ROYSTER v. MANAGEMENT TRAINING CENTER

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
SAMUEL ROYSTER,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-22-MCR/MJF
MANAGEMENT TRAINING
CENTER and RICKY DIXON,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a third amended
complaint asserting that the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections, Ricky Dixon, and the Management Training Center violated
Plaintiff’s Eighth-Amendment rights by failing to protect Plaintiff from
an inmate-on-inmate attack. Doc. 28. Because Plaintiff seeks damages
from a defendant who is immune from such relief, and because Plaintiff
fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the District Court should dismiss
this 	civil 	action 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	1915A(b)(1)–(2) 	and
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	while 	he 	was 	confined 	at 	Graceville
Correctional Facility he was attacked by another inmate. Doc. 28 at 6–7.
Specifically, on December 11, 2024, during a roster count, an unidentified
prison official allowed an unauthorized inmate to enter Plaintiff’s dorm.
Id. This inmate possessed a knife, and once in the dorm, proceeded to
stab Plaintiff three times. Id.
Plaintiff 	sues 	Dixon 	in 	his 	individual 	and 	official 	capacities.
Plaintiff asserts that Dixon failed to protect Plaintiff from the inmate
attack and that this violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. Plaintiff
also asserts an Eighth-Amendment “failure to protect” claim against
MTC. Id. Plaintiff requests $50,000 in compensatory damages. Id.
STANDARD
The 	District 	Court 	is required to 	review Plaintiff’s 	complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma
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pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). To
survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Ricky Dixon
1. 	Plaintiff’s Official-Capacity Claim Against Dixon
Plaintiff 	sues 	Ricky 	Dixon 	in 	his 	official 	capacity 	and 	seeks
compensatory damages. Doc. 28 at 3, 9. This claim is barred by the
sovereign immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment.
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states may
assert sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against
a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated
the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented to the lawsuit.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d
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1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Ex parte Young provides a narrow
exception to sovereign immunity in cases where a party is seeking
prospective relief against State officials for violation of federal law. 209
U.S. 	123 	(1908). 	But 	this 	exception 	applies 	only 	when 	the 	alleged
violations are ongoing and not when the relief pertains to past violations
of federal law. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
Congress 	has 	not 	abrogated 	Florida’s 	sovereign 	immunity
regarding actions for damages under section 1983, and Florida has not
consented to such suits. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
67–68 (1989). Plaintiff, therefore, cannot sue Dixon in his official capacity
for damages. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s claims do not fit within the narrow
Ex 	parte 	Young 	exception. 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	identifies 	only 	past
misconduct, not anticipated future harm. Doc. 28 at 6–7 (alleging that
the events giving rise to the complaint occurred on December 11, 2024,
while Plaintiff was housed at Graceville Correctional Facility). He also
does not seek any form of prospective relief. Id. at 9.
Because Plaintiff’s official-capacity claim against Dixon is barred
by sovereign immunity, the District Court should dismiss this claim.
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2. 	Plaintiff’s Individual-Capacity Claim Against Dixon
To state a “failure-to-protect” claim, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) plaintiff was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm;
(2) defendant acted with deliberate indifference; and
(3) defendant’s constitutional violation caused plaintiff’s injuries.
Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 2021); Mosley v. Zachery,
966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020); Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295,
1301 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	allege 	that 	Dixon 	was 	the 	individual
responsible for allowing the inmate-attacker into the Plaintiff’s dorm.
Rather, Plaintiff’s “failure-to-protect” claim against Dixon rests solely on
the theory of respondeat superior. But section 1983 claims “may not be
brought against supervisory officials on the basis of vicarious liability or
respondeat superior.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th
Cir. 2010).
Supervisors “are liable under § 1983 ‘either when the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when
there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official
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and the alleged constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Reno,
325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)). A causal connection can be
established by facts indicating that there is “a history of widespread
abuse that puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct
the alleged deprivation but he fails to do so”; facts that indicate the
supervisor’s “custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights”; or when facts “support an inference that the
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing
so.’” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003); Keating, 598
F.3d at 762 (quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235). “The standard by which
a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a
subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Doe v. School Bd. Of Broward Cnty,
604 F.3d 1248, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Dixon “failed to control violence and
misconduct at this private instit[ution].” Doc. 28 at 6. Plaintiff, however,
offers no facts to support this conclusion. For example, Plaintiff does not
allege that Dixon was aware of widespread violence and elected not to
intervene and stop the violence. Id. at 5–6.
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Plaintiff also does not allege facts that would support an inference
that Dixon directed his subordinate to act unlawfully. Furthermore,
Plaintiff does not assert that Dixon knew that correctional officers would
act unlawfully, and Dixon failed to stop this unlawful conduct. Id. In
short, Plaintiff offers nothing more “than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me 	accusation,” 	which 	is 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a
plausible claim. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). Thus, the District Court should dismiss this claim.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against MTC
An entity like MTC “is liable under § 1983 only when the entity
itself is a ‘moving force’ behind the deprivation . . . ; thus, . . . the entity’s
‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.”
Kentucky 	v. 	Graham, 	473 	U.S. 	159, 	166 	(1985) 	(citations 	omitted);
Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 453 (11th Cir. 1997). That is, to impose
section 1983 liability on MTC, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that his
constitutional rights were violated; (2) that [MTC] had a custom or policy
that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and
(3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown,
392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v.
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Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997).
A policy is “a decision that is officially adopted by the [entity], or
created by an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting
on behalf of the [entity].” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488,
489 (11th Cir. 1997). Because an entity like MTC will rarely have an
officially-adopted 	policy 	that 	permits 	a 	particular 	constitutional
violation, a plaintiff may alternatively allege that the constitutional
violation was caused by a custom, which is a “practice that is so settled
and permanent that it takes on the force of law” or is a “persistent and
wide-spread practice.” Id.; Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310
(11th Cir. 2011) (“a custom must be such ‘a longstanding and widespread
practice [that it] is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials
because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.’”).
Here, Plaintiff does not identify any MTC policy that caused the
alleged constitutional violation. In fact, Plaintiff alleges that the FDC
and MTC have policies to prevent inmate-on-inmate attacks. Doc. 28 at
7.
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True, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	an 	MTC 	employee 	deviated 	from
FDC/MTC policy and allowed an inmate—who was assigned to a different
dorm—to enter Plaintiff’s dorm. Allegations of “a single incident of
unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability” against
MTC.1 City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality
opinion); see Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310. Because Plaintiff has failed to
identify an MTC custom or policy that violates the Eighth Amendment
or caused Plaintiff harm, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against
MTC. The District Court, therefore, should dismiss Plaintiff’s claim
against MTC.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS 	this 	civil 	action 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1915A(b)(1)–(2) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 4th day of March, 2026.
1 In a conclusory fashion, Plaintiff alleges that other “incidents” occurred.
But Plaintiff does not identify the nature of these alleged “incidents”,
their frequency, their etiology, or any other facts.
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/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge 	to 	address 	preliminary 	matters 	and to 	make
recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See
N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B),
(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed
findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	report 	and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only and does not control. An objecting
party must serve a copy of the objections on all other
parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate
judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report 	and 	recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to
challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th
Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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