Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 9:26-cv-80651-HERNANDEZ
MICHELLE MARIE HUMMEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_____________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff Michelle Marie Hummel (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Motion for Leave to
File Renewed Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis Out of Time (“Motion for Leave to File”),
[ECF No. 9], with a renewed Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (the “Renewed IFP Motion”),
[ECF No. 9-2], and a Motion Regarding Non-Receipt of Docket Entry 4 and for Copy of Order and
Appropriate Relief (the “Non-Receipt Motion”), [ECF No. 10]. 	For the reasons listed below, we
GRANT all three motions.
A court “may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or
proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1); see also Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpreting
statute to apply to all persons seeking to proceed in forma pauperis).
In the Eleventh Circuit, district courts have “wide discretion” in ruling on motions to proceed
in forma pauperis, but the privilege should be “bestowed only upon those who are truly indigent.”
Fletcher v. Astrue, No. 1:11-cv-24398-WJZ, 2011 WL 13319589, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2011) (quoting
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Jones v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., No. 3:07-cv-177-J-32TEM, 2007 WL 1789242, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June
19, 2007)). Even so, permission to proceed in forma pauperis is committed to the sound discretion
of the Court. Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[P]ermission to so proceed [IFP] is
committed to the sound discretion of the court.”).
When considering a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “[t]he only determination to be
made by the court . . . is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty.”
Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306–07. A person need not be “absolutely destitute” or “forced to become [a]
public charge[ ]” to proceed in forma pauperis; rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it
represents that the litigant, because of [her] poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and
to support and provide necessities for [herself] and [her] dependents.” Id. The § 1915 analysis requires
“comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine whether [s]he has satisfied the
poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir., 574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff previously filed an Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (the “Original IFP
Motion”), [ECF No. 3], which we found deficient is several ways, [ECF No. 8]. 	We nevertheless
permitted Plaintiff to “submit a new IFP motion that includes the required information on or before
August 28, 2026.” Id. at 4. The Renewed IFP Motion corrects the previously identified defects. [ECF
No. 9-2]. Although Plaintiff filed the Renewed IFP Motion after the Court’s deadline, she asks that
we excuse her tardiness because it stemmed from circumstances beyond her control, including her
disability. [ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 2–3]. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we will extend her the benefit
of the doubt and excuse the late filing.
The Renewed IFP Motion reflects an average monthly income of $2,114.68 during the past
12 months and an expected income of only $526 next month, including self-employment, public
assistance, gifts, and child support. Id. at 1–2. Plaintiff has $1,000 in a checking account. Id. at 2.
The Renewed IFP Motion reflects that Plaintiff’s assets include a home valued at $525,000 and a
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vehicle valued at $3,000. Id. at 3. Relatedly, it shows that Plaintiff has a monthly mortgage payment
of $1,900 (including real estate taxes and property insurance). 	Id. at 4. 	Other monthly expenses
include $375 for utilities, $20 for food, $50 for transportation, $66 in car insurance, and $100 for car
installment payments. Id. The Renewed IFP Motion also clarifies that there is no spousal assistance
for these expenses, nor are any spousal assets listed. Id. at 2, 4. Therefore, Plaintiff’s monthly expenses
are $2,511, id. at 5, exceeding both her average monthly income over the past 12 months and her
expected income next month, id. at 1–2.
Plaintiff also attached a declaration explaining that her “income is limited, irregular, and
unpredictable” and that she “receive[s] child-support payments sporadically” and inconsistently. Id.
at 6. It also helps clarify Plaintiff’s equity in her home. Id. Although Plaintiff “own[s] and reside[s]
in” the home, it “is subject to substantial mortgage and other obligations secured by the home,” and
“[a]ny remaining equity is tied up in [her] primary residence and is non-liquid.” Id. Further, despite
not making any monthly payments, Plaintiff reports having “substantial outstanding credit-card debt.”
Id. Plaintiff thus satisfies § 1915’s poverty requirement.
There is, however, one more step to the IFP review. A court “must dismiss a case in which
the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis if the court determines that the complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 	Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim properly, a complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“While a
plaintiff need not set out detailed factual allegations, a complaint will not suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” 	Dumond v. Carrington, No. 1:22-cv-20339-RKA,
2022 WL 1121741, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2022) (quotation marks omitted). To comply with federal
pleading standards, a complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
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that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” FED . R. C IV . P. 8(a)(2). Although “pro se pleadings are held to
a more lenient standard than pleadings filed by lawyers,” Abram-Adams v. Citigroup, Inc., 491 F. App’x
972, 974 (11th Cir. 2012), that “leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a
party or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action,” Curtiss v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 856 F. App’x 276, 276 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff proceeds under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security regarding her disability claim. [ECF No. 1 at 1]. “There exist three
prerequisites set forth for judicial review in [42 U.S.C.] § 405(g): (1) a final decision made by the
Commissioner after a hearing; (2) the commencement of a civil action within sixty days of the mailing
of notice of the Commissioner’s final decision; and (3) the filing of the action in an appropriate district
court.” 	Anderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv-20900-BB, 2022 WL 16835935, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 9, 2022). 	The Commissioner’s decision is final only after four steps of administrative review
have been completed: “(1) initial determination; (2) reconsideration determination; (3) hearing before
an [administrative law judge]; and (4) Appeals Council review.” Id. Plaintiff provides a short and plain
statement meeting these requirements and thus states a claim upon which relief may be granted. She
alleges that her “claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.” Id. ¶ 6. She alleges that her
assigned “ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.” Id. ¶ 8. She also alleges
that “the Appeals Council denied review” of her claim, “making the ALJ’s decision the final decision
of the Commissioner.” Id. ¶ 10. Therefore, Plaintiff satisfies the first element of a § 405(g) claim.
Anderson, 2022 WL 16835935, at *2. 	The Commissioner’s decision became final on April 6, 2026,
[ECF No. 1 ¶ 10], and Plaintiff filed her Complaint on June 3, 2026, see generally id. Therefore, Plaintiff
satisfies the second element of a § 405(g) claim. Anderson, 2022 WL 16835935, at *2. Plaintiff resides
in Palm Beach County, Florida, [ECF No. 1 ¶ 2]. Thus, the third element of a § 405(g) claim has also
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been satisfied. 	Anderson, 2022 WL 16835935, at *2. 	At this early stage of litigation, Plaintiff has
adequately stated a claim for which relief may be granted. So the Renewed IFP Motion is GRANTED.
Last, the Non-Receipt Motion, [ECF No. 10], informs the Court that Plaintiff did not receive
the Court’s Order Setting Social Security Case Procedures and Deadlines (“Order on SSA
Procedures”), [ECF No. 4]. Plaintiff asks that she be granted “a reasonable opportunity to comply”
with any expired deadlines within the Order on SSA Procedures. 	Id. ¶ 5. 	Certain deadlines in the
Order on SSA Procedures have passed, namely: the deadline for the parties to confer regarding their
consent to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge, [ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 1–2], and Plaintiff’s
deadline to file a motion for summary judgment, id. ¶ 3.c. Again, a measure of grace is due. The Non-
Receipt Motion is GRANTED and the lapsed deadlines shall run from the date of this Order.
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Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File, [ECF No. 9], is GRANTED.
2. 	Plaintiff’s Renewed IFP Motion, [ECF No. 9-2], is GRANTED. Plaintiff does not need
to prepay the filing fee in this case and may proceed without prepayment of costs or fees.
3. 	Plaintiff’s Non-Receipt Motion [ECF No. 10], is GRANTED. The deadlines applicable
to Plaintiff set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3.c of this Court’s Order on SSA Procedures,
[ECF No. 4], shall run from the date of entry of this Order. 	The Clerk of Court is
INSTRUCTED to mail a copy of the Order on SSA Procedures, [ECF No. 4], to Plaintiff.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on October 14, 2026.
_________________________________
YENEY HERNANDEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	Pro se Plaintiff Michelle Marie Hummel
103 Lexington Place
Royal Palm Beach, FL 33411
Counsel of record
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