Johnson v. Webhelp Americas, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-cv-22043-ALTMAN
SASHA JOHNSON, individually, and
on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WEBHELP AMERICAS LLC,
Defendant.
_________________________/
ORDER
Our Plaintiff—Sasha Johnson—has brought this collective and class action under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (“NCWHA”) against our
Defendant—Webhelp Americas LLC. See Amended Complaint (“AC”) [ECF No. 15] ¶ 1. The
Amended Complaint alleges that the “Defendant required its Agents to begin work prior to their
scheduled shifts by performing compensable, off-the-clock work that was integral and indispensable
to their jobs, including booting up computers, logging into numerous software programs, and logging
into phones.” Id. ¶ 4. “The Agents only ‘clocked in’ and received compensation after this preliminary
work was completed,” even though, the Amended Complaint says, “they were required to perform
this work in order to be ‘phone ready’ when their scheduled shifts began.” Ibid. The Plaintiff has sued
on behalf of herself and “[a]ll current and former hourly call center agents who worked for [the]
Defendant at any time during the past three years.” Id. ¶ 11. The Plaintiff now “seek[s] conditional
certification of [her] FLSA claims[.]” Motion for Conditional Class Certification (the “Motion”) [ECF
No. 49] at 2. Having carefully examined the briefs and the record—and for the reasons we outline
below—we now DENY the Motion for Conditional Class Certification.
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B ACKGROUND
The Plaintiff “worked [remotely] for [the] Defendant as an Agent from approximately
November 2021 until May 2022.” AC ¶ 23; see also Declaration of Named Plaintiff Sasha Johnson (“Pl.
Decl.”) [ECF No. 49-1] ¶ 1 (“I am a Greensboro, North Carolina resident and worked remotely for
Webhelp America, LLC (‘Webhelp’) as an hourly call center agent (‘Agent’) from November 2021
until May 2022.”). According to the Plaintiff, the “Defendant used its attendance/schedule adherence
policies to pressure its Agents into arriving early and working off-the-clock so they could be ‘phone
ready’ at the start of their shifts.” AC ¶ 50. “Upon arriving to their home computer,” the Plaintiff
alleges, she and other Agents “were trained and required to follow a specific protocol to start up and
log into the company’s computer network and numerous software programs in order to access the
necessary information to perform their work.” Id. ¶ 51. “The pre-shift boot-up and login process[,]”
according to the Plaintiff, “took substantial time on a daily basis, ranging from twelve (12) to fifteen
(15) minutes per shift, or more, depending on how fast/slow the computers and programs were
operating.” Id. ¶ 53. But the Plaintiff says that the “Agents were not compensated for all of this work
because [the] Defendant prohibited Agents from clocking into its timekeeping software before the
start of their scheduled shifts.” Id. ¶ 61.
On May 29, 2024, the Plaintiff filed this case, asserting violations of the FLSA and NCWHA.
See generally First Complaint [ECF No. 1]. On June 11, 2024, the Plaintiff filed what we’ll call the
Stricken Amended Complaint [ECF No. 11]. Just a few hours later, however, the Clerk informed the
Plaintiff that her “filing is a violation of Section 3J(1) of CM/ECF Admin Procedures and LR 5.1(b)”
and that the Plaintiff “must File a Notice of Striking, then refile document pursuant to CM/ECF
Admin Procedures and Local Rules.” Clerk’s Paperless Notice to Filer [ECF No. 13]. So, that same
day, the Plaintiff struck her own Stricken Amended Complaint (hence the name), see Notice of Striking
[ECF No. 14], and filed her now-operative Amended Complaint, asserting both a collective action
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under § 216(b) of the FLSA, see AC ¶¶ 90–103, and a class action under Federal Rule 23(b), see id.
¶¶ 104–21.
Since the Amended Complaint was filed, four other individuals have joined the action as “opt-
in” plaintiffs (the “Opt-In Plaintiff(s)”). See Opt-In Notice of Mellissia Giles Hunt (“Hunt Notice”)
[ECF No. 43]; Opt-In Notice of Rhonda Mallory (“Mallory Notice”) [ECF No. 54]; Dylan Quinn
Opt-In Notice (“Quinn Notice”) [ECF No. 62]; Keondria Strong Opt-In Notice (“Strong Notice”)
[ECF No. 65]. Each Opt-In Plaintiff signed an identical Consent to Join (the “Consent to Join(s)”).
See Mellissia Giles Hunt Consent to Join (“Hunt Consent to Join”) [ECF No. 43-1]; Rhonda Mallory
Consent to Join (“Mallory Consent to Join”) [ECF No. 54-1]; Dylan Quin Consent to Join (“Quinn
Consent to Join”) [ECF No. 62-1]; Keondria Strong Consent to Join (“Strong Consent to Join”) [ECF
No. 65-1]. No Opt-In Plaintiff submitted either an affidavit or a declaration. See generally Docket.
On March 28, 2025, the Plaintiff1 moved for conditional class certification of the alleged class
under § 216(b) of the FLSA. See generally Mot. The Plaintiff “seek[s] conditional certification of [her]
FLSA claims on behalf of the following employee collective: All current and former hourly call center agents
who worked for Defendant at any time during the past three years (the ‘FLSA Collective’).” Id. at 2. The crux of
the Plaintiff’s allegations is that the “Defendant willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly suffering or
permitting [the] Plaintiffs to perform unpaid work before, during, and after their scheduled shifts, and
failing to pay these employees the federally mandated overtime compensation.” Ibid. The Defendant
opposes the Motion, see Resp. [ECF No. 55], and the Plaintiff has replied, see Reply [ECF No. 61].
1 When the Motion was filed, the Plaintiffs included Johnson and Opt-In Plaintiff Hunt. As
of this writing, though, the Plaintiffs include Johnson and the four Opt-In Plaintiffs. Because Johnson
originally sued as a singular named Plaintiff, we’ll refer to the person bringing this action as the Plaintiff
(singular).
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T HE L AW
“The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers accused of violating the FLSA.”
Morgan v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008). Section 216(b) provides that
“[a]n action . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and
on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The
key to an FLSA collective action is that participants “must affirmatively opt into the suit.” Morgan, 551
F.3d at 1258–59 (citing § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which
such action is brought.”)). “That is, once a plaintiff files a complaint against an employer, any other
similarly situated employees who want to join must affirmatively consent to be a party and file written
consent with the court.” Id. at 1259; see also LaChapelle v. Owens–Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288–89 (5th
Cir. 1975) (recognizing this “fundamental” difference between Rule 23 class actions and § 216(b)
collective actions).2 “Because similarly situated employees must affirmatively opt-in to the lawsuit, the
decision to certify the action, on its own, does not create a class of plaintiffs.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at
1259.
“While not requiring a rigid process for determining similarity,” the Eleventh Circuit has
“sanctioned a two-stage procedure for district courts to effectively manage FLSA collective actions in
the pretrial phase.” Id. at 1260. “The first step of whether a collective action should be certified is the
notice stage.” Ibid. (first citing Anderson v. Cagle’s Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2007); and then
citing Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001)). “Here, a district court
2 “In a Rule 23 class action,” by contrast, “each person who falls within the class definition is
considered to be a class member and is bound by the judgment, favorable or unfavorable, unless he
has opted out.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing FED . R.
C IV . P. 23(c)(3)).
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determines whether other similarly situated employees should be notified.” Ibid. “This first step is also
referred to as conditional certification since the decision may be reexamined once the case is ready for
trial.” Id. at 1261; see also Albritton v. Cagle’s, Inc., 508 F.3d 1012, 1014 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing Hipp’s
first stage as “conditionally certifying the collective action”).
At 	this 	first 	stage, 	“the 	district 	court 	should 	satisfy 	itself 	that 	there 	are 	other
employees . . . who desire to ‘opt-in’ and who are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job
requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d
1562, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1991). The “plaintiff has the burden of showing a ‘reasonable basis’ for his
claim that there are other similarly situated employees.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson,
488 F.3d at 952). The Eleventh Circuit has “described the standard for determining similarity, at this
initial stage, as ‘not particularly stringent,’ ‘fairly lenient,’ ‘flexible,’ ‘not heavy,’ and ‘less stringent than
that for joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under 42(b).” Id. at 1260–61 (first quoting Hipp,
252 F.3d at 1214; then quoting id. at 1218; then quoting id. at 1219; then quoting Grayson v. K Mart, 79
F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996); and then quoting id. at 1096). “The district court’s broad discretion
at the notice stage is thus constrained, to some extent, by the leniency of the standard for the exercise
of that discretion.” Id. at 1261.
“Second, after a plaintiff satisfies its initial burden to demonstrate the existence of similarly
situated employees, an employer may move for decertification.” Williams v. Imperial Hosp. Grp., Inc.,
2010 WL 3943590, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2010) (Cohn, J.) (citing Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261). “At this
point, the district court has a much thicker record than it had at the notice stage, and can therefore
make a more informed factual determination of similarity.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261. “This second
stage is less lenient, and the plaintiff bears a heavier burden.” Ibid.
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A NALYSIS
The Plaintiff is now at the first (or notice) stage of collective-action certification, “also referred
to as conditional certification[.]” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261. At this stage, as we’ve said, we must
determine whether the Plaintiff has “identif[ied] similarly situated employees who wish to opt into a
lawsuit before [we] may conditionally certify a class.” Vertilus v. Anglin’s Beach Cafe, LLC, 2019 WL
4753622, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2019) (Altman, J.). For the reasons we outline below, the Plaintiff
has failed to meet that burden.
“The key to starting the motors of a collective action is a showing that there is a similarly
situated group of employees.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1259. “The FLSA itself does not define how similar
the employees must be before the case may proceed as a collective action.” Ibid. And the Eleventh
Circuit has “not adopted a precise definition of the term.” Ibid. “In the absence of clear Circuit
guidance after Morgan, district courts in this Circuit have adopted various tests to analyze whether
employees are similarly situated.” Lioces v. AG-Pro, LLC, 2025 WL 2982063, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 22,
2025) (Sands, J.); see also Kristin M. Stastny, Eleventh Circuit Treatment of Certification of Collective Actions
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act: A Remedial Statute Without A Remedy?, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 1191,
1227 (2008) (“[D]istrict courts, left with little direction from the Eleventh Circuit, have failed to state
any uniform expression of factors relevant to the ‘similarly situated’ inquiry.”). Courts in our District
“have adopted a five-factor test to aid in determining whether plaintiffs are similarly situated[.]” Martin
v. HCA-IT&S Field Operations, Inc., 2023 WL 11916702, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2023) (Huck, J.). We’ll
follow suit and consider those same five factors (as we’ve done in other, prior cases): “(1) whether the
plaintiffs all held the same job title; (2) whether they worked in the same geographic location; (3)
whether the alleged violations occurred during the same time period; (4) whether the plaintiffs were
subjected to the same policies and practices, and whether these policies and practices were established
in the same manner and by the same decision-maker; and (5) the extent to which the actions which
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constitute the violations claimed by [the] plaintiffs are similar.” Vertilus, 2019 WL 4753622, at *2 (citing
Echevarria v. Las Vegas Beach, Inc., 2010 WL 2179747, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2010) (Huck, J.) (observing
that, “[w]hile the statute does not define ‘similarly situated,’ courts have filled this gap by identifying
the following [five] factors relevant to such a determination”)).3 “No single factor is dispositive,”
Barnes v. Aventura Finest Carwash, 2015 WL 11201213, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2015) (Moore, C.J.) (citing
Rojas v. Garda CL Se., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 677 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Rosenbaum, J.)), and “[t]he decision
to create an opt-in collective action remains ‘soundly within the discretion of the district court,’” ibid.
(quoting Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1216).
The Plaintiff insists that she “has met her ‘fairly lenient’ burden of providing a ‘reasonable
basis’ that she and other Agents are similarly situated [because the] Defendant uniformly failed to pay
them for all hours worked.” Mot. at 11. “The declaration and pleadings[,]” the Plaintiff argues,
“establish that [the] Defendant employed uniform and companywide pay practices for its hourly
Agents and illustrate that [the] Defendant violated the law by refusing to pay its hourly Agents for all
pre-, mid-, and post-shift work.” Ibid. In the Plaintiff’s view:
[Her] declaration [ ] illustrates that [the] Defendants’ Agents: (1) were all paid an hourly
rate; (2) regularly worked 40 hours in a workweek; (3) were trained to start up/log
into/open various computer and software programs, servers, and applications prior to
clocking in; (4) were trained to shut down these computer programs and applications
post-clocking out; and (5) were not paid for their time spent completing these tasks.
Ibid. (first citing Pl. Decl. ¶ 1; then citing Stricken Amended Complaint ¶¶ 31–34; then citing Pl. Decl.
¶¶ 5–7; then citing Stricken Amended Complaint ¶¶ 49–73; then citing Pl. Dec. ¶¶ 15–16, 19, 22; and
then citing Stricken Amended Complaint ¶¶ 49–73).
3 Courts in our District frequently apply these same factors. See Echevarria, 2010 WL 2179747,
at *2; Rojas v. Garda CL Se., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 677 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (Rosenbaum, J.); Smith v.
Tradesmen Int’l, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (King, J.); Stone v. First Union Corp.,
203 F.R.D. 532 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Gold, J.); Barnes, 2015 WL 11201213, at *2.
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In support of all this, the Plaintiff relies principally on the Stricken Amended Complaint—and
not her operative Amended Complaint.4 But “[a] pleading which has been stricken by the Court is to be
considered as if it had never been filed.” Swift Spinning, Inc. v. Mercados Internacionales, S.A., 2008 WL
11417687, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2008) (Gold, J.) (citing Williams v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 134 F.R.D.
302, 303 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (Snyder, Mag. J.)); see also 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 773 (2021) (“[A]fter a pleading
has been stricken, it ceases to be a part of the record and is to be considered as though it had never
been filed.”). So, while “at the initial stage the district court’s decision to certify a class is based
primarily on pleadings and affidavits[,]” Anderson, 488 F.3d at 953, we cannot consider the Stricken
Amended Complaint because it isn’t part of our record, see His House Recovery Residence, Inc. v. Cobb
Cnty., Ga., 2019 WL 11343462, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2019) (Jones, J.) (holding that the court
“cannot consider evidence (exhibits, affidavits, or declarations) not entered on the docket”), aff’d, 806
F. App’x 780 (11th Cir. 2020); Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Dependable Warehousing & Dist., Inc., 303 F. Supp.
3d 1329, 1333 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (Moreno, J.) (“However, that evidence is not a part of the record
and thus, the Court will not take it into account.” (citing Wilson v. Doss, 552 F. App’x 970, 971 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“In considering the motion for summary judgment, the relevant inquiry is whether the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, based on the record evidence and the inferences
therefrom.”))); United States v. Groover, 2021 WL 3205719, at *3 (11th Cir. July 29, 2021) (“Generally,
we do not consider evidence not in the record.”). We could deny the Motion on this basis alone
because the Plaintiff fails to cite any pleadings that would entitle her to relief. See Bule v. Garda CL Se.,
Inc., 2014 WL 3501546, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 2014) (Moreno, J.) (denying conditional collective
certification where “[t]he Complaint contains no factual basis by which to assess whether [the] Plaintiff
4 Recall that the Plaintiff struck her own Stricken Amended Complaint on June 11, 2024, see
Notice of Striking, because it constituted “a violation of Section 3J(1) of CM/ECF Admin Procedures
and LR 5.1(b),” Clerk’s Paperless Notice to Filer.
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and the other employees are similarly situated”). But here’s the thing: Even if the Plaintiff had cited
her operative Amended Complaint, we’d still deny the Motion on its merits.
In its Response, the Defendant argues that the “Plaintiff, who worked in North Carolina,
ask[s] this Court to conditionally certify a collective class of nearly 2237 Agents across 38
states . . . based solely on her own declaration in which she simply states that from ‘multiple
conversations with other Agents’ she ‘know(s) that
all of WebHelp’s Agents were subject to similar
pay practices and policies.’” Resp. at 10 (quoting Pl. Decl. ¶ 24) (emphasis in original). “Such a self-
serving declaration,” the Defendant continues, “which fails to identify the Agents and their locations,
is insufficient to warrant conditional certification.” Ibid. We agree with the Defendant.
Our “determination that the evidence shows a particular group of opt-in plaintiffs are similarly
situated is a finding of fact.” Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1260. And the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that
“[t]he plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for their claim of class-wide
discrimination.” Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097. “The plaintiff[ ] may meet this burden, which is not heavy,
by making substantial allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed allegations supported
by affidavits[.]” Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219; see also Blake v. Batmasian, 197 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1371 (S.D.
Fla. 2016) (Marra, J.) (“To meet this burden, a plaintiff may not rest on mere allegations but must,
through affidavit or other sworn testimony, establish that the putative ‘opt-in’ employees are ‘similarly
situated’ to him in their job descriptions and claims alleged.”); Alvarez v. Sun Commodities, Inc., 2012 WL
2344577, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2012) (Cohn, J.) (“[A] plaintiff cannot rely on speculative, vague, or
conclusory allegations,” but 	must support 	her case 	with 	“detailed allegations supported 	by
affidavits”).
The problem here is that our Plaintiff’s only evidence for the supposed similarity of the Opt-
in Plaintiffs’ claims is her own declaration, in which she attests that she “worked remotely for [the
Defendant] as an hourly call center agent . . . from November 2021 until May 2022.” Pl. Decl. ¶ 1. In
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that role, Johnson says, she was “trained and required to follow a specific protocol to start up and log
into the company’s computer network and numerous software programs in order to access the
necessary information to perform our work.” Id. ¶ 8. This “resulted in [her] working off-the-clock for
at least 12 to 15 minutes (or more) before each shift for which [she] was never compensated.” Id. ¶ 12.
Johnson’s statements all track the Amended Complaint (which the Motion doesn’t cite). But, for
conditional class certification, the Plaintiff must show that there were “similarly situated employees
who wish to opt into [the] lawsuit[.]” Vertilus, 2019 WL 4753622, at *2. And she hasn’t done that.
In describing this class of “similarly situated” employees, Johnson says only this in her
declaration:
I have had multiple conversations with other Agents about Webhelp’s compensation
policies, including those described above, and its failure to pay Agents for all work
performed. From those conversations, I know that
all of Webhelp’s Agents were
subject to similar pay practices and policies.
Pl. Decl. ¶ 24 (emphasis in original). This wholly conclusory assertion—which is based on
inadmissible hearsay, see FED . R. E VID . 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at trial or a hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted”)—is all the Plaintiff has adduced for the purported similarity of this class.5 We
5 “District courts may disregard statements that are not based on personal knowledge or are
inadequately supported.” Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Digit Dirt Worx, Inc., 793 F. App’x 896, 902 (11th Cir.
2019); see also Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Affidavits must be based
on personal knowledge and must set forth facts that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”). Here, the Plaintiff asks us to certify a nationwide class based on her speculation that “
all
of Webhelp’s Agents were subject to similar pay practices and policies.” Pl. Decl. ¶ 24. This we won’t
do. See Rodgers v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 2006 WL 752831, at *16–21 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2006) (Whittemore,
J.) (“A plaintiff’s or counsel’s belief in the existence of other employees who desire to opt in and
‘unsupported expectations that additional plaintiffs will subsequently come forward are insufficient to
justify’ certification of a collective action and notice to a potential class.”); Rascon v. Ford Midway Mall,
Inc., 2010 WL 11504357, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 27, 2010) (Graham, J.) (“Based on the affidavits, the
Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion[ ] regarding this issue in their Motion, without more, is insufficient to
justify certification of a collective action.”); Pickering v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 2012 WL 314691, at *11
(M.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 2012) (Watkins, C.J.) (denying conditional class certification because the plaintiff’s
declaration only showed his “belief that other sales representatives in his division also were ‘spending
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won’t allow a Plaintiff to satisfy its evidentiary burden by saying, essentially, “I’ve spoken to them
and, trust me, they’re all similarly situated to me.” And we find it noteworthy that none of the Opt-In
Plaintiffs has backed her up in that assertion. None of them filed affidavits or declarations—and none
allege either that they fall within the FLSA’s definition of collective actions or that they’re “similarly
situated” to Johnson. Instead, each Opt-In Plaintiff filed an identical “Notice of Consent,” saying
only the following:
1. 	Pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), I hereby consent to join
and act as a plaintiff in this lawsuit.
2. 	I worked for Defendant(s) as an hourly employee and I agree to be bound by any
adjudication or court rulings in this lawsuit, whether favorable or unfavorable. I
understand that reasonable costs expended by Plaintiffs’ counsel on my behalf will be
deducted from any settlement or judgment amount on a pro-rata basis among all other
plaintiffs. I understand that Plaintiffs’ counsel will petition the Court for an award of
attorneys’ fees from any settlement or judgment.
3. 	I hereby designate Sommers Schwartz, P.C. and Dorcey Law Firm, PLC law firms to
represent me in this lawsuit.
Hunt Consent to Join. That’s it. The Opt-In Plaintiffs thus tell us where they worked, whom they’ve
retained as counsel, and how the Opt-In Plaintiffs and counsel will be compensated if they prevail. But
they don’t tell us whether the Opt-In Plaintiffs are “similarly situated” to Johnson. And they do nothing
to satisfy the five-step inquiry courts in our District apply in these cases: They never say that they share
the same “job title” (“agent” versus something else) or “geographic location” with the Plaintiff, that
the “time period” of the “alleged violations” was the same, that they were subjected to the same
“policies and practices” as the Plaintiff, or that the “actions which constitute violations” were the
same. See Vertilus, 2019 WL 4753622, at *2. We thus cannot say that the Opt-In Plaintiffs are “similarly
a lot of time at night on e-mails,’ but that belief by itself carries no evidentiary weight,” and concluding
that the plaintiff’s “belief addressing the duties of the six or eight sales representatives in his division
would be of limited utility for justifying nationwide certification”); Boyd v. Alutiiq Global Sols., LLC,
2011 WL 3511085, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2011) (“[D]eclarations filed in support of a motion for
conditional certification must be based on personal knowledge.”).
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situated” to Johnson (or to each other). See Rife v. Fronton Holdings, LLC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1262
(S.D. Fla. 2016) (Lenard, J.) (“In fact, the opt-ins fail to describe any of their job requirements, so it is
impossible for the Court to determine whether they are similarly situated to [the] Plaintiff.”); see also
Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.)
(“[P]laintiffs must introduce more than their own statements that other potential class members
exist.”).
As we’ve explained in a similar case, “the Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that other individuals
may have been aggrieved by the Defendants’ conduct—and that these other individuals, whoever they
are, may one day wish to join this lawsuit—does not come close to meeting the standard for conditional
class certification.” Vertilus, 2019 WL 4753622, at *3. Indeed, courts in our Circuit frequently deny
collective-class certification in cases like ours—where the only evidence the plaintiff adduces comes
from conclusory assertions in her own declaration. See, e.g., Rodgers v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 2006 WL
752831, at *16-21 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2006) (Whittemore, J.) (denying conditional class certification
because the plaintiff—and two employees who signed consents to join—failed to identify other
employees who wanted to opt into the lawsuit); Blake, 197 F. Supp. at 1375 (denying conditional class
certification where the plaintiff “provide[d] only one declaration other than his own” and reasoning
that “the complete lack of information as to [the plaintiff’s] other proposed opt-in, Leisha Rosario,
utterly fails to satisfy even the lenient standard suggested in Hipp”); Rife, 219 F. Supp. 3d at 1262
(finding that the plaintiff “failed to satisfy his burden of showing a ‘reasonable basis’ for his claim that
there are other similarly situated employees” where “the opt-ins’ Declarations are vague and entirely
unhelpful with respect to job requirements” and “the opt-ins fail to describe any of their job
requirements,” making it “impossible for the Court to determine whether they are similarly situated
to [p]laintiff”); Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (M.D. Ala. 2004)
(Thompson, J.) (denying conditional class certification where the plaintiffs sought “approval of class
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notice without calling the court’s attention to any evidence of the ways in which their and the proposed
class members’ jobs are similar”); Spradlin v. Key Installation Servs., Inc., 2023 WL 11708679, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 4, 2023) (Howard, J.) (denying collective class certification where there were only “two opt-
in plaintiffs” and where, as to one of those opt-ins, the plaintiff “was unable to obtain his signed
declaration or provide accurate employment details”).
***
After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Class Certification [ECF No. 49] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on February 12, 2026.
______________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
Case 1:24-cv-22043-RKA Document 72 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2026 Page 13 of 13