TALMADGE v. MCCRAY et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
DALVEN TALMADGE,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-336-MW/MJF
D. MCCRAY, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned has preliminarily screened Plaintiff’s complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because the facts as
presented in this complaint fail to state a facially plausible claim for relief
against the named Defendants, the District Court should dismiss this
civil action.
BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed his complaint against five
employees of the Florida Department of Corrections: Captain D. McCray;
Warden Heath Holland; Assistant Warden Joseph Floyd; Seargent T.
Patton; and Seargent A Dyson. Doc. 1 at 1–3. Plaintiff sues Defendants
in their individual and official capacities.
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Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	on 	June 	11, 	2025, 	while 	Plaintiff 	was
incarcerated, McCray and Dyson confiscated Plaintiff’s canteen items
and personal property. Doc. 1 at 7. McCray and Dyson provided Plaintiff
a property slip, but the property slip did not account for all of the property
that had been confiscated. Id. 	Plaintiff refused to sign the property slip.
Plaintiff states that he sent a request to Patton to return Plaintiff’s
property. Patton denied Plaintiff’s request. Plaintiff asserts that he filed
grievances about his lost property, but Floyd and Holland did not return
Plaintiff’s property.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s right to possess
property and his right to due process.
Plaintiff seeks $300 and punitive damages. Plaintiff also requests
that the District Court demote Holland and Floyd and terminate the
FDC’s employment of McCray, Dyson, and Patton.
STANDARD
The 	District 	Court 	is required to 	review Plaintiff’s 	complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
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a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma
pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). The
District Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of
the complaint and must consider all reasonable inferences derived from
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunnings v.
Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994). To survive dismissal,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Fourteenth-Amendment Due Process Claim
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
against deprivations of property “without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. To state a claim for a deprivation of due process, a
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prisoner must allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected
property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate
process. Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994); see Catron
v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011); Grayden
v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).
With respect to the third element, when a state official was not
acting pursuant to any established state procedure, but rather was
engaging in a “random, unauthorized” act, a post-deprivation process is
all that is due. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 513, 533 (1984); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1984). Florida law provides for an
adequate post-deprivation remedy for theft of inmate property by prison
guards insofar as an inmate may file a tort action in state court to recover
damages. See Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1) (waiving sovereign immunity for tort
actions brought against the State or its agencies for, among other things,
“loss of property” caused by the “wrongful act or omission of any employee
of 	the 	agency 	or 	subdivision 	while 	acting 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	the
employee’s office or employment”); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331
(11th Cir. 2009) (“We have recognized that ‘a civil cause of action for
wrongful conversion of personal property’ under state law is a sufficient
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postdeprivation remedy when it extends to unauthorized seizures of
personal property by state officers.”) (quoting Lindsey v. Storey, 936 F.2d
554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991)).
The existence of 	a 	private 	cause 	of 	action 	under 	Florida 	law
provides 	Plaintiff 	with 	a 	meaningful 	post-deprivation 	remedy 	to
challenge the loss of his property caused by Defendants. Case, 555 F.3d
at 1331; see Loor v. Bailey, 708 F. App’x 992, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff has not alleged that he was denied the right to assert such a
claim in a Florida court. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation
of due process, and the District Court should dismiss this civil action.
B. 	Plaintiff Requests Relief the District Court Cannot Grant
1. 	Sovereign Immunity
To 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff 	is 	seeking 	monetary 	damages 	from
Defendants in their official capacity, his claims against these Defendants
are also be barred by immunity recognized in the Eleventh Amendment.
Generally, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states may
assert sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against
a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated
the State’s sovereign immunity, or the State has consented to the lawsuit.
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See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d
1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Congress has not abrogated the
States’ sovereign immunity in actions for damages under section 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68 (1989). Thus, to the
extent Plaintiff is seeking damages from Defendants in their official
capacities, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, and the District
Court should dismiss these claims.
2. 	Injunctive Relief
To the extent Plaintiff seeks a court order firing or demoting
Defendants, the District Court lacks the authority to grant such relief.
Hill v. Hill, No. 22-13620, 2025 WL 2702092, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 23,
2025) (“Federal courts have no authority to fire state employees or take
over the performance of their functions.”); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283, 288 (5th Cir. 1978), rev’d in part on other grounds by Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). The District Court, therefore, should dismiss
Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the District Court:
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1. 	DISMISS 	this civil action 	with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1); and
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida this 9th day of January 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge 	to 	address 	preliminary 	matters 	and to 	make
recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See
N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and
recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of
the 	date 	of 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation. 	Any
different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not
control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to 	challenge 	on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28
U.S.C. § 636.
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