Feldman v. Biagioni et al

0:26-cv-62555Flsd13 ott 2026

Testo completo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-CV-62555-STRAUSS
GARRETT EVAN FELDMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
SKIP BIAGIONI and CORAL SPRINGS
POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
ORDER
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Motion”) [DE 3]. Because Plaintiff seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply here. Under that
statute, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
The Court will deny the Motion without prejudice and require Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint because the current complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that Plaintiff is bringing claims for violations of his constitutional
and civil rights. See [DE 1] at 2. However, it fails to include enough factual allegations to raise a
plausible inference that Defendants are liable.
Although Plaintiff’s Complaint does not make it clear, Plaintiff is presumably bringing an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—based on the allegations that Defendants, who appear to be a
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police officer and the Coral Springs Police Department, have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional and
civil rights. See [DE 1] at 1-3. “Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157 (11th
Cir. 2020) (“Section 1983 is ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,’ not ‘a
federalized amalgamation of pre-existing common-law claims.’” (internal citations omitted)). It
requires a plaintiff to “identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Jones v.
Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 811 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at
271). “To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the
defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived it of a right protected by the Constitution or
by a federal statute.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir.
2019); see also Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To state a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the United States Constitution or federal law and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law.” (citations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff appears to challenge “Defendants’ conduct during and following [his] traffic
stop, arrest, detention, transportation, booking, and processing, including the handling of [his]
vehicle and personal property and the collection and processing of identifying and biometric
information.” [DE 1] at 1. Yet Plaintiff does not include any supporting factual allegations to
describe the challenged conduct or explain what happened. Plaintiff also does not make clear what
federal rights he believes Defendants allegedly violated. Vaguely gesturing at an incident and
one’s federal rights as a whole is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. The
closest Plaintiff gets to alleging what right Defendants violated is by noting that he seeks damages
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for “[f]alse arrest / initial unlawful seizure.” See id. at 6. While “[a]n arrest without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment,” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 n.15 (11th Cir.
2010) (citing Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir.1997)), Plaintiff’s allegations
are not enough because it is unclear whether Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants lacked probable
cause. Even if Plaintiff did allege that Defendants lacked probable cause, the allegations are too
vague and conclusory to raise a plausible inference that Defendants are liable.
Lastly, a police department is not a proper legal entity and thus cannot be sued under
§ 1983; the proper defendant would instead be the city rather than its department. See Dean v.
Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Perez v. Aventura Police Dept., No. 25-CV-
23196, 2025 WL 2774428, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2025) (“[E]ven if Plaintiff brought a plausible
claim . . . , 	he 	cannot 	sue 	the 	Aventura 	Police 	Department 	under 	§ 1983.”), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2762481 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2025). To the extent that Plaintiff
meant to sue the named officer and the City of Coral Springs, “[a] municipality may be held
accountable in damages for the conduct of a particular governmental actor only when the plaintiff
shows that the execution of the municipality’s official ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ effectively was the
cause of the complained of injury.” McCants v. City of Mobile, 752 F. App’x 744, 748 (11th Cir.
2018) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978)).
Nevertheless, the Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended
complaint. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint alleging a § 1983 claim against
Defendants, he must include enough factual allegations to plausibly show that Defendants violated
specified federal rights. Alternatively, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint asserting
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other claims against Defendants (instead of a § 1983 claim), he must include allegations to show
that this Court has jurisdiction, in addition to alleging sufficient facts to support his claims.1
Any amended complaint must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 In
accordance with Rule 8, a complaint must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds
for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the
alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Rule 8(a) does not require
“detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions”; a “formulaic
recitation of the cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must
be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
1 While the Court has jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court would
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over state law claims (such as a false imprisonment claim
under state law) unless the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and Plaintiff and Defendants
are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In other words, if Plaintiff is domiciled in
Florida, and any Defendant is a citizen of Florida, this Court would not have diversity jurisdiction
under § 1332.
2 The Court recognizes that Plaintiff is pro se and that pro se pleadings are liberally construed and
held to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981
F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give
a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading
in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir.
2014). Moreover, pro se litigants are required to comply with procedural rules. See McNeil v.
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in
ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”); Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]lthough [courts]
are to give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants, ‘[courts] nevertheless have
required them to conform to procedural rules.’” (citing Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2002))).
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U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, under Rule 10, a plaintiff must state his claims “in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(b).
For the reasons discussed above, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1. 	The Motion [DE 3] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	By November 12, 2026, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint in accordance
with this Order (i.e., an amended complaint that rectifies the deficiencies with Plaintiff’s current
complaint, including, but not limited to, the deficiencies addressed above)—to the extent Plaintiff
can state a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. Failure to file an amended complaint in
accordance with this Order may result in dismissal of this action without further notice.
3. 	By November 12, 2026, Plaintiff shall pay the filing fee of $405 or file a renewed
motion to waive the filing fee. Any renewed motion must be prepared using Form AO 239, must
contain complete and accurate information, and must be signed under penalty of perjury. Failure
to pay the filing fee or file a renewed motion to waive the filing fee in accordance with this Order
may result in dismissal of this action without further notice.
4. 	Plaintiff provided an address of “[g]eneral delivery” in West Palm Beach. See
[DE 1] at 4. It is unclear to the Court whether Plaintiff can reliably obtain mail from the Court at
the provided address. Plaintiff is reminded that it is his obligation to provide the Clerk of Court
with an up-to-date address at which he can be reached so that he can keep himself apprised of
recent orders from the Court.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 13th day of October 2026.
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