Galloway-Banks v. Carnival Corporation

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 1:25-CV-23074-WILLIAMS/LETT
RAYMONA GALLOWAY-BANKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CARNIVAL CORPORATION d/b/a
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINE,
Defendant.
___________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on The Honorable Kathleen M. Williams’s
referral [ECF No. 13] of Defendant Carnival Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 11] for a report and recommendation.
Upon review of the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Law in
Opposition of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Response”) [ECF No. 14], Defendant’s
Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Reply”) [ECF No. 15], and the pertinent
portions of the record, the Court respectfully recommends as follows.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This is a maritime personal injury action arising from an August 25, 2024, slip-
and-fall incident aboard the Carnival Breeze. Compl. ¶¶7, 13, 21. Plaintiff asserts
two causes of action under general maritime law: Count I for negligent failure to
maintain and Count II for negligent failure to warn. Id. ¶¶ 24–33, 34–45. 	Plaintiff
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alleges that, in the “Subject Area” of the vessel, “the floor within the Subject Area
was covered with water and cleaning chemicals and/or soap fluids that felt slimy to
the touch (the ‘Substance’), which created an unreasonably slippery and hazardous
walking surface (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Dangerous Condition’).” Id. at 20.
Carnival Corporation d/b/a Carnival Cruise Line (“Carnival”) moves to dismiss
the Complaint, “because it does not provide sufficient facts to establish that Carnival
had notice of the alleged risk-creating condition.” Mot. at 1. In Response, Plaintiff
argues that the Complaint alleges specific facts supporting actual notice, including
that Carnival’s employees: (1) placed the Substance on the floor in the Subject Area;
(2) created the Dangerous Condition by failing to properly dry the floor; (3) turned off
the lights in the Subject Area; and (4) observed the Substance on the floor. Compl. ¶¶
16, 20, 27(a)-(i), 28(a)-(e), 35(a-e); Resp. ¶¶ 4–7. Carnival replied that the facts
alleging notice are insufficient. Reply at 2.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as
true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint and all reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts. Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th
Cir. 1994). To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain: “(1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction [;] ... (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand
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for the relief sought[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Thus, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
While the Court must accept all the allegations in the Complaint as true,
“[c]onclusory 	allegations, 	unwarranted 	deductions 	of 	facts 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). “Dismissal is therefore permitted
when on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual
allegations will support the cause of action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d
1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd.
of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Carnival 	contends 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	“contains 	only 	conclusory
allegations that Carnival had notice of the allegedly dangerous condition,” asserting
that Plaintiff alleges notice “essentially, because the Substance was on the floor.”
Mot. at 5. Carnival notes that Plaintiff does not allege how long the Substance was
present, whether any crewmember saw the Substance before the incident, or other
facts showing constructive notice. Id. at 5–6.
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“A defendant can be deemed to be on actual notice where the ‘defendant knows
of the risk creating condition’ and on constructive notice ‘when a dangerous condition
has existed for such a period of time that the shipowner must have known the
condition was present and thus would have been invited to correct it.’” Michel v.
Carnival Corp., No. 24-21617-CIV-COHN/VALLE, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107964, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. June 17, 2024). However, the question at this stage is whether Plaintiff
has alleged enough factual content to plausibly support the existence of notice, not
whether Plaintiff has proven it. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Here, the Complaint contains more than a bare conclusion that Carnival “knew
or should have known” of the Dangerous Condition. In paragraph 20, Plaintiff alleges
that “the floor within the Subject Area was covered with water and cleaning
chemicals and/or soap fluids that felt slimy to the touch (the ‘Substance’), which
created 	an 	unreasonably 	slippery 	and 	hazardous 	walking 	surface 	(hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Dangerous Condition’).” Compl. ¶ 20. In paragraph 28, Plaintiff
alleges that Carnival was on “actual prior notice of the presence of the Substance on
the 	floor” 	because, 	among 	other 	reasons: 	(1) 	Defendant, 	Carnival, 	placed 	the
Substance on the floor in the Subject Area; (2) Carnival’s employees or agents created
the Dangerous Condition by failing to properly dry the floor; (3) Carnival turned off
the lights in the Subject Area; and (4) Carnival observed the Substance on the floor
in the Subject Area. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges similar facts in paragraph 35 in support
of her failure-to-warn claim, and paragraph 27(c) further alleges that Carnival knew
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or should have known of the Dangerous Condition by virtue of its crew’s presence and
activities in the Subject Area. Compl. ¶¶ 27(c), 35(e).
Taken together, these factual allegations aver that Carnival, through its
employees, had actual knowledge of the Dangerous Condition in the Subject Area
before Plaintiff’s fall. Plaintiff does not simply say Carnival “created” the condition
and stop there; she alleges that Carnival’s employees were cleaning the floor, applied
soapy water and cleaning chemicals, failed to dry the area, turned off the lights, and
“observed the Substance on the floor” where Plaintiff slipped. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 27(c),
28(d), 35. At the pleading stage, those allegations are factual, not conclusory, and
they plausibly support an inference of actual notice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”).
The cases on which Carnival relies involve complaints that largely recited the
notice element without explaining how the defendant would have acquired knowledge
of the hazard, such as by the amount of time the substance was on the floor, prior
similar incidents, or direct observation. Mot. at 4–6; see, e.g., Moseley v. Carnival
Corp., 593 F. App’x 890, 893 (11th Cir. 2014) (“mere possibility that the defendant
may have acted unlawfully is insufficient”); Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th
931, 935 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal where complaint failed “to include any
factual allegations that were sufficient to satisfy the pleading standard . . . such that
it is facially plausible that Carnival had actual or constructive notice”); Holland v.
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Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal where
“allegations do not cross the line from possibility to plausibility of entitlement to
relief”).
Here, by contrast, Plaintiff’s theory of notice is grounded in specific allegations
of Carnival’s conduct and observation in the Subject Area immediately surrounding
the incident. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 27(c), 28, 35. Although these allegations may come close
to the line, they are sufficient to “nudge [Plaintiff’s] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Court emphasizes that Plaintiff will bear the burden of producing evidence
that Carnival had actual or constructive notice of the Dangerous Condition at
summary judgment or trial. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“[t]o recover for negligence, a plaintiff must show that . . . the defendant
had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition.”); Keefe v. Bahama
Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding a negligence action
requires, as prerequisite to imposing liability, that owner have had actual or
constructive notice of risk-creating condition). But at this early stage, accepting the
well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s
favor, the Complaint states plausible claims for negligent failure to maintain and
negligent failure to warn. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is not warranted.
IV. 	RECCOMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that
Defendant Carnival Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.
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Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above
findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a). The
parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely object waives the right to challenge
on appeal the District Court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 2nd
day of February 2026.
_____________________________________
ENJOLIQUÉ A. LETT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: All Counsel of Record
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