Divya Khullar

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
DIVYA KHULLAR, 	Case No. 24-13663-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 7
____________________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER (I) GRANTING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
STAY AND TO COMPEL ABANDONMENT; (II) DENYING MOTION
TO ENFORCE STAY; AND (III) OVERRULING OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS
A 	dispute 	between 	attorneys 	Divya 	Khullar 	and 	Cindy 	Goldstein 	over
$4,333.33 in legal fees has spawned litigation at every level of state and federal court
in Florida: Broward County, Florida County Court;1 Broward County, Florida Circuit
Court;2 the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal;3 the Supreme Court of Florida;4
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida;5 the United
1 Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. v. Khullar, Case No. CONO21002226 (Broward Cnty. Cnty. Ct.).
2 Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. v. Khullar, Case No. CACE22006638 (Broward Cnty. Cir. Ct.).
3 Khullar, v. Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A., Case No. 4D2024-0565 (Fla. 4th DCA).
4 The Florida Bar v. Khullar, Case No. SC2023-0582 (Fla.).
5 In re Khullar, Case No. 24-13663-SMG (Bankr. S.D. Fla.).
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on October 29, 2025.
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States District Court for the Southern District of Florida;6 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.7 This all-out war has led to Mr. Khullar
being suspended from the practice of law, being sanctioned under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, being threatened with criminal contempt, having a
nearly half-a-million dollar attorneys’ fees and costs judgment entered against him,
and having had this Court determine that that judgment is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
Subject only to his filing a certificate showing that he has completed a required
course on personal financial management8 – an act entirely within his control –
Mr. Khullar is due to receive a discharge of his other debts.9 Upon granting of that
discharge, the automatic stay will terminate10 and Mr. Khullar and Ms. Goldstein11
will be free to continue litigating over this non-dischargeable debt in any non-
bankruptcy forum of their choosing. The only things left to accomplish in this chapter
7 bankruptcy case are for the trustee to collect and liquidate estate assets (including
litigation claims against third parties), for the Court to determine the allowed amount
of any disputed proofs of claim, and for the trustee to then make a distribution to
creditors. Insofar as it concerns Mr. Khullar’s pursuit of a discharge and this Court’s
determination of which debts are dischargeable, however, this case is essentially over.
6 Khullar v. Goldstein, Case No. 0:24-cv-62170-DSL (S.D. Fla.).
7 Khullar v. Goldstein, Case Nos. 25-11131 and 25-11031 (11th Cir.).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(c)(1)(H); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(7).
9 Mr. Khullar has otherwise been eligible to receive a discharge since August 1, 2025. See Dkt. No. 187.
10 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).
11 Because Ms. Goldstein and her law firm, Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. have asserted essentially the same
claims and arguments, the Court will refer to them collectively as Ms. Goldstein.
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Pending before the Court now are the following contested matters:
• 	Ms. Goldstein’s motion for retroactive relief from the automatic stay
to allow continued litigation of claims initiated by Mr. Khullar in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
(whose rulings are now on appeal before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit), to compel the trustee to abandon
those claims to Mr. Khullar, and to allow continued litigation of
related state court appellate proceedings;12
• 	Mr. Khullar’s motion to enforce the automatic stay as to state court
contempt proceedings against him;13
• 	Mr. 	Khullar’s 	objection 	to 	proof 	of 	claim 	number 	7 	filed 	by
Ms. Goldstein;14 and
• 	Mr. Khullar’s objections to proofs of claim numbers 2, 3, and 4, filed
by Mark W. Rickard, P.A. dba Law Guard.15
For the reasons discussed below, the Court will (1) grant Ms. Goldstein’s motion for
stay relief and to compel abandonment, (2) deny Mr. Khullar’s motion to enforce the
automatic stay, and (3) overrule Mr. Khullar’s objections to claims.
I. 	Stay Relief and Abandonment.
Ms. Goldstein seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) for
cause, to allow litigation with Mr. Khullar in both state and federal courts to resume.
Ms. Goldstein also requests that the automatic stay be retroactively annulled to
validate actions previously taken in District Court, where Mr. Khullar – in violation
of 	the 	automatic 	stay 	in 	his 	own 	case 	– 	had 	commenced 	an 	action 	against
Ms. Goldstein and others. Ms. Goldstein also requests that the chapter 7 trustee,
Kenneth A. Welt, be compelled to abandon the claims Mr. Khullar had asserted in
12 Dkt. No. 215.
13 Dkt. No. 220.
14 Dkt. No. 193.
15 Dkt. No. 194.
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violation of the stay. The trustee does not object to the requested relief. Mr. Khullar
consents to retroactive stay relief to continue with the federal court litigation, but
only after resolution of the other matters addressed by this Order. He objects,
however, to stay relief to continue with the state court litigation and to compelling
the trustee to abandon the estate’s litigation claims.16
Mr. Khullar also filed his own motion to enforce the automatic stay and for an
award of damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for willful violation of the stay with
respect to state court contempt proceedings against him. He argues that these
proceedings constitute continuation of an action to collect a pre-petition debt, which
is stayed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Ms. Goldstein and the Florida state attorney’s
office argue that these are criminal contempt proceedings that are not subject to the
automatic stay.17
When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) provides an
automatic stay of collection action by creditors.18 It is this aspect of the stay that an
individual chapter 7 debtor often seeks to enforce against creditors.19 But the
automatic stay also stays “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”20 This aspect
16 Dkt. No. 229.
17 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (the automatic stay does not apply to “the commencement or continuation
of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor”).
18 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), (7).
19 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (“an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”).
20 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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of the stay – as ironic as it may sound – may often be violated by an individual debtor,
against whom the trustee may seek to enforce it.
This is because under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition
creates an estate comprised of all property the debtor owned as of the petition date.
Upon the filing of a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, a trustee is then automatically
appointed.21 And under 11 U.S.C. § 323, the trustee is the representative of the estate.
Thus, if as of the petition date the debtor had the right to assert a litigation claim
against any entity, that litigation claim (regardless of its strength or weakness)
becomes property of the bankruptcy estate. The trustee then becomes the sole entity
that can control, pursue, litigate, sell, settle, abandon, or otherwise dispose of that
claim. In other words, the trustee – and only the trustee – has standing to bring that
claim. When the debtor – after he has filed for bankruptcy – pursues or continues to
pursue a claim that existed as of his petition date, he lacks standing to do so and his
action violates the automatic stay as an act to exercise control over property of the
estate.22
Here, Mr. Khullar filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on April 17, 2024.23
In a chapter 11 case, a debtor initially becomes a debtor-in-possession, which has the
rights and powers of a trustee.24 Thus, when his case was a chapter 11 case,
Mr. Khullar – as debtor-in-possession – had the right to assert litigation claims on
behalf of his estate. But after his case was converted to a chapter 7 case on September
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702(d).
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
23 Dkt. No. 1.
24 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a).
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13, 202425 and a trustee was appointed,26 Mr. Khullar no longer controlled these
claims. Instead, the trustee did.
A. 	The District Court Action.
Notwithstanding that he lacked the authority to do so, on November 15, 2024
– after his bankruptcy case was converted to chapter 7 and a trustee was appointed
– Mr. Khullar filed a twelve-count complaint against Cindy A. Goldstein, Cindy A.
Goldstein, P.A., Sandy R. Topkin, Mark Rickard, and Mark Rickard, P.A. in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.27 In this action,
Mr. Khullar purported to assert civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
and 1986; affirmative claims for violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362
and for contempt of court; claims for common law fraud; claims for conspiracy to
commit mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (a criminal law statute); claims
for tortious interference, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
slander per se; and a claim seeking a preliminary injunction. Other than defendant
Mark Rickard – who raised as an affirmative defense Mr. Khullar’s lack of standing28
– no party to the District Court action sought to dismiss Mr. Khullar’s complaint for
lack of standing or for having been brought in violation of the automatic stay. Nor did
Ms. Goldstein, the trustee, or any other party raise this stay violation in this Court
25 Dkt. No. 71,
26 Dkt. Nos. 72, 77.
27 Khullar v. Goldstein, Case No. 0:24-cv-62170-DSL (S.D. Fla.).
28 Id., Dkt. No. 41, at 5, 7, 9, 10, 13, 16, 19, 23.
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until well after the District Court had dismissed Mr. Khullar’s claims29 and imposed
Rule 11 sanctions against him.30
In this Circuit, however, acts taken in violation of the automatic stay are
generally void.31 But under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), for cause a court may grant relief
from 	the 	automatic 	stay, 	including 	by 	terminating, 	annulling, 	modifying, 	or
conditioning the stay. As the Eleventh Circuit recently held, annulment of the stay
“is a statutory power granted to bankruptcy courts by Congress, which allows them
to ‘grant retroactive relief from the automatic stay’ and ‘validate action taken’ while
the stay was in effect.”32 Because Mr. Khullar, Ms. Goldstein, and the trustee all do
not object, the Court will grant Ms. Goldstein’s motion for retroactive stay relief.33
But granting retroactive stay relief is only one side of the coin here. The action
complained of – Mr. Khullar asserting claims he had no right to bring – also requires
the trustee to abandon those claims to Mr. Khullar. Under 11 U.S.C. § 554(b), “[o]n
request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order the
trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that
29 Id., Dkt. No. 43.
30 Id., Dkt. Nos. 57, 92.
31 In re Patel, 142 F.4th 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241,
1244 (11th Cir. 2006)).
32 Patel, 142 F.4th at 1321 (quoting In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749 F.2d 670, 675 (11th Cir. 1984)).
33 In addition to granting retroactive stay relief, there is also cause for prospective stay relief. The
Court has already determined that Mr. Khullar’s debt to Ms. Goldstein is not dischargeable. Once
Mr. Khullar files a certificate of completion of the required financial management course, his discharge
will issue and the automatic stay will terminate as a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). As a
result, Mr. Khullar and Ms. Goldstein will be free to continue litigating whenever and wherever they
wish. Granting stay relief now thus leaves the parties where they would be if Mr. Khullar had fulfilled
his obligation to complete the required financial management course and file the certificate of
completion. In other words, by delaying doing so, Mr. Khullar has effectively delayed termination of
the automatic stay. The Court will not reward this dilatory conduct and will instead put the parties
where they would be if Mr. Khullar had done what he was required to do.
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is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”34 Ms. Goldstein argues that the
claims asserted by Mr. Khullar in the District Court action arise out of what even
Mr. Khullar 	admits 	are 	pre-petition 	events 	and 	therefore 	are 	property 	of 	his
bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). She further argues that these claims
should be abandoned to minimize the burden on the bankruptcy estate and to
eliminate any exposure the bankruptcy estate could have by continuing to pursue
claims that the District Court has already ruled to be not only meritless, but
frivolous.35 Although Mr. Khullar consents to retroactive stay relief, he objects to
abandonment. 	But 	the 	trustee 	– 	who 	owns 	these 	claims 	– does 	not 	object 	to
abandonment.36 Because courts “generally defer to a Trustee’s exercise of business
judgment in determining whether to abandon an estate asset,”37 the Court will do so
here and compel the trustee to abandon these claims to Mr. Khullar.
B. 	The State Court Litigation.
1. 	The State Court Appeal.
The Court discussed the history of state court litigation between Mr. Khullar
and Ms. Goldstein in its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for
Summary Judgment in Adversary No. 24-1337.38 The result of that state court
litigation was a judgment against Mr. Khullar (and two non-debtor corporations he
owned and controlled) for over $440,000 – more than 10,000% of the amount at issue.
34 11 U.S.C. § 554(b).
35 Khullar v. Goldstein, Case No. 0:24-cv-62170-DSL (S.D. Fla.), Dkt. No. 57.
36 Dkt. No. 227, at ¶ 7.
37 In re Culligan Ltd., 2023 WL 5942498, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting In re Crockett, 642
B.R. 97, 101 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)).
38 In re Khullar, 2025 WL 1507748, at *1–3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2025).
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Mr. Khullar appealed that judgment, and that appeal was still pending before the
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal when Mr. Khullar filed for bankruptcy. This
Court had previously ruled that the automatic stay did not apply to the two non-
debtor entities owned and controlled by Mr. Khullar – Khullar, P.A. and Khullar Law,
PLLC.39 Thus that appeal was permitted to proceed as to those two entities.
Ms. Goldstein now seeks stay relief to permit the state court appeal to proceed
as to Mr. Khullar individually as well. Mr. Khullar opposes this request, alleging that
the state court proceedings are biased and violate his due process rights. But for the
same reasons discussed above, the Court will grant stay relief to permit the state
court appeal to proceed as to Mr. Khullar individually as well. The Court has already
determined that Mr. Khullar’s debt to Ms. Goldstein is non-dischargeable. Once
Mr. Khullar files a certificate of completion of the required financial management
course, he will then receive a discharge of his other debts and the automatic stay will
terminate as a matter of law.40 Delaying stay relief at this juncture would only reward
Mr. Khullar’s dilatory conduct in not completing the financial management course
and filing a certificate of completion. The Court declines to do that here. Thus, stay
relief will also be granted to permit the state court appeal to proceed as to
Mr. Khullar.
2. 	State Court Contempt Proceedings.
During 	the 	state 	court 	litigation, 	Mr. 	Khullar 	allegedly 	made 	material
misrepresentations 	to 	the 	state 	court, 	which 	resulted 	in 	a 	criminal 	contempt
39 Dkt. Nos. 38, 100.
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).
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proceeding against him. Mr. Khullar now seeks entry of an order determining that
the state court contempt proceedings violate the automatic stay and enjoining their
continued prosecution.41 Ms. Goldstein objects, arguing that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)
excludes from the automatic stay criminal proceedings or actions against a debtor.
Whether a “criminal” contempt proceeding falls under section 362(b)(1) is not
always a straightforward inquiry. The textbook distinction is that contempt is civil if
the sanction “is remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant” and criminal if the
sanction “is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.”42 But a contempt
proceeding “is either civil or criminal by virtue of its character and purpose, rather
than based on the label it has been given.”43 As explained by the Supreme Court:
The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . . involves confining
a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command
such as an order to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be
turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance. . . . Imprisonment
for a fixed term similarly is coercive when the contemnor is given the
option of earlier release if he complies. . . . In these circumstances, the
contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by
committing an affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of his prison in
his own pocket. . . .
By contrast, a fixed sentence of imprisonment is punitive and criminal
if it is imposed retrospectively for a completed act of disobedience . . .
such that the contemnor cannot avoid or abbreviate the confinement
through later compliance. . . . When a contempt involves the prior
conduct of an isolated, prohibited act, the resulting sanction has no
41 Dkt. No. 220.
42 Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994) (quoting Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
43 Ampersand Publ’g, LLC v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 2023 WL 6879887, at *8 (D.D.C. 2023) (emphasis
added) (cleaned up) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
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coercive effect. The defendant is furnished no key, and he cannot shorten
the term by promising not to repeat the offense.44
The distinction is important because “criminal contempt sanctions are entitled to full
criminal process.”45
Mr. Khullar failed to supply the Court with a sufficient record from which to
determine whether the state contempt proceeding is civil or criminal. But an
assistant state attorney appeared at the September 10, 2025 hearing and argued that
Mr. Khullar’s alleged offense was lying to the court, which is a completed act of
disobedience that cannot be purged; that Mr. Khullar was arraigned; that a public
defender was appointed by the state court to represent Mr. Khullar; and that
Mr. Khullar faces nearly 6 months in jail as a sanction.
Mr. Kullar did not directly refute any of these allegations. Instead, he argued
that if he is permitted to relitigate Ms. Goldstein’s claim in this Court and prevails,
then he will ultimately have no liability to Ms. Goldstein and therefore cannot be held
in contempt of court (even criminal contempt) related to her claim against him. This
argument, however, fails to sustain Mr. Khullar’s burden to make a prima facie
showing that the state court, the state attorney, or Ms. Goldstein have willfully
violated the automatic stay.46 Indeed, it appears based on the arguments of the
assistant state attorney that these proceedings are in fact criminal and not civil – and
as such would be excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). But
44 Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828–29 (cleaned up).
45 Id. at 833 (emphasis added).
46 See Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1556 (11th Cir. 1996) (the moving party bears the burden
to make a prima facie showing that the automatic stay has been violated).
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because Mr. Khullar failed to make even a prima facie showing, his motion to enforce
the automatic stay will be denied.
Given the current posture of Mr. Khullar’s bankruptcy case, however, to the
extent the automatic stay might apply to these contempt proceedings (the Court is
not determining that it does), cause nevertheless exists to grant stay relief to permit
these proceedings to proceed. Again, the only thing standing between issuance of a
discharge to Mr. Khullar and termination of the automatic stay is his failure to file a
certificate of completion of the required financial management course – something
completely in his control. That is reason enough to grant stay relief to permit these
state court contempt proceedings relating to a non-dischargeable debt – even if they
were civil and not criminal – to proceed.
II. 	Claim Objections.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), a proof of claim is deemed allowed unless a party in
interest objects. In most chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, an individual debtor is usually
not considered a party in interest with standing to object to proofs of claim.47 This is
because where there are insufficient assets to pay all costs of administration and all
creditors in full, the individual debtor will not stand to recover anything from the
case. But in cases where there are sufficient assets to pay all creditors in full (which
is not the case here), or where the court has determined certain debts to be
47 In re Eriksen, 647 B.R. 192, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2022) (“Debtors do not automatically have
standing to object to claims in Chapter 7 cases.”).
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nondischargeable (which is the case here), “the debtor has a direct pecuniary interest
in the outcome of the action” and therefore has standing to object to claims.48
Here, because the Court has already determined that Ms. Goldstein’s claim is
nondischargeable, Mr. Khullar has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of these
claim objections. He therefore is a party in interest with standing to object to claims.
Specifically, because Ms. Goldstein’s claim is nondischargeable and survives the
bankruptcy case, it is in Mr. Khullar’s interests to object to other claims. If successful,
Ms. Goldstein will receive a greater distribution on her claim from the bankruptcy
estate, which in turn will reduce the balance of her nondischargeable claim that she
may continue to pursue notwithstanding Mr. Khullar’s bankruptcy discharge. As for
Ms. Goldstein’s claim itself, as discussed below, Mr. Khullar is precluded for other
reasons from contesting that claim. Lack of standing, however, is not one of them.
A. 	Ms. Goldstein’s Claim.
Mr. Khullar argues that Ms. Goldstein’s $462,694.87 claim is unenforceable,
excessive, and tainted by fraud and due process violations. Specifically, Mr. Khullar
argues that Ms. Goldstein lacked standing to seek fees in state court because no valid
retainer agreement or client consent existed and because the purported sale of a law
practice violated Florida Bar rules. He further alleges that the underlying state court
proceedings were riddled with misconduct, including coercion, fabricated evidence,
improper fee awards disproportionate to the settlement at issue, and continued
collection efforts in violation of the automatic stay. The objection also alleges Rule
48 In re O’Donnell, 2005 WL 1279268, at *6 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2005); see also In re Diget, 2022 WL 626941,
at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2022).
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9011 violations, arguing that Ms. Goldstein did not make a reasonable inquiry before
filing her claim, and that she pursued her claim for improper purposes.49 Mr. Khullar
requests that the Court disallow Ms. Goldstein’s claim in whole or in part and set an
evidentiary hearing to address these issues.
Ms. Goldstein argues that Mr. Khullar’s objection should be overruled based
on lack of standing, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. First as to standing, as discussed above, because the Court has determined
that Ms. Goldstein’s claim is nondischargeable, Mr. Khullar would – generally
speaking – have standing to object to it. Thus, standing is not a basis in this case to
overrule Mr. Khullar’s objection to Ms. Goldstein’s claim.
Res judicata and collateral estoppel, however, do require the Court to overrule
Mr. Khullar’s objection. Res judicata – or claim preclusion – is a doctrine that
promotes judicial economy by “giving finality to parties who have already litigated a
claim.”50 It “facilitates ‘the conclusive resolution of disputes’ by reducing ‘the expense
and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources, and fostering
reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.’”51
Where it applies, “[r]es judicata bars the filing of claims which were raised or could
have been raised in an earlier proceeding.”52 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 – known as “The
49 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011.
50 In re Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006); Maldonado v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 664
F.3d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Res judicata is a judicially crafted doctrine, created to provide
finality and conserve resources.”).
51 Shurick v. Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116–17 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979) (cleaned up)).
52 Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Data
Lease Financial Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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Full Faith and Credit Act,”53 which was enacted by the very first Congress in 1790
– federal courts must “‘give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as
another court of that State would give.’”54
The Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts “to refer to the preclusion
law of the State in which judgment was rendered.”55 Under Florida law, “a final
judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction is absolute and settles all issues
actually litigated in a proceeding as well as those issues that could have been
litigated.”56 To apply res judicata under Florida law, there must be: “[1] A judgment
on the merits rendered in a former suit between [2] the same parties or their privies,
[3] upon the same cause of action, [4] by a court of competent jurisdiction.”57 If all
four of these elements are met, then the judgment “is conclusive not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every
other matter which might with propriety have been litigated and determined in that
action.”58
Res judicata applies here and bars Mr. Khullar’s objection to Ms. Goldstein’s
claim. The February 19, 2024 Final Judgment for Plaintiffs, Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A.
and Cindy Goldstein, and Against Defendants, Khullar, P.A., Divya Khullar, and
Khullar Law, PLLC in favor of Ms. Goldstein and against Mr. Khullar in the amount
of $440,649.56 is (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered in a former suit between
53 Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (1790).
54 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (quoting Parsons Steel, Inc. v.
First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986)).
55 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985).
56 Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006).
57 Id. (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001)).
58 Id. (quoting Juliano, 801 So. 2d at 105).
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(2) the same parties (3) upon the same cause of action that is at issue in the objection
to claim, (4) from the Broward County Circuit Court, a court of competent jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Mr. Khullar’s objection to Ms. Goldstein’s claim will be overruled based
on res judicata.
Collateral estoppel – or issue preclusion – also applies here. This doctrine “bars
relitigation of an issue previously decided in judicial or administrative proceedings if
the party against whom the prior decision is asserted had a ‘full and fair opportunity’
to litigate that issue in an earlier case.”59 Again applying Florida law,60 Mr. Khullar
is precluded from contesting the validity of Ms. Goldstein’s claim if:
(1) 	the identical issue was presented in the prior proceeding;
(2) 	the 	issue 	was 	a 	critical 	and 	necessary 	part 	of 	the 	prior
determination;
(3) 	there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue;
(4) 	the parties to the prior action were identical to the parties of the
current proceeding; and
(5) 	the issue was actually litigated.61
The 	Broward 	County 	Circuit 	Court’s 	February 	19, 	2024 	final 	judgment
satisfies all these elements as well. The identical issue was presented – Mr. Khullar’s
liability for the disputed attorneys’ fees between him and Ms. Goldstein, plus the fees
and costs awarded as a litigation sanction. The issue determined was a critical and
necessary part of the state court’s determination. Although Mr. Khullar contests this,
the record reflects that there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The
59 In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, 675 (11th Cir. 1993), as corrected on reh’g (June 22, 1993) (quoting
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980)).
60 Khullar, 2025 WL 1507748, at *4 (citing In re Harris, 3 F.4th 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2021); St.
Laurent, 991 F.2d at 675; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991)).
61 Id. (quoting Thakkar v. Good Gateway, LLC, 351 So. 3d 192, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (cleaned up)).
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parties were identical. And, again, while Mr. Khullar contests this, the record reflects
that the issue was actually litigated. Accordingly, based on the state court’s February
19, 2024 final judgment, Mr. Khullar is collaterally estopped from contesting the
validity of Ms. Goldstein’s claim.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine,62 on the other hand, does not apply here
because the state court final judgment was still subject to appeal as of the petition
date. Unlike collateral estoppel and res judicata – which have a preclusive effect
under Florida 	law notwithstanding a 	pending 	appeal63 – 	the 	Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply “when an appeal from the state court judgment remains
pending at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains
of injuries caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that
judgment.”64 Accordingly, based on res judicata and collateral estoppel – but not for
lack of standing or under Rooker-Feldman – Mr. Khullar’s objection to Ms. Goldstein’s
claim must be overruled.
B. 	Mr. Rickard’s Claims.
Mr. Khullar also objects to claim numbers 2, 3, and 4 filed by Mark W. Rickard,
P.A. dba Law Guard, arguing they are unenforceable under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Claim
number 2 is for $3,228.79 based on a Broward County Circuit Court February 4, 2022
62 See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th
1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2021) (describing Rooker-Feldman as “a limited doctrine that applies only when
litigants try to appeal state court losses in the lower federal courts.”); In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144, 152
(3d Cir. 2025) (describing Rooker-Feldman as a “narrow rule” with “narrow application,” which “does
not ‘supersede the ordinary application of preclusion law’ when a plaintiff relitigates a matter decided
in another forum.”) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 281) (cleaned up)).
63 CCB, LLC v. BankTrust, 552 F. App’x 963, 965 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Reese v. Damato, 44 Fla. 692,
698 (1902)).
64 Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1279.
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Final Judgment on Court Sanctions, plus interest thereon. Claim number 3 is for
$23,849.07 based on a Broward County Circuit Court August 16, 2023 Amended
Judgment for Costs and Attorney Fees (Correcting Scrivener’s Error), plus interest
thereon. Claim number 4 is for $7,921.70, which is an unliquidated amount based on
a Broward County Circuit Court December 7, 2023 Order on Mark W. Rickard, P.A.’s
Motion for Sanctions. In his objections, Mr. Khullar argues that these claims – which
arise from state court sanctions judgments – were tainted by due process violations,
fraud, and lack of factual or legal basis, including reliance on a contested certificate
of service, denial of discovery, and the alleged submission of a doctored email.
Mr. Khullar further contends the sanctions constitute non-compensatory penalties,
include excessive and unreasonable fees, and reflect external influence, including
Mr. Rickard’s alleged admission of pursuing the litigation to harm him. Mr. Khullar
seeks full disallowance of the claims or alternatively, reconsideration under 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(j) for cause, citing fraud, procedural irregularities, and inequity.65
Mr. Rickard argues in his response66 that the claims are supported by final
state court judgments and that Mr. Khullar’s objections to Mr. Rickard’s claims are
barred by res judicata, as the same issues of liability and damages were litigated to
conclusion in state court. But an even more fundamental issue requires the objections
to be overruled. Under 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), a properly and timely filed proof of claim
is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest objects.67 If a party objects, the Court is
65 Section 502(j) – which permits a court to reconsider for cause a claim that has been allowed or
disallowed – does not apply here. Aside from its prima facie validity, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f),
Mr. Rickard’s claims have not previously been allowed or disallowed.
66 Dkt. No. 196.
67 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
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then required to determine the amount of the claim and allow the claim in the amount
determined (subject to certain exceptions not applicable here).68 Under Federal Rule
of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f), a properly filed proof of claim constitutes “prima
facie evidence of the claim’s validity and amount.”69 When an objection to a proof of
claim is filed, “the burden then shifts to the objecting party to come forward with
enough substantiations to overcome the claimant’s prima facie case.”70 “If the
objecting party overcomes the prima facie case, then the burden of proof falls to the
party that would bear the burden outside of bankruptcy.”71
Nothing in Mr. Khullar’s objections offers enough substantiations to overcome
the prima facie validity of these claims. Claims number 2 and 3 are completely
liquidated claims based on final state court judgments.72 Those orders were issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction and were final and appealable. Both Mr. Rickard
and Mr. Khullar were involved in the state court action in which these orders were
entered. And finally, Mr. Khullar’s objections to these claims raise issues that were
raised – or could have been raised – in the state court proceeding and which the state
court already decided. As such, Mr. Khullar’s objections to claims number 2 and 3
will be overruled based on res judicata as well.
68 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).
69 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f).
70 In re Walston, 606 F. App’x 543, 546 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting Benjamin v. Diamond
(In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 1977)); see In re Allegheny Intern., Inc., 954 F.2d
167, 173–74 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In practice, the objector must produce evidence which, if believed, would
refute at least one of the allegations that is essential to the claim’s legal sufficiency.”).
71 Walston, 606 F. App’x at 546 (citing Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000); 9 C OLLIER
ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶ 3001.09[2] (16th ed. 2015)).
72 The orders were issued in Miller v. Hoste, Case No. CACE-15-001694 (Broward Cnty. Cir. Ct.).
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As for claim number 4, it too is based on a final and appealable order from a
court of competent jurisdiction involving the same parties and the same cause of
action. The only difference is that claim number 4 was unliquidated as of the petition
date. Attached to claim number 4, however, was an Affidavit of Costs and Attorneys’
Fees Related to Sanctions dated December 8, 2023, together with supporting receipts
for expenses and time records for attorneys’ fees. Although unliquidated as of the
petition date, nothing in Mr. Khullar’s objection to this claim overcomes its prima
facie validity. Moreover, based on the Court’s own review of the expenses and
attorney 	time 	records, 	the 	Court 	determines 	the 	amounts 	requested 	to 	be
reasonable.73 Accordingly, based on both res judicata and the failure of Mr. Khullar
to sustain his burden to overcome the claim’s prima facie validity, Mr. Khullar’s
objection to claim number 4 will be overruled as well.
III. 	Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that:
1. 	Creditors Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A.’s (I) Motion
for Relief from the Automatic Stay With Respect to District Court Action and State
Court Appeal, and (II) Motion to Compel Abandonment74 is GRANTED.
73 Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., 36 F.4th 1083, 1090 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Courts are considered
experts on the reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rates requested.
Indeed, a district court ‘may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and
proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to
value.’” (quoting Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302–03 (11th. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)))); Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776,
781 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
74 Dkt. No. 215.
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2. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is ANNULLED effective as of November 15, 2024 with respect to the federal
civil action styled Khullar v. Goldstein, Case No. 0:24-cv-62170-DSL (S.D. Fla.) (the
“District Court Action”).
3. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(b), all of the estate’s right, title, and interest
in and to any claims that were asserted or could have been asserted in the District
Court Action are ABANDONED to the Debtor, Divya Khullar.
4. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to the commencement or continuation,
including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding by Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. against
Divya Khullar with respect to Divya Khullar’s debt to Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy
A. Goldstein, P.A. pursuant to the February 19, 2024 Final Judgment for Plaintiffs,
Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. and Cindy Goldstein, and Against Defendants, Khullar, P.A.,
Divya Khullar, and Khullar Law, PLLC entered in Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A., et al. v.
Khullar, P.A., et al., Case No. CACE22006638, in the Circuit Court of the 17th
Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida (the “Non-Dischargeable Debt”),
including without limitation the appeal styled Khullar, v. Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A.,
Case No. 4D2024-0565 (Fla. 4th DCA), and any other related appeals.
5. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to the enforcement by Cindy A. Goldstein
and Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. of the Non-Dischargeable Debt against Divya Khullar.
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6. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to any act by Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy
A. Goldstein, P.A. to create, perfect, or enforce against property of Divya Khullar (but
not against property of the estate) any lien to the extent that such lien secures the
Non-Dischargeable Debt.
7. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to any act by Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy
A. Goldstein, P.A. to collect, assess, or recover the Non-Dischargeable Debt.
8. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to the setoff by Cindy A. Goldstein and Cindy
A. Goldstein, P.A. of any debt owing to Divya Khullar that arose before the
commencement of this case against the Non-Dischargeable Debt.
9. 	Debtor Divya Khullar’s Verified Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 and for Damages for Willful Violation Thereof Under 11
U.S.C. § 362(k)75 is DENIED.
10. 	Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) is TERMINATED with respect to any and all contempt proceedings – both
civil and criminal – in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and
for Broward County, Florida, including without limitation any contempt proceedings
related in any way to the Non-Dischargeable Debt.
75 Dkt. No. 220.
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11. 	Divya Khullar’s objection76 to Claim No. 7 filed by Cindy A. Goldstein
and Cindy A. Goldstein, P.A. is OVERRULED.
12. 	Claim No. 7 is ALLOWED as filed as a general unsecured claim in the
amount of $462,694.87.
13. 	Divya Khullar’s objections77 to Claim Nos. 2, 3, and 4, filed by Mark W.
Rickard, P.A. dba Law Guard, are OVERRULED.
14. 	Claim No. 2 is ALLOWED as filed as a general unsecured claim in the
amount of $3,228.79.
15. 	Claim No. 3 is ALLOWED as filed as a general unsecured claim in the
amount of $23,849.07.
16. 	Claim No. 4 is ALLOWED as filed as a general unsecured claim in the
amount of $7,921.70.
# # #
Copies furnished to all counsel of record via CM/ECF and by the Clerk of Court to:
Divya Khullar
2136 NE 27th Court
Lighthouse Point, FL 33064
76 Dkt. No. 193.
77 Dkt. No. 194.
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