Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-26557-CV-DIMITROULEAS
MANUEL DIEGUEZ-CUELLAR,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, KROME NORTH SERVICE
PROCESSING CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
/
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Manuel Dieguez-Cuellar’s (“Petitioner”)
pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) [DE 1],
filed September 22, 2026. Respondent, Warden, Krome North Service Processing Center
(“Respondent”), has argued that the Petition must be denied because Petitioner is lawfully detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Petitioner has not shown good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under Zadvydas. [DE 6 at
7–9]. The Court has considered the Petition [DE 1], Respondent’s Response [DE 6], the Reply
[DE 7], and the accompanying exhibits, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. Upon
careful consideration, the Petition [DE 1] is DENIED.
Section 1231(a) of the INA applies to aliens who are subject to a final order of removal.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). When an alien is ordered removed, “the Attorney General shall remove
the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days[,]” which is known as the “removal
period.” Id. Once the order of removal is finalized, the Government should do its best to execute
removal during the ninety-day period. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001). But
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sometimes the Government does not timely remove the petitioner, so the indefinite detention of an
alien “raises serious constitutional concerns.” Sosa v. Warden, Baker Corr. Inst., No. 26-cv-51,
2026 WL 592434, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3 2026). “The Supreme Court in Zadvydas held that six
months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation.” Id.
Petitioner moves for habeas relief and argues that his post-removal-order detention is
unlawful because his detention has become prolonged and his removal is not reasonably
foreseeable. [DE 1-1 at 1]. To obtain relief from post-removal-order detention under the Zadvydas
framework, a petitioner must: “(1) show that he’s been detained for more than six months; and (2)
establish that there’s no significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future.” Flores-Reyes
v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., No. 26-cv-20226, 2026 WL 406708, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026)
(citing Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]o state a claim under
Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but
also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”))
Here, Petitioner has not provided evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Petitioner’s non-cooperation with Respondent’s removal efforts is the only barrier to his removal.
See Oladokun v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 479 F. App’x 895, 897 (11th Cir. 2012) (“In contrast to the
petitioner in Zadvydas, who could not be removed because the receiving countries refused to
accept him, [Petitioner’s] non-cooperation is the only barrier to his removal.”).
Petitioner claims removal is not reasonable foreseeable in the immediate future because
“[t]he [United States] government was unable to remove him in [June] 6[,] 2023[,] and the Cuban
Government still will not accept him for repatriation,” [DE 1-1 at 2], and that the United States
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government’s attempts to remove him to Mexico—a third country not of his origin, [DE 1-1 at
1]—“have been an informal effort to compel voluntary departure, not an above board removal
attempt that complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.” [DE 1-1 at 2–3].
On September 28, 2026, in its Response, the Respondent argued that Petitioner’s prolonged
detention is of his own doing. [DE 6 at 9] (“It[’]s Petitioner conduct that has prolonged his
detention and thwarted his anticipated and successful removal. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met
his threshold burden under Zadvydas and Akinwale.”). Along with its Response, the Respondent
filed several exhibits in support of its position that Petitioner’s prolonged detention is of his own
doing. For instance, [DE 6-11] appears to be a notice of removal for “Manuel Dieguez-Cuellar”
dated March 25, 2026, purporting to inform him of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s
(“ICE”) intent to remove him to Mexico, with a certificate of service signed by someone on the
line above “Signature of Alien,” date of service marked as “3/25/26.” [DE 6-11 at 1]. On May 21,
2026, per [DE 6-12], Petitioner received a warning for failure to depart, [DE 6-12 at 1], as well as
an instruction sheet requiring him to assist in his removal, [DE 6-12 at 2], both of which were
stamped “REFUSE TO SIGN.” That same day, per [DE 6-13], Petitioner received a notice of
removal, which also was stamped “REFUSE TO SIGN.” On June 19, 2026, Petitioner was issued
a notice of removal advising him of the intention of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) to remove him to Mexico, but on the same date, Petitioner refused to sign the same. See
[DE 6-14 at 1]. On July 13, 2026, Petitioner was served with a copy of a notice of failure to comply
due to his refusal to sign the aforesaid notice of removal. See [DE 6-14 at 2]. On August 24, 2026,
per [DE 6-15], Petitioner received a warning for failure to depart, [DE 6-15 at 1], as well as an
instruction sheet requiring him to assist in his removal, [DE 6-15 at 2], though neither bore a stamp
indicating that he refused to sign. However, on August 24, 2026, Petitioner was issued a notice of
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removal [DE 6-15] advising him of the intention of ICE to remove him to Mexico, but on the same
date, Petitioner refused to sign the same, which refusal was noted on the notice of removal. See
[DE 6-16 at 1]; see also [DE 6-17 at 1]. That same day, Petitioner was served with a copy of the a
notice of failure to comply due to his refusal to sign the aforesaid notice of removal. See [DE 6-17
at 2]. Deportation Officer Juan Moreno has declared under penalty of perjury that Petitioner
remains detained at Krome North Service Processing Center pending removal, [DE 6-5 at 4].
On October 6, 2026, in his Reply [DE 7], Petitioner largely reiterated the arguments he
made in his Petition. Petitioner does, however, contend that his refusal to sign a notice of removal
is not the cause of his prolonged detention, but rather the refusal of the Respondent provide “travel
documents and a letter from Mexico that it was accepting [him].” [DE 7 at 3]. Instead, Petitioner
asserts, “all he got was an ICE agent trying to compel petitioner to voluntary depart with the threat
of prolonged detention if he refused to sign.” [DE 7 at 2–3].
The Court, having considered the foregoing, finds that Petitioner does not provide good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future when he is responsible for thwarting his removal. Lezama Garcia v. Miami Field Office
Director, 2026 WL 632351, at *6 (S.D. Fla. March 6, 2026); see also Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Atty.
Gen., 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The six-month period is tolled, however, if the
alien acts to prevent his removal.”). On the record before the Court, the Court finds that although
Petitioner has been in custody since at least March 31, 2026, the Petitioner has refused to cooperate
since at least May 21, 2026. See [DE 6-12], [DE 6-13]. The Court notes that Petitioner has not
denied that he has refused to cooperate with the legitimate requests by the Respondent to assist
with his removal proceedings. Furthermore, Respondent has provided numerous exhibits
corroborating Petitioner’s refusals. See supra. Therefore, Court finds that Petitioner’s continued
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detention without a bond hearing is the consequence of his repeated refusal cooperate in the
removal process.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1] is DENIED.
2. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT any pending motions.
3. The Clerk will provide Petitioner a copy of this order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, this
9th day of October, 2026.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
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