USA v. Yener

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 24-cr-20523-BLOOM/Elfenbein
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARUN ABDUL-HAMID YENER,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (“Motion”), ECF
No. [62]. Defendant seeks to suppress “all statements made by him on March 1, 2024, and all
physical evidence obtained after federal agents seized two cellphones found in his storage unit
following a search on March 1, 2024.” Id. The Government filed a Response in Opposition
(“Response”), ECF No. [68], and Defendant filed a Reply in Support (“Reply”), ECF No. [72].
The Court also held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion on February 6, 2026, and February 9,
2026. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the supporting and opposing filings, the
record in this case, the applicable law, the testimony, other evidence admitted. 	the parties' oral
arguments and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2025, the Defendant was charged by Superseding Indictment with Attempted
Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (Count 1), Attempted
Use of Explosive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Count 2); Threatening to Assault and Murder
a Federal Law Enforcement Officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(l)(B) (Counts 3-5) and
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Possession of Obscene Visual Representations of the Sexual Abuse of Children, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1466A(b) (Count 6). ECF No. [46] at 4.
The Defendant now seeks to suppress all statements he made on March 1, 2024, and all
physical evidence obtained after federal agents seized two cellphones following a search of his
storage unit. ECF No. [62] at 1. The Defendant argues he was questioned in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, the search of his storage unit and seizure of his phones violated the Fourth
Amendment, and the search warrant for his phones lacked probable cause. The Government
responds that the Defendant was not in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings,
the Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his storage unit, the seizure of the Defendant’s
cell phones was constitutionally valid, and the search warrant established the requisite probable
cause. ECF No. [68].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to suppress must in every critical respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed,
and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented.” United
States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Smith, 546
F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977)). “In short, the motion must allege facts which, if proven, would provide
a basis for relief. A court need not act upon general or conclusory assertions founded on mere
suspicion or conjecture....” Id. (citing United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1983)).
While in certain well-defined situations the ultimate burden of persuasion may shift to the
government upon an initial showing of certain facts by the defendant, “[i]t is well established that
the burdens of production and persuasion generally rest upon the movant in a suppression hearing.”
United States v. Lincks, No. 09–60187–CR, 2009 WL 3256745, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2009)
(quoting United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977)). The evidentiary burden
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at a suppression hearing is a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 177 (1974).
Relevant to the case before this Court, when a Defendant alleges his statements were taken in
violation of his Miranda rights, he bears the burden of proving he was in custody when he made
those statements. United States v. Sigouin, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing
United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1977)).
Moreover, “[u]pon a motion to suppress evidence gathered through a warrantless search and
seizure, the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the search rests with the prosecution. The
Government must demonstrate that the challenged action falls within one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement, thereby rendering it reasonable within the meaning of the
[F]ourth [A]mendment.” United States v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing
United States v. Impson, 482 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.1973)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Defendant was not Entitled to Miranda Warnings
Defendant argues he was “in custody” at the time he was questioned when surrounded by
multiple officers, handcuffed, and prevented from leaving. ECF No. [62] at 5. Defendant further
argues that his custodial interrogation required Miranda warnings. Id. While in custody, Defendant
contends he invoked his right to silence, which did not deter officers from continuing their
questioning. Id. Defendant avers that because his request to remain silent was not scrupulously
honored, all statements made on March 1, 2026, must be suppressed. Id at 6.
The Government responds that the Defendant was not in custody, and therefore, not entitled to
Miranda warnings. ECF No. [68] at 4. Specifically, the Government contends the totality of the
circumstances surrounding law enforcement’s interactions with the Defendant did not rise to the
type of coercive environment requiring Miranda warnings. Id. The Government contends that the
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Defendant was only temporarily detained until Coral Springs detectives could arrive on scene. Id.
To that end, the Defendant was allowed to remain seated on a bench outside the diner and was not
subject to “brandishing of firearms or threats, physical force or pressure, or placed in a locked
squad car.” Id. The Government further points out that when the Coral Springs detective arrived
on scene, he immediately requested Defendant’s handcuffs be removed before the detective’s
inquiry. The Government argues the body-worn camera footage shows that the Defendant spoke
with the detective and other law enforcement officers in a calm manner and in a neutral setting
both outside the diner and after the Defendant agreed to go to his storage unit. Id. at 7-8.
The Court finds the Defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings. “Miranda warnings are
required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him ‘in
custody.’” Cordera v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 636 F. App'x 552, 555 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). To determine whether a suspect is “in custody,”
courts look at the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
99, 112 (1995). In consideration of those circumstances, the test is an objective one: “the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). The “ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with
a formal arrest.” Cordera, 636 F. App'x at 555 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)). Thus, the Court turns to address the facts surrounding the Defendant’s statements.
Admitted into evidence at the hearing was the e body-worn camera footage. The footage begins
with the Defendant in handcuffs and seated on a bench outside of a diner. He is surrounded by four
officers, and a fifth officer arrives on scene and walks over to the Defendant. ECF No. [88-3A] at
0:40-0:47. The fifth officer is informed by another detective that Detective Faiola, who is yet to
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arrive on scene, needs to speak to the Defendant. ECF No. [68-3] at 1. He is also informed that the
Defendant “doesn’t wanna talk.” Id. at 2. Approximately seven minutes later, after the arrival of
Detective Chad Whittington, Officer Dagostinis asks Detective Whittington, “is he free to leave
now?” Id. at 4. Detective Whittington replies, “[unintelligible] tell you in 30 seconds here
[unintelligible] phone and we’ll figure it out.” Id. This exchange occurs in front of the Defendant.
ECF No. [88-3A] at 8:22-8:27.
The Government contends that this encounter with the Defendant constitutes merely a
“temporary detainment” akin to a traffic or Terry stop. The Court disagrees. At this point, placed
in handcuffs and surrounded by multiple police officers, the Defendant was in custody. However,
the record reflects that while Defendant was in handcuffs, he was not interrogated.1 As such, the
Miranda warnings were not required.
About one minute later, Detective Faiola arrived and the situation evolved. He requests the
handcuffs be removed. ECF No. [68-3] at 5. From that point forward, the Defendant is no longer
in handcuffs. As the Government points out, Detective Faiola tells the Defendant:
Listen just so you know, you’re not in trouble, okay? You can’t get in trouble for
things like that you say or whatever, uhm, but you have people concerned, that’s
all. That’s why I took you out of the handcuffs, you’re not under arrest okay, uhm,
but I do want to speak to you about these writings, so just to kind of put your mind
at ease.
Id. at 6. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “informing an individual that he is ‘not under arrest’
and that the proposed conversation is voluntary is also ‘powerful evidence’ that he is not in
1 In Rhode Isalnd v. Innis, the Supreme Court held that “[w]e conclude that the Miranda safeguards come
into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. That is to say, the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. 446 U.S. 291 at 301 (1980). Here the Defendant was not subject to express questioning or its
functional equivalent while he was handcuffed.
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custody.” United States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Moreover, the Court finds that throughout the body-warn camera footage, the officers spoke
to the Defendant in a manner that was calm and non-confrontational.2 See United States v. Luna-
Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that in assessing the totality of the
circumstances for an ‘in custody’ analysis, the Court should consider whether the officers
brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance
with the officers could be compelled, including the location and length of the detention).
Furthermore, review of the body-warn camera footage shows that the officers never brandished
their weapons or touched the Defendant beyond initially patting him down. See United States v.
Maldonado, 562 F. App'x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding a postal inspector’s failure to
brandish a weapon as they approached the defendant weighed against custodial interrogation).
Finally, the locations of the questioning (the diner and outside the Defendant’s storage unit) were
familiar or at least neutral. See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Although the location of the interview is surely not dispositive in determining whether the
interviewee was in custody, ‘[c]ourts are much less likely to find the circumstances custodial when
the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral surroundings,’ such as the suspect's home.’”).
As such, the Court finds the Defendant was not in custody once Detective Faiola arrived and
released him from the handcuffs. Because the Court finds the Defendant was not entitled to
Miranda warnings, the Court need not address whether the Defendant invoked his right to silence.
2 As the Government points out, “law enforcement allowed [the Defendant] to smoke, inquired if he had
eaten breakfast before traveling to the storage unit, called his employer so that his tardiness would be
excused, and allowed him to move about without restraints as he and the officers traveled from the diner to
the storage unit and back.” ECF No. [68] at 8.
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B. The Defendant Voluntarily Consented to the Search of His Storage Unit
Defendant argues that 	any consent to search 	was manufactured 	and coerced by the
Government. ECF No. [62] at 10. Specifically, Defendant argues:
the fruits of the “private search” were put on display for [the Defendant], including
specific writings allegedly found in his storage unit, and specific drawings he
allegedly drew. The officers then proceeded to communicate to [the Defendant] that
they knew his criminal history, including by quoting directly from past police
reports. 	All 	the 	while, 	[the 	Defendant] 	was 	surrounded 	by 	at 	least 	four
officers/agents outside of a diner. And before any purported consent to search was
given, the officers threatened [the Defendant] with additional stops in the future if
he did not acquiesce to the search to “squash” the issue then and there.
Id. The Government responds that the Defendant voluntarily and knowingly consented to the
search of the storage unit, and the Defendant’s only concern was that his shift at work was about
to start. ECF No. [68] at 10. The Government points out that the Defendant provided written and
oral consent to search the unit. Id. The Court agrees with the Government.
“Whether consent. . .was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” United
States v. Robinson, 690 F.2d 869, 874 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Courts consider multiple factors when evaluating voluntariness, including:
(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status, (2) the presence of coercive police
procedure, (3) the extent and level of defendant's cooperation with police, (4) the defendant's
awareness of the right to refuse consent, and (5) the defendant's education and intelligence. Id. The
list of factors is non-exhaustive, but such factors are “indicia of coercion to be considered during
weighing of totality of circumstances in determining whether consent was voluntary.” United
States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, the Defendant signed a voluntary consent form to allow the officers to search the storage
unit. ECF No. [80-4]. The signing of the consent form is captured on body-warn camera footage.
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ECF No. [88-3B] at 16:10-18:21. While the Defendant argues the officers improperly coerced his
consent prior to signing the form by surrounding him, communicating his criminal history, and
threatening future stops, the body-warn camera footage tells a different story. As the Court
previously noted, once Detective Faiola removed the handcuffs from the Defendant, he was no
longer in custody. The Defendant’s primary concern with accompanying the officers to the storage
unit was his prior work commitments. ECF No. [68-3] at 73. The tone throughout the interaction
with officers was conversational, until after the search, when officers sought to take the
Defendant’s phones. At that point the Defendant became upset and stated:
this is not a threat, I’m being, making a deadass statement. Y’all take my shit,
there’s no, there’s no negotiating, there is no communicating, all, all that niceness
is out the door because now you’re taking away my livelihood.
Id. at 211. Moreover, the Defendant tells the officers “we’re no longer cool man.” Id. at 218. Such
statements give the Court insight into the Defendant’s state of mind throughout the prior
interactions. “Consent is about what the suspect knows and does, not what the police intend.
‘Coercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect.’” United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d
1207, 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296, 1990). Here, the
Defendant’s statements imply a willingness to cooperate and a cordial relationship with the
officers, which ended only after the officers indicated they would take his phones, but existed
during the consent to search the storage unit. Moreover, it is only after the officers take the phones
that the Defendant requests to be given his things so he can leave, evidencing an awareness that
he could have ceased cooperation at any time. ECF No. [68-3] at 225. The totality of the
circumstances support that the Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his storage unit.
C. The Seizure of the Defendant’s Phones Did Not Violate the Fourth Amendment
Defendant argues the seizure of his phones violates the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, he
contends that the criminality of the phones was not immediately apparent. ECF No. [62] at 12. In
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support, the Defendant points out that despite being questioned for hours on March 1, 2026, he
was not arrested. Id. Moreover, he was arrested over six months later for actions that post-dated
the seizure of the phones. Id. As such, the Defendant argues probable cause did not exist to believe
there was evidence of a crime on the phones. Id.
The Government responds that seizure of the phones was constitutionally valid. ECF No. [68]
at 12. Specifically, the Government argues the Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless seizures
of property when law enforcement can show 1) probable cause to believe that the property in
question contains contraband or evidence of a crime; and 2) an applicable warrant exception, such
as exigent circumstances, apply. Id. (citing United States v. Babcock, 924 F.3d 1180, 1186 (11th
Cir. 	2019). 	The 	Government 	contends 	that 	the 	Defendant’s 	statements 	concerning 	his
communications with foreign terrorist organizations (“FTOs”) and their efforts to recruit him,
coupled with writings and drawings found in the storage unit, informed law enforcement’s decision
to seize the phones and prevent the Defendant from wiping or otherwise removing the illicit
communications. Id. at 13.
During the search of the storage unit, law enforcement and the Defendant discussed his
contacts with FTOs. FBI Agent Sutherland then states, “Okay and they, are we all grouping them
from one group, multiple groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah—” ECF No. [68-3] at
168. The Defendant responds, “I’ve, I’ve had contact with at least three all together in my whole
life. . . Hezbollah, ISIS and Al Nusrah Front.” Id. Agent Sutherland seeks clarification, “So when
you say that you have people in your phone right now that you’re talking to, what, what are they
talking, who are they with?” Id. The Defendant replies, “Oh every fucking body. Everybody’s
working with everybody—Everybody’s doing shit together, the fuck. Cartels are talking to
terrorists, they’re both talking to each other trying to negotiate.” Id. Agent Sutherland seeks
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specifics, “But these people specifically talking to you, who do they identify as?” Id. The
Defendant answers, “They, they, they’re not gonna say who they are you just gotta wa-listen to
how they talk and how they move to understand who they are.” Id. The Defendant then explains
that he heard from one of these contacts as recently as January. Id. at 169. The Defendant
acknowledges he was in a “panel”3 with an individual claiming to associated with ISIS. The
Defendant suspected he was Al Nusrah Front. Id. at 173. Law enforcement also reviewed his
writings and drawings “regarding war and inflicting harm.” ECF Nos. [68] at 14, [68-2].
Given those facts, the Court turns to whether the officers had probable cause to seize the
phones. Probable cause to seize property is the belief that evidence will “probably be found in a
particular location.” United States v. Babcock, 924 F.3d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United
States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2012). Probable cause does not require
conclusive evidence and “is not a high bar.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 899 (11th Cir.
2022) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). Probable cause requires only a “substantial
chance” that evidence of criminal activity exists. Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1192 (citing Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983)). A “‘substantial chance’ exists ‘where the facts within the
collective knowledge of law enforcement officials’ suffice ‘to cause a person of reasonable caution
to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed’ and... evidence of that offense
will be found in a particular place.” Id. (quoting Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir.
2018)). Here, the officers had probable cause to believe the property contained evidence of a crime.
The Defendant discussed with the officers his contacts with various FTOs and indicated he had
contact with one as recently as January. Moreover, the officers had already viewed Defendant’s
writings and drawings from the storage unit that depicted images regarding war and inflicting
3 The Defendant confirmed after being asked by Agent Sutherland that a “panel” was like a group chat.
ECF No. [68-3] at 170.
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harm. ECF No. [68-3]. Agent Sutherland asked the Defendant about a line he wrote, “be prepared
brothers”. ECF No. [68-3] at 113. The Defendant responded, “Ah, that, uhm, this is when, this is
when they last hit me up and this is the t-this is what I was talking when I said they last hit me up
and I was supposed to contact them, but they vanished.” Id. The Defendant indicated he wrote that
after being contacted by someone from Al Nusrah Front just three months prior. Id. Law
enforcement officers also found a bat with writings such as “take their life”, “fight or die”, “kill”,
and “no mercy”. Id. at 111. The writings combined with the Defendant’s statements about his FTO
contacts formed the basis for probable cause and for the officers to believe the phone contained
evidence of a crime, such as messages related to the Defendant planning attacks against the United
States.
To satisfy the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the Court must also
determine whether independent probable cause has been established to believe that evidence will
be removed or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained. Babcock, 924 F.3d 1180 at 1194 (citing
United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 446 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit has explained
that, in drug cases and cases concerning electronic files, the exception of exigent circumstances is
particularly compelling because contraband, records, and electronic files can be easily and quickly
destroyed. See Babcock, 924 F.3d at 1194. However, a cell phone itself does not create an exigent
circumstance. Id. (citing Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2018)). Law
enforcement must have a reason to believe a suspect would delete the electronic files in question.
Here, the Defendant became combative after he was told his phones would be taken. ECF No. [68]
at 14. And it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that the Defendant had the ability and
incentive to destroy information contained on the phone after an FBI agent and other members of
law enforcement expressed concern about his writings and contacts. See Babcock, 924 F.3d at
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1194 (holding that it was reasonable for officers to conclude defendant would destroy information
after learning of the investigation of his relationship with a minor). Though the Defendant argues
the criminality on the phone was not immediately apparent under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement, that standard is not relevant, whereas here, the Government asserts that
exigent circumstances, not plain view, satisfied the exception. Defendant further argues that
because no arrest took place, that probable cause cannot exist. Defendant cites no case law to
support such a claim. As such, the Court finds exigent circumstances existed to seize the phones
without a warrant.
D. The Search Warrant For the Phones Contained Probable Cause
Finally, Defendant argues that the search warrant obtained after the two cell phones were
seized lacked probable cause. ECF No. [62] at 13. Specifically, the Defendant points out that the
Application for Warrant states that warrant was related to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1),
which makes it a federal crime to provide material support or resources to FTOs. Id. Defendant
contends that nowhere in the warrant application does the affiant swear out any facts related to the
Defendant providing support to an FTO, only that he communicated “with members sympathetic
to or affiliated” with FTOs. Id. at 14.
The Government responds that in support of its request to search the cell phones, the Affidavit
sets forth a summary of facts that supported the finding of probable cause including:
[S]tatements that [the defendant] made regarding his interactions with members of
FTOs and their efforts to recruit him into committing terroristic attacks within the
United States and overseas; his admission regarding his experience mixing
chemicals to create volatile, explosive reactions; how he would assist the FTO if
they asked him to mix chemicals due to his expertise in working with explosives;
the handwritten letters found within his storage unit that contained messages such
as “preparing for combat”, “a successful war”, “action is key to defeating our
enemies and their allies”, “day for battle is coming this Spring”, “be prepared
brothers”, and “self sacrifice”; how FTO members asked him about whether United
States had positioned warships in particular places that could strike adversarial
positions in Iraq and Yener’s confirmation that he provided such information; how
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the FTOs asked him to travel overseas to join their efforts and encouraged him to
commit acts within the United States; and Yener’s admission that he was waiting
for an opportunity to facilitate an attack within the United States
ECF No. [68] at 16-17.
Under the Fourth Amendment, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const.
Amend. IV. “Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the
circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence
at a particular location.” United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). “[T]he
[warrant] affidavit must contain sufficient information to conclude that a fair probability existed
that seizable evidence would be found in the place sought to be searched.” United States v. Martin,
297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Courts
reviewing the legitimacy of search warrants should not interpret supporting affidavits in a
hypertechnical manner; rather, a realistic and commonsense approach should be employed so as
to encourage recourse to the warrant process and to promote the high level of deference
traditionally given to magistrates in their probable cause determinations.” United States v. Miller,
24 F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 1994). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held, [r]easonable minds
frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and
we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by
according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate's determination.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
914 (1984) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
Turning to the Affidavit, the facts support the Magistrate Judge’s finding of probable cause.
Specifically, the Affidavit explains that the Defendant reported being in contact with multiple
FTOs, ECF No. [68-5] ¶ 7, he communicated with those FTOs utilizing multiple cell phones, Id.,
he reported these FTOs would seek to recruit him and offered him assistance to travel overseas,
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Id. ¶ 8, the FTOs encouraged him to carry out plots and attacks on their behalf in the United States,
Id. ¶ 9, he was waiting for his opportunity to act within the United States, Id. ¶ 10, the writings
within the storage unit referenced “vague plans for ‘brothers’ and ‘his people’ to come together
and ‘prepare’”, Id. ¶ 11, drawings found within the storage unit depicted various rifles, handguns,
and explosive devices, Id., interviewing agents found multiple drawings of explosive devices,
some of which contained technical details about how the device operates and its intended purpose,
Id. ¶ 12, and the Defendant told law enforcement that he “made his choice” and the next time he
was contacted by an FTO he “would help them with this or that.” Id. ¶ 13.
The facts are more than sufficient to support the Magistrate Judge’s finding of probable cause
that evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 	.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, ECF
No. [62], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on March 20, 2026.
______ __ _______________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
counsel of record
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