Henion v. City of Lighthouse Point, Florida et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-60460-CIV-SINGHAL
KARLI HENION,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RODRIGUEZ, et
al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s
Untimely Response (DE [162] (the “First Motion”)) and Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Plaintiff’s Unauthorized Response (DE [163] (the “Second Motion,” and together with the
First Motion, the “Motions”)). 	The First Motion asks the Court to strike Plaintiff’s
Response to the Defendants’ Omnibus Motion in Limine (DE [159] (the “Response to
Defendants’ Motion in Limine”)), which Plaintiff filed out of time by just less than six
months. Likewise, the Second Motion urges the Court to strike Plaintiff’s Response and
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Strike the Expert Testimony
of Roy R. Bedard (DE [160] (the “Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike”)), which
Plaintiff filed nearly eight months late after filing a timely response in December 2025.
See (DE [114] (Plaintiff’s initial Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Expert
Testimony of Roy R. Bedard)). Plaintiff opposes, seeking a post hoc extension of time to
file the responses, and Defendants double down in reply. (DE [165], [167]).
Defendants’ Motions focus on Plaintiff’s failure to obtain an extension of time to file
the untimely responses. 	See generally (DE [162], [163]). 	And as it concerns Plaintiff’s
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Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Defendants further argue that the Local Rules
require same be stricken as an unauthorized “additional memorand[um] . . . filed . . .
without prior leave of Court.” (DE [163] at 3 (quoting Local Rule 7.1(c)(1)). 	To be sure,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B) requires out-of-time filers to demonstrate
“excusable neglect” to obtain an extension of time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he
court may, for good cause, extend the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired
if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”). 	Accordingly, the Court may
accept Plaintiff’s out-of-time filings only if she demonstrates excusable neglect.
But just what is “excusable neglect”? 	Some time ago, the Supreme Court
construed that phrase in the context of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1).
See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993).
The Court explained that “neglect” means “to leave undone or unattended to especially
through carelessness.” Id. (brackets omitted and emphasis original) (quoting Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (1983)). 	“The word therefore encompasses both
simple, 	faultless 	omissions 	to 	act 	and, 	more 	commonly, 	omissions 	caused 	by
carelessness.” 	Id. 	Consequently, the excusable neglect standard “permit[s] [courts],
where 	appropriate, 	to 	accept 	late 	filings 	caused 	by 	inadvertence, 	mistake,
or carelessness.” Id.
Although Pioneer examined “excusable neglect” in the bankruptcy context, its
construction was driven by the phrase’s ordinary meaning and has since been adopted
by the Eleventh Circuit in a variety of contexts. See United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th
1147, 1170–71 (11th Cir. 2025) (Pioneer’s construction of “excusable neglect” extended
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5),
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and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b)(1)(B)) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the
Court applies Pioneer and its Eleventh Circuit progeny here.
“[A] court analyzing a claim of excusable neglect must make an equitable decision
when considering whether or not to excuse a party’s negligence in failing to meet a
deadline, taking into account all relevant circumstances as to what led to that party’s
failure.” Id. at 1170. The Court is guided by the following factors: “the danger of prejudice
to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable
control of the [late filer], and whether the [late filer] acted in good faith.” 	Id. (quoting
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff 	demonstrates 	excusable 	neglect. 	Critically, 	Defendants 	fail 	to
demonstrate genuine prejudice, highlighting only indirect prejudice to the extent this Court
does not treat Defendants’ Motion in Limine (DE [124]) as unopposed and considers
substitute argument opposing Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE [106]). The Court is not
swayed by these arguments, particularly since Defendants are themselves recent
beneficiaries of this Court’s refusal to grant whole cloth Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion in
Limine. 	See (DE [161] (independently scrutinizing and denying much of Plaintiff’s
unopposed Motion in Limine). To scrutinize Plaintiff’s unopposed motion and then strike
Plaintiff’s belated responses—as Defendants urge the Court to do—smacks of a certain
inequity.
The late filings have not impacted the proceedings, either. The Court has not yet
resolved either the Motion to Strike (DE [106]) or Motion in Limine (DE [124]) and
consideration of Plaintiff’s responses (DE [159], [160]) will not upset the trial date.
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And although Plaintiff’s delay is her fault, the Court discerns no bad faith or
circumstances 	warranting 	an 	order 	striking 	her 	late 	responses. 	As 	it 	concerns
Defendants’ Motion to Strike, Plaintiff did timely respond. See (DE [114]). The problem
is that she now—nearly eight months later—seeks to substitute that response. Although
her more recent filing is unquestionably late, it was filed relatively shortly after Plaintiff’s
current counsel appeared. 	And it was only after current counsel appeared that Plaintiff
could have filed the current Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike. Because the Court
discerns no bad faith, no undue delay since Plaintiff’s current counsel appeared, and the
Court perceives that it will be better aided in resolving Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE
[106]) by Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike than by Plaintiff’s initial
response filed in December 2025, the Court finds excusable neglect as to that filing.
Turning to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion in Limine, the delay was
unquestionably within Plaintiff’s control. Discerning no bad faith, the Court perceives that
Plaintiff’s prior counsel—like Defendants—unwisely opted to not respond to the motion in
limine. 	Now—after hiring new counsel—Plaintiff hopes to remedy that imprudent
decision. And because the Court independently scrutinized Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion
in 	Limine, 	it 	also 	declines 	to 	prevent 	Plaintiff’s 	good-faith 	attempt 	to 	respond 	to
Defendants’ pending Motion in Limine. 	See (DE [161]). 	Indeed, Plaintiff’s belated
response will assist the Court in accurately resolving these issues before trial, and
therefore benefits not only Plaintiff, but also the Court and the administration of justice.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	extends 	nunc 	pro 	tunc 	Plaintiff’s 	deadlines 	to 	respond 	to
Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE [106]) and Motion in Limine (DE [124]) and accepts both
the Response to Defendants’ Motion in Limine (DE [159]) and the Response to
Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE [160]) as timely filed.
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Finally, Local Rule 7.1(c)(1) does not preclude Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Motion to Strike. 	Although that rule forbids “further or additional memoranda” after the
timely memoranda is filed unless the filer obtains “prior leave of Court,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
7.1(c)(1), the Court’s decision to grant Plaintiff’s post hoc motion for extension of time to
file her Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike is itself the necessary “prior leave of
Court.” Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. 	The Motions (DE [162], [163]) are DENIED;
2. 	Plaintiff’s deadlines to file her Response to Defendants’ Motion in Limine (DE
[159]) 	and 	Response 	to 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Strike 	(DE 	[160]) 	are
EXTENDED nunc pro tunc to July 17, 2026; and
3. 	Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion in Limine (DE [159]) and Response
to Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE [160]) are ACCEPTED as timely filed;
4. 	Defendants’ deadlines to reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion in
Limine (DE [159]) and Response to Defendants’ Motion to Strike (DE [160]) are
ABBREVIATED to August 3, 2026.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 29th day of
July 2026.
Copies furnished counsel via CM/ECF
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