inmate to attack another inmate, guards “not only failed to take reasonable measures
to guarantee [Plaintiff’s] safety as required by the Eighth Amendment, they
intentionally brought danger to him. They themselves were a large part of the
‘conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm’ to [Plaintiff].”) (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 832-34); Hakeem v. Adams, 2025 WL 918169, at *12 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 26,
2025) (“If the On-duty Defendants took affirmative steps to work with the Attackers
and encourage them to beat Hakeem because of his alleged knowledge of their
involvement in a contraband scheme, this would almost certainly violate the Eighth
Amendment.”).
Bentley’s allegations, however, are too vague and conclusory to support this
claim. The complaint does not describe any communications or interactions between
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Reudgen and Hill regarding the attack on Bentley. See Hakeem, 2025 WL 918169,
at 	*12 	(“[D]espite 	Plaintiff’s 	contention, 	the 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	allege 	any
communications, interactions, or other factual basis for the assertion that the On-
duty Defendants were somehow working with the Attackers. Thus, because Plaintiff
fails to make any non-conclusory allegations of some agreement between the On-
duty Defendants and the Attackers, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Three is
GRANTED”). Bentley has alleged no facts to show that there was any agreement
or understanding between Reudgen and Hill regarding the attack on Bentley. 	See
Allaben v. Howanitz, 579 F. App’x 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiff failed
to plead a conspiracy between officials and private individuals because she did not
allege they “reached an understanding” to deny constitutional rights, or willfully
participated in or were aware of the conspiracy) (citations omitted).
In sum, while Bentley may believe Reudgen intentionally left Hill’s cell open
to facilitate an attack, he alleges no facts to support that assumption. 	The Court
“would have to speculate or pile inference upon inference to get from what the
complaint said to what it needed to say. 	And this we will not do.” 	Brown v.
Anderson, 2023 WL 1102568, at *4 (11th Cir. Jan. 30, 2023). Reudgen’s isolated
verbal threat, which, alone, does not rise to a constitutional violation, O'Donnell v.
Thomas, 826 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding “alleged verbal threats by jail
officials ... did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”), is also insufficient
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“to nudge Bentley’s claim” of a conspiracy between Hill and Reudgen “across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” 	Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2013) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 	Therefore, Claim II should also be
dismissed.
IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) be GRANTED and this
action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
2. 	That the clerk be directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 19 th day of May, 2026
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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