Alvarez v. Goat Hospitality Group LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-cv-24135-ALTMAN/Sanchez
CAROL ALVAREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOAT HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
Our Plaintiff, Carol Alvarez, alleges that the Defendants—Goat Hospitality Group LLC
(“GHG”) and WGOAT15 LLC—discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her
pregnancy, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (“Title VII”), the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”), the Florida
Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), and the Miami-Dade Human Rights Ordinance (“MDHRO”). See
Amended Complaint [ECF No. 15] ¶¶ 68–216. In her Amended Complaint, Alvarez advances eleven
claims: (1) sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII (Count I); (2) retaliation, in violation of Title
VII (Count II); (3) hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII (Count III); (4) pregnancy
discrimination, in violation of the PWFA (Count IV); (5) retaliation, in violation of the PWFA (Count
V); (6) sex discrimination, in violation of the FCRA (Count VI); (7) retaliation, in violation of the
FCRA (Count VII); (8) hostile work environment, in violation of the FCRA (Count VIII); (9) sex
discrimination, in violation of the MDHRO (Count IX); (10) retaliation, in violation of the MDHRO
(Count X); and (11) hostile work environment, in violation of the MDHRO (Count XI). See ibid.
The Defendants have moved to dismiss Alvarez’s Amended Complaint on several grounds.
See generally Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) [ECF No. 16]. After careful review, we DENY the MTD.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 1 of 16

2
T HE FACTS
In September 2023, the Defendants hired Alvarez as a line cook. See Amended Complaint ¶
24. Approximately one month after she was hired, Alvarez learned that she was pregnant. See id. ¶ 26.
Alvarez “experienced significant physical impairments and limitations related to her pregnancy,
including but not limited to, persistent fatigue, frequent nausea, episodes of lightheadedness, difficulty
standing for prolonged periods, and an inability to perform heavy lifting,” which “substantially limited
her ability to perform major life activities such as standing, walking, and lifting.” Id. ¶ 29. Despite these
pregnancy-related impairments, Alvarez was “able to perform the essential functions of her job with
reasonable accommodations” and was, she tells us, considered “an exemplary employee.” Id. ¶ 30.
When Alvarez informed her superiors, Richard Fuentes and Maximilliano Carvallo, that she
was pregnant, they “accused [ ] Alvarez of lying during her hiring process, claiming that [ ] Alvarez
had concealed her pregnancy to obtain her position with [the] Defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 31–33. After this
exchange, “Carvallo drastically cut [ ] Alvarez’s scheduled work hours, which, in turn, substantially
reduced [ ] Alvarez’s pay.” Id. ¶ 35. Carvallo also “engaged in sexually harassing conduct towards [ ]
Alvarez, often asking [ ] Alvarez if she was in a relationship [and] making inappropriate comments”
towards her. Id. ¶ 36.
In November 2023, Alvarez reported Fuentes and Carvallo’s conduct to Eric Garcia, the
Defendants’ Human Resources Manager, who assured Alvarez that he would investigate her claims.
See id. ¶¶ 37–38. “Several weeks later, Fuentes and Carvallo stopped working for Defendants.” Id. ¶
39. Alvarez wasn’t sure if Fuentes’s and Carvallo’s “departures were related to her complaints but was
nonetheless relieved by the news.” Ibid. Shortly thereafter, Aberlardo Vargas assumed supervisory
duties over Alvarez. Id. ¶ 40. Alvarez alleges that Vargas “failed to reasonably accommodate [ ]
Alvarez’s pregnancy related medical conditions without justification,” including her requests for a meal
break, sufficient time for restroom breaks, and her request to be excused from tasks that involved
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 2 of 16

3
heavy lifting. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Vargas also apparently ridiculed Alvarez, commenting that she was “paid
to work, not paid to eat,” and telling her that “fifty-year-olds take their breaks faster than you.” Id. ¶¶
47–48. Vargas also insisted that Alvarez perform heavy-lifting tasks despite her pregnancy. See id. ¶¶
49–51. Alvarez repeatedly informed Garcia of her need for reasonable accommodations—but, instead
of discussing the issue with her, the “Defendants threatened to fire [ ] Alvarez if she could not keep
up with the same physical demands.” Id. ¶ 52.
On February 7, 2024, Alvarez told Vargas that she had to miss her shift because she had been
hospitalized as a result of some pregnancy-related pain. See id. ¶ 53. Subsequently, Alvarez informed
Vargas and Garcia that her “medical provider recommended she take medical leave from February 7,
2024, to February 12, 2024[.]” Id. ¶ 55. Despite this suggestion from Alvarez’s doctor, on February
10, 2024, Vargas “demanded to know whether [Alvarez] would [ ] be reporting to work.” Id. ¶ 56. “By
this point, [ ] Alvarez recognized that [the] Defendants’ unrelenting hostility and refusal to
accommodate her pregnancy rendered her work environment intolerable” and “concluded that she
had no choice but to resign, as remaining under these oppressive conditions threatened her own safety
and well-being, and that of her unborn child.” Id. ¶ 57.
T HE LAW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this
“plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ibid. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). The standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ibid. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). “[T]he standard ‘simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 3 of 16

4
reveal evidence’ of the required element.” Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309–10
(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a motion to dismiss, “the court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.” Dusek v.
JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016).
ANALYSIS
Alvarez asserts eleven claims under Title VII, the PWFA, the FCRA, and the MDHRO. See
generally Amended Complaint. In their Motion to Dismiss, the Defendants advance five arguments.
First, they contend that the Amended Complaint fails “to plead facts such as to require the Court to
consider the two separate Defendants, [GHG] and [WGOAT15], as ‘joint employers.’” MTD at 5.
Alvarez, the Defendants say, thus fails to meet the various statutes’ minimum-employee requirements.
See id. at 6. Second, they say that the Amended Complaint doesn’t state either a discrimination or a hostile
work environment claim because Alvarez hasn’t alleged that she suffered “any adverse employment
action” or “that she was treated differently than any other employee.” Id. at 7. Third, they argue that
Alvarez hasn’t stated a retaliation claim because she’s failed to demonstrate that she suffered any
adverse employment actions “as a result” of her complaint to the HR manager (Garcia). See id. at 10
(“[The] Plaintiff’s [complaint] to [the Defendants’] Human Resources professional, [Garcia], would
constitute protected activity. Following this complaint, [the] Plaintiff alleged no retaliation as a result
of that complaint. Initially, Plaintiff alleged the opposite, that the Human Resources professional
investigated and that the two persons complained about [ ] were no longer working with her.”); see also
id. at 11 (“[The] Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint merely includes claims for retaliation, without any
different allegations, separate from alleged discrimination.” (cleaned up)). Fourth, they claim that the
Amended Complaint is “impermissibly vague” and doesn’t “provide clear notice as to the nature of
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 4 of 16

5
her claims, [or] what facts apply to which alleged ‘employer’ or how [the] Plaintiff reaches statutory
minimums[.]” Id. at 11. Fifth, they insist that Alvarez hasn’t pled a viable constructive-discharge claim
because the Amended Complaint “does not plead facts regarding [Alvarez’s] working conditions, let
alone that conditions were intolerable or deliberate.” Id. at 14. We’ll address (and reject) each argument
in turn.
I. 	Numerosity & Joint Employers
Each of the statutes that governs Alvarez’s claims defines an “employer” as a person or entity
with a minimum number of employees. Title VII defines “employer” as an individual or firm that’s
“engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of
such a person[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg(2)(i) (defining “employer” under
the PWFA as “a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees”);
F LA. S TAT. § 760.02(7) (defining “employer” under the FCRA as “any person employing 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, and any agent of such a person”); Miami-Dade Cnty. Code § 11A-25(2) (defining
“employer” under the MDHRO as “any person who in the regular course of business has five (5) or
more employees in Miami-Dade County in each of four (4) or more calendar weeks in the current
calendar year and any agent, acting manager, contractor or subcontractor of such person”).
Alvarez tells us that the Defendants meet these numerosity requirements because the
“Defendants solely and/or jointly employed at least fifteen (15) employees or more for the applicable
statutory period.” Amended Complaint ¶ 10. The Defendants counter on two fronts. First, they say
that the “Plaintiff failed to plead any fact, including that either Defendant meets the standard under
any statute, to meet the minimum number of employees.” MTD at 6. But, as we’ve just said, Alvarez
expressly tells us that the Defendants employed at least fifteen people. See Amended Complaint ¶ 10.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 5 of 16

6
The Defendants may disagree with this factual assertion—it may even be wrong as a matter of fact—
but, at this stage of the case, we must assume that it’s true. See Dusek, 832 F.3d 1246 (“[We] must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to
plaintiff.”)
Second, the Defendants argue that Alvarez hasn’t pled sufficient facts for us to consider GHG
and WGOAT15 as “joint employers” for purposes of these statutory minimums. MTD at 5. But that’s
not true. The Eleventh Circuit has identified three circumstances in which we may aggregate two
ostensibly separate entities as a single “employer” under Title VII:
First, where two ostensibly separate entities are highly integrated with respect to
ownership and operations, we may count them together under Title VII. . . . Second,
where two entities contract with each other for the performance of some task, and one
company retains sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of
the other company’s employees, we may treat the entities as joint employers and
aggregate them. . . . Third, where an employer delegates sufficient control of some
traditional rights over employees to a third party, we may treat the third party as an
agent of the employer and aggregate the two when counting employees.
Peppers v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 835 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Alvarez easily meets this
standard by alleging that the Defendants were her joint employers because they “collectively exercised
shared authority and control over the terms and conditions of [ ] Alvarez’s employment, including
hiring, firing, and work assignments.” Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, 11. Alvarez adds that the
Defendants maintain “interrelated operations, centralized management, and economic dependence on
their combined businesses.” Id. ¶ 9. By way of example, Alvarez explains that Defendant WGOAT15
administered her payroll, while Defendant GHG’s “management was directly and actively involved in
the events surrounding Alvarez’s complaints of unlawful discrimination,” including by “issuing her
[Family Medical Leave Act] paperwork that identified her employer as ‘GOAT Hospitality Group.’”
Id. ¶ 8. That’s all more than enough at this early stage of the case.
In any event, as Alvarez correctly observes, “determining the existence of a joint employment
relationship requires fact intensive inquiries that need to be developed and are not readily amenable
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 6 of 16

7
to resolution on a motion to dismiss.” Response at 7–8 (citations omitted). Precisely because the joint-
employment inquiry is often fact-intensive, courts in our District have been reluctant to dismiss
employment claims (like Alvarez’s) that hinge on an allegation of joint employment. See, e.g., Downie v.
BF Weston, LLC, 2016 WL 7451427, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2016) (Marra, J.) (“[T]he determination
requested by Defendants; i.e., that Defendants are not joint employers, is ill-suited at this early stage.
Indeed, such a decision requires a factual inquiry that is best left until an adequate record is
developed.”); Diaz v. U.S. Century Bank, 2012 WL 3597510, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2012) (Moreno,
C.J.) (“[A]n exhaustive joint employment analysis would thus be premature at this stage where
Plaintiffs have submitted a plausible claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Century Bank’s motion to
dismiss.”). We thus DENY this portion of the Defendants’ MTD.
II. 	Discrimination
Next, the Defendants argue that Alvarez has failed to state a plausible discrimination claim. A
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of sex or pregnancy discrimination by establishing that she: “(1) is
a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) was replaced by a person outside [her] protected class or was treated less favorably than
a similarly-situated individual outside [her] protected class.” Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of
Fla. Dep’t of Educ. ex rel. Univ. of S. Fla., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (cleaned up)).1 A plaintiff “need not necessarily establish a
prima facie case [of discrimination] to survive a motion to dismiss, but she must nevertheless satisfy the
1 The parties agree (and we’ll therefore assume) that FCRA and MDHRO discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation claims are all analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims. See
MTD at 6 (“Both the FCRA and the MDHRO are reviewed under the same standard as Title VII.”
(cleaned up)); Response at 12 (“The FCRA and MDHRO claims, analyzed under the same Title VII
framework, are likewise sufficiently pleaded.”); see also Harkins v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 2025 WL
522674, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2025) (Moreno, J.) (“The Florida Civil Rights Act [and MDHRO]
[are] modeled after Title VII, and thus, claims brought under [them] are analyzed by federal courts
using the same framework[.]”).
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 7 of 16

8
pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twombly.” Melendez v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 2014 WL 6682535,
at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2014) (Altonaga, J.) (cleaned up).
In the Defendants’ view, Alvarez hasn’t pled a viable Title VII discrimination claim because
she hasn’t alleged that she suffered “any adverse employment action” or “that she was treated
differently than any other employee.” Id. at 7; see also ibid. (“Employers are free to reduce employees’
hours, even if a person is pregnant.”).2 Alvarez (obviously) disagrees. She says that the reduction in
her hours, the resulting loss of pay, the Defendants’ refusal to provide her with reasonable
accommodations, and her constructive discharge all qualify as adverse employment actions. See
Response at 10 (“[The] significant reduction in [Alvarez’s] hours and consequent loss of pay is a clear
adverse employment action. Furthermore, the pervasive denial of reasonable accommodations can,
itself, constitute an adverse employment action. Most significantly, [the] Defendants’ egregious
conduct culminated in [ ] Alvarez’s constructive discharge an adverse action of the highest order.”
(cleaned up)). At this early stage of the case, we agree with Alvarez.
To establish an adverse employment action, “an employee must show a serious and material
change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d
1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006). “The employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person
in the circumstances.” Ibid. Put another way, an adverse employment action is “a decision of the
employer [that] impacted the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s job in a real and
demonstrable way.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 920 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit has found that both a “reduction in an employee’s
hours, which reduces the employee’s take-home pay,” Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434
2 The Defendants concede that Alvarez is a member of a protected class, see MTD at 7 (“Plaintiff
alleged she was a member of a protected class”), and don’t dispute that she was qualified for her
position, see generally ibid.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 8 of 16

9
F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006), and a “constructive discharge,” Menzie v. Ann Taylor Retail, Inc., 549
F. App’x 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2013), can constitute adverse employment actions, see Monaghan v. Worldpay
US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Tangible employment actions consist of things that
affect continued employment or pay—things like terminations, demotions, suspensions without pay,
and pay raises or cuts—as well as other things that are similarly significant standing alone.”).
Having reviewed these cases, we agree that Alvarez has identified two allegedly adverse
employment actions in her Amended Complaint: the reduction in her hours (and pay) and her
constructive discharge. See Amended Complaint ¶ 35 (“Almost immediately after learning of her
pregnancy, Carvallo drastically cut [ ] Alvarez’s scheduled work hours, which in turn, substantially
reduced [ ] Alvarez’s pay); see also id. ¶¶ 57–58 (“Alvarez recognized that Defendants’ unrelenting
hostility and refusal to accommodate her pregnancy rendered her work environment intolerable[ ]
[and] concluded that she had no choice but to resign, as remaining under these oppressive conditions
threatened her own safety and well-being, and that of her unborn child. . . . Defendants constructively
terminated [ ] Alvarez.”). That’s enough for now.
We reject the Defendants’ second argument—that Alvarez has “failed to allege that other
employees also did not have their hours reduced,” MTD 7—because a plaintiff needn’t “identify each
similarly situated [ ] employee for a discrimination claim to pass muster at the motion to dismiss stage,”
nor must she “name a specific comparator to sufficiently plead a claim of discrimination,” Melendez,
2014 WL 6682535, at *4 (cleaned up). At this phase of the case, Alvarez need only allege that she was
“treated less favorably than [ ] similarly-situated individual[s] outside [her] protected class.” Maynard,
342 F.3d at 1289. And that’s what she’s done. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 75–76 (“[Defendants]
den[ied] [ ] Alvarez the same terms and conditions of employment afforded to other employees . . .
[and] [n]o similarly situated employees outside of [ ] Alvarez’s protected class endured the
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 9 of 16

10
discriminatory conduct that [ ] Alvarez was forced to endure.”). For all these reasons, we DENY the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I, IV, VI, and IX.
III. 	Hostile Work Environment
The Defendants also contend that Alvarez hasn’t pled sufficient facts to support her hostile
work environment claims. “[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). “To prove a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show (1) that
he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee has been subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment, such as sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature;
(3) that the harassment must have been based on the sex of the employee; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer liable.” Reeves
v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “Either severity
or pervasiveness is sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
According to the Defendants, Alvarez’s hostile work environment claims fail because she’s
only cited “a few sporadic comments directed towards her gender, not her pregnancy.” MTD at 9
(citing Ivey v. Crestwood Med. Ctr., 2024 WL 1269765, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 26, 2024)). But this argument
makes no sense. First, it’s axiomatic that a party may succeed on a hostile work environment claim “by
proving that . . . discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66. Second, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e defines “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on
the basis of sex’” to include “because of or on the basis of pregnancy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Alvarez,
therefore, may succeed on her hostile work environment claims by proving mistreatment based either
on her gender or her pregnancy.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 10 of 16

11
And Alvarez isn’t relying on “sporadic comments” alone. MTD at 9. She tells us that Carvallo
“often ask[ed] [ ] Alvarez if she was in a relationship” and repeatedly made inappropriate comments,
like “‘[m]assage that chicken like you massage your Cuban husband’ and ‘[y]ou put makeup on your
face so you should put it on your ass too.’” Amended Complaint ¶ 36. Alvarez also alleges that Vargas
ridiculed her because of her pregnancy, telling her that “‘[f]ifty-year-olds take their breaks faster than
you,’ and openly laughing whenever [ ] Alvarez pointed out that her slower pace stemmed from her
pregnancy-related limitations.” Id. ¶ 48. Finally, Alvarez identifies what she describes as “intolerable”
conditions that went well beyond mere commentary. See id. ¶ 46 (“Vargas went so far as to impose an
unreasonable requirement that [ ] Alvarez seek his explicit permission every single time she needed to
use the restroom[.]”); id. ¶ 49 (“Because of her pregnancy, [ ] Alvarez requested that she be excused
from lifting heavy objects. Instead of accommodating this reasonable request, Vargas flatly dismissed
her concerns, stating her pregnancy ‘meant nothing,’ and insisting she perform the same strenuous
lifting tasks as other employees without limitations.”).3
When we take all these allegations together—and drawing all reasonable inferences for
Alvarez—we think she’s done just enough to state a viable hostile work environment claim here. See
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (“[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’
can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”).
We therefore DENY the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts III, VIII, and XI.
3 For all these reasons, the Defendants’ reliance on Ivey is misplaced. In Ivey, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff
had only “presented a single incident of an inappropriate comment about her race.” Ivey, 2024 WL
1269765, at *1. As we’ve said, however, Alvarez has alleged much more than a single derogatory
comment.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 11 of 16

12
IV. 	Retaliation
“A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under Title VII [or the FCRA or the MDHRO] must
show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action;
and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Howard
v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d
1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008)). Alvarez has done enough to satisfy each of these elements for now.
a. 	Protected Activity
The Defendants concede that Alvarez engaged in statutorily protected activity when she
reported Fuentes’s, Carvallo’s, and Vargas’s discriminatory conduct to Garcia, the Defendants’ HR
Manager. See MTD at 10 (“Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [sic] to Human Resources professional,
[Garcia], would constitute protected activity.”). And we agree. See Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, Fla.,
267 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Statutorily protected expression includes internal complaints
of sexual harassment to superiors[.]”). Alvarez alleges that she lodged at least two complaints with
Garcia. See Amended Complaint ¶ 37 (“In or around November of 2023, [ ] Alvarez reported Fuentes
and Carvallo’s discriminatory conduct to Eric Garcia [ ], an individual male who was employed by
[the] Defendants as Human Resources Manager.”); id. ¶ 50 (“In or around January 2024, [ ] Alvarez
notified Garcia of Vargas’s conduct, specifically informing him that she was being compelled to lift
weighty items in direct conflict with her medical restrictions.” (cleaned up)).4 That’s plenty for now.
4 The Amended Complaint alleges that, “[i]n or around January 2023, [ ] Alvarez notified Garcia of
Vargas’s conduct[.]” Ibid. (emphasis added). But, because this date predates her September 2023 hiring,
see id. ¶ 26, we’ll assume that Alvarez meant to allege that she registered her complaint with Garcia in
January 2024.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 12 of 16

13
b. 	Adverse Action
We’ve already found that Alvarez has properly identified two adverse employment actions in
her complaint. See supra § II (finding that Alvarez’s reduction in hours and constructive discharge may
constitute adverse employment actions).
c. 	Causal Connection
And Alvarez has pled “a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action.” Howard, 605 F.3d at 1244. The Defendants, of course, disagree. See MTD at 10 (“Following
[the November 2023 complaint to Garcia], [the] Plaintiff alleged no retaliation as a result of that
complaint. Initially, [the] Plaintiff alleged the opposite, that the Human Resources professional
investigated and that the two persons complained about, RF and MC, were no longer working with
her.”); see also ibid (“[The] Plaintiff alleges that she complained of her third alleged supervisor, AV.
Again, Plaintiff alleged that EG investigated her complaints. Following this complaint, Plaintiff alleged
no change, but instead ‘continuing’ conduct of any unchanging nature.” (cleaned up)).
“At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not prove causation but must plead sufficient
facts to make it plausible.” Vega v. City of Sweetwater, 2025 WL 2306197, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2025)
(Altonaga, C.J.) (citations omitted). To establish a causal link between protected activity and an adverse
employment action, “a plaintiff merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative
employment action are not completely unrelated.” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1278 (cleaned up). “The
burden of causation can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th
Cir. 2007). Here, Alvarez has stated a plausible claim of retaliation under Title VII, the PWFA, the
FCRA, and the MDHRO based on the temporal proximity between her January 2024 report to Garcia
and her February 2024 constructive discharge.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 13 of 16

14
Alvarez alleges that, in January 2024, “she notified Garcia of Vargas’s conduct, specifically
informing him that she was being compelled to lift weighty items in direct conflict with her medical
restrictions.” Amended Complaint ¶ 50. Despite her condition, “Garcia agreed with Vargas and
informed [ ] Alvarez that she could, in fact, lift heavy objects because she was only seven [ ] months
pregnant.” Id. ¶ 51. According to Alvarez, this (alleged) refusal to accommodate her request for a
reasonable accommodation—coupled with Vargas’s disregard for Alvarez’s need for medical leave, see
id. ¶ 56 (“On or around February 10, 2024, while [ ] Alvarez remained on authorized medical leave,
Vargas demanded to know whether she would still be reporting to work, disregarding her doctor’s
specific instructions to rest and recover.”)—caused her constructive discharge in February 2024, just
one month after her final report to Garcia. This close temporal proximity between Alvarez’s protected
activity and the adverse employment action is enough for us to DENY the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Counts II, V, VII, and X.
V. 	Vagueness
The Defendants maintain that Alvarez’s complaint is so “vague” that it doesn’t “provide clear
notice as to the nature of her claims[.]” MTD at 11. So, they ask us to order her “to file a more definite
statement.” Id. at 14. This argument borders on frivolity. “A motion for a more definite statement
may only be granted [ ] if a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be
required to frame a responsive pleading.” Hernandez v. Two Bros. Farm, LLC, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1379,
1381–82 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (Martinez, J.) (citing Betancourt v. Marine Cargo Mgmt., 930 F. Supp. 606, 608
(S.D. Fla.1996) (King, J.)). A motion for a more definite statement is appropriate only when a
complaint is drafted in such a way that it’s “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are
intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Anderson v. District Bd. of Trs., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th
Cir. 1996).
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 14 of 16

15
Alvarez’s Amended Complaint is not so vague as to prevent the Defendants from
understanding which claims it’s asserting—or which facts support those claims. As we’ve explained,
the Amended Complaint sufficiently provides a factual basis for each of Alvarez’s claims. And the
Defendants understood the Amended Complaint well enough to file an intelligent and targeted motion
to dismiss, which correctly identified Alvarez’s claims and the grounds on which they rest. We thus
DENY the Defendants’ request for a more definite statement.
VI. 	Constructive Discharge
Finally, the Defendants contend that Alvarez has failed to state a constructive-discharge claim
because she “does not plead facts regarding her working conditions, let alone that [the] conditions
were intolerable or deliberate,” and because she has “failed to allege any treatment specific to her
which was deliberate, let alone so intolerable that any employee would be compelled to resign.” MTD
at 14. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Alvarez doesn’t assert an independent
constructive-termination claim. Instead, she identifies her constructive termination as one of the
adverse employment actions that undergirds her other claims. See generally Amended Complaint. Second,
Alvarez has sufficiently alleged that she was constructively discharged from her position. A
“[c]onstructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working
conditions intolerable and thereby forces [her] to quit [her] job.” Piccirillo v. City of Pembroke Pines, 2016
WL 1028333, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2016) (Bloom, J.) (citing Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1298
(11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1536 (2010)). To qualify as constructive discharge, an employee’s
working conditions must be objectively “unbearable,” such that “a reasonable person in that person’s
position would be compelled to resign.” Ibid.
Alvarez’s Amended Complaint meets this standard because she alleges that the Defendants’
“unrelenting 	hostility” 	(as 	described 	throughout 	her 	Amended 	Complaint) 	and 	“refusal 	to
accommodate her pregnancy” rendered the prospect of her continued employment intolerable.
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 15 of 16

16
Amended Complaint ¶ 57. Specifically, Alvarez believed that the Defendants’ insistence that she lift
heavy objects threatened both her own health and the well-being of her unborn child. Ibid. These
allegations, which we must assume to be true, are enough for us to conclude that Alvarez may have
been constructively discharged. We therefore DENY this final part of the Defendants’ MTD.
CONCLUSION
After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 16] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on January 21, 2026.
_________________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: 	counsel of record
Case 1:24-cv-24135-RKA Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/21/2026 Page 16 of 16