Mesa Underwriters Specialty Insurance Company v. Golf Car Depot Holdings, LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
KEY WEST DIVISION
CASE NO: 4:24-CV-10090-DPG/DSW
MESA UNDERWRITERS’ SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a foreign corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GOLF CAR DEPOT HOLDINGS, LLC,
JANELLE L. GARBER, individually,
DAVID R. GARBER, JR., individually, and
DAVID R. GARBER, JR., as Guardian
of the Person for JANELLE L. GARBER,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Final Judgment and
supporting Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed by Plaintiff Mesa Underwriters Specialty
Insurance Company’s (“MUSIC”) [ECF Nos. 22, 23], and the Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting Statement of Undisputed Material Facts filed by Defendants Janelle L. Garber (“Mrs.
Garber”) and David R. Garber, Jr. (“Mr. Garber”), individually and on Mrs. Garber’s behalf as
guardian of her person (collectively, the “Garbers”) [ECF Nos. 37, 38]. The Garbers opposed
MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment [ECF No. 31], and MUSIC filed a Reply [ECF
No. 35]. MUSIC, in turn, opposed the Garbers’ Motion for Summary Judgment by adopting its
Motion for Summary Final Judgment and Reply [ECF No. 39], and the Garbers filed their Reply,
adopting their opposition to MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment [ECF No. 41]. The
Court heard argument on both motions on October 9, 2025 [ECF No. 52].
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This case was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United States
District Judge, for ruling on all pretrial non-dispositive matters and a report and recommendation
on all dispositive matters, including MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment and the
Garbers’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 43]. For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment [ECF
No. 22] be GRANTED, the Garbers’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 37] be DENIED,
and final judgment be entered in favor of MUSIC.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
This insurance coverage dispute arises from a golf cart accident that led to a personal injury
lawsuit currently pending in Florida state court (the “Underlying Action”) against Defendant Golf
Car Depot Holdings, LLC (“GCD”), an insured of Plaintiff MUSIC. See Garber v. Ibis Bay Rides,
LLC, No. 25-CA-673-K (Fla. Cir. Ct. 16th Jud. Cir.). GCD tendered its defense to MUSIC under
its garage liability policy (the “Policy”), and MUSIC agreed to defend GCD subject to a full
reservation of rights, including the right to seek declaratory relief. MUSIC now brings this action
for declaratory relief to determine its rights and obligations under the Policy with respect to the
claims asserted in the Underlying Action.
A. The Underlying Action
On March 21, 2023, Mrs. Garber and her husband, Mr. Garber, individually and on Mrs.
Garber’s behalf as guardian of her person, filed a negligence and products liability action in Florida
state court against several defendants, including GCD. See [ECF No. 1-1]. The Complaint alleges
that GCD, which sells, rents, and services golf carts, purchased a Yamaha golf cart, “upgraded” it,
1 The Court has determined the facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, based on the
parties’ submissions, including exhibits.
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and sold it to Ibis Bay Rides, LLC (“Ibis Bay”) in Key West, Florida. [Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 17]. On June
25, 2022, Ibis Bay rented the golf cart to a friend of Ms. Garber. [Id. ¶¶16-17]. Ms. Garber was a
passenger when her friend allegedly lost control while driving the golf cart. [Id. ¶18]. The golf cart
struck a curb, overturned, and ejected Ms. Garber, resulting in severe injuries for which she seeks
damages. [Id.]. The Garbers sued GCD for negligence, strict liability, premises liability, and loss
of consortium. [Id.]. In substance, the Garbers allege that GCD’s modifications and sale of the golf
cart rendered it unreasonably dangerous by increasing its propensity to lose stability and roll over
during foreseeable use. [Id.].
B. MUSIC’s Garage Liability Policy Issued to GCD
MUSIC issued the subject garage liability Policy to GCD, effective January 8, 2022, to
January 8, 2023, with a $1,000,000 liability limit for any accident applicable to GCD’s “garage
operations.” [ECF No. 1-2 at 10]. The Policy’s declarations identify GCD’s business description
as “GOLF CART DEALER” and list three Florida locations at which GCD conducts its garage
operations, one in Fort Lauderdale and two in Miami. [Id. at 10-11]. The Policy’s liability coverage
is organized into two grants: (1) “Garage Operations – Other Than Covered ‘Autos’” and (2)
“Garage Operations – Covered ‘Autos.’” [Id. at 43]. Both grants require MUSIC to pay any amount
that GCD must pay as damages due to a “bodily injury” caused by an “accident” and “resulting
from [GCD’s] ‘garage operations,’” and, subject to the Policy’s terms, to defend GCD against any
“suit” seeking such damages. [Id. at 43].
For liability coverage, the Policy’s declarations designate covered “autos” with symbols
22 (“Owned ‘Autos’ Only”) and 29 (“Non-Owned ‘Autos’ Used in Your Garage Business”). [Id.].
Symbol 22 encompasses autos GCD owns, including autos acquired during the policy period. [Id.].
Symbol 29 encompasses autos GCD does not own, lease, hire, rent, or borrow, but that are used in
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connection with GCD’s garage business as described in the Declarations, including certain autos
owned by GCD’s employees or members while used in that business. [Id.]. The Policy defines
“garage operations” to mean the ownership, maintenance, or use of locations for garage business
and adjoining roads or accesses, and includes the ownership, maintenance, or use of autos
designated as covered “autos” as well as “all operations necessary or incidental to a garage
business.” [Id. at 57].
Two endorsements in the Policy are central to this dispute. First, a “Transfer of Ownership
or Surrender of Possession” endorsement (the “Transfer of Ownership Exclusion”) adds an
exclusion to the Policy’s coverage for “‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurring after either
ownership of an ‘auto’ is transferred or possession of an ‘auto’ is surrendered to another person
pursuant to a sale, conditional sale, gift, abandonment, or lease.” [Id. at 18]. Second, a separate
endorsement—including the “Designated Products or Operations Exclusion” (the “Designated
Operations Exclusion”)—bars coverage for any “‘loss’, ‘bodily injury’, or ‘property damage’
arising from or contributed to in any way by the designated products or operations listed below:
Any and all Golf Cart Rental Operations.” [Id. at 25].
C. MUSIC’s Declaratory Judgment Action
On November 20, 2024, MUSIC filed this one-count action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
seeking a declaration that the Policy affords no coverage for the claims against GCD in the
Underlying Action and that MUSIC therefore owes no duty to defend or indemnify GCD. [ECF
No. 1]. MUSIC contends that the accident neither falls within the Policy’s coverage grant nor, in
any event, would survive the Transfer of Ownership or the Designated Operations Exclusions.
[Id.]. On March 12, 2025, MUSIC moved for summary final judgment on its claim, arguing that
the accident did not involve a covered “auto” or result from GCD’s “garage operations,” and,
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alternatively, that any potential coverage is eliminated by the Transfer of Ownership Exclusion—
because the accident occurred after GCD sold the golf cart to Ibis Bay—and by the Designated
Operations Exclusion, because the loss arose out of golf cart rental operations. [ECF Nos. 31, 32].
The Garbers opposed MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment and filed their own
competing Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that the allegations in the Underlying Action
establish MUSIC’s duty to defend GCD as a matter of law. [ECF Nos. 31, 37]. The Garbers argue
that (1) the Underlying Action against GCD falls within the “Garage Operations – Other Than
Covered ‘Autos’” coverage grant, (2) the Policy’s Transfer of Ownership Exclusion is ambiguous
as to who must effect the transfer and therefore must be construed in favor of coverage; and (3)
the Policy’s Designated Operations Exclusion does not apply because the Underlying Action does
not allege that GCD itself engaged in golf cart rental operations at the time of the accident. [Id.].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Salmeron-Salmeron v. Spivey, 926
F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). The Court must view the record
and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and decide whether
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642,
646 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); see
also Luke v. Gulley, 50 F.4th 90, 95 (11th Cir. 2022).
“The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the
standard applied when only one party files a motion.” Torres v. Rock & River Food Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 3d 1320, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d
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1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves,
warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.” Torres, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1327
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] court must consider each motion on its own
merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.”
Id. at 1327–28.
An insurer’s duty to defend “depends solely on the allegations in the complaint filed against
the insured.” Trizec Props., Inc. v. Biltmore Const. Co., 767 F.2d 810, 811 (11th Cir. 1985)
(quotation omitted); see also Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Beaver, 466 F.3d 1289, 1296
(11th Cir. 2006). )2 There is no duty to defend if there is no doubt that the allegations of the
complaint do not fall within the policy’s coverage. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. JDC (Am.) Corp.,
52 F.3d 1575, 1580-81 (11th Cir. 1995). Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify, “[A] court’s determination that the insurer has no duty to defend requires a finding that
there is no duty to indemnify.” Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. AXA
Equitable Life Ins., Co., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1230 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (collecting federal and state
court cases applying the “principle that a finding of no duty to defend, as a matter of Florida law,
necessarily includes a finding of no duty to indemnify.”).
Where the determination of insurance coverage depends upon the legal effect of the
provisions of an insurance policy, the interpretation of the policy is a matter of law for the Court
2 Here, the Parties’ coverage positions are based on the allegations asserted against GCD in the
complaint originally filed in Garber v. Ibis Bay Rides, LLC, Case No. 23-CA-234-K (Fla. Cir. Ct.
16th Jud. Cir. Mar. 23, 2021). Although that prior case was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice
after the filing of MUSIC’s Motion for Summary Final Judgment, the Parties have stipulated that
the complaint in the refiled action, Case No. 25-CA-673-K, asserts substantively identical
allegations against GCD. Accordingly, the duty to defend analysis applies equally to the
allegations in the refiled action. [ECF No. 42].
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to determine and is, therefore, amenable to summary judgment. Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Great
Atl. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). “Summary judgment is appropriate in
declaratory judgment actions seeking a declaration of coverage when the insurer’s duty, if any,
rests solely on the applicability of the insurance policy, the construction and effect of which is a
matter of law.” Northland Cas. Co. v. HBE Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
“The policy, however, must contain clear and unambiguous wording to resolve the issue as a matter
of law.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Vinardell Power Sys., Inc., No. 19-20093-
CIV, 2020 WL 1307192, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2020).
“The construction of insurance contracts is governed by substantive state law,” which in
this case is Florida. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ca’D’Oro, 362 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1272 (S.D. Fla.
2018) (citing Provau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 1985)). Under
well-settled Florida law, ordinary contract principles govern the interpretation and construction of
insurance policies. Vozzcom, Inc. v. Beazley Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
If the policy’s language is clear, there is no need for judicial construction, and the contract must
be enforced as written. Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla.
2005). “The terms of an insurance policy should be taken and understood in their ordinary sense
and the policy should receive a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation consistent with the
intent of the parties – not a strained, forced or unrealistic construction.” Allied World Nat’l Assur.
Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1188 (S.D. Fla. 2019), quoting Siegle v.
Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So.2d 732, 736 (Fla. 2002).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. The Underlying Action Alleges an “Accident” Arising from GCD’s “Garage
Operations” Triggering Coverage under Section II.A.1 of the Policy.
The threshold issue before the Court is whether the Underlying Action asserts claims that
fall within the grant of coverage under MUSIC’s garage liability Policy. The Parties agree that
there is no coverage under Section II.A.2 (“Garage Operations – Covered ‘Autos’”) because the
Underlying Action alleges that Ibis Bay, not GCD, owned the subject golf cart at the time of the
accident [ECF No. 31 at 4]. The coverage question, therefore, turns on Section II.A.1, which
provides in relevant part:
We will pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of ‘bodily
injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies caused by an
‘accident’ and resulting from ‘garage operations’ other than the ownership,
maintenance or use of covered ‘autos. ‘
We have a right and duty to defend any “insured” against a “suit” asking for these
damages . . .
[ECF No. 1-2 at 57] (emphasis added). Further, the Policy defines “garage operations” as:
[T]he ownership, maintenance or use of locations for garage business and that
portion of the roads or other accesses that adjoin these locations. Garage
operations” includes the ownership, maintenance or use of the ‘autos’ indicated in
Section I of this coverage form as covered ‘autos.’ Garage operations” also include
all operations necessary or incidental to a garage business.
The Court finds Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Beach Cars of West Palm,
Inc., cited by the Garbers, instructive in determining that the Underlying Action’s allegations fall
within the “garage operations” insured under the Policy. See Beach Cars of West Palm, Inc., 929
So. 2d 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (hereinafter “Beach Cars”). In Beach Cars, an auto dealership
sold an SUV that was involved in a car accident two years later. Id. at 729. An injured passenger
sued the dealership on product liability theories arising from the SUV’s allegedly defective seat
belt. Id. In an ensuing insurance coverage action, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal
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expressly stated that coverage was triggered “not only by an ‘accident’, but also one ‘resulting
from garage operations,’” within the meaning of the subject policy. Id. at 733.
Here, GCD is insured under a garage liability Policy that employs the same definition of
“garage operations” as the policy construed in Beach Cars. Accordingly, consistent with Beach
Cars—where the court concluded that the seat-belt failure claims arose out of an “accident” and
resulted from the dealer’s “garage operations”—the Underlying Action alleges that Ms. Garber’s
injuries stemmed from an accident following GCD’s modifications to the subject golf cart and
therefore asserts claims within the Policy’s coverage grant in Section II.A.1. Despite MUSIC’s
contention that the subject accident occurred away from GCD’s listed locations, the Policy affords
coverage for damages arising out of GCD’s “garage operations” anywhere in the United States.
See Pa. Mfrs.’ Ass’n Ins. Co. v. N. Am. Auto Servs., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1294 (S.D. Fla.
2020) (rejecting insurer’s argument under a materially similar garage liability policy that coverage
was limited to accidents on defendant’s premises and holding it broad enough to encompass an
off-site work dinner). Applying the same reasoning in Beach Cars, the Court concludes that the
Underlying Action’s allegations fall within Section II.A.1’s coverage grant, and MUSIC therefore
has a duty to defend GCD in the Underlying Action.
B. The Policy’s Transfer of Ownership Exclusion Unambiguously Cuts Off Any
Coverage.
Because the Underlying Action asserts claims that fall within “garage operations – other
than covered ‘autos,’” as defined in Section II.A.1 of the Policy, MUSIC can avoid its duty to
defend only if it establishes that an exclusion in the Policy clearly and unambiguously eliminates
that coverage.
MUSIC, as the insurer, bears the burden to show that the Underlying Action’s allegations
are “cast solely and entirely within the policy exclusion.” Advanced Sys., Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co.,
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272 So. 3d 523, 527 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Florida law requires that “in construing insurance
policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full
meaning and operative effect.” U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla.
2007). Further, the language of an exclusion in a policy is enforced according to its plain meaning,
and courts may not “rewrite contracts, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results
contrary to the intentions of the parties.” Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So. 2d at 532. However, if
“relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing
coverage and the another limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous.”
Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 34. “Ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted liberally in favor of the
insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.” Id.
Here, MUSIC seeks to rely on the Policy’s Transfer of Ownership Exclusion, which
provides that the Policy does not apply to:
‘Bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurring after either ownership of an ‘auto’
is transferred or possession of an ‘auto’ is surrendered to another person pursuant
to sale, conditional sale, gift, abandonment, or lease.
[ECF No. 1-2 at 16-18]. The Garbers argue that the exclusion’s use of “ownership. . . is transferred”
in passive voice is ambiguous because it does not specify who must effectuate the transfer. From
this, the Garbers advance a competing interpretation under which the exclusion is triggered only
when MUSIC’s insured’s customer (here, Ibis Bay) transfers ownership to another person, such
that the exclusion would not apply while Ibis Bay continues to own the subject golf cart.
The Court rejects the Garbers’ contention that the exclusion is ambiguous. The exclusion’s
plain meaning is straightforward: it withdraws coverage for bodily injury that occurs only after a
specific event—the transfer of ownership of an “auto” or the surrender of its possession pursuant
to a sale, conditional sale, gift, abandonment, or lease. The mere use of the passive voice does not
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create any ambiguity as to whether a qualifying transfer has occurred. See State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986) (stating the “mere fact that a provision in
an insurance policy could be more clearly drafted does not necessarily mean that the provision is
otherwise inconsistent, uncertain or ambiguous”). The exclusion asks only whether ownership “is
transferred” before the injury, not who performs that act, and it is undisputed that GCD transferred
ownership of the golf cart to Ibis Bay. [ECF No. 38 ¶3].
Florida law does not permit the Court “to write in policy language that [an insurer] has
chosen to omit.” Beach Cars of W. Palm, Inc., 929 So. 2d at 732. The Garbers’ construction can
be sustained only by effectively rewriting the exclusion to say, for example, “after a customer’s
ownership of an ‘auto’ is transferred to another person” or “after ownership . . . is transferred a
second time.” The Court is not persuaded that the Garbers’ “customer-transfer” reading is a
reasonable alternative interpretation that renders the exclusion ambiguous. Further, courts within
this Circuit have repeatedly treated materially identical exclusions as unambiguous and applied
them by asking only whether, at the time of the accident, the transferor still owned or controlled
the “auto” (in those cases, the transferor was the insured, as here)—not any subsequent transfer.
See, e.g., Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dixie Way Motors, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1244–45
(S.D. Fla. 2023); report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:19-CV-274-OC-30PRL, 2020 WL
3574452 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2020); Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. JB&L Auto Sales, Inc., No. 5:23-CV-74
(MTT), 2024 WL 2194842, at *7 (M.D. Ga. May 15, 2024); LM Ins. Corp. v. Occidental Fire &
Cas. Co., 5:19-CV-274-OC-30PRL, 2020 WL 3496426, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2020).
Accordingly, the Transfer of Ownership Exclusion in the Policy bars coverage for the
accident alleged in the Underlying Action, because all claimed bodily injury occurred after GCD
had transferred ownership of the golf cart to Ibis Bay pursuant to a sale.
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C. The Policy’s Designated Operations Exclusion for “Any and All Golf Cart Rental
Operations” Also Bars Coverage.
Because the Court has already concluded that the Underlying Action both triggers the
Section II.A.1 “garage operations” coverage grant but, separately, falls within the Transfer of
Ownership Exclusion, MUSIC’s showing of no coverage is complete without resorting to any
additional exclusion. The Parties, however, devote some briefing to the Designated Operations
Exclusion. Therefore, the Court addresses this exclusion in the alternative.
The Designated Operations Exclusion provides:
This insurance does not apply to: ‘Loss’, ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’
arising from or contributed to in any way by the designated products or operations
listed below: Any and all Golf Cart Rental Operations.
[ECF No. 1-2 at 25]. Here, MUSIC argues that the exclusion’s plain meaning leaves no doubt that
the loss in this case arose from “Golf Cart Rental Operations” carried out by Ibis Bay and is
therefore excluded from coverage. The Garbers, however, suggest that the exclusion is ambiguous
because it can be reasonably interpreted to apply only to injuries arising from the insured’s, GCD’s,
undertaking of the prohibited rental operations. Accordingly, the Garbers argue that, if the
exclusion is susceptible to such a narrower construction, it must be construed in favor of coverage.
Unless there exists “a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning after
resort to the ordinary rules of construction,” a court must apply a policy exclusion’s plain meaning.
See Caloosa Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp., No.12-80260, 2012 WL
12845876, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2012), aff'd, 522 F. App’x. 638 (11th Cir. 2013). Florida’s
Supreme Court has recognized that the phrase “arising out of” is unambiguous and broad when
used in a policy exclusion, meaning “flowing from,” “incident to,” or “having a connection with.”
See Taurus Holdings, Inc., 913 So.2d at 539. Further, “the term ‘any’ when ‘[r]ead naturally . . .
has an expansive meaning.’” See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Acceleration
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Nat. Serv. Corp. v. Brickell Fin. Services Motor Club, Inc., 541 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA
1989) (“‘[A]ny’ is ‘often synonymous with ‘either,’ ‘every,’ or ‘all’’”); see, e.g., Scaglione v.
Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 75 F.4th 944, 951 (8th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, given the breadth
of ‘any’ and the absence of limiting language, the subject exclusion was not confined to only
assaults or batteries committed by the insured or the insured’s employees).
Accordingly, the Court rejects the Garbers’ contention that the Designated Operations
Exclusion is ambiguous for failing to specify whose “golf cart rental operations” trigger it, as the
exclusion’s plain language imposes no such restriction. See, e.g., Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp.,
2012 WL 12845876 at *4 (construing a policy’s exclusion for loss “arising out of the use or
operation of any horses or horse-drawn apparatus,” and rejecting the insured’s attempt to narrow
the exclusion to situations in which only the insured itself engaged in such operations). As the
exclusion contains no limiting language, the exclusion’s terms bar coverage for any loss arising
out of “Any and all Golf Cart Rental Operations,” regardless of who operates the golf cart rental
business. MUSIC’s construction would require the Court to rewrite the provision by adding
limitations not found in its text, such as “[a]ny and all golf cart rental operations conducted by the
insured or the insured’s employees/agents.” Given that it is undisputed that Ibis Bay rented the
golf cart involved in the accident, the asserted loss plainly arises from “golf cart rental operations”
and is therefore barred by the Designated Operations Exclusion. [ECF No. 38 ¶3].
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that MUSIC’s Motion
for Summary Final Judgment [ECF No. 22] be GRANTED and that the Garbers’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [ECF No. 37] be DENIED. MUSIC has no duty to defend GCD in the
Underlying Action. And since MUSIC has no duty to defend GCD in the Underlying Action, it
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also has no duty to indemnify GCD for any damages which may be awarded against GCD in that
action. See e.g., Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 657 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2011).
V. 	OBJECTIONS
The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Omnibus Report and
Recommendation to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Darrin P. Gayles, United
States District Judge. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo
determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the parties from
attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except
upon grounds of plain error, if necessary, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989);
11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on this 5th
day of January, 2026.
_____________________________________
DETRA SHAW-WILDER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: Counsel of Record
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