USA v. Yener

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 24-cr-20523-BLOOM/Elfenbein
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HARUN ABDUL-HAMID YENER,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Compel, ECF No. [109],
Motion In Limine RE Recorded Statements (“Motion in Limine”), ECF No. [113], and Motion for
Reconsideration RE: Curtain, ECF No. [122]. The Government filed Responses in Opposition,
ECF Nos. [112], [118], [124]. Defendant filed Replies in Support, ECF Nos. [117], [121], [125].
The Court has reviewed the Motion, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Compel, ECF No.
[109], is denied, Defendant’s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [113], is granted in part and denied in
part, and Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [124], is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 27, 2025, Defendant was charged by Superseding Indictment with Attempted
Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a) (Count 1), Attempted
Use of Explosive, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Count 2); Threatening to Assault and Murder
a Federal Law Enforcement Officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(l)(B) (Counts 3-5) and
Possession of Obscene Visual Representations of the Sexual Abuse of Children, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1466A(b) (Count 6). ECF No. [46] at 4.
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Early in the case, the Government represented that the case involved classified materials
and will involve filings pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. III,
(“CIPA”) and requested appointment of a Classified Information Security Officer (“CISO). ECF
NO. [19]. The Court thereafter granted the motion. ECF No. [26] (citing Classified Information
Procedures Act, Pub. L. 96-456 § 9, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980)). The Court issued further unopposed
protective orders. See ECF Nos. [32]; [52]; [57], and, on March 2, 2026, granted the Government’s
motion to allow a screen (or other measure) to be used to block the view of the Undercover
Employees (“UCEs”) and Confidential Human Source (“CHS”) from the public at trial. ECF No.
[93].
Defendant now seeks reconsideration of the Order permitting use of a screen at trial to
block the view of the UCEs and CHS from the gallery. Defendant also seeks, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the Government’s entire file regarding the CHS and the identities
of the UCEs and CHS used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in this case. ECF No.
[109]. Defendant further seeks to exclude certain evidence of recorded statements, pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404, and 803, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ECF
No. [113]. The Government opposes all requested relief.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Compel
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “is the primary rule governing pretrial
discovery in criminal cases, and it ‘spells out the materials the prosecution must produce on the
defendant's request.’” United States v. Russell, Case No. 22-20348-CR, 2022 WL 17736195, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2022) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003)).
In addition to the discovery obligations embodied by Rule 16, a criminal defendant's due process
rights obligate the prosecution to disclose information that is favorable to the defendant and that
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is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
Favorable evidence for Brady purposes includes both exculpatory and impeachment
evidence. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Jordan, 316 F.3d at 1253. But mere
“favorableness” to the defendant is not enough to qualify for Brady protections – the information
must also be material. Evidence “is material as long as there is a strong indication that it will ‘play
an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating
testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal.’” United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted). In Giglio, the Supreme Court extended Brady to disclosure
of impeachment material. United States v. Singleton, CASE NO. 22-14048-CR, 2023 WL
2164588, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2023); see Jordan, 316 F.3d at 1253. Under Giglio, “[w]hen the
‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of
evidence affecting credibility” justifies a new trial. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-54 (internal citation
omitted).
The difference between Brady material and Giglio material is that Brady information is
exculpatory, meaning it “relates to evidence which directly tends to lessen a defendant's guilt,”
while Giglio material is impeaching, meaning that it relates to “witness credibility type evidence
of a collateral nature...indirectly making it less likely that the defendant is guilty.” United States v.
Hopkins, Cr. No. S–05–0538 EJG, 2008 WL 4453583, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2008) (emphasis
omitted). The purpose of Giglio and its progeny is “to ensure that the jury knows the facts that
might motivate a witness in giving testimony[.]” Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1465 (11th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1467 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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B. Motion in Limine
A party can file a motion in limine to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence from future
proceedings. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). “In fairness to the parties and their
ability to put on their case, a court should exclude evidence in limine only when it is clearly
inadmissible on all potential grounds.” United States. v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345
(S.D. 	Fla. 	2010). 	The 	movant 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	proving 	that 	the 	evidence 	is
inadmissible. Id. “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred
until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice may be resolved in
proper context.” In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 6:06-md-1769, 6:07-cv-15733, 2009 WL
260989, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009). Likewise, “[i]n light of the preliminary or preemptive
nature of motions in limine, ‘any party may seek reconsideration at trial in light of the evidence
actually presented and shall make contemporaneous objections when evidence is elicited.’” Holder
v. 	Anderson, 	No. 	3:16-cv-1307, 	2018 	WL 	4956757, 	at 	*1 	(M.D. 	Fla. 	May 	30,
2018) (quoting Miller ex rel. Miller v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:01-cv-545FTM-29DNF, 2004 WL
4054843, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2004)); see In re Seroquel, 2009 WL 260989, at *1 (“The court
will entertain objections on individual proffers as they arise at trial, even though the proffer falls
within the scope of a denied motion in limine.”) (citing United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412,
416 (7th Cir. 1989)).
“In general, a district court may deny a motion in limine when it ‘lacks the necessary
specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded.’” Vaughn v. Carnival Corp., 571 F. Supp.
3d 1318, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2021) (quoting Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
CIV. A. 99-D-880-E, 2001 WL 617521, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2001)). “Motions in limine
should be limited to specific pieces of evidence and not serve as reinforcement regarding the
various rules governing trial.” Powers v. Target Corp., No. 19-cv-60922, 2020 WL 1986968, at
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*7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020) (quoting Holder v. Anderson, No. 3:16-cv-1307, 2018 WL 4956757,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2018)).
C. Motion for Reconsideration
“Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically authorize motions for
reconsideration, both the [United States] Supreme Court and [the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit] have permitted parties to file such motions in criminal cases.” Serrano v. United States,
411 F. App'x 253, 254-55 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); United States v. Nunez, No. 2:17-
CR-87-FtM-38MRM, 2020 WL 5569522, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2020). In ruling on a motion
for reconsideration in a criminal case, federal district courts apply civil standards and exercise
substantial discretion. See United States v. Sabooni, No. 09-20298-CR, 2014 WL 4385446, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2014) (citing United States v. Pugh, 426 F. App'x 876, 876 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60 govern motions for reconsideration.
Rule 59(e) allows a court to amend or alter its judgment for 28 days. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e). “The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly discovered
evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343
(11th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Likewise, Rule 60 allows a
court to relieve a party from an order for select reasons like “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Under this framework, courts
have interpreted three grounds for reconsidering an order: “(1) an intervening
change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to
correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc. v. City
of Lakeland, Fla., 189 F.R.D. 480, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1999). These grounds show that
motions for reconsideration cannot simply ask a court to reexamine an unfavorable
ruling. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int'l., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir.
2010). “The burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances
supporting reconsideration.” Mannings v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsboro Ctny., Fla., 149
F.R.D. 235, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Nunez, 2020 WL 5569522, at *1; see also Smith v. Ocwen Fin., 488 F. App'x 426, 428 (11th Cir.
2012) (“A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise arguments, or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment” (citing Arthur v. King,
500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007))).
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Indeed, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be “employed sparingly.”
Burger King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2002). As such, to
warrant reconsideration, the movant “must demonstrate why the court should reconsider its prior
decision and set forth facts and law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse
its prior decision. A motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not merely address issues
litigated previously.” Instituto de Prevision Militar v. Lehman Bros., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Compel
Defendant moves to compel the Government’s entire file regarding the CHS and the
identities of the UCEs and CHS used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in this case.
Defendant agrees to treat the information as sensitive and utilize the information consistent with
the Protective Order Regarding Classified Information, ECF No. [52]. Defendant argues that
whether to compel the disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity requires the Court to
balance the “public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to
prepare his defense.” Id. at 6 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 (1957)).
Defendant points out the Eleventh Circuit has set forth a three-factor test to guide this inquiry,
which includes “(1) the extent of the informant’s participation in the criminal activity; (2) the
directness of the relationship between the defendant’s asserted defense and the probable testimony
of the informant; (3) the government’s interest in non-disclosure.” Id. at 6 (quoting United States
v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490 (11th Cir. 1991)). Defendant contends each factor weighs in
favor of disclosure. First, Defendant argues the extent of undercover involvement in this case is
complete and total as the UCEs and CHS were not mere tipsters, but the only other active
participants. Second, Defendant intends to present the defense of entrapment and avers that the
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ability to interview, investigate, and call as witnesses the UCEs and CHS is critical to that defense.
Finally, Defendant argues the Government’s interest in non-disclosure is nonexistent, given the
protective orders already in place in this case.
The Government responds that this Court has already twice ruled the items Defendant seeks
are not discoverable, and the Motion should be denied. ECF No. [112] at 1. Specifically, the
Government points out this Court’s November 14, 2025 Protective Order states “[i]n light of the
Giglio information that will be produced to defense counsel prior to trial, disclosures of the true
names and identifying information, to include places of birth, dates of birth, addresses, social
security numbers, to defense counsel is not required.” ECF No. [57] at 3. The Government also
relies on the Court’s March 2, 2026, in which the Court granted the Government’s motion to allow
the UCEs and CHS to testify at trial using the undercover pseudonyms without publicly disclosing
their true identities. ECF No. [93].
The 	Government 	represents 	that 	in 	balancing 	the 	highly 	sensitive 	and 	classified
information at stake with its discovery obligations, it initially provided modulated, pixelated
versions of the recordings in which the identities of the UCEs and CHS were redacted. ECF No.
[112] at 5. On March 3, 2026, considering the Court’s prior order, ECF No. [93], the FBI
declassified an unmodulated and unpixellated version of the recordings in which the identities of
the UCEs and CHS remain redacted. Id. at 6. The Government asserts that declassifying the
unmodulated, unpixellated audio and video recordings does not mean the identities of the UCEs
and CHS, as well as the information within the CHS file, are no longer classified. Id. at 6-7.
Moreover, the Defendant should not have access to the highly sensitive and classified information
concerning the identities of the UCEs and CHS because “[a]ny disclosure of this highly classified
information risks serious damage to the national security of the United States, interference with
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crucial on-going national security investigations, and places the safety of the witnesses, including
their families, at risk.” Id. at 4.
The Government cites United States v. Chaoqun, No. 18 CR 611, 2022 WL 2543846, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2022), in which that court conducted the Roviaro analysis and found that the
government’s need to protect national security and maintain the confidentiality of information
outweighed the limited helpfulness of the information to the defense’s theory of the case. 2022
WL 2543846 at *5. In Chaoqun, defendant sought an order directing that the UCEs personal
identifying information be disclosed to defense counsel only. Id. at *1. There, defendant argued
the information was relevant to prove that he was coerced into participating in an intelligence
operation. Id. at *4. The court determined that defense counsel’s cross-examination of the UCE as
to what he said or did to coerce defendant was not only unimpeded by the government’s request
for a protective order, but also facilitated by the government’s video recordings, which would
contain the relevant information of what the UCE said, did, or asked during his meetings with
defendant and defendant's reaction to the same. Id.
Defendant is correct that in deciding whether to compel the disclosure of a confidential
informant’s identity, the Court must balance the “public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62. It is
also unrebutted that the extent of the UCEs and CHS’s involvement in the criminal activity in this
case is essentially complete, as “neither the fake militia nor the creation of the explosive device
involved any civilian involvement.” ECF No. [109] at 8.
However, the Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that he cannot present the
defense of entrapment without the Government’s entire file regarding the CHS and the identities
of the UCEs and CHS. “Entrapment is an affirmative defense that requires (1) government
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inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the
crime before the inducement.” United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016).
Defendant’s only argument for the relevance of the requested information is that “not every
meeting, and certainly not every interaction, was captured on audio/video equipment.” ECF No.
[109] at 9. Defendant does not explain why the requested information would aid a jury in assessing
either element. On the contrary, neither the identities of the UCEs and CHS nor the Government’s
file regarding the CHS, appears relevant to whether the Government induced the crime or whether
Defendant was ready and willing to engage in the charged crime absent any contact with the
Government's officers or agents. Moreover, the Government points out that disclosure of the
requested information risks serious damage to the national security of the United States and would
interfere in on-going national security investigations. As such, disclosure of the identities carries
risk. See Chaoqun, 2022 WL 2543846, at *3 (“The use of the undercover employee's personal
information as a basis for conducting a wider search would increase the likelihood of exposing,
however inadvertently, the identity of the undercover agent and his/her family.”). Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Government's need to protect national security and maintain the confidentiality
of this information outweighs the limited helpfulness of such information to Defendant’s theory
of the case. In the alternative, Defendant requests the opportunity to interview the UCEs and CHS
before 	trial. 	ECF 	No. 	[117] 	at 	7. 	Defendant 	cites 	to
United States v. Saa, 859 F.2d 1067, 1074 (2d Cir. 1988), and argues the Government may not
place a defendant at a tactical disadvantage by reserving to itself alone the ability to interview a
material witness. However, in Saa, the witness the defendant sought to interview was not one the
Government was calling at trial. 859 F.2d at 1074. Here, Defendant does not describe a single
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witness it seeks to interview that the Government is not calling as a witness at trial. As such,
Defendant’s request for pre-trial interviews is denied. The Motion to Compel is denied.
B. 	Motion in Limine
Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of recorded statements pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence 401, 402, 403, 404, and 803, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ECF No. [113] at 1.
Defendant argues some of the recorded conversations include subjects that are not relevant in this
case. Defendant further argues the conversations cover subjects that are highly divisive and use
inflammatory and offensive language. Defendant identifies categories of conversations he seeks
to exclude.
i. 	Political discussions: 	Defendant seeks to exclude all political discussions not
relevant to the alleged offense conduct, such as “opinions concerning the two
candidates in the 2024 presidential election, the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel
and its subsequent response thereto, the Russia/Ukraine conflict, and unrelated acts
of political violence in the United States.
ii. 	Contacts with FTOs: 	Defendant seeks to exclude discussions of Defendant’s
purported contacts with foreign terrorist organizations (“FTOs”) but acknowledges
that some statements concerning past contacts may be relevant, but argues many of
the statements are vague, rambling, and confusing.
iii. 	Prior arrests, acts, Baker Act: 	Defendant seeks to exclude statements regarding
prior arrests, uncharged acts of violence, and allegedly threatening statements he
made at his place of employment, which resulted in him being “Baker Acted”.
Specifically, Defendant seeks to exclude all references to letters he wrote while in
Oklahoma for unrelated charges. Defendant argues these letters are irrelevant,
unduly prejudicial, and violative of Rule 404(b), as they are evidence of another
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crime, wrong, or bad act with no purpose other to prove Defendant acted in
accordance with his bad character. Id. at 9-10. Similarly, Defendant seeks to
exclude a recorded call in which he tells the CHS about a prior incident in which
Defendant claims to have pointed a gun at a man in a dispute over a missing remote
control. Defendant contends this statement has no relevance to the instant charges.
Id. at 10. Defendant also seeks to exclude references to a July 2, 2023, incident at
Defendant’s workplace in which he allegedly made statements threatening to “put
this area back on the map just like Parkland.” Id. Ultimately, the police were called
in response, and Defendant was “Baker Acted”. Id. Defendant argues such
references are wholly unrelated to the alleged offenses and highly prejudicial. Id.
Defendant further seeks to exclude recorded statements concerning a baseball bat
covered in writings such as “die or fight,” “Don’t be scared to kill,” “kill or be
killed,” and “take their souls.” Id. at 11. Defendant contends such statements have
no relevance to the instant matter, and inclusion of such statements would permit
impermissible propensity evidence and serve to elicit an emotional reaction from
the jury. Id.
iv. 	Religious background: 	Defendant seeks to exclude discussions concerning
Defendant’s religious background. Id. at 12. Specifically, Defendant seeks to
exclude statements he made to officers that he was raised Sunni, no longer attends
mosque, and that his stepfather died in Tunisia fighting in the Arab Spring. Id.
Defendant contends references to his religious background are not probative as the
Government does not claim Defendant’s actions were religiously motivated, but
rather in support of a domestic “militia” whose aim was to “cause political turmoil”.
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Id. at 13.
v. 	Firearms: 	Defendant 	seeks 	to 	exclude 	statements 	concerning 	Defendant’s
possession of, views on, and knowledge regarding firearms. Id. at 14. Defendant
contends that statements concerning firearms have no relevance to the charged
crimes, but invites the inference that Defendant is “a bad man with criminal intent
and therefore must be guilty of the specific offenses charges in the superseding
indictment.” Id. at 16.
vi. 	N.Y. Attack: 	Defendant seeks to exclude discussions of targets and plans for
attacks following the alleged attempt to bomb the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
Defendant contends such statements constitute improper 404(b) evidence and must
be excluded. Id.
vii. 	Racist Remarks: Defendant seeks to exclude any recorded statements that racist,
anti-Semitic, homophobic, or derogatory in nature. Id. Defendant contends there is
no evidence that the alleged plot was motivated by racial animus, nor was it targeted
as any racial, religious, or ethnic group. Id. at 17. As such, Defendant argues such
statements have minimal probative value, but are highly inflammatory and will
result in extreme prejudice. Id.
The Government responds with the specific statements it intends to introduce and the basis
for the statement’s admissibility. See generally ECF No. [118]. The Court addresses those
statements in turn.
i. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 7
The Government seeks to introduce the following statement:
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Defendant contends this statement is an invocation of his right to remain silent under the Fifth
Amendment. ECF No. [113-1]. The Government argues Defendant’s answer “no comment” does
not amount to an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent as a suspect “must articulate
his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer under the
circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent.”
ECF No. [118] at 8 (quoting Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994)). The
Government argues this exchange is highly probative as it goes directly to Counts I and II, both of
which involve the attempted use of an explosive. Id. at 9.
Defendant replies that he recognizes this Court has already found he was not in custody at
the time he made the statements but maintains his objection to preserve the issue for further review.
ECF No. [121] at 5. Defendant does not address the Government’s argument that these statements
are highly probative. The Court agrees with the Government that Defendant’s “no comment”
statement was not a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. As this was
the sole basis Defendant sought exclusion, Defendant has not met his burden of proving that the
statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
ii. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 35-36
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government contends these statements are relevant because they show Defendant’s use and
familiarity with various online communication platforms. ECF No. [118] at 10. The Government
argues the statements are probative because this exchange occurred approximately three months
before Defendant met the CHS through Facebook messenger and quickly moved their conversation
to WhatsApp. Id. The Government contends this exchange shows the random encounter between
Defendant and the CHS was not out of the ordinary and Defendant welcomed communications
from strangers on Facebook before transitioning to other platforms. Id.
Defendant replies that the statements are not relevant to any matter at issue in the case, nor
do they tend to show that random encounters on Facebook messenger were a regular occurrence.
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ECF No. [121] at 6. Defendant further argues the statements are part of larger group of statements
regarding his family and religious background and the probative value is outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Id. at 6-7.
The Court notes that the statements do not contain references to Defendant’s family or his
religious background. And to the extent the Government seeks to introduce the statements to show
Defendant’s familiarity with the platform he uses to communicate with the CHS, the statements
are relevant. Accordingly, Defendant has not met his burden of proving the statements
inadmissible on all possible grounds.
iii. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 48
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
Defendant replies that he does not seek to exclude these statements. ECF No. [121] at 7.
iv. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 123-126
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues that evidence at trial will show Defendant willingly joined what
he believed to be an anti-government militia with the intent of serving as its bombmaker and
Defendant ultimately made critical decisions on how to successfully effectuate violent acts of
domestic terror. ECF No. [118] at 14. The Government further argues this exchange is relevant
and highly probative because it shows Defendant’s willingness to join an anti-government militia
even before meeting the UCEs. Id. at 15. The Government contends these statements are also
admissible in establishing Defendant’s predisposition toward the commission of Counts I and II.
Id. Defendant replies these statements are “purely propensity evidence”. ECF No. [121] at 8.
Defendant further contends the prejudicial value of the statements far exceeds their probative
value. Id. at 9.
While 	the 	Government 	may 	not 	ordinarily 	introduce 	evidence 	of 	a 	Defendant’s
predisposition to engage in criminal activity, “it may do so once a defendant submits evidence
which raises the possibility that he was induced to commit the crime[.]” United States v. Walther,
867 F.2d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989). Moreover, “[i]ntroduction of extrinsic offense evidence is
a reliable method for showing the criminal predisposition necessary to rebut any allegation of
entrapment.” United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United States
v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir. 1981). Here, statements which show the Defendant’s
predisposition to join an anti-government militia has probative value. This is particularly true to
the extent that Defendant seeks to present an entrapment defense. As such, Defendant has not met
his burden of proving that the statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
v. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 161-164
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues the statements are highly probative and relevant in proving Defendant’s
intent for Count I and II. ECF No. [118] at 17. The Government contends Defendant’s statements
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show he is cognizant that domestic law enforcement presence could prevent him from “doing
fucked up shit”, which explains Defendant’s “surreptitious behavior when he began constructing
the explosive he sought to detonate outside the New York Stock Exchange and his detailed advice
on how to prevent apprehension post-detonation.” Id. Moreover, the Government contends these
statements are admissible as evidence of his predisposition toward committing destructive acts
within the United States. Id.
Defendant describes these statements as “vague and rambling” and argues the statements
do not reveal intent. ECF No. [121] at 9. Defendant further argues “doing fucked up shit” can
encapsulate many acts and is not specific enough to attribute to an attempt to place an explosive
device at the New York Stock Exchange. Id. Defendant further argues these statements are not
admissible as evidence of his predisposition and cites Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 at
550 (1992), for the general proposition that evidence that merely indicates a generic inclination to
act within a broad range is of little probative value in establishing predisposition. In Jacobson, a
defendant ordered and received copies of a magazine which contained photographs of nude preteen
and teenage boys. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 543. Such conduct was not made illegal under Federal
law until later. Id. at 551. Thus, the Supreme Court held that “[e]vidence of predisposition to do
what once was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to do what is now illegal,
for there is a common understanding that most people obey the law even when they disapprove of
it.” Id.
Here, in contrast, Defendant’s statements contemplate his willingness to do “fucked up
shit” absent law enforcement presence. Such predisposition statements do not contemplate a
predisposition to commit legal conduct as was recognized in Jacobson. The Court finds the
statements may admissible given the context in which it is introduced, especially in the event
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Defendant puts forward an entrapment defense. The Court further finds Defendant has not met his
burden of demonstrating the statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds. The Government
has proffered that the statements will explain the Defendant’s behavior when he began constructing
the explosive he sought to detonate outside the New York Stock Exchange and his detailed
statements on how to prevent apprehension post-detonation.
vi. Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 164-165
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
The Government contends these statements are relevant and probative because they show
Defendant is motivated by the personal benefit of power. ECF No. [118] at 18. The Government
contends the trial will reveal that Defendant sought to use the militia to commit multiple bombings
throughout the United States and would continue to facilitate attacks in order to “reset” the
government. Id. The Government argues this desire for power is consistent with Defendant’s
behavior during the investigation in which he never sought wealth or materialistic rewards. Id. The
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Government further argues the statements are predisposition evidence as the statements show
Defendant was driven by his pursuit of power. Id. at 19. The Government explains that the
evidence at trial will show Defendant recorded a statement to send after the bombs detonated which
explained his desire for a reset of the Government and a call for public support. Id. The
Government argues these statements about Defendant’s desire for power are consistent with the
steps he would later take to become the voice of the anti-government movement. Id. Defendant
argues an interest in power does not necessarily equate to an interest in obtaining power by means
of placing an explosive device. ECF No. [121] at 9.
The Court agrees with the Government that these statements explain Defendant’s
motivation. At this stage, Defendant has the burden of proving that the statements are inadmissible
on all potential grounds. Considering the Government’s representations about what the evidence
at trial will show, Defendant has not met his burden.
vii. Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 174-178
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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Here, the Government repeats its arguments for admissibility in the context of Defendant’s desire
for power and control. ECF No. [118] at 21. The Government also again argues admissibility as to
Defendant’s predisposition. Id. Defendant also repeats his previous arguments about power to
argue exclusion. ECF No. [121] at 9-10. Accordingly, Defendant has not at this time met his burden
of proving that the statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
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viii. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-1] at 182-184
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues these statements show Defendant’s readiness to engage in conflict.
ECF No. [118] at 24. The Government argues the statements, when read in conjunction with
Defendant’s pursuit of power and control, show the Defendant was being patient for his chance to
achieve what he wanted. Id. The Government contends the statements contribute to the recurring
theme that power and control were Defendant’s motivation for becoming involved in the anti-
government militia and the statements are admissible as evidence of predisposition. Id. Defendant
reiterates his previous arguments that the statements are vague, rambling, and improper
predisposition evidence. ECF No. [121] at 9-10.
The Court finds that the statements are probative of the Defendant’s motivation and may be
admissible to rebut a proffered entrapment defense. Accordingly, Defendant has not met his burden
of proving that the statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
ix. Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-7] at 4
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
The Government argues at trial it will present evidence that Defendant threatened to assault and
kill the federal agents that interacted with him on March 1, 2024. ECF No. [118] at 25. The
Government correctly notes that to prove Count V, Threatening to Assault and Murder a Federal
Law Enforcement Officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(l)(B), it must prove that Defendant’s
threats were “true threats” in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals”
and not merely hyperbole.” Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003)).
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The Government represents that Defendant made multiple references to using a firearm to
murder the federal agents and Defendant’s statement about wanting a firearm shows his threats to
the agents were not made in jest or hyperbole. Id.
Defendant replies that his statement on September 30, 2024 in which he expresses interest
in purchasing a firearm is in no way related to his October 20, 2024 statement concerning his
purported desire to kill federal agents. ECF No. [121] at 10. Defendant points out that the
September 30, 2024 statement makes no reference to the killing of agents or what he would use
the firearm for. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has established that “the probative value of pre-threat conduct include
the following: the proximity in time between the threat and the prior conduct, the seriousness of
defendant's prior conduct, and the extent to which the pre-threat conduct has progressed towards
carrying out the threat.” United States v. Barbour, 70 F.3d 580, 587 (11th Cir. 1995). While the
proximity in time between Defendant’s threat and prior conduct is marginal, the Court recognizes
that Defendant not only never acquired a firearm, but his conduct never progressed toward carrying
out the threat to shoot the federal agents. Moreover, as Defendant points out, he never indicated in
his statement what he intended to use the firearm for. The Eleventh Circuit previously rejected as
admissible, evidence that a Defendant purchased over $4,000.00 worth of weapons 53 days prior
to placing a phone call threatening to kill his former boss. See United States v. Philibert, 947 F.2d
1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, the nexus between the statement wishing to obtain a firearm
and the threats to shoot the federal agents is even more marginal as there is no evidence Defendant
ever obtained a firearm. Absent a clear connection between the acquisition of a weapon and the
intent to carry out a specific threat, the Court cannot find that Defendant’s statement that he would
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at some point like to acquire a firearm probative of whether a later threat was a true threat. As
such, the statement is excluded.
x. 	Statement from Transcript, ECF No. [113-11] at 12-13
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
The Government argues these statements show Defendant’s intent to further the anti-government
militia by acknowledging that if President Donald Trump were to assume the presidency, President
Trump would have no hesitation ordering death against militias who opposed him. ECF No. [118]
at 27. The Government contends that Defendant’s readiness to engage in armed conflict in such a
scenario is highly probative of the context, motive, and set-up of the crimes alleged in Counts I
and II. Id. at 28. The Government further argues these statements are linked in time and
circumstances with the charges crime and form an integral and natural part of an account of the
crime. Id.
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Defendant replies that nothing in these speculative statements is relevant to any matters in
this trial and the risk of wasting the jury’s time with such minimally probative evidence is high.
ECF No. [121] at 11. Defendant further argues the “marginal probative value of such statements
is minimal, particularly given the volume of much more directly relevant evidence available to the
[G]overnment.” Id.
At this stage, Defendant has failed to meet his burden of proving that the statements are
inadmissible on all potential grounds. The Government has proffered that these statements will
contribute to the jury’s understanding of context, Defendant’s motive, and set-up of the alleged
crimes. To the extent that manifests at trial, the statements would be admissible.
xi. Statements from Transcript ECF No. [113-12] at 2
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
The Government argues these statements are relevant to show Defendant’s intent to target a
location outside of Florida to minimize detection. ECF No. [118] at 28. The Government contends
this statement is highly probative because Defendant indicates a place like New York would sow
confusion regarding who perpetrated the crime. Id. The Government further argues Defendant’s
selection of the city where the New York Stock Exchange is located is highly probative of the
context, motive, and set-up for the selection of a target outside of Florida to evade apprehension.
Id. Defendant does not address these statements and has not met his burden.
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xii. Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-13] at 19-20
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues these statements show Defendant’s awareness that following
through with violent attacks against the Government means there is no turning back. ECF No.
[118] at 30. The Government further argues Defendant’s statements show he is committed to
accomplishing his plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 31. The Government
contends the mere mention of “Allah” by UCE-2 in these statements is not prejudicial, but rather
a means of explaining to Defendant that he must be sure in his decision-making. Id.
Defendant 	argues 	these 	statements 	impermissibly 	inject 	religion 	and 	his 	cultural
background into the trial. ECF No. [121] at 12. Defendant further argues the statements are not
specifically tied to the alleged bomb plot and the probative value of the statements are greatly
diminished by the fact that this conversation is wholly duplicative and cumulative of nearly
identical statements the Government seeks to admit. Id. In support, Defendant cites numerous parts
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of the transcripts which reflect the same sentiments as the above statements but do not mention
religion. Id. at 11-15.
The Court agrees with Defendant that the probative value of the above statement is severely
diminished by its cumulative nature and risks unnecessary prejudice to the Defendant through
reference to religion. See United States v. Gbenedio, 95 F.4th 1319, 1335 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Under
Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of ... needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’”). As such, the statements are excluded.
xiii. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-14] at 3-8
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues these statements are relevant because they show Defendant
believes “the Feds” control the media and will refuse to attribute any anti-government conduct to
a specific militia or organization. ECF No. [118] at 33. The Government contends this is why
Defendant eagerly accepted the opportunity to craft a recorded statement that would be
disseminated and that Defendant was unwilling to let “the Feds” control the narrative and sought
to be the voice of the anti-government movement. Id.
Defendant argues that these statements contain no discussion of the need to prepare a
recorded statement claiming responsibility for the planned attack. ECF No. [121] at 16. Defendant
points out there exists multiple other conversations Defendant does not seek to exclude in which
Defendant and UCE 1 discuss the desirability of recording a statement for the media, and what
such a statement should include. Id. Thus, the probative value of Defendant’s statements about
“the Feds” controlling the media in the context of unrelated acts of political violence is minimal
and outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues and wasting the jury’s time. Id.
The Court finds the probative value of these statements outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and risks confusing the jury. Those statements are excluded.
xiv. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-14] at 8-20.
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
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The Government argues that like the previous section, these statements focus on what type
of response Defendant expects from the Government. ECF No. [118] at 39. Specifically, the
Government notes that Defendant recognizes a military response to a militia attack would result
in a civil war which would cause the Government to lose support. Id. The Government further
notes that Defendant expresses excitement at other individuals’ efforts to destroy ballots and push
back against the Government. Id. The Government contends this shows Defendant’s full support
for anti-government conduct, which serves as evidence in support of the intent and knowledge
requirement in Counts I and II and the malice requirement in Count II. Id.
Defendant replies these statements are not clearly related to the alleged offense conduct
but involve a general discussion of a possible civil war in the abstract. ECF No. [121] at 16.
Defendant contends the statements lack probative value, while raising the risk of prejudice. Id. at
17.
The Court cannot find at this time that Defendant has met his burden of proving that the
statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds. Though Defendant suggests these statements
raise the risk of unfair prejudice, the Government correctly points out that the statements are
probative of Defendant’s motive and displays Defendant’s support for anti-government conduct
which can be elicited as evidence in support of Defendant’s knowledge, intent, and malice.
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xv. Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-14] at 39-42
The Government seeks to introduce the following statements:
The Government argues Defendant’s statements show his desire to be a warrior in conflict. ECF
No. [118] at 41. The Government contends the evidence at trial will show the conflict in question
to be what Defendant deems an inevitable civil war set off by his bombing of the New York Stock
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Exchange. Id. The Government further argues the desire to inflict harm and willingness to engage
in battle consistent with anti-government agenda goes towards proving knowledge, intent, and
malice. Id. Moreover, the Government argues the statements are probative of the context, motive,
and set-up of the crimes set forth in Count I and II. Id.
Defendant replies the probative value of the statement is low as the Government intends to
play “tens of hours of other recordings in which Defendant expressly discusses the context, motive,
and set-up of his alleged actions.” ECF No. [121] at 17. Defendant contends the other statements
lack the dark religious overtones of these statements which make them unduly prejudicial. Id.
At this time, the Court cannot find Defendant has met his burden of proving that the
statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds. The Court agrees with the Government that
the statements are probative of context, motive, and set-up of the crimes set forth in Counts I and
II, considering the Government’s representation that the evidence at trial will show Defendant’s
desire to set off a civil war via the bombing of the New York Stock Exchange.
xvi. 	Statements Concerning Potential Future Targets
The Government seeks to introduce several of Defendant’s statements which discuss
potential future targets. Specifically, the Government seeks to introduce statements found in ECF
Nos. [113-15] at 19-29; [113-18] at 50, 53-54, 197-199, 201-202; [113-19] at 14-17, 28-32. The
Government argues discussion of future targets beyond the New York Stock Exchange established
the intent and knowledge requirements associated with Counts I and II, and the malice requirement
of Count II. ECF No. [118] at 45. The Government contends this is true because the planning of
future attacks is inherently predicated on the success of the bombing outside the New York Stock
Exchange and Defendant’s ability to evade apprehension. Id. The Government further contends
such statements are not extrinsic within the meaning of Rule 404(b), but arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense. Id. 45-46. The Government argues the
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statements and identification of other targets are intrinsic because their admission at trial is
necessary to complete the story of the crime. Id. at 46. The Government avers that such evidence
allows the jury to understand that Defendant’s perception was that the militia would conduct a
series of attacks, which is why he does not intend on releasing his recorded statement to the media
until after he knows the bombing of the Stock Exchange was a success. Id. The Government argues
that without such evidence the jury would be left trying to understand how the attempted bombing
of a single building would cause a reset of the Government. Id.
Defendant replies that the discussions of future targets do not constitute an integral part of
the account of the charged offenses. ECF No. [121] at 18. Defendant contends that the
Government’s narrative of how the alleged plan to bomb the New York Stock Exchange can be
told without any reference to future attacks. Id. Defendant argues references to future attacks are
not relevant, only serve to paint Defendant in a bad light, and risk confusing the jury as to the
matters at issue in the case. Id. at 19. Defendant further argues the statements constitute improper
Rule 404(b) evidence, for which the Government has not provided the requisite notice. ECF No.
[113] at 16.
The Court will first address whether the statements are extrinsic evidence subject to 404(b)
analysis. Evidence of criminal conduct falls outside the scope of Rule 404(b) and is independently
admissible if it is, “‘(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions as the charged offense[s], (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3)
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense[s].’” United States v.
Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1205
n. 9 (11th Cir. 2005)). Defendant’s statements squarely fall outside the scope of Rule 404(b). First,
the statements come within the same series of transactions as Defendant is actively discussing
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future targets in the build up to the bombing of the New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, as the
Government represents, the discussions of future attacks are informative as to Defendant’s larger
motivation in resetting the Government and aids in establishing the intent and knowledge
requirements associated with Counts I and II, as well as the malice requirement of Count II. As
such, the statements help complete the story for the jury as regards Defendant’s overall goals with
the militia which contributes to an understanding of his intent and motive. “Evidence, not part of
the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up
of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or
forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story
of the crime for the jury.” United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1985). As such, the Court cannot find
Defendant has met his burden of proving that the statements regarding future targets are
inadmissible on all potential grounds.
xvii. 	Statements from Transcript, ECF No. [113-15] at 47-49
The Government seeks to introduce the following statement:
The Government argues this statement reinforces Defendant’s commitment to engaging in conflict
and the inevitable civil war. ECF No. [118] at 47. The Government further contends this evidence
ties into the writings that law enforcement observed in his storage unit on March 1, 2024, as well
as his statements that he was waiting for the right opportunity to strike. Id.
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In his Reply, Defendant points out Defendant and the UCE discuss “Muslim militias” and
their tactics and appear to criticize some of the tactics utilized by such groups, including the use
of suicide attacks. ECF No. [121] at 17. Defendant argues the abstract discussion of such tactics
by other groups has no place in the trial and the Government’s attempt to introduce such statements
is an effort to improperly introduce Defendant’s religious and cultural background.
At the outset, the Court notes that the only mention of a “Muslim militia” in the
Government’s proposed excerpt is the Defendant explaining that he does not want to sacrifice
anyone in contrast to the actions of Muslim militias. ECF No. [113-15] at 48. The Court fails to
see how such a statement attempts to introduce the Defendant’s religious and cultural background.
Moreover, the statements are probative of the context, motive, and set-up of the crimes as the
discussion relates to the tactics Defendant would allegedly settle on in attempting to blow up the
New York Stock Exchange. As such, the Court cannot find Defendant has met his burden of
proving that the statements regarding future targets are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
xviii. 	Statements Concerning Defendant’s Contacts with FTOs
Defendant acknowledges that some of his statements concerning past contacts with people
he believed to be connected to FTOs may be relevant considering the threatening statements he
made to federal agents after they informed him they were seizing his phones. ECF No. [113] at 8.
Defendant only seeks to exclude statements concerning FTOs which are “unclear, confusing, and
repetitive.” Id. at 113.
The Government responds that Defendant’s threats against the federal agents centered on
references to “my people”, “dudes”, “he”, and “them”, and without context the jury will not be
able to understand the threatening nature of the remarks and why these communications amounted
to criminal threats. ECF No. [118] at 7. The Government argues Defendant’s statements
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concerning his contacts with FTOs provides context for many of the suspicious drawings and
writings that resulted in law enforcement meeting with Defendant on March 1, 2024. Id.
The Court agrees that Defendant’s statements concerning his contact with FTOs are
relevant considering the threats he made and animosity he displayed to the federal agents after they
informed Defendant they would seize his phone. At this time, the Court cannot find Defendant has
met his burden of proving that the statements are inadmissible on all potential grounds.
C. 	Motion for Reconsideration
Defendant asks the Court to reconsider its Protective Order, ECF No. [93], which permitted
the Government to use a screen (or other measure) to block the view of the UCEs and CHS from
the public at trial. Defendant argues that reconsideration is warranted because the declassification
of the video files is “new evidence”. ECF No. [122] ¶ 4. Defendant contends that because the
recordings have been declassified, the faces of the UCEs and CHS will be seen on the videos
played during trial, and there is no justification for the use of a screen. Id. ¶ 5. Therefore, it is
Defendant’s position that the use of the screen would be unduly prejudicial and the equivalent of
presenting the Defendant in shackles or prison garb, giving the impression that Defendant must be
separated from society. Id. ¶ 8. Defendant further argues the screen violates Defendant’s right to a
public trial and equates the use of the screen to a partial closure of the courtroom. Defendant relies
on Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984), for the proposition that “the party seeking to close
the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be
no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.”
Id. ¶ 10. Defendant contends that because the videos are now declassified, there is no governmental
interest in using a screen. Id.
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The Government responds that Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is not legally
justified as the identities of the UCEs and CHS remain classified and still must be protected from
public disclosure. ECF No. [124] at 3-4. Moreover, the Government points out that courts have
determined the use of a screen is an alternative to closure, rather than a closure subject to the
requirement of Waller. Id. at 4. (citing Blades v. United States, No. 15-CF-663, 2019 WL 291888
(D.C. Jan. 23, 2019)) (“By contrast, where proceedings are conducted in the open courtroom but
with some members of the public having an obstructed view, courts have generally concluded that
the process is an alternative to closure rather than a closure subject to the requirements of Waller”).
The Government asserts that it is not seeking to modify the Defendant’s appearance to imply he is
dangerous, needs shackles, or is currently incarcerated. Id. at 7.
Though Defendant argues the screen constitutes a closure of the courtroom subject to the
requirements of Waller, courts have consistently found a screen to function as an alternative to
closure. See Blades v. United States, No. 15-CF-663, 2019 WL 291888 (D.C. Jan. 23, 2019);
Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 103-10 (2d Cir. 2008); Pearson v. James, 105 F.3d 828, 830
(2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1217 (8th Cir. 1991). As such, the Court
does not find it necessary to subject the use of a screen to the requirements of Waller. Furthermore,
the Court does not find that the declassification of the videos is “new evidence” or has eliminated
the Government interest in protecting the safety of the UCEs and CHS, vital national security
information, and the ability of the United States to conduct other investigations implicating
national security. Defendant has failed to cite support for his contention that the use of the screen
is equivalent to placing Defendant in shackles or prison garb. The Defendant has failed to meet his
burden on reconsideration to show an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of
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new evidence, or the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. As such, Defendant’s Motion
for Reconsideration is denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Defendant’s Motion to Compel, ECF No. [109], is DENIED.
2. 	Defendant’s Motion In Limine, ECF No. [113], is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part.
3. 	Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. [122], is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on May 29, 2026.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
Case 1:24-cr-20523-BB Document 126 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/29/2026 Page 47 of 47