LESLIE et al v. MARKLING et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
ONICA LESLIE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CHAD MARKLING, LKQ SOUTHEAST
INC., and INTERSTATE
NATIONALEASE INC.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 4:25-CV-174 (CDL)
O R D E R
Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	they 	were 	injured 	in 	a 	truck 	wreck
caused 	by 	Chad 	Markling. 	At 	the 	time 	of 	the 	wreck, 	Markling 	was
driving 	a 	truck 	owned 	by 	Interstate 	Nationalease 	Inc.
(“Interstate”), 	which 	Interstate 	leased 	to 	LKQ 	Southeast 	Inc.
Plaintiffs, 	who 	are 	Georgia 	citizens, 	filed 	this 	action 	in 	the
State 	Court 	of 	Muscogee 	County 	against 	Markling, 	Interstate, 	and
LKQ. 	Interstate 	is 	a 	Georgia 	corporation, 	so 	complete 	diversity
does not exist on the face of the complaint. 	Interstate contends
that 	Plaintiffs 	fraudulently 	misjoined 	Interstate 	to 	defeat
federal diversity jurisdiction, and Defendants removed the action
to 	this 	Court 	on 	that 	basis. 	The 	Court 	permitted 	the 	parties 	to
conduct 	limited 	jurisdictional 	discovery 	on 	Interstate’s
“connection (or lack thereof) to the truck and to Markling.” 	Order
4 (Sep. 4, 2025), ECF No. 15. 	That discovery is now complete.
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Plaintiffs 	now 	acknowledge 	that 	the 	facts 	they 	obtained
during 	discovery 	do 	not 	support 	the 	claims 	they 	asserted 	against
Interstate in their operative complaint, which were based on their
theory that Interstate was Markling’s employer. 	Plaintiffs still
contend 	that 	they 	did 	not 	fraudulently 	misjoin 	Interstate, 	and
they 	ask 	the 	Court 	to 	remand 	this 	action 	to 	state 	court.
Interstate, on the other hand, maintains that it was fraudulently
misjoined, 	and 	it 	filed 	a 	“summary 	judgment” 	motion 	on 	the
fraudulent 	joinder 	issue.1 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the
Court 	grants 	Interstate’s 	motion 	(ECF 	No. 	21) 	to 	the 	following
extent: 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Interstate 	was 	fraudulently 	joined,
and the Court thus dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Interstate
and denies Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (ECF No. 10).
DISCUSSION
A 	state 	court 	action 	may 	be 	removed 	to 	federal 	court 	if
diversity 	jurisdiction 	exists. 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1441(a). 	“When 	a
defendant removes a case to federal court on diversity grounds, a
court 	must 	remand 	the 	matter 	back 	to 	state 	court 	if 	any 	of 	the
properly 	joined 	parties 	in 	interest 	are 	citizens 	of 	the 	state 	in
which the suit was filed.” Henderson v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co.,
454 	F.3d 	1278, 	1281 	(11th 	Cir. 	2006). 	But 	if 	“a 	plaintiff 	names
1 Interstate labels its motion as one for “summary judgment.” 	While the
relevant 	standard 	applicable 	to 	the 	motion 	may 	be 	similar 	to 	summary
judgment, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	motion 	actually 	seeks 	dismissal 	of
the claims against Interstate for misjoinder.
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a non-diverse defendant solely in order to defeat federal diversity
jurisdiction, 	the 	district 	court 	must 	ignore 	the 	presence 	of 	the
non-diverse 	defendant 	and 	deny 	any 	motion 	to 	remand 	the 	matter
back to state court” based on fraudulent joinder. Id. 	To establish
fraudulent 	joinder, 	a 	defendant 	must 	demonstrate 	by 	clear 	and
convincing evidence “either that: ‘(1) there is no possibility the
plaintiff 	can 	establish 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	the 	resident
defendant; 	or 	(2) 	the 	plaintiff 	has 	fraudulently 	pled
jurisdictional 	facts 	to 	bring 	the 	resident 	defendant 	into 	state
court.’” Id. (quoting Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th
Cir. 	1997)). 	Here, 	Interstate 	contends 	that 	there 	is 	no
possibility that Plaintiffs can establish a cause of action against
Interstate 	and 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	thus 	ignore 	Interstate’s
presence and deny Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
To 	determine 	whether 	a 	resident 	defendant 	has 	been
fraudulently 	joined, 	the 	courts 	consider 	“the 	plaintiff’s
pleadings 	at 	the 	time 	of 	removal, 	supplemented 	by 	any 	affidavits
and 	deposition 	transcripts 	submitted 	by 	the 	parties.” 	Legg 	v.
Wyeth, 	428 	F.3d 	1317, 	1322 	(11th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(quoting 	Pacheco 	de
Perez 	v. 	AT&T 	Co., 	139 	F.3d 	1368, 	1380 	(11th 	Cir. 	1998)). 	The
proceeding to resolve “a claim of fraudulent joinder is similar to
that 	used 	for 	ruling 	on 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment.” 	Id. 	at
1322-23 	(quoting 	Crowe, 	113 	F.3d 	at 	1538). 	Thus, 	the 	Court 	must
resolve all fact questions in Plaintiffs’ favor. 	Id. 	“But there
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must be some question of fact before the district court can resolve
that fact in the plaintiff’s favor.” 	Id. at 1323. 	If a plaintiff
does not present evidence to create a fact dispute on the evidence
the 	defendant 	submitted 	to 	establish 	fraudulent 	joinder, 	“the
court 	cannot 	then 	resolve 	the 	facts 	in 	the” 	plaintiff’s 	“favor
based solely on” unsupported allegations in the complaint. 	Id.
I. 	Factual Background
The 	present 	record 	reveals 	the 	following 	facts. 	Interstate
Nationalease 	Inc. 	is 	a 	truck 	leasing 	and 	rental 	company 	whose
primary business is renting and leasing vehicles. 	Interstate owned
a 	2017 	Freightliner 	Cascadia 	truck, 	and 	it 	leased 	that 	truck 	to
LKQ Southeast, Inc. pursuant to a written rental agreement. 	Veasey
Aff. Attach. 1, Rental Contract (May 25, 2023), ECF No. 21-2 at 7-
8. 	The rental agreement stated that the truck would be driven by
an 	LKQ 	driver, 	but 	it 	did 	not 	identify 	a 	specific 	person 	as 	the
ultimate 	driver 	of 	the 	truck. 	Id. 	Under 	the 	rental 	agreement,
Interstate agreed to maintain the truck “in good order and repair
and safe operating condition” and to repair or replace the vehicle
in the “event of mechanical failure.” 	Rental Contract ¶ 1.A. 	The
agreement 	also 	stated 	that 	LKQ, 	the 	customer, 	had 	“examined 	the
vehicle” 	and 	acknowledged 	that 	the 	vehicle 	was 	“undamaged 	and 	in
good 	condition 	and 	repair.” 	Id. 	¶ 3.B. 	The 	agreement 	further
stated that LKQ should not cause or permit “repairs or adjustments”
to the vehicle without Interstate’s “express permission” and that
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LKQ 	must 	notify 	Interstate 	“immediately” 	in 	“all 	cases 	of
mechanical 	malfunction,” 	then 	follow 	Interstate’s 	“instructions
regarding any and all repair work.” Id. ¶ 3.C.
In June 2023, Chad Markling was driving the truck when he was
in a wreck that injured Plaintiffs. 	In their original complaint,
Plaintiffs 	asserted 	claims 	against 	Interstate 	based 	on 	their
theory 	that 	Interstate 	was 	Markling’s 	employer. 	It 	is 	now
undisputed 	that 	Markling 	was 	never 	an 	employee 	or 	contractor 	of
Interstate; 	Interstate 	never 	supervised 	or 	managed 	Markling;
Interstate never exercised any control or direction over Markling;
Interstate 	never 	set 	policies, 	standards, 	or 	procedures 	for
Markling; 	Interstate 	did 	not 	lease 	the 	truck 	to 	Markling; 	and
Interstate 	never 	had 	any 	agreement 	with 	Markling 	regarding 	the
truck.
II. 	Analysis
Defendants argue that there is no possibility Plaintiffs can
establish a cause of action against Interstate because Interstate
was undisputedly not Markling’s employer and there is no basis for
Holding 	Interstate 	liable 	for 	Markling’s 	acts 	under 	a 	respondeat
superior 	theory. 	Plaintiffs 	now 	acknowledge 	that 	there 	was 	no
employment 	relationship 	between 	Interstate 	and 	Markling 	and 	that
Interstate 	leased 	the 	truck 	to 	LKQ, 	not 	to 	Markling 	directly.
Thus, 	Defendants 	are 	correct 	that 	there 	is 	no 	possibility 	that
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Plaintiffs can establish a cause of action against Interstate based
on the employment theory Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint.
Plaintiffs 	nonetheless 	speculate 	that 	it 	is 	possible 	that
additional 	discovery 	might 	reveal 	evidence 	to 	support 	two
potential 	“new” 	claims: 	a 	claim 	against 	Interstate 	for 	negligent
entrustment and a claim that Interstate did not properly maintain
the truck. 	Plaintiffs further argue that if additional discovery
reveals evidence to support such claims, then Plaintiffs can amend
their 	complaint 	to 	add 	them. 	But 	Plaintiffs 	did 	not 	explain 	why
they 	could 	not 	discover 	such 	evidence 	(if 	it 	exists) 	during 	the
now-completed 	discovery 	of 	Interstate’s 	connections 	to 	the 	truck
and to Markling.
Plaintiffs’ 	first 	potential 	“new” 	cause 	of 	action 	against
Interstate 	is 	for 	negligent 	entrustment 	of 	a 	vehicle. 	The 	claim
is 	not 	new; 	Plaintiffs 	asserted 	this 	claim 	against 	Interstate 	in
their original complaint. 	To state a negligent entrustment claim
against 	the 	owner 	of 	a 	vehicle, 	a 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	the
owner gave the driver permission to drive its vehicle, with “actual
knowledge 	that 	the 	driver 	[was] 	incompetent 	or 	habitually
reckless.” 	Riley 	v. 	Barreras, 	890 	S.E.2d 	36, 	38 	(Ga. 	Ct. 	App.
2023) (quoting Dougherty Equip. Co. v. Roper, 757 S.E.2d 885, 890
(Ga. 	Ct. 	App. 	2014)). 	Here, 	Plaintiffs 	assert 	that 	discovery
revealed 	evidence 	from 	which 	a 	reasonable 	factfinder 	could
conclude that Interstate did not adequately vet LKQ or its drivers
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before 	it 	leased 	the 	truck 	to 	LKQ. 	But 	Plaintiffs 	acknowledge
that 	such 	evidence 	is 	not 	enough 	to 	establish 	a 	negligent
entrustment 	claim. 	See 	id. 	(“The 	entrustor 	is 	not 	liable 	merely
because 	he 	or 	she, 	by 	the 	exercise 	of 	reasonable 	care 	and
diligence, could have ascertained the fact of the incompetency of
the 	driver.”) 	(quoting 	Western 	Indus. 	v. 	Poole, 	634 	S.E.2d 	118,
120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)). 	Plaintiffs did not point to any evidence
that 	Markling 	was 	incompetent 	or 	habitually 	reckless 	or 	that
Interstate 	had 	actual 	knowledge 	of 	such 	issues. 	Plaintiffs 	also
did 	not 	explain 	why 	they 	could 	not 	discover 	facts 	regarding
Markling’s 	driving 	record 	or 	Interstate’s 	knowledge 	of 	it 	when
they 	had 	an 	opportunity 	to 	conduct 	discovery 	on 	Interstate’s
connections 	to 	Markling. 	For 	all 	these 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	finds
that the pleadings at the time of removal, as supplemented by the
evidence in the present record, do not demonstrate any possibility
that 	Plaintiffs 	can 	establish 	a 	negligent 	entrustment 	cause 	of
action against Interstate.
Plaintiffs’ 	other 	potential 	new 	cause 	of 	action 	against
Interstate 	is 	for 	failure 	to 	keep 	the 	truck 	in 	safe 	operating
condition. 	During discovery, Plaintiffs learned that there was a
rental 	agreement 	between 	Interstate 	and 	LKQ, 	which 	required
Interstate 	to 	maintain 	the 	truck 	safe 	in 	operating 	condition 	and
to 	repair 	the 	truck 	in 	the 	event 	of 	a 	mechanical 	failure.
Plaintiffs 	hypothesize 	that 	additional 	discovery 	might 	show 	that
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Interstate 	breached 	its 	contractual 	duties 	and 	that 	there 	were
mechanical defects in the truck that could have contributed to the
wreck. 	But the only evidence Plaintiffs pointed to on this issue
is 	the 	rental 	contract, 	which 	stated 	that 	LKQ 	acknowledged 	that
the truck was in good repair at the time of rental. 	Rental Contract
¶ 3.B. 	Plaintiffs did not point to any evidence to create a fact
dispute 	on 	this 	issue, 	such 	as 	evidence 	from 	which 	a 	reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the truck was not in good repair at
the 	time 	of 	rental 	or 	that 	it 	developed 	a 	mechanical 	defect 	that
Interstate knew about before the wreck but failed to repair. 	And,
Plaintiffs 	did 	not 	explain 	why 	they 	could 	not 	obtain 	basic
information 	about 	the 	truck’s 	condition 	during 	their 	recent
opportunity 	to 	conduct 	discovery 	on 	Interstate’s 	connection 	to
Markling 	and 	the 	truck. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the
pleadings 	at 	the 	time 	of 	removal, 	as 	supplemented 	by 	evidence 	in
the 	present 	record, 	do 	not 	demonstrate 	any 	possibility 	that
Plaintiffs can establish a cause of action against Interstate for
failure to maintain the truck in safe operating condition.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
Defendants 	sufficiently 	established 	that 	there 	is 	no 	possibility
Plaintiffs 	can 	establish 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	Interstate.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	grants 	Defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss
Interstate 	for 	misjoinder 	(ECF 	No. 	21) 	to 	the 	following 	extent:
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the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Interstate 	was 	fraudulently 	joined, 	and 	the
Court 	thus 	dismisses 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	against 	Interstate 	and
denies Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (ECF No. 10). 	Within twenty-
one 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	this 	order, 	the 	remaining 	parties 	shall
file a proposed scheduling order that complies with the Rules 16/26
order that was issued on June 23, 2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 12th day of January, 2026.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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