ARCE v. ARCE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
JENNIFER LYNN ARCE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv2511-MCR-HTC
ARMANDO ARCE,
Defendant.
________________________/
ORDER and
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Armando Arce, proceeding pro se, has filed a notice of removal and a
memorandum in support, seeking to remove an action for a domestic violence
injunction from state to federal court. 	Docs. 1 & 7. 	Arce also filed a motion to
disqualify the undersigned.1 Doc. 6. Upon consideration, the motion to disqualify
will be DENIED. 	In addition, after reviewing the notice of removal and the state
court proceedings, the undersigned concludes Arce has not established the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, this case should be REMANDED to state court.
1 Arce also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) and then subsequently paid the
full filing fee. Thus, the clerk shall terminate that motion as moot. His motion to proceed in forma
pauperis as to costs (Doc. 9) shall also be terminated as moot since this matter should be remanded
to state court.
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I. 	Background
On August 2, 2023, Jennifer Lynn Arce (“Jennifer”) filed a petition for
injunction for protection against domestic violence against Arce. 	Doc. 1 at 7-16;
Arce v. Arce, Okaloosa County Case No. 2023 DR 2903. On August 15, 2023, Judge
David Oberliesen entered a final judgment of injunction against Arce and in favor
of Jennifer. Doc. 1 at 17-27.
Arce 	maintains 	he 	has 	continuously 	challenged 	the 	injunction 	as
jurisdictionally void. He says the injunction is void because Judge Oberliesen used
Fla. Stat. § 784.03 (the criminal statute for battery) as the predicate act rather than
Fla. Stat. § 741.28 (the civil statute defining “domestic violence” for purposes of
injunctions under Chapter 741). On December 5, 2025, Judge Jennie Kinsey denied
Arce’s emergency motion for dissolution of the injunction. On December 8, 2025,
Arce filed a notice of removal to try to remove the state court action to federal court.
Doc. 1.
II. 	Arce has not established a basis for disqualification.
As an initial matter, Arce has moved to disqualify me from hearing this case.
Doc. 6. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a judge should recuse herself in any proceeding
in which her impartiality might reasonably questioned. 	“The test is whether an
objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the
grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the
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judge’s impartiality.” 	Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir.
1988). 	In addition, a judge should recuse herself when she has a personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). After reviewing Arce’s motion
and the relevant law, I conclude he has not established a basis for disqualification.
Arce first claims my impartiality might reasonably be questioned because I
was assigned to a case he filed in June 2021 against Secretary of Education Miguel
Cardona, and I issued a report recommending that Cardona’s motion to dismiss be
granted. 	See Arce v. Cardona, N.D. Fla. Case No. 3:21cv833-MCR-HTC. 	Arce
notes the Department of Education sent him a $1,000 federal student loan refund
check on December 3, 2025, and argues his receipt of that check shows my
recommendation in the Cardona case was incorrect.
However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a
bias or partiality motion.” 	Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994);
Springer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 784 F. App’x 721, 724 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“Ordinarily, a judge’s rulings in the same or a related matter may not serve as the
basis for a motion to recuse.”) (citation omitted). Instead, “[t]he judge’s bias must
be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from something other than that which
the judge learned by participating in the case.” 	McWhorter v. City of Birmingham,
906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990). 	Because Arce’s only basis for arguing my
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impartiality might reasonably questioned is the unfavorable recommendation I made
in his prior case, he has not shown recusal is required under § 455(a). See Springer,
784 F. App’x at 724 (“Although [the magistrate judge] recommended dismissal of
two of Mr. Springer’s prior cases and Mr. Springer filed a judicial inquiry against
him, this was not enough to raise a substantial doubt about his impartiality.”).
Next, Arce alleges my involvement with the Cardona case caused me to
acquire personal knowledge of disputed facts that may be relevant to this proceeding.
He claims, “[t]he present case involves issues arising from the same pattern of
governmental conduct that [he] challenged in the Cardona case—specifically,
federal funding mechanisms and their interaction with state court proceedings.”
Doc. 6 at 3.
However, in the Cardona case, Arce alleged the Secretary of Education
improperly disclosed his personal information and negatively influenced his credit
reports. 	Those claims are not related to the petition for a domestic violence
injunction that Jennifer brought against Arce. Moreover, as the caselaw makes clear,
the personal knowledge referenced in § 455(b) must come from an extrajudicial
source. 	See Wood v. Frederick, 2022 WL 1742953, at *5 (11th Cir. May 31, 2022)
(“the judge’s personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary fact must have been
gained extrajudicially”) (citing United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 969 (11th Cir.
1999)). Thus, any knowledge I acquired during my involvement with the Cardona
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case would not provide a basis for recusal, and I have no extrajudicial knowledge
regarding the relationship between Jennifer and Arce, or of the proceedings
involving them.
Based on the foregoing, Arce has not demonstrated that my recusal is required;
his motion will be denied. 	See United States v. Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558
(11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse
[herself] on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.”).
III. 	Arce has not established the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over
the removed state court action.
Arce argues removal of the action for a domestic violence injunction from
state to federal court is proper: (1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, the civil rights removal
statute; and (2) because the action presents a federal question. However, as will be
explained below, neither of these arguments has merit. Thus, because Arce has not
demonstrated this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Jennifer’s petition, this
case must be remanded to state court. 	See Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d
967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A removing defendant bears the burden of proving
proper federal jurisdiction.”); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006) (noting courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party”).
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A. 	The civil rights removal statute does not provide a basis for
jurisdiction.
Arce first argues the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the civil rights
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). 	To remove a case under § 1443(1), the
removal petition must show: (1) “the right upon which the petitioner relies arises
under a federal law ‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial
equality’”; and (2) the petitioner “has been denied or cannot enforce that right in the
state courts.” 	Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966)).
In his notice of removal, Arce claims he is being denied: (1) procedural due
process based on the entry and enforcement of a jurisdictionally void injunction; (2)
substantive due process based on the deprivation of his parental rights; (3) equal
protection through disparate application of domestic violence statutes; and (4) access
to the courts through coordinated recusals, procedural obstacles, and refusal to
address jurisdictional challenges. He adds that he cannot enforce his constitutional
rights in state court because “the state judiciary has demonstrably refused to address
the fundamental jurisdictional defect underlying the challenged injunction, instead
engaging in a pattern of procedural maneuvers designed to insulate the void order
from constitutional review.” Doc. 1 at 2.
Arce’s notice of removal is not predicated on a federal law providing for
specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. 	The laws he relies on—the
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First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause,2 the Due Process Clause,
and the Equal Protection Clause—are broad constitutional guarantees of general
application which courts have held are not sufficient to support removal under
§ 1443. 	See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792 (“[T]he defendants’ broad contentions under
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot support a valid claim for removal under s 1443, because the guarantees of
those clauses are phrased in terms of general application available to all persons or
citizens, rather than in the specific language of racial equality 	that 	s 1443
demands.”); Miller v. Lambeth, 443 F.3d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 2006) (the “Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of the United States Constitution” are “federal laws of
general 	applicability, 	which 	are 	not 	sufficient 	to 	qualify 	for 	removal 	under
§ 1443(1)”); Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295-96 (“[T]o the extent Conley relies upon broad
assertions under the Equal Protection Clause or § 1983, those rights are insufficient
to support a valid claim for removal under § 1443(1).”).
And there is nothing in the record to indicate Arce was deprived of any right
in the underlying state court proceeding based on his race. See Cave v. Florida, 814
F. App’x 555, 557 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding remand was proper because defendant
“did not properly assert reliance on any specific civil right under federal law ‘stated
2 Access to the courts is a constitutional right “grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
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in terms of racial equality’ – indeed, neither her Notice of Removal nor appeal
mention her race or make any assertions of race-based discrimination”). Nor has he
identified any state law which authorizes the denial of his civil rights. See Alabama
v. Thomason, 687 F. App’x 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2017) (stating “in the paradigmatic
case, removal is proper [under § 1443] where a facially discriminatory state law
authorizes the denial of the defendant’s civil rights”).
Lastly, Arce’s memorandum in support of his notice of removal alleges
various state actors have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by conspiring to deprive him
of his rights. However, the alleged conspiracy was not motivated by his membership
in an identifiable group; instead, he suggests the conspirators had a financial motive.
Thus, none of Arce’s allegations suggest his rights under § 1985(3) have been
violated in the state court action. 	See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102
(1971) (a § 1985 claim requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action”); 	White v.
Berger, 709 F. App’x 532, 538 (11th Cir. 2017) (Section 1985 “protects individuals
from conspiracies to harm them motivated by their membership in classes having
common characteristics of an inherent nature—i.e., those kinds of classes offered
special protection under the equal protection clause.”).
Based on the foregoing, Arce cannot remove the petition for domestic
violence injunction to federal court under § 1443.
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B. 	Jennifer’s petition for a domestic violence injunction does not
present a federal question.3
Arce next claims the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the state
court action. 	He alleges the action presents the following federal questions: (1)
“whether a state court order entered without subject matter jurisdiction violates the
Due Process Clause”; (2) “whether the application of an incorrect statutory predicate
(criminal vs. civil) renders a domestic violence injunction void ab initio”; and (3)
“whether systematic judicial coordination to prevent constitutional review of
jurisdictional defects constitutes a deprivation of civil rights under color of state
law.” 	Doc. 1 at 3. 	Arce also alleges he wants to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and the False Claims Act. Doc. 7 at 6.
However, for purposes of removal, the Court only looks to Jennifer’s petition
for a domestic violence injunction and considers whether it presents a federal
question. See Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 182 F.3d
851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999) (“A case … may be removed based on federal question
jurisdiction ‘only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows
that it is based’ on federal law.”) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)). And it does not. An action seeking a domestic violence
3 Arce could not invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction because he is a Florida resident. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (stating a defendant cannot remove a civil action based on diversity
jurisdiction “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought”).
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injunction is a cause of action created by Florida law, and nothing in the petition
(Doc. 1 at 7-16) alleges a violation of federal law. See Fla. Stat. § 741.30(1) (“There
is created a cause of action for an injunction for protection against domestic
violence.”).
The federal questions Arce claims the case presents are all related to Arce’s
belief that the state court proceedings have violated his rights under federal law. But
federal question jurisdiction cannot be premised on federal defenses that could be
raised in response to the claims in state court. Cf. Newton v. Capital Assurance Co.,
Inc., 245 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The federal cause of action or question
of federal law must be apparent from the face of the well-pleaded complaint and not
from a defense or anticipated defense.”). 	Furthermore, Arce’s attempt to raise
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and the False
Claims Act are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because the Court cannot
consider counterclaims when determining whether removal is proper. 	See Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 442 (2019) (“Section 1441(a) thus does
not permit removal based on counterclaims at all, as a counterclaim is irrelevant to
whether the district court had ‘original jurisdiction’ over the civil action.”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
over this case, and it must be remanded to state court. See Dickey v. Ardis, 2018 WL
1100902, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, (N.D.
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Fla. Feb. 28, 2018) (concluding petition for domestic violence injunction did not
present federal question and remanding case to state court).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. 	Arce’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 2 & 9) are
TERMINATED as moot.
2. 	Arce’s motion to disqualify (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
And it is RECOMMENDED:
1. 	That Okaloosa County Case No. 2023 DR 2903 be REMANDED to the
state court from which it was removed because this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the state court action.
2. 	That the clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 11 th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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