Huntington Bank v. M/Y Something About Meri et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
CASE NO. 25-61018-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
v.
M/Y SOMETHING ABOUT MERI, her engines,
machinery, tackle, apparel, boats, furniture,
equipment, rigging, freights, and all other
necessary appurtenances, etc., in rem, and
STANLEY R. KALISH, in personam,
Defendant(s).
___________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt Against Danielle
Morron. 	ECF No. 177. 	The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District
Judge, referred the Motion to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. See
ECF No. 179; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 	Having carefully reviewed the Motion, the
Response, the Reply, the entire case file, and applicable law, as well as argument from
the Parties at a January 8, 2026 hearing, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED IN PART
for the reasons outlined below.
BACKGROUND
This is a contentious matter involving the repossession of a boat due to its owner,
Stanley Kalish (hereinafter “Kalish”), being in arrears on his mortgage. The holder of that
mortgage, Huntington National Bank (hereinafter “the Bank”), brought a claim alleging
that Kalish is in breach of his loan agreement. Over the course of this case, pro se party
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Danielle Morron (hereinafter “Morron”) was allowed to intervene, but was repeatedly
warned that her conduct must conform to Court standards. 	The Bank now brings this
Motion contending that Morron has not stopped an ongoing harassment campaign that
has already been recognized and sanctioned by this Court. See ECF Nos. 138; 144. The
Bank argues that this Court’s prior sanctions have not adequately curtailed Morron’s
campaign and now requests enhanced sanctions.
Specifically, the Bank requests that this Court find Morron in civil contempt and: 1)
strike all pleadings and other filings submitted by Morron; 2) dismiss Morron from this
case with prejudice; 3) impose appropriate sanctions, including attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred in reading and responding to her misconduct; 4) enter an enhanced protective
order prohibiting Morron from communicating with the Bank or its attorneys in any
manner, except through properly filed court documents or with prior written approval from
this Court. 	See ECF No. 177 at *15. The Bank also requests that the Court waive any
conferral requirement under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)(A) as to any filings directed at Morron.
DISCUSSION
At the hearing on the Motion, the undersigned found on the record that Morron
had, indeed, continued to harass the Bank and its attorneys in violation of this Court’s
prior Order. Both the Bank and Morron herself have submitted evidence that Morron has
failed to follow the Court’s directives. See ECF Nos. 177; 194-1. Morron offered no real
justification for this failure. The undersigned now reiterates the findings from that hearing.
Specifically, the undersigned forbids Morron from communicating with the Bank and its
attorneys in any way, and waives the Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)(A) conferral requirement
between the Bank and Morron.
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The Court now turns to the Bank’s request that Morron be dismissed from the case
with prejudice. The undersigned agrees with the Bank that Morron should be dismissed
from the case, not as a matter of contempt, but as a matter of law.
When this Court allowed Morron to intervene in this case, it did so reluctantly and
upon the consent of the Parties. 	ECF Nos. 137; 142. 	Even at the time, it was unclear
that Morron could assert a valid interest, but the Court nonetheless allowed her to
intervene so that she could clarify what precise interest she has in the vessel. Id. at *3.
Since that time, Morron has failed to provide that clarification. At various times throughout
the litigation, Morron has both asserted and disclaimed ownership and a salvage lien on
the 	boat, 	interests 	which, 	as 	this 	Court 	explained 	in 	an 	earlier 	Report 	and
Recommendation, are fundamentally incompatible. ECF No. 137. When challenged as
to her standing in this matter, Morron appears to have disclaimed all interest in the boat
except a possessory interest, meaning that she was in possession of the boat at the time
of an allegedly unlawful arrest. 	ECF No. 194. 	Per this Court’s most recent Report and
Recommendation, ECF No. 223, the Bank committed no error in its repossession and
arrest of the vessel.
As the undersigned found in that Report and Recommendation, Morron has not at
any point put before the Court any evidence that would justify a claim to the vessel, and
the time to do so has passed. See ECF No. 223 at *5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Supplementary
Admiralty Rule C(6)). A Court may reconsider a previous order granting intervention. In
re Hornbeam Corp., No. 14-24887-MC-LOUIS, 2019 WL 1491727, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4,
2019); Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. Salazar, No. 5:09-CV-02502 EJD,
2012 WL 4717814, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 28, 2012). In doing so, the Court performs the
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same analysis it did when allowing intervention, taking into account whether an intervenor
still meets the requirements. 	This Court previously granted intervention under Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 24(a), which states that
the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest.
As acknowledged in the prior Report and Recommendation on intervention, the
Court was skeptical that Morron met the Rule 24 requirements. Nonetheless, the Court
allowed Morron the opportunity to intervene based largely on the Parties’ concession that
she should be allowed the opportunity to assert a valid interest. 	Given Morron’s
continuously changing interest claims, dismissals, and reassertions, the undersigned
finds that it would be nigh impossible for her to do so. The Bank has now requested that
she be dismissed from the case. The request should be granted and any pending filings
by Morron should be denied as moot.
The Bank also requests fees as a sanction for Morron’s actions. 	Although the
Court has the discretion to award such fees, the undersigned is mindful of Morron’s pro
se status and unfamiliarity with Court procedures. 	Likewise, it is unlikely that Morron
would 	have 	been 	allowed 	to 	intervene 	absent 	the 	Bank’s 	non-objection 	to 	said
intervention. Further, her dismissal from the case obviates the need for further sanctions.
See Schramek v. Jones, 161 F.R.D. 119, 122 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing the pro se
status of the sanctioned party, finding that imposition of financial sanctions would not be
the best deterrent of future untoward behavior). 	The Bank’s request for fees should be
denied.
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RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt Against Danielle Morron’s ECF No. 177, should be
GRANTED IN PART. 	It should be granted to the extent that Morron be prohibited from
communicating with the Bank or the Bank’s attorneys in any manner regarding this case,
except through properly filed court documents or with prior written approval from this
Court. 	The Court should also waive any Local Rule 7.1(a)(3)(A) conferral requirement
when it comes to any filings between the Bank and Morron. The Motion should otherwise
be DENIED.
Morron should be dismissed from this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24 for
failure to establish a viable claim to the vessel, and any pending filings by her should be
denied as moot.
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Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	contained 	in 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
DONE and SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 14th day of January
2026.
________________________________
PATRICK M. HUNT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas
All counsel of record
Danielle Morron
3401 SW Sawgrass Villas Dr., 11-C
Palm City, FL 34990
PRO SE
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