KOSTER LLC, v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-60993-CIV-DAMIAN
KOSTER LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARTFORD INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 11]
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, Hartford Insurance Company of the
Midwest’s (“Hartford” or “Defendant”), Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] (“Motion”), filed
July 11, 2025.
THE COURT has reviewed the Motion, the parties’ briefing [ECF Nos. 13 and 14],
the applicable law, and the relevant portions of the record and is otherwise fully advised. For
the reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case arises from Hartford’s partial denial of Plaintiff, Koster LLC’s (“Koster” or
“Plaintiff”), flood insurance claim. Hartford is a Write-Your-Own (“WYO”) insurance
carrier participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). [ECF No. 1
(“Complaint”) ¶ 7]. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) administers
the NFIP pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.
As alleged in the Complaint, Koster owns a property located at 612 SE 16th Street,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 (the “Property”), which Hartford insured under a Standard
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 1 of 11

Flood Insurance Policy (“SFIP”). Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Koster submitted a claim based on damages
the Property allegedly sustained due to flooding on or about April 12, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 13–16.
On August 29, 2023, Hartford sent a letter partially denying Koster’s claim. A copy of
the August 29, 2023 letter is attached to the Motion. [ECF No. 11-4 (“August 29, 2023
Letter”)]. The Letter states “we have denied your request for review of the contractors
estimate and lack of supporting documentation for damages to the risk. Therefore, your claim
remains payable based on the adjusters revised estimate in the amount of $77,749.96.” Id. at
1. The letter also refers to a “detached building” that was “referenced in the adjusters photos
as a detached utility/laundry room [which] would require its own policy and remains denied
based on letter dated June 30, 2023.” The Letter includes a FEMA “Policyholder Rights”
document that advised Koster of its rights and options “if your flood insurer denies your
claim.” Id. at 5. The Policyholder Rights page specifically states “[i]f you do not agree with
your insurer’s decision to deny your claim and you receive a full or partial claim denial letter
from your insurer, you have options,” including the right to file an appeal of the insurer’s
decision and “file suit in the Federal District Court where the damage occurred within one
year of when your insurer first denied all or part of your claim.” Id.
Approximately 20 months after the August 29, 2023 Letter, on May 19, 2025, Koster
filed the Complaint in this action asserting one count for breach of the insurance contract and
alleging that Hartford “has delayed and denied the Plaintiff’s claims, which are due and owed
under the SFIP.” Id. ¶ 29. On July 11, 2025, Hartford filed the Motion to Dismiss now before
this Court in which Hartford argues that the Complaint must be dismissed because Koster’s
lawsuit was not filed within one year of the August 29, 2023 Letter and is therefore barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. Koster filed a Response to the Motion in which it argues,
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 2 of 11

generally, that the August 29, 2023 Letter did not trigger the one-year limitations period and
that the limitations period was tolled because the parties continued to negotiate and engaged
in other acts after the August 29, 2023 Letter. On August 4, 2025, Hartford filed a Reply
rejecting Koster’s arguments. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to
dismiss a complaint that does not satisfy the applicable pleading requirements for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Court must review the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
facts as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, pleadings that “are
no more than conclusions[ ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Dismissal pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion is warranted “only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts
that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint.” Shands Teaching Hosp.
& Clinics, Inc. v. Beech St. Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73).
At the dismissal stage, “courts only consider the four corners of a complaint and the
complaint’s attached exhibits when analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Turner v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023) However, “a document outside the four
corners of the complaint may . . . be considered” as incorporated by reference if the document
“is central to the plaintiff’s claims and is undisputed in terms of authenticity,” regardless of
whether it is “mentioned in” or “attached to” the complaint. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc.,
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 3 of 11

433 F.3d 1337, 1340 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292,
1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[A] court may properly consider a document not referred to or
attached to a complaint under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine . . . .”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Based on a careful review of the Complaint, the Motion, and the parties’ submissions,
viewing well pled facts as true and construing them in Koster’s favor, this Court finds that
Koster’s breach of contract claim is time-barred and due to be dismissed.
A. The NFIA.
By way of background, the National Flood Insurance Act (“NFIA”) governs the
cooperative efforts between the federal government and the private insurance industry to
make flood insurance available to the public on reasonable terms and conditions. See 42
U.S.C. § 4001. “The [NFIA] was adopted in 1968 in response to the exorbitant premiums
flood insurers charged at the time.” House v. Bankers Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331 (M.D.
Fla. 1999). As relevant here, under the NFIA, FEMA authorizes private insurance companies
to issue WYO policies. Id. at 1331–32. These carriers sell the insurance, adjust and pay claims,
and provide risk capital. Garboza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 10-23584-CV-JLK, 2011 WL
13223662, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2011) (King, J.). The terms of the WYO polices
themselves, however, are dictated by federal regulations. House, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1332. The
policies “are reinsured and subsidized by [FEMA],” id. at 1331, and the carriers are
considered fiscal agents of the United States. Shuford v. Fid. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 508 F.3d
1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1); West v. Harris, 573 F.2d 873, 879
(5th Cir. 1978) (describing the NFIP). The NFIP confers jurisdiction in federal court “without
regard to the amount in controversy.” 42 U.S.C. § 4053; see also West, 573 F.2d at 881.
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 4 of 11

B. The Incorporation-By-Reference Doctrine.
As an initial matter, though not addressed by Koster in its Response, this Court may
consider the exhibits attached in support of the Motion, including (1) the Policy Declarations
Page [ECF No. 11-2]; (2) the SFIP’s Dwelling Form [ECF No. 11-3]; and (3) the August 29,
2023 Letter [ECF No. 11-4].
Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss should not consider anything beyond
the face of the complaint and any documents attached to it. Edwards v. Dothan City Schs., 82
F.4th 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2023). If the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, the
court should treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). However, the court may consider outside documents that are attached to the motion
to dismiss without treating the motion as one for summary judgment when “the document is
(1) central to the plaintiff’s claims; and (2) undisputed, meaning that its authenticity is not
challenged.” Johnson, 107 F.4th at 1300.
Here, the Policy Declarations Page, the SFIP’s Dwelling Form, and the August 29,
2023 Letter all fall within the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. These documents are
central to Koster’s allegations in the Complaint that Hartford breached the SFIP, in part, “by
rendering an[ ] improper partial denial for certain portions of the subject Property.” Compl. ¶
51. Indeed, Koster references the documents, either generally or specifically, in the Complaint
and in its Response, and its claims are based on them. As for the authenticity of the exhibits,
Koster neither contests nor challenges their validity in its Response. See generally Resp.
Therefore, except for the Declaration of Wendy Strow [ECF No. 11-1], this Court will
consider Hartford’s attached documents (1) the Policy Declarations Page [ECF No. 11-2]; (2)
the SFIP’s Dwelling Form [ECF No. 11-3]; and (3) the August 29, 2023 Letter [ECF No. 11-
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 5 of 11

4] in resolving the Motion.1 See Price v. Wright Nat’l Flood Ins. Co., No. 2:24-CV-914-SPC-
KCD, 2025 WL 487627, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2025) (considering denial letter attached
to insurer’s motion to dismiss in breach of SFIP claim); 4922 Mgmt. LLC v. Selective Ins. Co. of
the Southeast, No. 2:24-CV-894-SPC-NPM, 2025 WL 417701, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2025)
(same).
C. Timeliness Of Koster’s Lawsuit.
In standard flood insurance disputes, a plaintiff must file a lawsuit “within one year
after the date of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial disallowance” of the claim. 42
U.S.C. § 4072. Specifically, Section 4072 provides:
In the event the program is carried out as provided in section 4071 of this title,
the Administrator shall be authorized to adjust and make payment of any
claims for proved and approved losses covered by flood insurance, and upon
the disallowance by the Administrator of any such claim, or upon the refusal
of the claimant to accept the amount allowed upon any such claim, the
claimant, within one year after the date of mailing of notice of disallowance
or partial disallowance by the Administrator, may institute an action against
the Administrator on such claim in the United States district court for the
district in which the insured property or the major part thereof shall have
been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such
court to hear and determine such action without regard to the amount in
controversy.
42 U.S.C. § 4072 (emphasis added); see also 44 C.F.R. § 62.22(a). A similar one-year limitation
period appears in Part VII.O of the SFIP’s Dwelling Form:
If you do sue, you must start the suit within one year after the date of the
written denial of all or part of the claim, and you must file the suit in the
United States District Court of the district in which the insured property was
located at the time of loss. This requirement applies to any claim that you
may have under this policy and to any dispute that you may have arising out
of the handling of any claim under the policy.
1 The Court notes that Hartford also submitted the Declaration of Wendy Strow [ECF No.
11-1]. 	The 	Declaration 	does 	not 	fall 	within 	the 	incorporation-by-reference 	doctrine.
Therefore, in resolving the Motion, this Court has not considered Strow’s Declaration.
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 6 of 11

ECF No. 11-3 at 25 (emphasis in original).
1. 	Whether The August 29, 2023 Letter Triggered The One-Year Limitations Period.
As noted above, Hartford mailed what it avers is a partial claim denial letter on August
29, 2023. [ECF No. 11-4]. Koster filed suit on May 19, 2025 – over one year and eight months
after Hartford’s mailing of the August 29, 2023 Letter. Koster argues that the August 2023
Letter did not constitute a notice of disallowance or partial disallowance that would trigger
the limitations period. Resp. at 2. Koster claims that the August 2023 Letter did not state that
the claim was denied, did not notify Koster of any right to appeal, and did not contain
language indicating finality of closure of the claim. Id. Koster contends the one-year limitation
period did not begin to run until Hartford ultimately concluded its investigation into the flood
insurance claim on December 24, 2024. Id. at 3.2 Hartford replies that the August 2023 Letter
was clearly a partial denial of Koster’s claim and points to unambiguous language in the Letter
indicating that portions of the claim were being denied and that Koster had the right to appeal
or file a lawsuit. Reply at 2–3.
Thus, the issue is whether the August 29, 2023 Letter is a partial written denial. The
Middle District decision in 4922 Management LLC is instructive here. As that court explains,
at the outset, “[t]o determine whether a letter is a partial written denial, courts closely examine
the letter’s content.” 4922 Mgmt. LLC, 2025 WL 417701, at *1 (citation omitted). As noted
above, the August 29, 2023 Letter states, in relevant part:
. . . [T]he detached building was referenced in the adjusters photos as a
detached utility/laundry room and this building would require its own policy
and remains denied based on letter dated June 20, 2023.
2 Koster claims it received correspondence dated December 24, 2024, from Hartford stating
that “the investigation of your flood insurance claim . . . has concluded.” Resp. at 3. Notably,
Koster did not attach the December 2024 correspondence to nor reference it in the Complaint.
And the correspondence attached to the Response does not include a mailing date.
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 7 of 11

. . . . Because of your failure to cooperate in scheduling this reinspection, we
have denied your request for review of the contractors estimate and lack of
supporting documentation for damages to the risk. Therefore, your claim
remains payable based on the adjusters revised estimate in the amount of
$77,749.96, pursuant to SFIP excerpts[.]
[ECF No. 11-4 at 1]. These statements are unambiguous and clearly put Koster on notice that
at least part of its claim had been denied. Koster admits as much in its Response by noting
the letter includes “a reference to denial of some items.” Resp. at 3. And, importantly, the
Policyholder Rights attached to the August 29, 2023 Letter notified Koster of its right to
appeal to FEMA and to file suit in federal court “within one year of when your insurer first
denied all or part of your claim.” Id. at 5. Courts considering this issue consistently hold that
“a letter from an insurer sufficient to put an insured on notice that a part of [its] claim has
been disallowed is sufficient to trigger Section 4072’s one-year limitation period.” Sylve v. Am.
Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 2:23-CV-04068, 2024 WL 422063, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2024)
(citing McInnis v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 22-30022, 2022 WL 4594609, at *3 (5th Cir.
Sept. 30, 2022)); see also Palmer v. Selective Ins. Co., No. 24-1599, 2024 WL 5126265, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 16, 2024) (collecting cases). This Court agrees and finds that the August 2023 Letter
constitutes a partial disallowance under § 4072.
And, although the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on the issue of whether a partial
denial letter is a proper disallowance that triggers the one-year limitation period, district courts
in the Eleventh Circuit unanimously agree that it is. See, e.g., Raulerson v. American Strategic
Ins. Corp., No. 8:25-cv-00407-WFJ-AAS, 2025 WL 1133767, at * 3–4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 17,
2025); Mercer v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 2:24-CV-882-JES-NPM, 2025 WL
1018390, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2025); Price v. Wright Nat’l Flood Ins. Co., No. 2:24-CV-914-
SPC-KCD, 2025 WL 487627, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2025); Hawk v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 8 of 11

Midwest, No. 2:24-CV-823-JES-NPM, 2025 WL 326668, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2025); 4922
Mgmt., 2025 WL 417701, at *2. This Court agrees.
Koster’s arguments to the contrary, set forth in its Response, without citation to
relevant legal authority, are unavailing. Koster first contends that the statute of limitations
was not triggered by the August 2023 letter because the letter did not contain “a clear,
unequivocal written denial that both explains the denial and informs the insured of their
appeal rights.” Resp. at 3. In support of this contention, Koster does cite legal authority, the
Eastern District of Louisiana’s 2008 decision in Willis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
No. 07-4862, 2008 WL 793514 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2008). In Willis, the district court held that
a denial letter relied upon by the insurer was not issued in response to a proof of loss and
therefore did not trigger the limitations period. However, as Hartford points out in its Reply,
the Fifth Circuit has since held that “the plain language of § 4072 indicates a denial of a claim
begins the prescriptive period, not a denial of the proof of loss.” 4922 Mgmt. LLC, 2025 WL
417701, at *4 (citing McInnis, 2022 WL 4594609, at *3 (deeming a claim denied when a letter
stated that “content items that were not supported by photographs were not able to be
included in your claim,” referred to that as a “decision to deny coverage,” and informed
claimant of her right to administratively appeal any portion of the denied claim); see also
Lionheart Holding GRP v. Phila Contrib. Ship Ins. Co., 368 F. App’x 282, 283–85 (3d Cir. 2010)
(deeming a claim denied when a letter stated that claimant’s house was not covered and
informed claimant of its one-year deadline to sue).
In sum, this Court finds that the August 29, 2023 Letter was a partial denial that
triggered the one-year limitations period under § 4072.
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 9 of 11

2. 	Whether The Limitations Period Was Tolled.
Koster also contends that the statute of limitations was not triggered because Hartford
continued to investigate the claim, reinspected the Property, and made an additional payment
after the August 2023 Letter. Resp. at 4. However, courts routinely hold that denial letters
trigger the limitations period even when additional documentation is subsequently submitted
or the adjusting process continues. See 4922 Mgmt. LLC, 2025 WL 417701, at *2 (citing Cohen
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 924 F.3d 776, 781 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding a denial letter triggered the
limitations period when it denied coverage for various claimed items pending additional
documentation)); Lionheart Holding, 368 F. App’x at 284–85 (holding that a partial denial
letter triggered the statute of limitations even though the parties continued to engage in a
“lengthy . . . investigation and adjustment process” for claims related to the same flooding
event); Palmer, 2024 WL 5126265, at *5 (finding that a denial letter constituted a disallowance
under 	§ 	4072 	even 	though 	the 	plaintiffs 	continued 	to 	provide 	additional 	requested
documentation after receiving the letter); see also McInnis, 2022 WL 4594609, at *2–3 (rejecting
claimant’s argument that the subsequent rejection of a proof of loss extended the statutory
clock).
This Court agrees and finds that the fact that Hartford’s continued tasks related to
Koster’s claim after the August 29, 2023 partial denial Letter did not toll or extend the
limitations period under § 4072.
In light of the overwhelming legal authority cited above and in light of the
circumstances presented in Koster’s Complaint and in the documents central to its claim, this
Court concludes that the one-year limitation period was triggered by Hartford’s partial denial
of Koster’s claim in the August 29, 2023 Letter. Therefore, Koster’s Complaint, filed more
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 10 of 11

than twenty months after the date of mailing of Hartford’s notice of partial denial of Koster’s
claim, is time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 4072.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED as time-barred.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 13th
day of February, 2026.
__________________________________
MELISSA DAMIAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 0:25-cv-60993-MD Document 29 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/14/2026 Page 11 of 11