John Papagno

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
JOHN PAPAGNO, 	Case No. 24-16005-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 7
____________________________________/
ORDER (I) GRANTING MOTION TO REOPEN;
(II) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
MOTION FOR CONTEMPT; AND (III) DENYING (A) MOTION TO
STAY EVICTION JUDGMENT, (B) MOTION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF, AND (C) MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE HEARINGS
NOLA Lofts Condominium I violated the automatic stay when it recorded a
claim 	of 	lien 	under 	Fla. 	Stat. 	§ 718.116(5) 	after 	John 	Papagno 	had 	filed 	for
bankruptcy. As a result, Mr. Papagno is asking this Court to declare NOLA’s lien
invalid, sanction NOLA for violating the automatic stay and discharge injunction,
and enjoin NOLA from proceeding with other state court litigation against him.
Although the Court is determining that NOLA violated the automatic stay, an
evidentiary hearing will be required to determine whether that violation was willful
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on April 2, 2026.
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and if so, whether Mr. Papagno was injured, and if so, what damages, if any, he
suffered. That, however, is the extent of the consequences of NOLA having recorded
its claim of lien in violation of the automatic stay.
NOLA’s having recorded its claim of lien in violation of the automatic stay does
not, however, eliminate NOLA’s statutory lien rights under Florida Statutes, Chapter
718 and NOLA’s condominium declaration. Nor does NOLA’s post-discharge efforts
to enforce its lien rights in rem against Mr. Papagno’s condominium unit violate the
discharge injunction. And so long as NOLA continues to pursue solely in rem relief
against Mr. Papagno’s property in respect of any claim it had against him before he
filed for bankruptcy, it is not engaging in any conduct that this Court can or should
enjoin 	from 	proceeding 	in 	state 	court. 	This 	includes 	NOLA’s 	efforts 	to 	evict
Mr. Papagno for allegedly violating the condominium association rules and Florida
law.
I. 	Background.
Debtor John Papagno owns condominium unit 404 of Nola Lofts Condominium
I, located at 313 NE 2nd Street Unit 404, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301. On June
17, 2024, he filed this voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case1 without an attorney. He
received a discharge on September 24, 2024.2 The chapter 7 trustee then filed a report
of no distribution, certifying that there was no non-exempt property available to
distribute to creditors.3 His case was then closed on January 30, 2025.4
1 See Dkt. No. 1.
2 Dkt. No. 23.
3 Dkt. No. 26.
4 Dkt. No. 27.
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On June 20, 2024, however – three days after Mr. Papagno had filed his
bankruptcy petition – NOLA recorded in the Broward County property records a
claim of lien under Florida Statutes § 718.116(5), as a predicate to commencing an
action in state court to collect unpaid assessments.5 NOLA does not dispute that it
recorded its claim of lien after Mr. Papagno filed for bankruptcy and that having done
so violated the automatic stay.
Indeed, in an apparent acknowledgment that its claim of lien recorded in
violation of the automatic stay was void,6 on October 16, 2024 – after Mr. Papagno
had received his discharge – NOLA recorded a second claim of lien and issued a 45-
day demand letter to Mr. Papagno. The letter specified in bold that:
The 	Association 	is 	not 	seeking 	any 	personal 	or 	deficiency
judgment against you as a result of your discharge in Case
Number 24-16005-SMG. However, the discharge does not affect
the Association’s lien and foreclosure rights as the Association’s
has a continuing lien on your property and the Association’s lien
was not stripped, avoided or eliminated in the bankruptcy.7
On January 16, 2025, NOLA then filed in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial
Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida a one count foreclosure complaint against
Mr. Papagno and any unknown occupants of his condominium unit.8 Consistent with
its October 16 letter, the complaint specified that as a result of Mr. Papagno’s
bankruptcy discharge, NOLA would not seek any deficiency against him personally.9
5 Dkt. No. 37 at 11.
6 See Lee v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 102 F.4th 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 2024) (“actions taken in violation of
the automatic stay are void and without effect”) (quoting U.S. v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.
2006)).
7 Dkt. No. 37 at 15–17; see Dkt. No. 42, ¶ 4.
8 Case No. CACE-25-000697; see Dkt. No. 37 at 18–32; see also Dkt. No. 42, ¶ 5.
9 Dkt. No. 37 at 22; see also Dkt. No. 42, ¶ 5.
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About eight months later, NOLA filed a second state court action against
Mr. Papagno and any unknown occupants of his condominium unit.10 This action
sought injunctive relief to remove unapproved occupants residing in the unit, to
prevent unlawful and improper use of the unit in violation of fire codes, and to compel
Mr. Papagno to repair his unit’s air conditioner.11
Against this backdrop, Mr. Papagno now asserts (again without counsel) that
NOLA has engaged in a continuing pattern of post-petition and post-discharge
conduct – including lien recordings, payment demands, foreclosure proceedings, and
eviction efforts – that violated the automatic stay and discharge injunction. As a
result, he filed the following five motions, together with an affidavit12 containing
multiple exhibits:
1. 	Debtor’s Emergency Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 350(b) and Rule 5010 for the Purpose of Enforcing the
Automatic Stay, the Discharge Injunction, and Related Relief
(Motion to Reopen);13
2. 	Debtor’s Motion for Contempt for Violations of the Automatic Stay
and Discharge Injunction (Motion for Contempt);14
3. 	Emergency Motion to Halt and Stay Enforcement of Eviction
Judgment and for Immediate Injunctive Relief (Motion to Stay
Eviction Judgment);15
4. 	Debtor’s Motion for Declaratory Relief and for Systemic Sanctions
Under the Court’s Inherent Authority (Motion for Declaratory
Relief);16 and
10 Case No. CACE-25-016406; see Dkt. No. 37 at 47–58; see also Dkt. No. 42, ¶ 20.
11 Dkt. No. 37 at 47–58; see also Dkt. No. 42, ¶ 20.
12 Dkt. No. 30, as amended by Dkt. No. 37.
13 Dkt. No. 29.
14 Dkt. No. 31.
15 Dkt. No. 32, as amended by Dkt. No. 38.
16 Dkt. No. 33, as amended by Dkt. No. 39.
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5. 	Debtor’s Motion to Consolidate Hearings on Pending Motions for
Judicial Economy (Motion to Consolidate Hearings).17
The Court set a hearing on these motions for March 4, 2026,18 before which NOLA
filed an omnibus response.19 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the
matter under advisement. After reviewing the motions, affidavits, exhibits, and
NOLA’s response, and considering the arguments made by the parties at the hearing,
for the reasons that follow the Court will grant the Motion to Reopen, grant in part
and deny in part the Motion for Contempt, deny as moot the Motion to Consolidate
Hearings, and deny on the merits the Motion to Stay Eviction Judgment and the
Motion for Declaratory Relief.
II. 	Jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction of, and may hear and determine, Mr. Papagno’s
bankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), 28 U.S.C. § 157(b), and the District
Court’s 	standing 	order 	of 	reference.20 Enforcement 	of 	the automatic 	stay 	and
discharge injunction are core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), as to which
this Court can enter final orders and judgments.
III. 	Discussion.
A. 	Motion to Reopen.
Mr. Papagno seeks to reopen his Chapter 7 case to address these alleged
violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction. Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b),
“[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer
17 Dkt. No. 34.
18 Dkt. Nos. 35, 40.
19 Dkt. No. 42.
20 Dist. Ct. Admin. Order 2024-84 (Nov. 1, 2024); see also Dist. Ct. Loc. R. 87.2.
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assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.”21 Because Mr. Papagno’s
other motions – if successful – might result in some relief accorded to him, it is
appropriate to reopen this case to adjudicate those motions. The motion to reopen will
therefore be granted.
B. 	Motion for Contempt.
Mr. Papagno alleges that NOLA willfully violated the automatic stay by
recording its claim of lien post-petition and then violated the discharge injunction by
recording another claim of lien based on an allegedly discharged debt, allegedly
issuing 	post-discharge 	payment 	demands, 	pursuing 	foreclosure, 	and 	allegedly
engaging in coercive conduct, including eviction-related actions. Mr. Papagno seeks
sanctions, damages, and enforcement of the discharge protections. NOLA, on the
other hand, contends that it only took legally permissible steps to enforce its in rem
rights with respect to the condominium based on its statutory lien.
1. 	Condominium Association Statutory Liens Under Florida Law.
“Condominiums and the forms of ownership interests therein are strictly
creatures of statute.”22 Under Florida law, a condominium is created by recording a
declaration of condominium in the public records of the county where the land is
located.23 	This 	declaration 	“strictly 	governs 	the 	relationships 	among 	the
21 11 U.S.C. § 350(b).
22 Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 2002) (“In Florida, Chapter
718, Florida Statutes, known as Florida’s ‘Condominium Act,’ gives statutory recognition to the
condominium form of ownership of real property and establishes a detailed scheme for the creation,
sale, and operation of condominiums.”).
23 Id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 718.104(2) (“A condominium is created by recording a declaration in the
public records of the county where the land is located, executed and acknowledged with the
requirements for a deed.”).
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condominium 	unit 	owners 	and 	the 	condominium 	association.”24 	“[B]ecause
condominiums are a creature of statute[,] courts must look to the statutory scheme
as well as the condominium declaration and other documents to determine the legal
rights of owners and the association.”25
Here, the Declaration of NOLA Lofts Condominium I, A Condominium was
recorded in the public records of Broward County, Florida on February 2, 2005.26
Referencing the Florida Condominium Act, section 2.1 of the Declaration defines the
“Act” to mean “the Florida Condominium Act (Chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes)
as it exists on the date hereof and as it may be hereafter renumbered.”27 This
language is significant because under Florida law, a condominium’s declaration “is
governed by the substantive law in effect at the time of its recording unless the
declaration specifically provides that it will be subject to Florida statutory association
law ‘as amended from time to time.’”28 Thus, because the declaration did not state
that it was subject to the Florida Condominium Act “as it may be amended from time
24 Woodside Vill. Condo., 806 So. 2d at 456.
25 Id.
26 See OR Book 38993, Pages 1450–1545, Pub. Recs. of Broward Cnty., Fla. (Feb. 2, 2005).
Mr. Papagno’s filings included portions – but not all – of the condominium declaration. At the
conclusion of the March 4 hearing, the Court asked the parties if there were any other papers the
Court needed to consider in order to rule. Mr. Papagno responded that the Court needed the
condominium declaration. Counsel for NOLA did not dispute that, but pointed out that the only
relevant provision would be section 13. After the hearing, Mr. Papagno then filed with the Court only
section 13 of the declaration. Dkt. No. 43. But Mr. Papagno’s argument about “Kaufman” language
(discussed next), required the Court to review the entire declaration. Because the condominium
declaration is a publicly recorded official government land record that is not subject to reasonable
dispute and can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2), the Court may take judicial notice of it on its own, see Fed.
R. Evid. 201(c)(1).
27 OR Book 38993, at p. 1450, § 2.1.
28 In re Clement, 644 B.R. 917, 921 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2022) (citing Kaufman v. Shere, 347 So. 2d 627
(Fla. 3d DCA 1977)).
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to time,”29 the declaration “remains subject to the substantive law in effect when it
was created unless and until the declaration is amended.”30
Section 13.3 contains the relevant provisions here, and provides as follows:31
13.3 Default in Payment of Assessments for Common Expenses.
Assessments and installments thereof not paid within ten (10) days from
the date when they are due shall bear interest at fifteen percent (15%)
per annum from the date due until paid and shall be subject to an
administrative late fee in an amount not to exceed the greater of $25.00
or five percent (5%) of each delinquent installment. The Association has
a lien on each Condominium Parcel for any unpaid Assessments on such
Parcel, interest thereon and reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred
by the Association incident to the collection of the Assessments or
enforcement of the lien. Except as set forth below, the lien is effective from,
and shall relate back to, the date of the recording of this Declaration.
However, as to first mortgages of record, the lien is effective from and
after recording of a claim of lien. The lien shall be evidenced by the
recording of a claim of lien in the Public Records of the County. To be
valid, the claim of lien must state the description of the Condominium
Parcel, the name of the record Owner, the name and address of the
Association, the amount due and the due dates, and the claim of lien
must be executed and acknowledged by an officer or authorized agent of
the Association. The claim of lien shall not be released until all sums
secured by it (or such other amount as to which the Association shall
agree by way of settlement) have been fully paid or until it is barred by
law. No such lien shall be effective longer than one (1) year after the
claim of lien has been recorded unless, within that one (1) year period,
an action to enforce the lien is commenced. The one (1) year period shall
automatically be extended for any length of time during which the
Association is prevented from filing a foreclosure action by an automatic
stay resulting from a bankruptcy petition filed by the Owner or any
other person claiming an interest in the Unit. The claim of lien shall
secure (whether or not stated therein) all unpaid Assessments as well
as interest and all reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by the
Association, which are due and which may accrue subsequent to the
recording of the claim of lien and prior to the entry of a final judgment
of foreclosure. Upon payment in full, the person making the payment is
entitled to a satisfaction of the lien in recordable form. The Association
may 	bring 	an 	action 	in 	its 	name 	to 	foreclose 	a 	lien 	for 	unpaid
29 Kaufman, 347 So. 2d at 628; see Clement, 644 B.R. at 921.
30 Clement, 644 B.R. at 922.
31 OR Book 38993, at p. 1461, § 13.3 (emphasis added).
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Assessments in the manner a mortgage of real property is foreclosed and
may also bring an action at law to recover a money judgment for the
unpaid Assessments without waiving any claim of lien. The Association
is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred either in a
lien foreclosure action or an action to recover a money judgment for
unpaid Assessments.
As an additional right and remedy of the Association, upon
default in the payment of Assessments as aforesaid and after thirty (30)
days’ 	prior 	written 	notice 	to 	the 	applicable 	Unit 	Owner 	and 	the
recording of a claim of lien, the Association may accelerate and declare
immediately due and payable all installments of Assessments for the
next 	twelve 	(12) 	months. 	In 	the 	event 	that 	the 	amount 	of 	such
installments changes during the twelve (12) month period, the Unit
Owner or the Association, as appropriate, shall be obligated to pay or
reimburse to the other the amount of increase or decrease within ten
(10) days of same taking effect.
Similarly, section 718.116 of the Florida Condominium Act, as in effect in 2005
(the year the condominium declaration was recorded),32 provided in relevant part as
follows:33
(5)(a) The association has a lien on each condominium parcel to
secure the payment of assessments. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection (1) and as set forth below, the lien is effective from and shall
relate back to the recording of the original declaration of condominium,
or, in the case of lien on a parcel located in a phase condominium, the
last to occur of the recording of the original declaration or amendment
thereto creating the parcel. However, as to first mortgages of record, the
lien is effective from and after recording of a claim of lien in the public
records of the county in which the condominium parcel is located.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to bestow upon any lien,
mortgage, or certified judgment of record on April 1, 1992, including the
lien for unpaid assessments created herein, a priority which, by law, the
lien, mortgage, or judgment did not have before that date.
(b) 	To be valid, a claim of lien must state the description of the
condominium parcel, the name of the record owner, the name and
address of the association, the amount due, and the due dates. It must
be executed and acknowledged by an officer or authorized agent of the
32 See Clement, 644 B.R. at 921; Kaufman, 347 So. 2d at 628.
33 Fla. Stat. 718.116(5)(a)–(b) (2005) (emphasis added).
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association. No such lien shall be effective longer than 1 year after the
claim of lien was recorded unless, within that time, an action to enforce
the 	lien 	is 	commenced. 	The 	1-year 	period 	shall 	automatically 	be
extended 	for 	any 	length 	of 	time 	during 	which 	the 	association 	is
prevented from filing a foreclosure action by an automatic stay resulting
from a bankruptcy petition filed by the parcel owner or any other person
claiming an interest in the parcel. The claim of lien shall secure all
unpaid assessments which are due and which may accrue subsequent to
the recording of the claim of lien and prior to the entry of a certificate of
title, as well as interest and all reasonable costs and attorney’s fees
incurred by the association incident to the collection process. Upon
payment in full, the person making the payment is entitled to a
satisfaction of the lien.
Thus, both the declaration and the version of section 718.116 in effect at the
time the declaration was recorded provide that the condominium association has a
lien on each condominium parcel to secure payment of assessments, and that the lien
relates back to and is effective from the date the condominium declaration was
recorded, which here was February 2, 2005.34 Both the declaration and the statute
then provide that as to first mortgages the lien is only effective from and after the
recording of a claim of lien in the public records.35 Here, however, there was no first
34 OR Book 38993, Page 1450, Pub. Recs. of Broward Cnty., Fla. (Feb. 2, 2005).
35 The relevant provision from the declaration states:
Except as set forth below, the lien is effective from, and shall relate back to, the date
of the recording of this Declaration. However, as to first mortgages of record, the lien
is effective from and after recording of a claim of lien. The lien shall be evidenced by
the recording of a claim of lien in the Public Records of the County.
The relevant provision of the statute states:
The association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the payment of
assessments. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1) and as set forth below, the
lien is effective from and shall relate back to the recording of the original declaration
of condominium, . . . However, as to first mortgages of record, the lien is effective from
and after recording of a claim of lien in the public records of the county in which the
condominium parcel is located.
That the statute says, as to first mortgages of record, “the lien is effective from and after recording of
a claim of lien in the public records of the county,” but the declaration says “the lien is effective from
and after recording of a claim of lien. The lien shall be evidenced by the recording of a claim of lien in
the Public Records of the County,” is an immaterial difference. Read in context, it is clear – where
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mortgage. Accordingly, under both the declaration and Florida Statutes § 718.116,36
NOLA has a statutory lien on Mr. Papagno’s unit to secure unpaid assessments,
interest, attorney’s fees, and costs, which lien is not dependent on the filing of a claim
of lien to be effective. The lien is effective from the date the condominium declaration
was recorded.
A claim of lien, however, is materially different from the lien itself under
Florida law. A lien in favor of a condominium association arises by operation of law
upon the filing of – and is effective from the date of recording of – a declaration of
condominium.37 A claim of lien, on the other hand, is a formal document that the
association records in the public records as a predicate to enforcing its lien rights.
Under Fla. Stat. § 718.116, before an association can initiate judicial foreclosure
proceedings, it must record its claim of lien.38 But recording the claim of lien has no
bearing on whether the association has a lien – it has one as a matter of law.
So here, under both the declaration and Florida law, NOLA had a lien on
Mr. Papagno’s condominium unit when he filed for bankruptcy. And NOLA was not
there is no first mortgage of record – that the association has lien as a matter of law and need not
record a claim of lien to perfect it.
36 This includes under both the 2005 version of § 718.116(5)(a), and the current (2025) version, which
today reads in relevant part as follows:
The association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the payment of
assessments. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (1) and as set forth below, the
lien is effective from and shall relate back to the recording of the original declaration
of condominium, . . . However, as to first mortgages of record, the lien is effective from
and after recording of a claim of lien in the public records of the county in which the
condominium parcel is located.
37 Calendar v. Stonebridge Gardens Section III Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 234 So. 3d 18, 19–20 (Fla. 4th DCA
2017); Fla. Stat. § 718.116(5)(a).
38 AGM Inv’rs, LLC v. Bus. Law Group, P.A., 219 So. 3d 920, 925 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (“The association’s
recording of a claim of lien is legally necessary to its institution of judicial foreclosure proceedings to
enforce that lien.”) (citing Fla. Stat. § 718.116(5)(b), (5)(c), (6)(b)).
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required to have filed any claim of lien to validate its lien rights – they existed (and
continue to exist) as a matter of law.39
2. 	The Automatic Stay.
The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) arises upon the filing of a bankruptcy
case. As relevant here, the automatic stay stops the following actions:40
(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative,
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case . . ., or to recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case . . .;
* * *
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
* * *
The automatic stay remains in place until the earlier of the time the case is closed,
the case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied.41
NOLA originally recorded a claim of lien for unpaid assessments on June 20,
2024 – three days after Mr. Papagno filed for bankruptcy. Mr. Papagno contends that
39 Calendar, 234 So. 3d at 19–20 (“the lien in favor of the association was created by the statute itself.
Since there is no indication that a first mortgage was at issue in this case, the association was not
required to file a claim to validate its lien.”).
40 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
41 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
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under section 362(a)(4), this violated the automatic stay. At the March 4 hearing,
NOLA did not dispute the fact that it recorded this claim of lien after Mr. Papagno
had filed for bankruptcy. Nor did it dispute the legal conclusion that this act violated
the automatic stay.
Mr. Papagno, however, argues that NOLA’s recording of this claim of lien was
“willful,” such that under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) he is entitled to damages. Section 362(k)
provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this
section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in
appropriate 	circumstances, 	may 	recover 	punitive 	damages.”42 Thus, 	under 	the
statute, it is not enough that a violation of the stay occurred; that violation must have
been “willful.” A stay violation is willful if the party who violated the stay (1) knew
the automatic stay was in effect, and (2) intended the actions that violated the stay.43
“It does not matter whether the violator specifically intended to violate the stay; all
that matters is that the violator intended to perform the act”44 while knowing that
the automatic stay was in effect.
NOLA admits that Mr. Papagno filed for bankruptcy on June 18, 2024, that
NOLA received notice of his bankruptcy filing on June 19, 2024, and that it recorded
its claim of lien on June 20, 2024. It argued at the March 4 hearing, however, that
the claim of lien had been prepared on June 18 (the day Mr. Papagno filed for
bankruptcy, at which time NOLA did not know he had filed for bankruptcy), but that
42 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
43 In re Lyubarsky, 615 B.R. 924, 929 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2020) (citing Jove Eng’g v. IRS (In re Jove
Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996)).
44 In re Meredith, 672 B.R. 802, 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2025).
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due to Juneteenth National Independence Day it could not record the claim of lien
until June 20, when it did so.
Although the Court’s docket shows that notice of Mr. Papagno’s bankruptcy
case was not mailed to NOLA until June 20, 2024,45 Mr. Papagno asserts – and NOLA
does not appear to contest – that on June 19, 2024, Mr. Papagno hand-delivered notice
of his bankruptcy filing to an attorney for NOLA.46 What is contested, however, is
whether NOLA’s filing of the claim of lien after one of its attorneys had received
actual notice of Mr. Papagno’s bankruptcy filing was willful, and if it was willful,
whether Mr. Papagno has been injured, and if he has been injured, what damages he
has suffered. To make this determination, the Court must schedule an evidentiary
hearing, which it will do by separate order. But for purposes of this order – and all
the other relief Mr. Papagno seeks besides damages for violation of the automatic
stay – the import of this claim of lien having been filed in violation of the automatic
stay is simply that it is void.47
3. 	The Discharge Injunction.
Mr. Papagno also argues that NOLA has violated the discharge injunction by
recording a second claim of lien after he received his discharge, allegedly issuing post-
discharge 	payment 	demands, 	pursuing 	foreclosure, 	and 	allegedly 	engaging 	in
coercive conduct, including eviction-related actions. NOLA, however, asserts that its
statutory lien was not discharged in bankruptcy, that the discharge injunction does
45 Dkt. No. 12.
46 See Dkt. No. 37, at 1, 10.
47 See Lee, 102 F.4th at 1180 (“actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and without
effect”).
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not apply to its lien, and that it is simply pursuing its in rem rights based on its
statutory lien. The Court agrees.
To begin, as the Court determined, the claim of lien filed on June 20, 2024, is
void. But this does not mean – as Mr. Papagno seems to suggest – that NOLA’s
statutory lien did not exist when he filed for bankruptcy or that as a result of having
received a discharge, NOLA is now an unsecured creditor whose entire claim was
discharged. There is no dispute that Mr. Papagno was liable to NOLA for unpaid
assessments when he filed for bankruptcy.48 And this Court has concluded that
NOLA has a lien, as a matter of law, to secure this claim. That NOLA then recorded
a claim of lien after Mr. Papagno had filed for bankruptcy – which the Court
determined to be void – does not, however, eliminate NOLA’s statutory lien that
existed when Mr. Papagno filed this case.
As discussed, a condominium association is not required to file a claim of lien
to validate or enforce its statutory lien to secure the payment of assessments if a
declaration of condominium was recorded and there is no first mortgage. Judge A.
Jay Cristol addressed a similar scenario in In re Valcarcel:49
It is undisputed there were unpaid condominium assessments due and
owing at the time the Debtor filed the Chapter 7 Case. It is also
undisputed Jade [Winds Association, Inc.] had not filed a claim of lien
in the public records at that time. In relation to amounts arising before
the order for relief, Debtor argues: “The claim of lien was filed after
debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The claim of lien improperly
secures amounts which were discharged in the debtor’s chapter 7 filing.
48 See Dkt. No. 1, at 28 (listing NOLA as a creditor for “HOA Assessments”). Mr. Papagno may dispute
the amount of the unpaid assessments for which he is liable, but the Court can conclude from his
bankruptcy schedules that he does not dispute that assessments in some amount were owing when he
filed for bankruptcy.
49 2013 WL 4097193 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013).
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Suggested Treatment: the amount claimed should be classified as
unsecured.” . . .
This argument overlooks Fla. Stat. § 718.116(5)(a), which provides, the
association has a lien on each condominium parcel to secure the
payment of assessments, and except as to first mortgagees in relation to
whom the lien is effective only upon recording a claim of lien in the
public records, the lien is effective from and shall relate back to the
recording of the original declaration of condominium. . . . The declaration
of 	condominium 	for 	Jade 	Winds 	Group 	Allamanda 	Gardens 	was
recorded on January 25, 1968, over forty years before the Chapter 7 Case
was filed.50
Judge Cristol held that the real property remained liable for the full amount of Jade’s
lien after a chapter 7 discharge and that post-discharge, while Jade was prohibited
from pursuing discharged amounts in personam, it retained its in rem lien in the full
amount of its claim and was entitled to pursue all of its in rem rights.51 Judge Cristol
also 	rejected 	the 	argument 	that 	Jade’s 	failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	debtor’s
characterization of Jade’s claim as wholly unsecured on his schedules or to otherwise
participate in the debtor’s no-asset chapter 7 case somehow avoided or eliminated the
statutory lien.52
Valcarcel is similar to Mr. Papagno’s case. Here, Mr. Papagno owed unpaid
assessments to NOLA as of the petition date, but NOLA had not yet recorded a claim
of lien. Mr. Papagno listed NOLA as an unsecured creditor on his schedules,53 and he
received a chapter 7 discharge.54 NOLA did not participate in Mr. Papagno’s no-asset
50 Id. at *2 (cleaned up); see 4 C OLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.24 (16th ed. 2026) (when a lien for unpaid
condominium association fees exists “it is unaffected by the discharge of the debtor’s unpaid
prepetition obligations.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (discharge injunction is limited to actions to
collect a debt as a personal liability of the debtor)).
51 Valcarcel, 2013 WL 4097193, at *2.
52 Id. at *3.
53 See Dkt. No. 1, at 28.
54 Dkt. No. 23.
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chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Nonetheless, as Judge Cristol did in Valcarcel, the Court
concludes 	here 	that 	NOLA’s 	statutory 	lien 	– 	in 	its 	full 	amount 	– 	survived
Mr. Papagno’s bankruptcy case and was not discharged. As a result, the lien is
unaffected by the discharge injunction, and NOLA was and is free to pursue its in
rem rights with respect to Mr. Papagno’s condominium unit. Accordingly, NOLA has
not violated the discharge injunction, and so to this extent, Mr. Papagno’s motion will
be denied.
C. 	Motion for Declaratory Relief.
In 	his 	Motion 	for 	Declaratory 	Relief,55 	Mr. 	Papagno 	seeks 	a 	series 	of
declaratory rulings clarifying the relationship between federal bankruptcy law and
Florida condominium lien statutes, specifically as they relate to the validity and
enforceability of liens arising from pre-petition notices and post-petition or post-
discharge actions. The motion frames these issues as part of a broader systemic
confusion regarding how condominium lien rights are affected by bankruptcy, and
asserts that without clear guidance, debtors are subjected to improper collection
efforts and prolonged litigation. The Court disagrees. For the reasons discussed, the
law is clear that NOLA has a lien, and that that lien survives Mr. Papagno’s
bankruptcy case. His motion for declaratory relief will therefore be denied.
D. 	Motion to Stay Eviction Judgment.
In his Motion to Stay Eviction Judgment,56 Mr. Papagno seeks emergency
injunctive relief to halt enforcement of a state court eviction-related judgment dated
55 Dkt. No. 33, as amended by Dkt. No. 39.
56 Dkt. No. 32, as amended by Dkt. No. 38.
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January 20, 2026. Specifically, he asserts that the eviction and related enforcement
actions are intertwined with alleged discharge violations and constitute coercive
efforts to collect a discharged debt. NOLA disagrees, asserting that the eviction-
related action is unrelated to any discharged debt or to its statutory lien for
assessments, and instead arises from post-petition violations of condominium rules,
including for having unauthorized occupants, property misuse, and safety concerns.
The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	NOLA. 	The 	eviction-related 	judgment 	is 	based 	on
Mr. Papagno’s post-petition violations of condominium rules unrelated to the pre-
petition debt he owed to NOLA for unpaid assessments. NOLA is not trying to enforce
any discharged debt and is not violating the discharge injunction in any way by
seeking – and then enforcing – the eviction-related judgment. The Court will
therefore deny Mr. Papagno’s Motion to Stay Eviction Judgment.
E. 	Motion to Consolidate Hearings.
Lastly, Mr. Papagno has moved to consolidate the hearings on his various
motions. Insofar as the Court set all his motions for hearing on the same day – March
4, 2026 – his motion will be denied as moot.
IV. 	Conclusion.
For the reasons discussed, it is ORDERED that:
1. 	The Motion to Reopen57 is GRANTED.
2. 	The Motion for Contempt58 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART, as set forth herein.
57 Dkt. No. 29.
58 Dkt. No. 31.
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3. 	The Motion for Contempt59 is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a
determination that NOLA violated the automatic stay by recording its claim of lien
on June 20, 2024. The Court will, by separate order, set an evidentiary hearing to
determine 	(a) 	whether 	the 	stay 	violation 	was 	willful, 	(b) 	if 	willful, 	whether
Mr. Papagno was injured by the stay violation, and (c) if he was injured, what
damages, if any, he suffered as a result.
4. 	The 	Motion 	for Contempt60 is DENIED to 	the extent 	it seeks 	a
determination that NOLA violated the discharge injunction or any other relief.
5. 	The Motion to Stay Eviction Judgment,61 as amended,62 is DENIED.
6. 	The Motion for Declaratory Relief,63 as amended,64 is DENIED.
7. 	The Motion to Consolidate Hearings65 is DENIED AS MOOT.
# # #
Copies furnished to all interested parties by the Clerk of Court.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Dkt. No. 32.
62 Dkt. No. 38.
63 Dkt. No. 33.
64 Dkt. No. 39.
65 Dkt. No. 34.
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