Johnson v. Borell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-80252-AMC
WILLIAM R. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARIA BORELL,
Defendant.
__________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant, Maria Borell, moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) (“Motion to
Dismiss”). ECF No. 62. The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 87 (response), 100
(reply). It has been referred to me for a recommendation. ECF No. 103. Previously, I
recommended that the Court deny the Motion insofar as it asserts a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 112. Now, after examining the record with respect to
personal jurisdiction over Ms. Borell, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to
Dismiss be GRANTED for lack of personal jurisdiction and that the SAC be
DISMISSED without prejudice.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, William Johnson, sues Ms. Borell and asserts three defamation-based
claims against her. ECF No. 60. The following allegations relevant to personal
jurisdiction are taken from the SAC:
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Borell dated from June 2022 to February 8, 2023. ¶27.1
On February 8, 2023, Ms. Borell executed an affidavit for law enforcement that
accused Mr. Johnson of assaulting her. ¶35. From February 24, 2023, through
October 11, 2023, Ms. Borell published statements through social media platforms
and direct communications with various individuals affiliated with Mr. Johnson.
¶¶39–44. Ms. Borell published social media posts accusing Mr. Johnson of domestic
violence and/or republishing the affidavit that Mr. Johnson claims is defamatory. Id.
The “defamatory actions and statements, including through republication of [Ms.
Borell’s] Affidavit Statement, have been viewed by an untold number of persons, and
ha[ve] been accessed by and viewed by persons within this District.”2 ¶41. Ms. Borell
contacted individuals and entities involved in Mr. Johnson’s industry, but the SAC
does not allege where these individuals were located, whether Ms. Borell knew their
locations, or what methods of contact were employed. ¶¶43–44. The SAC alleges that
Ms. Borell “directly contacted” an individual who owns a Florida-based racing team
1 Unless otherwise noted, paragraph citations are taken from the SAC, ECF
No. 60.
2 The SAC does not specifically identify any persons in this District or in
Florida who accessed or viewed the statements.
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and unidentified employees of a Florida-based racing series. ¶43. The SAC does not
allege that Ms. Borell was in Florida when she published the allegedly-defamatory
statements.
II. 	LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The United States Constitution and the Florida long-arm statute prevent a
defendant from being forced to defend herself in the courts of a particular state unless
that 	state can properly 	exercise 	personal jurisdiction over her. 	See Stubbs v.
Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir.
2006); American Airlines, Inc. v. Spada, No. 23-CV-21844, 2024 WL 2797379, at *3
(S.D. Fla. May 1, 2024). There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and
specific. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919
(2011). General jurisdiction extends to any claim against a defendant, regardless of
the connection between the claim and the defendant’s contacts with the forum;
specific jurisdiction extends only to claims with a nexus to those contacts. Ford Motor
Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 359 (2021). In either case,
the first question is whether personal jurisdiction exists under the forum state’s long-
arm statute. Even if personal jurisdiction is authorized under a long-arm statute, the
exercise of jurisdiction also must comport with the federal due process clause. See,
e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1354 (11th Cir.
2013); McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1343 (S.D.
Fla. 2017) (citing United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)).
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“A plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant ‘bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to
make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.’” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri,
736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting United Techs., 556 F.3d at 1274); see
also Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir.
2002) (noting plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal
jurisdiction, and “[a] prima facie case is established if the plaintiff presents enough
evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990))).
A defendant challenges personal jurisdiction by filing a motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The challenge can be facial or factual. “[A] motion
to dismiss, without more, challenges only the facial sufficiency of the jurisdictional
pleading.” Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Omniactive Health Techs., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 1328,
1333 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Nelson, 677 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1996)). If the defendant includes affidavits or other evidence in support of the
12(b)(2) motion, the question of personal jurisdiction is resolved by reference to facts
outside the four corners of the complaint. Id.
Where a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction in a Rule 12(b)(2) motion
to dismiss and submits evidence in support of her position, “the burden traditionally
shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.” Meier, 288
F.3d at 1269. The plaintiff must then “substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in
the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate the
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factual allegations in the complaint.” Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp. A/S,
795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986). “Where the plaintiff's complaint and supporting
evidence 	conflict 	with 	the 	defendant’s 	affidavits, 	the 	court 	must 	construe 	all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food
Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), and still
must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, to the extent they are
uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits.” Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514.
“Where a complaint lacks jurisdictional allegations to sufficiently establish
a prima facie case, ‘the district court doesn’t go to the second and third steps of the
burden-shifting process, and the motion [to dismiss] should be granted.’” Andres v.
Raytheon Techs. Corp, No. 21-CV-61757, 2022 WL 1015489, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5,
2022) (quoting Diulus v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 823 F. App’x
843, 849 (11th Cir. 2020)). In addition, “if a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction
in a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(i) affords the
district court discretion on how to proceed.” Karnas v. Cuban, No. 22-CV-22538, 2025
WL 3759241, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 26, 2025) (quoting N. Am. Sugar Indus., Inc. v.
Xinjiang Goldwind Sci. & Tech. Co., 124 F.4th 1322, 1333 (11th Cir. 2025)). The
district court may “(1) hold an evidentiary hearing before trial to make factual
findings about personal jurisdiction or (2) decide the motion to dismiss under a prima
facie standard without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at *4. “[I]f the district court does
not hold an evidentiary hearing, it simply reviews whether the plaintiff satisfies the
prima facie requirement, which is a purely legal question.” Id.; see also 	Mut. Serv.
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Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a
defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, an evidentiary hearing
is not required.”). Still, “the district court must construe all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food
Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, the SAC alleges only specific jurisdiction. ¶¶7–10. The Motion is a facial
attack, as Ms. Borell challenges the SAC’s allegations but does not attach affidavits
or other evidence in support of her contentions regarding personal jurisdiction.3 Mr.
Johnson also does not attach evidence to his Response, relying on the SAC’s
allegations. The SAC invokes personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute,
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), on the grounds that Ms. Borell committed tortious conduct
including “knowingly directing the defamatory statements/publications into the State
of Florida with the intent that same be received into this State.” ECF No. 60 ¶7. The
SAC also alleges that Ms. Borell has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida, that
she targeted a forum resident intending to cause harm to the resident, and that she
“intentionally directed illegal acts towards the citizens and residents of Florida.” Id.
¶¶8–10. As far as factual support, the SAC alleges that Ms. Borell contacted
numerous individuals who were part of Mr. Johnson’s industry, one of which is
3 Ms. Borell has filed multiple affidavits in this litigation; however, those
affidavits relate to Mr. Johnson’s citizenship and other facts not relevant to her
contacts with Florida.
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alleged to be the owner of a “Florida based” racing team along with an unknown
number of unidentified employees of a “Florida based racing series.” ¶43. Finally, the
SAC alleges that Ms. Borell “tagged” these two Florida-based entities in social media
posts. ¶44. As to all remaining targets of Ms. Borell’s communications and posts, none
is alleged to be connected to Florida. Ms. Borell says she has not been in Florida since
a short stay in January 2023, did not commit any act in Florida, and did not direct
any statements into Florida. ECF No. 62 at 3. Thus, she concludes, the Court has no
personal jurisdiction over her pursuant to the long-arm statute and the Due Process
Clause. Id.
Mr. Johnson responds that the well-pleaded allegations detail that Ms. Borell
sent communications to individuals and entities located in Florida, disseminated an
affidavit to racing authorities that operate in and make decisions in Florida, and
created social media accounts to broadcast content into Florida.4 ECF No. 87 at 11.
In her Reply, Ms. Borell argues that Mr. Johnson fails to allege that any of her
conduct took place in Florida, fails to identify Florida recipients of any publications,
and fails to allege harm felt in Florida. ECF No. 100 at 6, 10. She reiterates that
“jurisdictional contacts must be the defendant’s own purposeful contacts with the
forum, not unilateral or plaintiff-centric connections.” Id. at 5–6.
4 The SAC does not provide this level of detail regarding the locations of the
individuals and entities that are alleged to have received the communications.
Compare ECF No. 87 at 11 with ¶¶43–44.
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First, Florida’s long-arm statute creates specific jurisdiction over “any cause of
action arising from,” as relevant here, “[c]omitting a tortious act within this state.”
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). “In order to prove specific jurisdiction, there must be a
‘connection or connexity’ between the enumerated activity in Florida and the cause of
action.” Yarger v. Convergence Aviation Ltd, 310 So. 3d 1276, 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2021) (quoting Aegis Def. Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 656, 661 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2017)) (cleaned up). “In other words, the causes of action alleged in the
complaint must arise from the defendant’s activities in Florida.” Yarger, 310 So. 3d
at 	1280. 	A 	defendant’s 	physical 	presence 	in 	Florida 	is 	not 	necessary; 	rather,
“‘committing a tortious act’ in Florida under section 48.193(1)[(a)(2)]5 can occur
through 	the 	nonresident 	defendant’s 	telephonic, 	electronic, 	or 	written
communications into Florida. . . . However, the cause of action must arise from the
communications.” Internet Sol’ns Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1208 (Fla. 2010)
(emphasis in original).
Ms. Borell asserts that she does not reside in Florida and has not been in
Florida since a brief visit in January 2023, that she “did not commit any act in
Florida, did not direct any statement into Florida.” ECF No. 62 at 3. The SAC does
5 Section 48.193 was amended effective July 1, 2016. The amendments re-
organized the numbering of the subsections but did not make any substantive
changes 	that 	affect 	the 	subsections 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	case 	or 	the 	analysis 	of
jurisdictional issues presented here. Compare Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2008) with Fla.
Stat. § 48.193 (2016).
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not allege that she resides in Florida, has been physically present in Florida, or
committed any acts in Florida.
In response, Mr. Johnson relies on section 48.193(1)(a)(2) of the long-arm
statute, which provides for personal jurisdiction over a person who “commit[s] a
tortious act within the State.” ECF No. 87 at 11–12. He argues that the SAC “details
that Borell sent emails and messages to individuals and entities located in Florida,
including Plaintiff’s employers, racing bodies, and professional contacts. Defendant
disseminated a defamatory affidavit to racing sanctioning authorities that oversee
Defendant’s profession and that operate and make decisions in Florida. She created
and operated numerous social media accounts for the purpose of broadcasting
defamatory content into Florida.” ECF No. 87 at 11.
In Ms. Borell’s Reply, she argues that the Response “identifies no Florida
recipient of any alleged publication, and alleges no harm felt in Florida.” ECF No.
100 at 10. Finally, Ms. Borell contends that “[j]urisdictional theories premised on
Internet publication fail where the defendant’s contacts with the forum are absent;
nationally available platforms do not create Florida-directed publication.” Id. at 12.
Mr. Johnson’s Response cites Internet Solutions for the proposition that section
48.193(1)(a)(2) confers jurisdiction over a defendant who allegedly posts defamatory
statements on the Internet. In Internet Solutions, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed, in a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, whether a nonresident
committed a tortious act for purposes of the long-arm statute when she made
allegedly defamatory statements about a Florida company on her website, where the
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posts were accessible and accessed in Florida. Id. at 1203. The Court concluded that
this conduct gave rise to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, but
expressly declined to analyze whether exercising jurisdiction violated the Due
Process Clause. Id. at 1216 (“The second step is a more restrictive one, precluding
suit in any situation where the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
would violate due process. This question is not before us in the certified question and
we do not deem it necessary to broaden the question.”).
Here, I need not reach whether personal jurisdiction over Ms. Borell is
permissible under the long-arm statute because it is impermissible under the Due
Process Clause. See Karnas v. Cuban, No. 22-CV-22538, 2025 WL 3759241, at *7 (S.D.
Fla. Dec. 30, 2025); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008) (“If
both Florida law and the United States Constitution permit, the federal district court
may exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.”).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “constrains a State’s
authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014). In analyzing whether it may exercise personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, a court examines:
(1) whether the plaintiff's claims “arise out of or relate to” at least one of
the defendant's contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident
defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum
state's laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
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Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
multiple cases). Courts employ two tests to determine whether exercising personal
jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause: (1) the Effects Test and (2) the
Minimum Contacts Test. Karnas, 2025 WL 3759241, at *7–11; Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 789 (1984); Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357.
Here, the SAC alleges the following facts relating to contacts between Ms.
Borell 	and 	Florida 	during 	the 	relevant 	time 	period, 	as 	relevant 	to 	personal
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause: (1) Ms. Borell is aware that Mr. Johnson
resides in Florida (¶28); (2) Ms. Borell contacted6 Dean Martin, the owner of KOHR,
which is based in Florida (¶43); (3) Ms. Borell contacted unidentified employees of
IMSA, which is based in Florida (¶43); (4) Ms. Borell “tagged” KOHR and IMSA in
social media posts (¶44(a)-(b)); (5) Ms. Borell started a Reddit “thread” that involved
IMSA among other individuals or entities (¶44(e)). The Court has not identified any
other alleged communications or actions in the SAC that show a connection between
Ms. Borell and Florida.
Ms. Borell argues that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her would
violate the Due Process Clause because she did not commit any acts in Florida or
direct any statements into Florida. ECF No. 62 at 3. Further, she contends that even
if Mr. Johnson resides in Florida, that fact is still insufficient under Walden to confer
jurisdiction. Id. (citing Walden, 571 U.S. 277). Mr. Johnson argues that Ms. Borell
6 The means by which Ms. Borell contacted Mr. Martin and the unidentified
employees is not alleged, nor is their location when they were contacted.
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intentionally 	directed a 	campaign 	of 	online 	defamation into Florida, 	which 	is
sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts and the Effects Test. ECF No. 87 at 10–11. In
her Reply, Ms. Borell argues that the Response misapplies the law by “conflating
Plaintiff’s unilateral Florida ties with Defendant’s contacts” and reiterating that
“jurisdictional contacts must be the defendant’s own purposeful contacts with the
forum.” ECF No. 100 at 10. She further argues that “nationally available platforms
do not create Florida-directed publication.” Id. at 12.
A. The Effects Test
The Effects Test requires a showing that Ms. Borell “(1) committed an
intentional tort (2) that was directly aimed at the forum, (3) causing an injury within
the forum that the defendant should have reasonably anticipated.” Oldfield v. Pueblo
De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1221 n.28 (11th Cir. 2009). Assuming without
deciding that the SAC plausibly alleges the intentional tort of defamation, it fails to
satisfy the second and third prongs of the Effects Test. A defendant’s actions “do not
create sufficient contacts with the forum state ‘simply because he allegedly directed
his conduct at [a] plaintiff[ ] whom he knew had ... connections’ with the forum state.”
Moore v. Cecil, 109 F.4th 1352, 1363 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at
289).
In Moore, the Eleventh Circuit addressed how courts should navigate personal
jurisdiction 	in 	the “unique 	context” 	of 	social 	media 	and other “internet-based
activities.” 109 F.4th at 1363–64. In determining whether this type of conduct is
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directly aimed at Florida, courts “must look to the defendant's focus, purpose, and/or
intent in posting the information.” Id.
“[W]here the out-of-state defendant deliberately directs his posting at
the plaintiff or at an audience in the forum state,” the “ ‘directly aimed
at the forum’ prong of the Calder effects test is satisfied.” But, “where
there is no evidence that the defendants posted the...information hoping
to reach the forum state or an audience in the forum state specifically,
then the Calder effects test is not satisfied.”
Karnas, 2025 WL 3759241, at *8 (emphasis in original) (quoting Moore, 109 F.4th at
1364) (internal citations omitted); Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. “Mere knowledge that the
effects of the defendant's conduct would be felt in the forum state, without more, is
insufficient.” Moore, 109 F.4th at 1363–64. A plaintiff must show that the forum state
is the “focal point” of social media postings and that the defendant intended to target
an audience specifically in that state for personal jurisdiction to be proper. Id. at 1364.
A “plaintiff’s residence in the forum, and suffering of harm there, will not alone
support jurisdiction under Calder.” Internet Sol’ns Corp. v. Marshall, No. 07-CV-
1740, 2010 WL 11617855, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2010) (following remand) (quoting
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Here, the SAC contains no specific allegations that Ms. Borell targeted a
Florida audience or knew the effects of her conduct would be felt specifically in
Florida. The SAC alleges that her statements “were directed to, accessible and were
actually received and read by people in this District and the State of Florida” and
that Ms. Borell contacted “the owner of Florida Based KOHR Motorsports” (“KOHR”)
and employees of the “Florida based IMSA racing series.” (“IMSA”). ¶¶43, 56, 71. The
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SAC further alleges that Ms. Borell “tagged” the IMSA and KOHR social media
accounts, among other accounts, in posts. ¶44. But there are no allegations that these
accounts are located in Florida, that Ms. Borell knew any of the individuals or entities
were in Florida, or that she intended her conduct’s effects to be felt in Florida. The
SAC also contains no allegations that she knew where any recipients of her postings
or communications were located such that she intended to direct communications
specifically into Florida. In short, nothing in the SAC shows that Florida was the focal
point of Ms. Borell’s statements or that she should have anticipated harm specific to
Florida; thus, the allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Effects Test for personal
jurisdiction.
The Response cites Adam J. Rubinstein, M.D., P.A. v. Ourian, No. 20-CV-
21948, 2020 WL 6591559 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2020), for the proposition that a
defamation 	campaign 	directed into Florida 	was 	sufficient 	to 	exercise 	personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. ECF No. 87 at 11–12. In Rubinstein, the plaintiff and
defendant were rival plastic surgeons. Rubinstein, 2020 WL 6591559, at *1. The
defendant allegedly published various communications including a blog post about
the plaintiff’s lack of qualifications and comments about a procedure the plaintiff
botched. Id. In addition, the complaint alleged that the defendant conspired with
third parties to post negative and false reviews about the plaintiff’s Florida business
on multiple websites in an attempt to undermine the business. Id. The complaint
alleged that plaintiff’s patients in Florida saw the reviews and mentioned them to
plaintiff. Id. at *2. 	The court concluded that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to
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make a prima facie case that the defendants engaged in a scheme to retaliate against
the plaintiff and harm his Florida business, satisfying the Effects Test. Id.
Here, unlike Rubinstein, the SAC does not allege that Ms. Borell specifically
aimed her communications at Florida or targeted individuals or businesses in
Florida, or that the communications were seen by individuals in Florida. Rather, it
alleges that she disseminated statements generally, a few of which might have
reached individuals or entities that happened to have a Florida connection. The
allegations against Ms. Borell do not indicate the targeted conduct alleged in
Rubinstein, and do not satisfy the Effects Test.
Mr. Johnson also cites Gubarev v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D.
Fla. 2017) in support of his contention that personal jurisdiction over Ms. Borell is
proper. ECF No. 87 at 12. However, in Gubarev, the court found that the defendant
not only intentionally published material on its website it knew would reach Florida,
it also facilitated interactions with Florida by sending reporters to Florida, creating
advertising specifically for Florida, and engaging in newsgathering efforts in Florida.
Gubarev, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. Those actions far exceed what the SAC has alleged
regarding Ms. Borell’s contacts with Florida, and Gubarev does not apply in this case.
Accordingly, even construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Mr.
Johnson, I conclude that the SAC does not contain sufficient allegations to satisfy the
Effects Test for personal jurisdiction.
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B. The Minimum Contacts Test
Next, under the Minimum Contacts Test, courts “assess the nonresident
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and ask whether those contacts: (1) are
related to the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) involve some act by which the defendant
purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business within the forum; and
(3) are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
in the forum.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1357. In that analysis, a court “identif[ies]
all contacts between a nonresident defendant and a forum state and ask whether,
individually or collectively, those contacts satisfy these criteria.” Id. “[T]he plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the
defendant’s conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State
that is the basis for its jurisdiction over [her].” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285.
“Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State
based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or
attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the
State.” Id. at 286 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76
(1985)); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359
(2021) (“The contacts must be the defendant’s own choice and not ‘random, isolated,
or fortuitous.’”); Sturmanskie LLC v. Picturemaxx Ag, No. 21-CV-21090, 2022 WL
3030451, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2022) (“Walden requires that the Court look to
Defendants’ contacts with the forum, not Defendants’ contacts with Plaintiff.”), report
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and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3028072 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2022) (emphasis
in original).
Construing these SAC’s allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Johnson,
the SAC still does not establish a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over Ms.
Borell based on minimum contacts. Essentially, the SAC alleges that Ms. Borell
engaged in a widespread effort to disseminate defamatory statements to audiences
located anywhere, not specifically in Florida, with a few recipients possibly located in
Florida. Only a small handful of contacts even have a remote connection to Florida,
and those contacts are “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” at best, and insufficient to
meet the standard for minimum contacts under the Due Process Clause. Walden, 571
U.S. at 285–86; see also Sturmanskie, 2022 WL 3030451, at *8 (“Plaintiff’s reliance
on the argument that Defendants were sending e-mails and making phone calls with
full knowledge that those communications were being directed at a Florida resident
is simply not sufficient.”); Micro Fin. Advisors, Inc. v. Coloumb, No. 23-11062, 2023
WL 7156898, at *4 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2023) (allegedly tortious emails and calls to
individual in Florida insufficient to show minimum contacts); Karnas, 2025 WL
3759241, at *10–11 (nationwide campaign and advertising that reached Florida
residents 	was 	insufficient 	for 	personal 	jurisdiction). 	Moreover, 	the 	SAC 	lacks
sufficient allegations that Ms. Borell has purposefully availed herself of the privilege
of 	engaging 	in 	activities 	in 	Florida. 	For 	all 	these 	reasons, 	the 	SAC 	fails 	to
demonstrate that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would allow
this case to proceed in a Florida court.
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Accordingly, the SAC does not make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause.
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	RECOMMEND 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	be
GRANTED under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Because there is no personal jurisdiction over Ms. Borell, I further
RECOMMEND that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and
Recommendation with the Honorable Aileen M. Cannon, United States District
Judge for the Southern District of Florida, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of being
served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file
objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's "right to challenge on appeal the
district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions." 11th Cir.
R. 3-1 (2016).
If parties do not intend to file objections, they shall file a notice
advising 	the 	District 	Court 	within 	FIVE 	DAYS 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.
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DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach
County, in the Southern District of Florida, this 26th day of February 2026.
__________________________________
BRUCE E. REINHART
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 9:25-cv-80252-AMC Document 129 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/26/2026 Page 19 of 19