Grossman v. B&J Services of Miami, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-20455-MOORE/Elfenbein
LORIN GROSSMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
B&J SERVICES OF MIAMI, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Lorin Grossman’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for
Entry of Final Default Judgment (the “Motion”). See ECF No. [24]. The Honorable K. Michael
Moore referred the Motion to me “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law and/or
to issue a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment.” See
ECF No. [25]. For the reasons explained below, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion,
ECF No. [24], be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
This lawsuit arises out of Defendants’ discriminatory actions against Plaintiff based on her
disability. See generally ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff, who uses a wheelchair and has no use of her legs,
alleges she sought to view and rent a dwelling located at 315 NW 59th Street, Miami, Florida (the
1 The Court takes the facts in this section from the allegations in the Complaint, which by their default
Defendants have admitted. See, e.g., Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298,
1307 (11th Cir. 2009); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(“A defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact as set forth in the
operative complaint.” (quotation marks omitted)).
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“Property”). 	See id. at ¶¶9, 16, 18-19. 	She alleges Defendant B&J Services of Miami, LLC
(“B&J”) owned the Property and “controlled the conditions of showing and leasing of the
Property” and used Defendant Carla Rodas (“Rodas”) as its agent for leasing. See id. at ¶10. In
January 2024, Defendants advertised the Property for lease on Facebook Marketplace and Plaintiff
contacted Defendants regarding the Facebook Marketplace posting on January 19, 2024 expressing
interest in renting the Property. See id. at ¶¶18-19. The Parties arranged for Plaintiff to tour the
Property on January 20, 2024. See id. at ¶18. Plaintiff alleges that later in the day on January 19,
she informed Rodas that she was disabled and used a wheelchair, and Rodas responded that the
pathway to the Property was not suitable for wheelchairs. See id. at ¶19. Plaintiff explained the
pathway would not be an issue for her. See id. Plaintiff alleges it was “[a]t that time” that Rodas
cancelled the January 20, 2024 showing, stating that the current residents would be moving out
that day and rescheduled it to January 22, 2024.2 See id.
On January 22, 2024, Rodas texted Plaintiff that the Property had been rented to someone
else and cancelled the showing, adding by text: “As I explained to you, the entrance to the
apartment is made of stone and is not suitable for wheelchairs.” See id. at ¶20. Plaintiff alleges
Defendants’ statement that the Property could not be toured on January 20 was false and that tours
were provided to able-bodied prospective tenants that day. 	See id. at ¶¶20-22. 	Plaintiff further
alleges a lease was entered into with a third party on January 20, 2024, and that Defendants’ actions
intentionally deprived her of an equal housing opportunity because of her disability, causing
emotional distress and other damages, and were willful and in reckless disregard of her rights. See
id. at ¶¶22-26.
2 Although the Complaint and Motion contain minor inconsistencies in certain dates, the Court should
construe those discrepancies as scrivener’s errors because the pleadings and record consistently describe
the same January 2024 sequence of events and communications underlying Plaintiff’s claims.
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Plaintiff brings claims under the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “Federal Act”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a), (b), (c), (d), and § 3604(f)(1), and parallel state-law claims under the Florida Fair
Housing Act (the “Florida Act”), Fla. Stat. § 760.23(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8), all premised on
disability discrimination in connection with the rental of the Property. 	Under the Federal and
Florida Act, Plaintiff alleges Defendants had knowledge of her disability and refused to negotiate
for or otherwise made unavailable the dwelling (Counts I and VI), discriminated in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of rental (Counts II and VII), made a written statement indicating a
preference or limitation related to wheelchair users (Counts III and VIII), misrepresented
availability or suitability in connection with her disability (Count IV and IX), and discriminated in
the rental or otherwise made unavailable/denied the dwelling because of disability (Counts V and
X). Plaintiff also brings a final claim under the Florida Act alleging Defendant made disability-
based discriminatory statements in the terms or conditions of rental (Count XI).
Plaintiff served Rodas with the Complaint on February 5, 2025. See ECF No. [7]. Plaintiff
served B&J with the Complaint on March 6, 2025, via substitute service pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 48.062. See ECF Nos. [14] and [16]. Neither Defendant
responded to the Complaint. Based on Defendants’ non-responsiveness, Plaintiff moved for entry
of Clerk’s default, see ECF No. [20], which the Clerk of Court granted, see ECF No. [21]. Plaintiff
then filed the Motion in which she reiterates that Defendants failed to respond to her Complaint
and the Clerk has entered default against both Defendants. See ECF No. [24] at 1. On the merits,
Plaintiff contends the well-pleaded allegations establish that she is a wheelchair user and a
qualified person with a disability, that B&J owned and controlled the rental of the Property and
used Rodas as their leasing agent, and that after Plaintiff disclosed her disability, Defendants
discouraged her from renting, delayed and canceled her showing under false pretenses, and then
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rented the Property to an able-bodied renter while texting that the entrance “is not suitable for
wheelchairs.” 	See id. at 2-3. 	The Motion also relies on the Florida Commission on Human
Relations’ investigation and Reasonable Cause determination, which it characterizes as detailed
factual findings supporting intentional disability discrimination and an intent to express a
preference or limitation based on Plaintiff’s protected status. See id. at 4-6.
As to relief, Plaintiff requests entry of final default judgment against both Defendants
jointly and severally, awarding $100,000.00 in punitive damages under Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5)
arguing the conduct was willful and that a full-cap punitive award is warranted to deter future
discrimination. See ECF No. [24] at 7-8. 	Additionally, Plaintiff seeks $9,000.00 in lost rental
savings, calculated as $150 per month over a five-year period, and $25,000.00 in compensatory
damages for emotional distress, loss of dignity, and humiliation, for a total of $134,000.00. See
id. at 8-10.
In support of the Motion, Plaintiff filed her affidavit attesting that she is an adult who uses
a wheelchair and lives an independent life, including working, traveling, and living without
assistance. See ECF No. [24-1] at ¶2. She explains that the discriminatory experience described
in her filings was “troubling and disturbing” to her and “left [her] traumatized” and with a
heightened sense of insecurity about whether she will be treated fairly as a disabled person. See
id. at ¶¶13-14. She further avers that the incident compounded preexisting issues for which she
has been in therapy for years and caused a loss of dignity. See id. at ¶12. For her emotional distress
and loss of dignity, Plaintiff requests $25,000. 	See id. at ¶15. 	As to economic and remedial
matters, she states she remained in her current apartment and is paying $120 more per month than
she would have paid at the Property, and she requests damages of $7,200 for five years of that
increased rent. See id. at ¶¶14-15. The Court notes that this amount relating to increased rent costs
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is different than the amounts Plaintiff described in the Motion. Compare ECF No. [24] at 9 with
[24-1] at 3. 	Additionally, Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in punitive damages to deter Defendants —
whom she describes as engaged in leasing and managing residential property — from further civil-
rights violations. See id. at ¶15. Defendants did not respond to the Motion, and the deadline to do
so has passed. The Motion is now ripe for review.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Default Judgment Standard
“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (a). After the clerk enters a default, the Court is authorized to
enter a final default judgment if the party seeking it applies for one. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (b)(2);
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2015) (“When a defendant has
failed to plead or defend, a district court may enter judgment by default.”).
“A ‘defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact’ as set
forth in the operative complaint.” TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289,
1298 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (quoting Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d
1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009)). 	But the defendant “is not held to admit facts that are not well-
pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” 	Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quotation marks omitted).
And a defendant’s default does not automatically permit the Court to enter a default judgment:
“Because the defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions
of law, the court must first determine whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleading for the
judgment to be entered.” Chanel, Inc. v. Replicachanelbag, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1259 (S.D. Fla.
2019); see also Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (“Entry of default judgment is only warranted when there
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is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” (quotation marks omitted)).
The Eleventh Circuit has “interpreted the standard” for evaluating whether a sufficient
basis for default judgment exists “as being akin to that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245; see also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] default judgment cannot stand on a complaint
that fails to state a claim.”). Of course, to “survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). 	“This plausibility standard is met ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.’” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
B. Federal Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3604)
The Federal Act makes it unlawful to engage in certain discriminatory housing practices
“because of” protected characteristics, and specifically prohibits discrimination “because of”
disability or “handicap.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. “In a discrimination case, ‘[b]efore discovery has
unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the
required prima facie case in a particular case.’” Hunt v. Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213,
1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)). “Thus,
the allegations in the complaint ‘should be judged by the statutory elements of an FHA claim rather
than the structure of the prima facie case.’” Id. at 1221-22 (quoting Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp.,
108 F.3d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Each subsection of § 3604 specifies different requirements and situations covered by the
Federal Act. Relevant here, Plaintiff alleges five Federal Fair Housing Act claims under 42 U.S.C.
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§ 3604(a)–(d) and (f)(1). Subsections (a) and (b) cover race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin but do not list disability or handicap as a protected trait. 	See § 3604(a)(b).
Specifically, subsection (a) prohibits refusing to sell or rent after a bona fide offer, refusing to
negotiate for sale or rental, or otherwise making unavailable or denying a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. See § 3604(a). Subsection
(b) prohibits discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin.” See § 3604(b).
By contrast, subsections (c), (d), and (f)(1) do include handicap as a listed protected trait.
Subsection (c) prohibits making, printing, or publishing or causing to be made, printed, or
published “any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination.” See § 3604(c); Sabal Palm Condominiums of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, Inc. v.
Fischer, No. 12-CV-60691, 2014 WL 988767, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014) (“a § 3604(c) claim
requires that the allegedly discriminatory statement be made in connection with the sale or rental
of a dwelling.”). 	Subsection (d) prohibits representing “to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when [it is,] in fact[,] available.” See § 3604(d); Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982) (a person “who has been the object of a misrepresentation
made unlawful under § [3604](d) has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended
to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act’s
provisions.”). Finally, subsection (f)(1) makes it unlawful to “discriminate in the sale or rental, or
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otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a [disability]
of[]” that buyer or renter or a person associated with them or “a person residing in or intending to
reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available[.]” See § 3604(f)(1); Hunt, 814
F.3d at 1222 (“a complaint must allege that the adverse action was taken because of a disability
and state the facts on which the plaintiff relies to support that claim.”)
C. Florida Fair Housing Act (Fla. Stat. §760.23)
Courts often consider claims under Florida’s Fair Housing Act (the “Florida Act”) and the
Federal Act together because these statutes contain essentially identical provisions. See Loren v.
Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (analyzing claims under the Florida Act and Federal
Act because they “contain[] statutory provisions that are substantively identical”, and “the facts
and circumstances that comprise the federal and state fair housing claims are the same.”); Bhogaita
v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The FHA and
the Florida Fair Housing Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal analysis
applies to each.”); Noah v. Assor, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“the Florida Fair
Housing Act ‘is patterned after the [Fair Housing Act] and courts have recognized that it is to be
construed consistently with federal law.’”) (quoting Milsap v. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 05-CV-60033, 2010 WL 427436, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010)); Hawn v. Shoreline
Towers Phase I Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 07-CV-97/RV/EMT, 2009 WL 691378, at *3 (N.D. Fla.
Mar. 12, 2009), aff'd sub nom., 347 F. App’x 464 (11th Cir. 2009).
For example, subsection (1) of Florida Statute § 760.23 makes it “unlawful to refuse to sell
or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise to make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race, color, national
origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion.” Accord 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (identical statutory
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language except the Federal Act does not include disability as a protected class). Subsection (2)
makes it “unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion.” § 760.23(2), Fla. Stat.;
accord 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (identical statutory language except the Federal Act does not include
disability as a protected class).
Subsection (3) makes it “unlawful to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed,
or published, any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, national origin,
sex, disability, familial status, or religion or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination. 	§ 760.23(3), Fla. Stat.; accord 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (identical statutory
language). Subsection (4) makes it “unlawful to represent to any person because of race, color,
national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available. § 760.23(4), Fla. Stat.; accord
42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (identical statutory language). 	Subsection (7) makes it unlawful to
“discriminate in the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
buyer or renter because of a disability of[]” that buyer or renter or a person associated with them
or “a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made
available[.]” § 760.23(7), Fla. Stat.; accord 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (identical statutory language).
Subsection (8) makes it “unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with such dwelling, because of a disability of[]” that buyer or renter or a person associated with
them or “a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made
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available[.]” § 760.23(8), Fla. Stat.; accord 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2) (identical statutory language).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has already obtained a Clerk’s default, see ECF Nos. [9] and [21], so final default
judgment is appropriate if there is a “sufficient basis” for it in the Complaint. See Chanel, Inc.,
362 F. Supp. 3d at 1259; Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245. A sufficient basis for default judgment exists
if the Complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face — that is, pleads factual content
allowing the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for violations of the
Fair Housing Acts under federal and Florida law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Complaint alleges eleven counts, five Federal Fair Housing Act claims under 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (a)–(d) and (f)(1), and six Florida Fair Housing Act claims under Florida Statute §
760.23(1)–(4) and (7)–(8). See ECF No. [1] at 5–13. As previously stated, courts have recognized
that Florida Act “is to be construed consistently with federal law.” See Noah, 379 F. Supp. 3d at
1296 (quoting Milsap, 2010 WL 427436, at *2); see also Loren, 309 F.3d at 1300; Bhogaita, 765
F.3d at 1285. Accordingly, this discussion treats the corresponding provisions of the Federal Act
and Florida Act, and case law interpreting the same, interchangeably where appropriate. See id.
A. Counts I, II, VI, and VII Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b) and Fla. Stat.
§760.23(1) and (2)
As noted above, the Federal Act and Florida Act’s language is identical in every way except
for the disability inclusion in subsections (a) and (b) of the Federal Act. Subsections (a) and (b)
of the Federal Act prohibit discrimination because of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin,” but they do not list disability as a protected trait. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (a), (b).
Plaintiff’s allegations sound exclusively in disability discrimination. See generally ECF No. [1].
For example, Count I alleges that “[u]pon learning of Plaintiff’s disability,” Defendants refused to
negotiate for, or otherwise made unavailable, the Property because of her disability. 	See id. at
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¶¶29-34. Count II likewise alleges Defendants discriminated in the terms and conditions of rental
“because of Plaintiff’s disability.” See id. at ¶¶36-41. Because Plaintiff does not allege adverse
action based on any trait covered by § 3604(a) or (b), Counts I and II fail to state a claim, so default
judgment cannot be entered.
By contrast, because subsections (1) and (2) of the Florida Act include disability as a
protected class, additional analysis is required for Counts VI and VII. Subsection (1) of Florida
Statute § 760.23 makes it “unlawful to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise to make unavailable or deny a dwelling
to any person because of [a protected trait].” 	Count VI pleads that Plaintiff is disabled, that
Defendants3 had actual knowledge of her protected status, and that she was qualified, ready,
willing, and able to tour and rent the Property. See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶65-67. It further alleges that,
upon learning of Plaintiff’s disability, Defendants attempted to dissuade her interest, used
subterfuge to delay and prevent her from viewing the Property, allowed able-bodied prospective
renters to view and lease the Property, and refused Plaintiff that same opportunity because of her
disability. 	See id. at ¶¶68-70. 	These allegations plausibly state a claim under § 760.23(1) for
refusing to negotiate for rental of, or otherwise making unavailable or denying, a dwelling because
3 Although Rodas is alleged to have communicated directly with Plaintiff and carried out the challenged
conduct, the Complaint pleads that Rodas acted on behalf of B&J Services in connection with the showing
and leasing of the Property. See ECF No. [1] at ¶10. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]t all material
times and on information and belief, B&J Services owned the Property and controlled the conditions of
showing and leasing [it, and that] B&J Services utilized Rodas as its agent to lease its rental properties.”
See id. Accordingly, the pleaded facts support holding B&J liable for Rodas’s actions taken within the
scope of that agency relationship. See Dillon v. Afbic Development Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 562 (11th Cir.
1979) (An action based upon the federal anti-discrimination statutes is essentially an action in tort. As the
Supreme Court has written in regard to the Fair Housing Act, “(a) damage action under the statute sounds
basically in tort the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a
plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach” (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
195 (1974).)); see also Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003) (“It is well established that the [Fair Housing]
Act provides for vicarious liability.”)).
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of disability. Default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor is, therefore, appropriate on Count VI.
Subsection (2) makes it “unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith, because of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or
religion.” 	§ 760.23(2), Fla. Stat. 	Count VII alleges Plaintiff’s disability and Defendants’
knowledge, her qualification and ability to rent, and that Defendants deprived her of the
opportunity to rent the Property on the same terms as able-bodied prospective renters because of
disability. See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶72-77. Although Count VII’s final paragraph appears to cite §
760.23(1) instead of § 760.23(2), the substance of the Count expressly pleads discrimination in the
“terms, conditions, or privileges” of rental because of disability, which is the conduct prohibited
by § 760.23(2). See id. at ¶77. Construing the pleading as a whole, Count VII plausibly states a
claim under § 760.23(2), requiring the entry of default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor.
B. Counts III and VIII Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (c) and Fla. Stat. § 760.23(3)
Subsection (c) prohibits making, printing, or publishing any notice, statement, or
advertisement with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation,
or discrimination based on protected traits. Courts in this District have held that a plaintiff states
a claim for relief under this subsection where the plaintiff’s “allegations establish a plausible claim
that [a defendant] committed or contributed to a violation of the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition of
statements of rental limitations based on [a protected trait].” Beck v. Royale Harbour of N. Palm
Beach Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-CV-80611, 2014 WL 4782962, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2014).
This is true even where the plaintiff “may fail to prove liability” of the particular defendant. See
id. Additionally, this District has extended this subsection to include communications and written
statements made by a person engaged in the sale or rental of a dwelling. 	See id. (finding that
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plaintiff stated a claim for relief against the association manager where they alleged that the
association manager wrote a letter to the unit owners relaying the association’s decision to deny
the tenants’ lease based on occupancy limits.).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that after she disclosed she used a wheelchair, Rodas stated in
writing: “As I explained to you, the entrance to the apartment is made of stone and is not suitable
for wheelchairs.” See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶19-20, 46-48, 82-84. Plaintiff further alleges this written
communication reflects that her disability was the motivating factor behind Defendants’ refusal to
show and lease the Property to her. See id. These communications by Rodas are sufficient to state
a plausible claim that Defendants committed or contributed to a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)
and the parallel Florida provision, § 760.23(3), making default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor
appropriate on Counts III and VIII.
C. Counts IV and IX Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (d) and Fla. Stat. § 760.23(4)
Subsection (d) prohibits representing to any person — because of a protected trait — that
a dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when it is, in fact, available. The United
States Supreme Court has explained that subsection (d) protects the “legal right to truthful
information about available housing.” Havens Realty Corp, 455 U.S. at 373. Accordingly, to state
a claim under this subsection the plaintiff must allege that the defendants made a misrepresentation
regarding the availability of housing. See id. at 373-75. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
misrepresented that the Property could not be toured on the day of Plaintiff’s scheduled tour even
though other able-bodied persons toured on that day. 	See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶21-22. 	This
misrepresentation by Defendants is sufficient to state a plausible claim that Defendants committed
or contributed to a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) and the parallel Florida provision, § 760.23(4)..
Accordingly, default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor is also appropriate on these claims.
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D. Counts V and X Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(1) and Fla. Stat. § 760.23(7)
Subsection (f)(1) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a disability of that buyer or renter.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that it is not necessary to state in the complaint “that the housing
remained available or was secured by an individual outside of the protected class[;] [b]ut a
complaint must allege that the adverse action was taken because of a disability and state the facts
on which the plaintiff relies to support that claim.” Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1222. Here, Plaintiff has
both stated that the Property was toured by and rented to renters who were not disabled and refused
Plaintiff the ability to tour and rent the Property because of her disability. 	See ECF No. [1] at
¶¶18-22, 60, 61. These allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Defendants’ adverse
actions were taken because of Plaintiff’s disability in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and the
parallel Florida provision, § 760.23(7). Therefore, default judgment is also appropriate on these
counts.
E. Count XI Under Fla. Stat. § 760.23(8)
Section 760.23(8) makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities
in connection therewith because of disability. 	In Count XI, Plaintiff alleges she is disabled,
Defendants had actual knowledge of her protected status, that she was qualified, ready, willing,
and able to tour and rent the Property, and Defendants prevented her from viewing the Property
and then rented it to a third party. 	See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶101-04. 	Additionally, Defendants
confirmed in writing that the Property was “not suitable for wheelchairs.” See id. at ¶105. These
allegations plausibly support an inference that Plaintiff was denied an equal opportunity to rent the
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Property on the same terms and conditions as able-bodied prospective renters because of disability,
which is sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim under § 760.23(8).
For these reasons, the Complaint states claims against Defendants for violations of
subsections (c), (d), and (f)(1) of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and of Florida
Statute § 760.23(1), (2), (3), (4), (7), and (8) that are plausible on their face. See Surtain, 789 F.3d
at 1245; Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1370 n.41; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
This means that Plaintiff has established a sufficient basis in the pleadings to support default
judgment against Defendants in Counts III through XI. 	See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245; Chanel,
Inc, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 1259. 	The Complaint, however, fails to state a claim for a violation of
subsections (a) and (b) of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, so default judgment
cannot be entered on Counts I and II.
F. 	Damages
“Once a plaintiff has established a sufficient basis for liability, the Court must conduct an
inquiry to determine the appropriate damages.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Compass Med. Centers
Inc., No. 21-CV-23623, 2022 WL 17653816, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2022), R&R adopted, No.
21-CV-23623, 2022 WL 17602650 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2022). 	Even in the default judgment
context, the district court “has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage
award it enters.” 	Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003).
“Although a defaulted defendant admits well-pleaded allegations of liability, allegations relating
to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default. Rather, the Court determines the
amount and character of damages to be awarded.” Miller v. Paradise of Port Richey, Inc., 75 F.
Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 2688 at 58–59 (3d ed. 1998)); Pastrana v. Level Up Fitness, LLC, No. 21-CV-21985,
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2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2021).
“Damages may be awarded only if the record adequately reflects the basis for award via ‘a
hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts.’” Adolph Coors
Co. v. Movement Against Racism & the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting
United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)); see also SEC v. Smyth, 420
F.3d 1225, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2005). “In other words, a court may award damages ‘as long as the
record contains evidence allowing the court to ascertain damages from mathematical calculations
and detailed affidavits.’” Pastrana, 2021 WL 5631776, at *3 (quoting Holtz v. Bagel Mkt., Inc.,
No. 12-CV-62040, 2013 WL 12141515, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013); Adolph Coors, 777 F.2d
at 1543–44)) (internal quotations omitted). The Federal Fair Housing Act authorizes an award of
actual and punitive damages to a prevailing plaintiff as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive
relief.4 	See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1)-(2). 	Florida law likewise authorizes “actual and punitive
damages, and reasonable attorney fees and costs.” See Fla. Stat. § 760.35(4).
Because Defendants are in default, the Court accepts as true Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations establishing intentional disability discrimination in connection with the rental of the
Property. See ECF No. [1] at ¶¶21, 23, 25. Based on her allegations, Plaintiff requests four forms
of damages: (1) $100,000 in punitive damages; (2) $9,000 in actual damages in lost rental savings;
(3) $25,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, loss of dignity, and humiliation; and
(4) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See ECF No. [24] at 10.
In doing so, Plaintiff relies on Florida Statute § 760.11(5). See id. at 7-9. Section 760.11,
however, is a remedies provision in Part I of Chapter 760 (the Florida Civil Rights Act) rather than
4 Plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief in the Motion, so the Court does not address that element of
potential damages in this Report and Recommendation.
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the Florida Fair Housing Act. Cf. § 760.11(5) (allowing for punitive damages and stating that “[t]he
provisions of ss. 768.72 and 768.73 do not apply to this section.”) (emphasis added). 	Because
Plaintiff’s state-law claims arise under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.20 et seq.,
the applicable state-law remedies provision is Florida Statute § 760.35. Milsap, 2010 WL 427436,
at *1–2; Carlton Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Miniaci, 419 So. 3d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025). The
remedies offered in Florida Statute § 760.35 parallel those available under the Federal Act, which
likewise authorizes actual and punitive damages and permits an award of reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs to a prevailing party. See § 760.35; 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1)-(2). Consistent with the
Florida Act’s intent to operate in harmony with the Federal Act, the Court therefore treats
Plaintiff’s mis-citation to § 760.11 as a non-substantive error and analyzes recoverable relief under
§ 760.35 and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c).
i. 	Punitive Damages
As previously stated, the Federal and Florida Acts both provide for recovery of punitive
damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1); Fla. Stat. § 760.35(4). “Punitive damages may be granted
here if the defendant exhibited a callous indifference to the federally protected rights of the
plaintiff.” Davis v. Lane Mgmt., LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Ferrill
v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 476 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 46-
47 (1983)).
Plaintiff requests $100,000 in punitive damages be awarded under the Florida Act and
argues a punitive award is necessary for deterrence, given the alleged intentional discrimination
by Defendants in the business of leasing and managing rental properties. See ECF No. [24] at 7-
8. Although the Eleventh Circuit decision in Blackwell arose in the administrative enforcement
context, it is instructive on deterrence. 	Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., on Behalf of
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Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 1990). 	The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
imposition of the maximum public-interest civil penalty where the adjudicator found the conduct
egregious, emphasized the respondent’s experience in real estate and knowledge that the conduct
was unlawful, noted the absence of financial evidence weighing against the maximum, and
concluded that deterrence and the interests of justice would be served. See id.
Here, Plaintiff has submitted sworn testimony describing intentional disability-based
exclusion from a housing opportunity, and Defendants — who defaulted — have offered no
contrary evidence, including no financial evidence that would militate against the requested
punitive amount. In these circumstances, and crediting Plaintiff’s sworn account for purposes of
default, a punitive award is warranted to punish and deter intentional housing discrimination, so
the Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s request for $100,000 in punitive damages to punish and
deter willful disability discrimination in housing.
ii. 	Actual Damages
The Court should award actual damages for Plaintiff’s emotional distress, humiliation, and
loss of dignity as well as the increased costs for future rentals. 	“Victims of discrimination in
violation of the FHA are entitled to actual damages. Although the statute provides little guidance
beyond this statement, anger, embarrassment, and emotional distress are clearly compensable
injuries under this standard.” 	Banai v. Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. on Behalf of
Times, 102 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1); Fla. Stat. §
760.35(4); Lombard v. Another S. Holding Co., LLC, No. 17-CV-1952-ORL-31-DCI, 2019 WL
1518699, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2019); Boswell v. Gumbaytay, No. 07-CV-135-WKW, 2009
WL 1515912, at *7–10 (M.D. Ala. June 1, 2009). “[D]amages for emotional distress ... ‘may be
inferred from the circumstances as well as proved by the testimony.’” Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Hous.
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& Urban Dev., on Behalf of Herron v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Marable v. Walker, 704 F.2d 1219, 1220 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159,
164 (5th Cir. 1977)). “That the amount of damages is incapable of exact measurement does not
bar recovery for the harm suffered.” Id. at 872–73 (quoting Marable, 704 F.2d at 1220).
In Blackwell, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an award that included both economic losses
and “embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress,” explaining that emotional-distress
damages “may be inferred from the circumstances as well as proved by the testimony,” and
although such damages are not susceptible to exact measurement, that “does not bar recovery.”
Blackwell, 908 F.2d at 872-73. 	Likewise, in Banai, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a substantial
compensatory award for humiliation and related emotional harms and cautioned that Blackwell did
not set any “ceiling” on recoverable damages, nor were such awards conditioned on physical
symptoms or publicity. Banai, 102 F.3d at 1207.
Applying those principles here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s sworn declaration in the
record supports Plaintiff’s requested $25,000 in actual damages for emotional distress, loss of
dignity, and humiliation and the amount is reasonable in light of Eleventh Circuit benchmarks.
Plaintiff attests that she was forced to argue about her ability to live independently, that Defendants
used a false pretext to prevent her from ever seeing the unit “only because” she uses a wheelchair,
and that the experience left her “traumatized,” with an accompanying loss of dignity and increased
insecurity about being treated fairly as a disabled person. See ECF No. [24-1] at ¶¶7-10, 13-15.
In Blackwell, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed $40,000 for the primary victim’s humiliation and
emotional distress (plus separate amounts for others affected). See 908 F.2d at 872-73. And in
Banai, the appellate court affirmed $35,000 per victim for closely related emotional harms. See
102 F.3d at 1207. 	Given Plaintiff’s sworn description of the discriminatory encounter and its
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impact, and because the $25,000 request is materially below amounts affirmed in Blackwell and
Banai, the Court finds $25,000 is a fair award for Plaintiff’s non-economic injuries.
With respect to Plaintiff’s claimed “lost rental savings,” the Court should award only the
amount that competent evidence in the record supports. In her affidavit, Plaintiff swears that, after
the incident, she was forced to remain in her current apartment, which costs $120 more per month
than the subject property, and she requests $7,200 for five years of increased rent. See ECF No.
[24-1] at ¶¶14-15. The Motion, however, requests $9,000 based on a $150 per month differential.
See ECF No. [24] at 9. This higher figure is not the amount Plaintiff attests to in her affidavit. On
this record, the Court should apply the $120 per month differential attested to in Plaintiff’s affidavit
and award her $7,200 for these damages.
iii. 	Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Plaintiff requests the Court reserve jurisdiction to award reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs following the entry of judgment. 	See ECF No. [24] at 10. 	“In a civil action under
subsection (a), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party…a reasonable attorney’s
fee and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2); see also Fla. Stat. § 760.35(4) (providing for attorney’s
fees and costs). “[A] ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief.” Bhogaita, 765
F.3d at 1291 (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)) (internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff has been awarded
relief on default judgment, the Court should reserve jurisdiction to award reasonable attorney’s
fees.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	should 	award 	Plaintiff 	$100,000.00 	in 	punitive 	damages,
$32,200.00 in actual damages ($7,200 for lost rental savings and $25,000.00 for emotional distress,
loss of dignity, and humiliation), for a total monetary judgment of $132,200.00. The Court should
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further reserve jurisdiction to determine and award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment against Defendants, ECF No. [24],
be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. 	A Final Default Judgment BE ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants
under Rule 55(b) for Counts III-XI, but not as to Counts I and II;
3. 	Plaintiff be AWARDED $100,000.00 in punitive damages and $32,200.00 in actual
damages for a total monetary judgment of $132,200.00.
4. 	Plaintiff’s counsel BE ORDERED to file a supplemental affidavit on the amount of
attorney’s fees and costs, including all necessary information to support a lodestar analysis,
with supporting timesheets.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties will have fourteen (14) days from the
date of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written
objections, if any, with the Honorable K. Michael Moore, United States District Judge. Failure to
timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of
an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to
factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if
necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149
(1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on December 17, 2025.
____________________________________
MARTY FULGUEIRA ELFENBEIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: All Counsel of Record
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