Penelope Ann Johnson

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
PENELOPE ANN JOHNSON, 	Case No. 25-13004-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 7
____________________________________/
ORDER (I) GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO SHARON
MUSCELLA AND PETER SOBOTA, (II) DENYING ALL OTHER PENDING
MOTIONS, AND (III) CANCELING FEBRUARY 5, 2026 HEARING
Attorney Peter Sobota represents Sharon Muscella in a highly contested
eviction action against Debtor Penelope Ann Johnson. Ms. Johnson filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition on March 21, 2025. Four days later, on March 25, 2025,
Mr. Sobota on behalf of Ms. Muscella extended a pre-petition writ of garnishment in
connection with that state court litigation. Extending this writ of garnishment after
Ms. Johnson filed for bankruptcy violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), an individual injured by any willful violation of the
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on February 2, 2026.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 16

2
automatic stay is entitled to recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’
fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella contend that any violation of the automatic stay
was not willful because, at the time Mr. Sobota extended the writ of garnishment,
neither 	Mr. 	Sobota 	nor 	Ms. 	Muscella 	knew 	that 	Ms. 	Johnson 	had 	filed 	for
bankruptcy.1 They now move for summary judgment on this issue.2
Leading up to and then after moving for summary judgment, both Mr. Sobota
(on behalf of himself and Ms. Muscella) and Ms. Johnson (who is representing herself)
flooded the Court with a myriad of motions, objections, responses, replies, discovery
requests, declarations, exhibits, and other filings.3 Wading through this morass, it is
clear there is still unresolved state court litigation – and significant animosity –
between Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella, on the one hand, and Ms. Johnson and her
non-debtor husband, Glen-Derrick Johnson, on the other hand. But within this
Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction, all that this Court must determine is
whether Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella willfully violated the automatic stay when
Mr. Sobota served the continuing writ of garnishment four days after Ms. Johnson
filed her chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
For the reasons that follow – and based on a thorough review of the materials
cited to in the record – the Court concludes that Ms. Johnson has failed to produce
1 Dkt. No. 52, at ¶ 2.
2 Dkt. No. 111.
3 See Dkt. Nos. 52, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 94, 95,
96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121,
122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 142.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 16

3
any evidence that Mr. Sobota or Ms. Muscella knew about Ms. Johnson’s bankruptcy
when Mr. Sobota extended the writ of garnishment. Accordingly, as a matter of law
their violation of the automatic stay was not willful. And because it was not willful,
Ms. Johnson is not entitled to any damages. The Court will therefore grant Mr. Sobota
and Ms. Muscella’s motion for summary judgment. Based on this determination –
and given the Court’s limited subject matter jurisdiction in this fully-administered
chapter 7 bankruptcy case in which the debtor has already received a discharge – all
other pending motions will be denied and the February 5, 2026 hearing scheduled in
this case will be canceled.
I. 	Background.
In 2024, Ms. Muscella moved to evict Ms. Johnson from her rental property
after Ms. Johnson failed to leave when her lease ended. Mr. Sobota is counsel of
record for Ms. Muscella in the state court eviction case against Ms. Johnson.4 In that
action, Ms. Muscella obtained a final judgment for eviction on October 18, 2024,5 and
a fee award against Ms. Johnson on January 6, 2025.6 Shortly thereafter, the
Broward County Clerk of Court issued writs of garnishment to Navy Federal Credit
Union 	on 	January 29, 	2025, and to 	Broward County, 	Florida 	(Ms. 	Johnson’s
employer) on February 6, 2025.7
4 Muscella v. Johnson et al., Case No. COWE24000070 (Fla. Cnty. Ct. Broward Cnty.).
5 See Sobota Declaration, Ex. B (Dkt. No. 111).
6 See Sobota Declaration, Ex. C (Dkt. No. 111).
7 See Sobota Declaration, Exs. D-G (Dkt. No. 111).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 16

4
On March 21, 2025, Ms. Johnson then filed a voluntary chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition.8 	Four 	days 	later, 	on 	March 	25, 	2025, 	Mr. 	Sobota 	(as 	counsel 	for
Ms. Muscella) filed a notice extending the existing writ of garnishment directed to
Navy Federal Credit Union. Neither Ms. Johnson nor her then-bankruptcy counsel9
filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the state court eviction action.10 Ms. Johnson’s
bankruptcy case proceeded in due course, and on June 20, 2025, Ms. Johnson received
a chapter 7 discharge.11
On September 4, 2025, Ms. Johnson filed a motion12 to enforce the discharge
injunction and for sanctions against Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota for violating the
automatic 	stay 	by 	filing 	the 	March 	25, 	2025, 	notice 	extending 	the 	writ 	of
garnishment. Mr. Sobota filed a verified response13 in opposition to the motion for
sanctions, asserting that he did not receive notice of Ms. Johnson’s bankruptcy filing
until April 2, 2025, and that the only alleged post-petition action taken by Mr. Sobota
on behalf of Ms. Muscella – the March 25, 2025, notice extending the writ of
garnishment – occurred before he had notice of the bankruptcy case. When the Court
conducted a hearing14 on Ms. Johnson’s motion for sanctions on October 1, 2025,
however, neither Ms. Muscella nor Mr. Sobota appeared. As a result – and based on
8 Dkt. No. 1.
9 Although she filed this chapter 7 bankruptcy case through an attorney, after the trustee concluded
her administration of the case and Ms. Johnson received a discharge, on July 30, 2025, the Court
granted Ms. Johnson’s attorney’s motion to withdraw. (Dkt. No. 45). From that point on, Ms. Johnson
has been representing herself.
10 It is undisputed that Mr. Sobota ultimately filed the suggestion of bankruptcy in the eviction action
on April 17, 2025. See Mot. for Sanctions, Ex. C (Dkt. No. 49).
11 Dkt. No. 27.
12 Dkt. No. 49.
13 Dkt. No. 52, at ¶¶ 4-8.
14 See Notice of Hearing (Dkt. No. 50).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 16

5
the materials submitted by Ms. Johnson in support of her motion – the Court granted
Ms. Johnson’s motion in part, determining that the continuing garnishment violated
the automatic stay and the discharge injunction.15 The Court then set an evidentiary
hearing 	to 	determine 	whether 	Ms. Johnson 	was 	entitled 	to 	sanctions 	against
Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for willfully violating the
automatic stay.16
Mr. Sobota then filed a verified response17 in opposition to the imposition of
sanctions, reiterating his argument that sanctions are unwarranted because he did
not receive notice of Ms. Johnson’s bankruptcy filing until April 2, 2025. After the
parties conducted discovery, Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota moved for summary
judgment,18 arguing it is undisputed that they did not have notice of Ms. Johnson’s
bankruptcy filing when the March 25, 2025, notice extending the writ of garnishment
was filed and that as a result, any violation of the automatic stay was not willful as
a matter of law. Ms. Johnson filed several responses19 in opposition to the motion,
and Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota filed a reply20 to those responses.
An evidentiary hearing21 to determine whether Ms. Johnson is entitled to
sanctions against Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota is currently scheduled for February
5, 2026. Other related motions are also set for hearing at that time.22 Upon
15 See Order (Dkt. No. 57).
16 Id.
17 Dkt. No. 67.
18 Dkt. No. 111.
19 Dkt. Nos. 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137.
20 Dkt. No. 139.
21 Dkt. No. 88.
22 See Dkt. Nos. 85, 86, 90.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 16

6
consideration of Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella’s motion for summary judgment, the
related briefs, and the materials in the record, however, the Court will grant the
motion for summary judgment for the reasons discussed below. And as further
discussed below, based on the Court’s decision to grant summary judgment, the
remaining matters set for hearing will be denied either as moot or on the merits.
II. 	Summary Judgment Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)23 requires the Court to grant summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”24 In considering a
motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe all facts and draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.25 The
moving party has the burden of establishing that there is an absence of any genuine
issue of material fact.26 Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts
to the non-movant, who must present specific facts showing that there exists a
genuine dispute of material fact.27 “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of
materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”28 The Court will not weigh the evidence or
23 Made applicable here by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056 and 9014(c)(1).
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
25 Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
26 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
27 Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir. 1990).
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 16

7
find facts at the summary judgment stage. Rather, the Court determines only
whether there is sufficient evidence upon which the fact-finder – in this case, the
Court – could find for the non-moving party.29 Based on its thorough review of the
record here, there is insufficient evidence upon which the Court could find for
Ms. Johnson 	that 	Mr. 	Sobota 	and 	Ms. 	Muscella 	knew 	about 	Ms. 	Johnson’s
bankruptcy case when Mr. Sobota filed a notice extending a writ of garnishment on
March 25, 2025.
III. 	Jurisdiction to Enforce the Stay.
The Court begins its analysis – as it must – with the question of jurisdiction.
“Federal 	courts 	have 	an 	independent 	obligation 	to 	ensure 	that 	subject-matter
jurisdiction exists before reaching the merits of a dispute.”30 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a), district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
the Bankruptcy Code.31 And under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), district courts have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy
Code or arising in or related to cases under the Bankruptcy Code.32 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)
then provides that each district court may refer any or all of its cases under the
Bankruptcy Code and any or all proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code or
arising in or related to a case under the Bankruptcy Code to the bankruptcy judges
29 Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 2003).
30 Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
32 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 16

8
for the district.33 The District Court has done so here through its standing Order of
Reference.34 As this Court explained in its In re Jimenez decision:
Although the terms “arising under,” “arising in,” and “related to” may
sound colloquial, they actually have very precise meanings that have
developed 	under 	the 	case 	law. 	A 	proceeding 	“arising 	under” 	the
Bankruptcy Code is “one based in a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
itself.” Examples of “arising under” proceedings include claims to avoid
preferences and fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548,
respectively. A proceeding “arising in” a bankruptcy case is one that is
not based on any right expressly created by the Bankruptcy Code, but
which would have no practical existence outside of the bankruptcy case.
Examples of “arising in” proceedings include determinations of the
validity, extent, or priority of liens; allowance or disallowance of claims
against the estate; and other matters affecting administration of the
bankruptcy estate.35
With respect to Ms. Johnson’s motion requesting sanctions for violation of the
automatic stay and Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota’s related motion for summary
judgment, the Court has “arising under” jurisdiction. This is because a motion to
enforce the automatic stay and the discharge injunction is a civil proceeding that
arises under specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, here 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and
524.
IV. 	Other Disputes Pending in this Court.
As to the myriad other disputes between Ms. Johnson and her husband, on the
one hand, and Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota, on the other hand, any other requests
for relief from this Court will be denied as discussed next.
33 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
34 Dist. Ct. Admin. Order 2024-84 (Nov. 1, 2024); see also Dist. Ct. Loc. R. 87.2.
35 In re Jimenez, 627 B.R. 536, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021) (internal citations omitted).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 8 of 16

9
Ms. Johnson’s motion “Regarding Harassment by New Counsel and Request
for Relief”36 attaches to it an unfiled motion for sanctions against Ms. Johnson under
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 that was purportedly served on her by
attorney David Langley, who represents Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella in this
bankruptcy case. As such, the Court will treat Ms. Johnson’s motion as an opposition
to a Rule 9011 motion that has not been filed. Because it has not been filed, however,
the Court cannot rule on the merits of the Rule 9011 motion or Ms. Johnson’s
responsive motion “Regarding Harassment by New Counsel and Request for Relief.”37
Merits aside, however, serving a motion under Rule 9011 on another party in a
bankruptcy case is a right provided by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Thus, there is nothing facially improper about Mr. Langley having done so. To the
extent Ms. Johnson’s motion seeks any justiciable relief on this issue at this time, her
motion will be denied.
Ms. Johnson also has pending another “emergency” motion for sanctions
against Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota for allegedly orchestrating a willful violation of
the automatic stay.38 The crux of the argument in this motion is that on December 4,
2025, the property manager for the property that Ms. Muscella leased to Ms. Johnson
violated the automatic stay by serving on Ms. Johnson a lease termination notice that
purportedly constituted an “act to obtain possession of property of the estate” in
violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). But in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case, under 11 U.S.C.
36 Dkt. No. 86.
37 Id.
38 Dkt. No. 105.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 9 of 16

10
§ 365(d)(1) if the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of residential
real property within 60 days of the petition date, as a matter of law that lease is
deemed rejected. The trustee in this case did not assume or reject the lease within 60
days of the petition date. Thus, as of May 20, 2025, the lease was deemed rejected.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), rejection constitutes a breach of such lease. With the lease
having been rejected and therefore breached as a matter of law, and with the trustee
having filed a notice on July 28, 2025, that she will not be administering any assets
in this case,39 any purported effort to terminate the lease under state law cannot
constitute an action to obtain possession of property of the estate and therefore does
not violate the automatic stay.40 This motion will be denied on the merits as well.
Any other disputes between Ms. Johnson, on the one hand, and Ms. Muscella
and Mr. Sobota, on the other hand, that do not seek to enforce the discharge
injunction41 arise under state law and do not “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code or
“arise in” a case under the Bankruptcy Code. The only way the Court would have
subject matter jurisdiction over these lingering disputes would be if they were
“related to” a case under the Bankruptcy Code. To determine whether a civil
proceeding is sufficiently related to a bankruptcy case to confer federal jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s “Pacor”
test, which states that:
39 Dkt. No. 44.
40 Moreover, in a chapter 7 case, it would be the trustee – not the debtor – who would have the right
to enforce this provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
41 The automatic stay terminated when Ms. Johnson received her discharge. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c)(2)(C).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 10 of 16

11
The usual articulation of the test for determining whether a civil
proceeding is related to bankruptcy is whether the outcome of the
proceeding 	could 	conceivably 	have 	an 	effect 	on 	the 	estate 	being
administered in bankruptcy. The proceeding need not necessarily be
against the debtor or against the debtor’s property. An action is related
to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities,
options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which
in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the
bankrupt estate.42
Here, Ms. Johnson has already received her bankruptcy discharge,43 and the chapter
7 trustee has certified that she has fully administered Ms. Johnson’s bankruptcy
estate.44 The remaining disputes between Ms. Johnson, on the one hand, and
Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella, on the other hand, could not conceivably have an effect
on her fully administered chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The Court therefore lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over these disputes and to the extent there are any other
pending requests for relief not specifically addressed herein, they are all denied for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
V. 	Conclusions of Law as to Willful Violation of the Automatic Stay.
The filing of a bankruptcy case operates as an automatic stay of “any act to
collect, 	assess, 	or 	recover 	a 	claim 	against 	the 	debtor 	that 	arose 	before 	the
commencement of the case.”45 This means that once a bankruptcy case is filed, the
Bankruptcy Code provides “a debtor with a breathing spell from creditors, stopping
all collection efforts,”46 including the continuation of an action or proceeding to
42 In re Brit. Am. Ins. Co. Ltd., 488 B.R. 205, 222 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Kemira,
Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 1990) and Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d
984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Jimenez, 627 B.R. at 541.
43 Dkt. No. 27.
44 Dkt. No. 44.
45 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).
46 In re Meredith, 672 B.R. 802, 805 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2025).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 11 of 16

12
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.47
The 	automatic 	stay 	remains 	in 	place 	until 	entry 	or 	denial 	of 	discharge 	or,
alternatively, until dismissal or closure of a bankruptcy case.48 Here, Ms. Johnson
asserts that Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota violated the automatic stay by filing the
March 25, 2025, notice extending the writ of garnishment in the eviction action, and
that sanctions are warranted under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
A. 	11 U.S.C. § 362(k) Requires “Willful” Violation.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), “an individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and
attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”
Thus, it is not enough that a violation of the stay occurred; that violation must have
been “willful.” A stay violation is willful if the party who violated the stay (1) knew
the automatic stay was in effect, and (2) intended the actions that violated the stay.49
“It does not matter whether the violator specifically intended to violate the stay; all
that matters is that the violator intended to perform the act”50 while knowing that
the automatic stay was in effect.
B. 	The Violation Here Was Not Willful.
Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota contend that they did not receive notice of the
bankruptcy filing until April 2, 2025, when they received the official Notice of Chapter
47 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
48 Meredith, 672 B.R. at 805; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2).
49 In re Lyubarsky, 615 B.R. 924, 929 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2020) (citing Jove Eng’g v. IRS (In re Jove
Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996)).
50 Meredith, 672 B.R. at 806.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 12 of 16

13
7 Bankruptcy Case51 generated by the Clerk of Court. This contention is supported
by the sworn declarations52 of Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota and by the Bankruptcy
Noticing Center’s certificate of mailing on the docket,53 which states that the Notice
of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case was sent by first class mail on March 26, 2025 – one
day after the filing of the continuation of the writ of garnishment – to “Peter Sobota,
Esq, 12555 Orange Drive, Suite 209, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33330-4304.”
The evidence submitted by Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota suffices to meet their
summary judgment burden of showing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists
as to whether they had notice of Ms. Johnson’s bankruptcy case as of March 25, 2025.
The burden then shifts to Ms. Johnson to produce evidence of specific facts creating
a genuine dispute as to this material fact. Ms. Johnson has failed to meet that burden.
She has produced no evidence that she filed any suggestion of bankruptcy in the
eviction action.54 After giving the parties an opportunity to conduct discovery, the
best evidence Ms. Johnson has of a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella knew Ms. Johnson had filed for bankruptcy when
Mr. Sobota served the continuation of the writ of garnishment on March 25, 2025 is
the following screenshot of the sent mail folder of someone’s mobile phone:
51 Dkt. No. 7.
52 The declarations are attached to the motion for summary judgment as Exhibit A (Muscella
Declaration) and Exhibit B (Sobota Declaration).
53 Dkt. No. 9.
54 In fact, upon learning of the bankruptcy and then speaking with the chapter 7 trustee, it was
Mr. Sobota who eventually filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the eviction action on April 17, 2025.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 13 of 16

14
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Johnson, as is required at
the summary judgment stage, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Johnson has met
her burden of presenting specific facts showing the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact.
All this screenshot shows is that on March 21, 2025, someone sent an email to
“Peter at SobotaLaw” with the subject line “Fwd: Bankruptcy Filing.” Even if an
email was sent to Mr. Sobota on March 21, 2025 informing him that Ms. Johnson had
filed for bankruptcy, there is no evidence that Mr. Sobota received or saw the email.
To the contrary, Mr. Sobota submitted an overwhelming quantum of evidence that he
had – well before the date of this email – blocked all incoming emails from the email
account 	“mrrsjhnson@icloud.com” 	due 	to 	a 	litany 	of 	vile, 	inappropriate, 	and
threatening emails that had been sent from that email address to Mr. Sobota.55
His declaration further notes that on March 22, 2025 one state court judge
terminated the Johnsons’ pro se status based on emails they had sent to Mr. Sobota
which the state court described as “beyond inappropriate and of such a crude and
55 See Sobota Declaration, at ¶ 17 and Ex. A (Dkt. No. 111). Mr. Sobota emailed Ms. Johnson and her
husband at mrrsjhnson@icloud.com on December 21, 2023, and informed them that “your e-mails are
now permanently blocked” and that “[a]ny and all further communication from you must be in writing
sent via U.S. Mail.” See Sobota Declaration, Ex. A (Dkt. No. 111). Mr. Sobota’s declaration also states
that his wife’s employer had similarly blocked emails from this same email address “to prevent
aggravated cyberstalking and death threats directed to my wife.” See Sobota Declaration, at ¶ 15 (Dkt.
No. 111).
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 14 of 16

15
vulgar nature that the Court will not reproduce them here.”56 Four days later another
state court judge called the contents of communications from this email address to
Mr. Sobota “inappropriate and vulgar in nature.”57 After Mr. Sobota blocked these
emails and informed the Johnsons he was doing so, according to his declaration he
then set up an email processing rule that automatically routed all emails from the
“mrrsjhnson@icloud.com” email address to a separate folder, so that he could access
them if needed in litigation or to provide to law enforcement.58
At bottom, the most Ms. Johnson has to support a willful violation of the stay
is the screenshot above. She does not, however – after being given the opportunity to
conduct discovery59 – have any evidence that Mr. Sobota or Ms. Muscella actually
knew Ms. Johnson had filed for bankruptcy when Mr. Sobota filed the continuing writ
of garnishment on March 25, 2025. The Court therefore concludes there is no genuine
dispute that neither Mr. Sobota nor Ms. Muscella knew at that time that Ms. Johnson
had filed for bankruptcy.
Based on this undisputed material fact, neither Mr. Sobota nor Ms. Muscella
willfully violated the automatic stay by serving the continuing writ of garnishment.
Mr. Sobota and Ms. Muscella are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
56 Sobota Declaration, at ¶ 14 (Dkt. No. 111).
57 Mr. Sobota has included the text of many of these emails in his various submissions to this Court.
This Court agrees that the emails are not only crude, inappropriate, and vulgar, but also threatening.
This Court likewise will not reproduce them here.
58 Sobota Declaration, at ¶ 17 (Dkt. No. 111).
59 Based on the history between the parties in the state court, on December 4, 2025, this Court presided
over Ms. Johnson’s depositions of Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota. See Dkt. No. 88. None of the parties,
however, have filed any transcripts of those depositions with this Court. Accordingly, although this
Court presided over those depositions, this Court has not considered any of the deposition testimony
in its ruling here.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 15 of 16

16
this issue, because under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), only an individual injured by a “willful”
violation of the automatic stay is entitled to recover damages. Because there was no
willful violation of the automatic stay, Ms. Johnson is not entitled to any damages.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that:
1. 	Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota’s motion for summary judgment60 is
GRANTED.
2. 	Ms. Muscella and Mr. Sobota did not willfully violate the automatic stay
when Mr. Sobota served a continuing writ of garnishment on March 25, 2025.
3. 	Ms. Johnson is not entitled to any damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k).
4. 	All 	other 	pending 	motions 	filed 	by 	Ms. 	Johnson, 	Mr. 	Sobota, 	or
Ms. Muscella are DENIED.
5. 	The February 5, 2026, hearing in this case is CANCELED.
# # #
Copies furnished to all interested parties by the Clerk of Court.
60 Dkt. No. 111.
Case 25-13004-SMG Doc 145 Filed 02/02/26 Page 16 of 16