Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
R.R.C.,
Petitioner,
vs.
Warden JASON STREEVAL, et al.
Respondents.
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CASE NO. 4:25-CV-525 (CDL)
O R D E R
The 	Stewart 	Detention 	Center 	saga 	continues. 	This 	time,
detainees 	claim 	that 	Respondents 	have 	blatantly 	ignored 	this
Court’s 	prior 	orders 	directing 	that 	detainees 	be 	provided 	with 	a
meaningful 	bond 	hearing 	pursuant 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226 	and 	the
applicable regulations. 	Each Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce
Judgment 	and 	to 	Show 	Cause 	Re 	Contempt 	(ECF 	No. 	11).1 	The 	Court
held 	a 	hearing 	on 	the 	motions. 	During 	the 	hearing, 	the 	Court
expressed 	skepticism 	about 	its 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	and
noted 	the 	dearth 	of 	evidence 	supporting 	Petitioners’ 	conspiracy
theory 	that 	the 	entire 	alien 	bond 	hearing 	process 	has 	become 	a
sham. 	At 	the 	close 	of 	the 	hearing, 	Petitioners 	requested 	an
1 Motions 	almost 	identical 	to 	the 	one 	filed 	in 	this 	case 	have 	been 	filed 	in
several other cases pending in this Court. The Court has consolidated those
cases with this one. 	Order Consolidating Cases (Feb. 24, 2026), ECF No. 17 in
4:25-cv-525 (CDL). 	Those cases are: 	4:25-cv-527 (CDL), 4:26-cv-73 (CDL), 4:26-
cv-76 (CDL), 4:26-cv-98 (CDL), 4:26-cv-163 (CDL), 4:26-cv-176 (CDL), 4:26-cv-
226 (CDL), 4:26-cv-249 (CDL), 4:26-cv-266 (CDL), 4:26-cv-271 (CDL). 	For the
reasons stated in the consolidation order, the Court also consolidates 4:26-
cv-206 (CDL) into this proceeding.
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opportunity to file supplemental briefing and a motion to conduct
discovery in an attempt to bolster the conspiracy claim. The Court
granted 	that 	request. 	The 	supplemental 	briefing, 	including
Respondents’ response, has been filed.
Petitioners 	double 	down 	on 	the 	arguments 	they 	made 	in 	their
original 	motions 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	release 	Petitioners 	from
detention 	based 	on 	Respondents’ 	failure 	to 	follow 	the 	Court’s
previous 	orders. 	In 	the 	alternative, 	Petitioners 	seek 	discovery
to 	support 	their 	claims. 	While 	Petitioners 	frame 	the 	motion 	as
one 	asking 	the 	Court 	to 	enforce 	its 	previous 	order, 	the 	motion
(as 	the 	Court 	observed 	at 	the 	hearing) 	in 	essence 	seeks 	to 	have
the Court second-guess the discretion of the immigration judge in
her denial of Petitioners’ requests for bond.
Recognizing 	its 	limited 	jurisdiction, 	the 	Court 	has 	never
ordered 	Respondents 	to 	grant 	any 	Petitioner 	a 	bond. 	The 	Court
ordered 	Respondents 	to 	conduct 	a 	bond 	hearing 	consistent 	with
8 U.S.C. 	§ 	1226 	and 	the 	applicable 	regulations. 	Order 	(Jan. 	22,
2026), ECF No. 9 (citing J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-CV-342-CDL,
2025 	WL 	3050094 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	Nov. 	1, 	2025) 	and 	P.R.S. 	v. 	Streeval,
No. 	4:25-CV-330-CDL, 	2025 	WL 	3269947 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	Nov. 	24, 	2025)).
The 	present 	record 	establishes 	that 	bond 	hearings 	have 	been 	held
by an immigration judge who denied the bond requests. 	Petitioners
complain that the immigration judge did not conduct a sufficiently
thorough 	and 	neutral 	review 	of 	each 	Petitioner’s 	bond 	request.
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Pretermitting 	whether 	the 	immigration 	judge 	was 	appropriately
diligent 	and 	fair, 	it 	is 	clear 	that 	the 	decision 	to 	grant 	a 	bond
in 	a 	particular 	case 	is 	a 	discretionary 	one. 	Congress 	never
intended for the district courts to act as intermediate appellate
courts 	with 	jurisdiction 	to 	review 	those 	individualized 	bond
decisions.
To 	the 	contrary, 	Congress 	expressly 	stripped 	the 	courts 	of
such 	jurisdiction. 	See 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(e) 	(“The 	Attorney
General’s[/Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security’s] 	discretionary
judgment regarding the application of [§ 1226] shall not be subject
to 	review. 	No 	court 	may 	set 	aside 	any 	action 	or 	decision 	by 	the
Attorney 	General[/Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security] 	under 	[§ 	1226]
regarding 	the 	detention 	of 	any 	alien 	or 	the 	revocation 	or 	denial
of bond or parole.”) (emphasis added). 	As explained by the Supreme
Court, 	“§ 	1226(e) 	precludes 	an 	alien 	from 	‘challenging 	a
“discretionary 	judgment” 	by 	the 	Attorney 	General[/Secretary 	of
Homeland 	Security] 	or 	a 	“decision” 	that 	the 	Attorney
General[/Secretary 	of 	Homeland 	Security] 	has 	made 	regarding 	his
detention or release.’” 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295
(2018) 	(quoting 	Denmore 	v. 	Kim, 	538 	U.S. 	510, 	516 	(2003)).
Therefore, 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	Petitioners 	challenge 	the
individualized decision-making of the immigration judge under the
facts 	of 	their 	specific 	cases, 	this 	Court 	does 	not 	have
jurisdiction to review those decisions.
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This 	jurisdiction-stripping 	provision, 	however, 	does 	not
prevent 	an 	alien 	from 	challenging 	the 	Government’s 	detention
authority under the “statutory framework as a whole.” 	Id. at 295-
296.2 	Similarly, the Court finds that it would have jurisdiction
to 	review 	a 	claim 	that 	Respondents 	have 	engaged 	in 	a 	systemic
scheme 	to 	deny 	meaningful 	bond 	review 	in 	violation 	of 	an 	alien’s
due process and statutory rights. 	Petitioners’ counsel has crafted
such 	a 	claim 	based 	on 	a 	conspiracy 	theory 	that 	the 	entire 	bond
process 	has 	been 	rendered 	a 	sham 	by 	the 	Executive 	Branch. 	Thus,
according 	to 	counsel, 	Petitioners 	were 	denied 	their 	due 	process
right 	to 	a 	bond 	decision 	by 	a 	neutral 	arbiter. 	Petitioners’
counsel, along with many of her colleagues in the immigration bar,
accuse the Executive Branch of corrupting the Justice Department’s
Executive 	Office 	of 	Immigration 	Review 	making 	it 	a 	mere 	rubber
stamp 	for 	the 	President’s 	deportation 	policies. 	Given 	that 	the
independent 	neutrality 	of 	the 	EOIR 	process 	is 	essential 	for
satisfying 	the 	due 	process 	requirements 	of 	the 	Constitution,
counsel’s accusations, if true, have serious consequences. 	But as
the 	Court 	alluded 	to 	at 	the 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	is 	skeptical 	that
the present record supports these allegations.
The 	evidence 	presented 	by 	Petitioner 	thus 	far 	consists
primarily of unsubstantiated hearsay and speculation flavored with
2 That is partly why the Court had jurisdiction to decide that § 1226 and not §
1225 (mandatory detention) applies in these and other similar cases.
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a degree of hyperbolic advocacy. See, e.g., Burman Aff. ¶ 19, ECF
No. 	11-5 	(“From 	conversations 	within 	the 	immigration 	bench 	and
professional organizations, it is clear . . .”); id. ¶ 20 (“I have
noticed 	increasing 	concern 	among 	members 	of 	the 	bench 	. . .”);
Baxter Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 11-7 (“There is reason to believe judges
have 	been 	instructed 	to 	deny 	bonds.”); 	Evans 	Decl. 	¶ 13, 	ECF 	No.
11-8 (“As reported throughout the country, due process is dead in
immigration 	court.”); 	id. 	(“It 	is 	abundantly 	clear 	that
immigration 	judges 	prioritize 	their 	job 	security 	over 	serving 	as
neutral 	magistrates 	at 	the 	expense 	of 	some 	of 	the 	world’s 	most
vulnerable 	people.”); 	Modi 	Decl. 	¶ 11, 	ECF 	No. 	11-10
(“Unfortunately, this . . . is a common occurrence in immigration
courts 	around 	the 	country 	where 	immigration 	judges 	are 	no 	longer
neutral 	arbitrators 	as 	they 	fear 	retaliation 	and 	firing 	by 	the
executive branch.”).
While 	sensational, 	such 	evidence 	is 	notoriously 	unreliable,
particularly when it is unsupported by any hard data substantiating
the conclusory allegations. 	Counsel is not required to produce a
“smoking gun,” but the absence of any direct evidence is telling.
Counsel’s 	conspiracy 	theory 	rests 	upon 	the 	slender 	reed 	that
certain circumstances in combination cannot possibly be the result
of 	coincidence. 	They 	must 	be 	the 	fruit 	of 	a 	devious 	and 	illegal
(or 	at 	least 	extra-constitutional) 	purposeful 	plan. 	Those
circumstances 	were 	described 	by 	one 	affiant 	as 	follows: 	“[T]he
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abrupt, 	uniform 	denial 	of 	bond—combined 	with 	judge 	reassignments
and 	the 	abandonment 	of 	prior 	practices—strongly 	suggests
coordinated 	action 	by 	EOIR 	and 	the 	Department 	of 	Justice 	to
undermine 	federal 	habeas 	relief.” 	Zambrano 	Decl. 	¶ 33, 	ECF 	No.
11-12. 	Counsel’s 	circumstantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	present 	record
can 	be 	summarized 	as 	follows: 	a 	perception 	that 	bonds 	are 	being
denied 	more 	frequently 	during 	the 	last 	several 	weeks, 	some
immigration 	judges 	are 	not 	thoroughly 	studying 	the 	record 	before
they 	deny 	bond, 	some 	immigration 	judges 	are 	not 	considering 	the
appropriate 	factors 	in 	deciding 	whether 	a 	detainee 	is 	a 	flight
risk, 	and 	several 	immigration 	judges 	have 	been 	fired. 	The 	Court
finds 	this 	evidence 	insufficient 	to 	support 	the 	inference 	that 	a
systemic 	failure 	of 	due 	process 	has 	occurred 	within 	the 	alien
removal process.
Petitioners 	now 	seek 	to 	conduct 	discovery 	to 	bolster 	this
record. 	The 	Court 	finds 	that 	they 	should 	be 	allowed 	to 	do 	so—in
a targeted and limited manner. 	The evidence that may theoretically
exist 	to 	support 	Petitioners’ 	claim 	of 	a 	systemic 	denial 	of 	due
process 	is 	controlled 	entirely 	by 	Respondents 	and 	agents 	of 	the
Government 	responsible 	for 	the 	administration 	of 	the 	immigration
review 	process 	by 	the 	Executive 	Branch. 	Furthermore, 	the 	Court
finds that Petitioners’ request for some discovery is not so devoid
of 	good 	faith 	that 	it 	amounts 	to 	an 	attempt 	to 	engage 	in 	an
unrestrained 	fishing 	expedition. 	A 	reasonable 	basis 	exists 	for
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permitting 	limited 	and 	targeted 	discovery. 	For 	example,
Petitioners 	pointed 	to 	some 	evidence 	of 	a 	dramatic 	reduction 	in
the number of bond approvals recently without an obvious change in
circumstances 	that 	would 	reasonably 	explain 	the 	change.
Furthermore, the Executive Branch’s aggressive enforcement of the
immigration laws with a “stretch it to the limit approach” creates
the 	potential 	for 	a 	disregard 	of 	traditional 	constitutional
guardrails. 	Counsel 	should 	be 	allowed 	to 	discover 	reliable
evidence 	that 	may 	substantiate 	the 	claim 	that 	this 	approach
includes a corruption of the immigration review process.
The 	Court 	finds 	Respondents’ 	objection 	to 	any 	discovery
unpersuasive. 	It 	is 	telling 	that 	Respondents, 	throughout 	their
briefing, 	rely 	heavily 	on 	the 	affidavit 	of 	Daren 	Margolin, 	the
Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, submitted
in 	opposition 	to 	Petitioners’ 	motion; 	yet 	they 	suggest 	that
Petitioner 	has 	no 	right 	to 	discover 	evidence 	to 	contest 	that
affidavit. 	This 	“trust 	us” 	without 	a 	right 	to 	verify 	attitude
demonstrates 	a 	misunderstanding 	of 	statutory 	and 	constitutional
law.
The 	Court 	reminds 	counsel 	for 	Respondents, 	as 	it 	has 	on
previous occasions, the Executive Branch’s authority in this area
is broad but not unlimited. 	See J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-CV-
342-CDL, 2025 WL 3050094, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025); see also
Y.A.P.A. 	v. 	Trump, 	785 	F.Supp.3d 	1350, 	1359 	(M.D. 	Ga. 	2025).
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Constitutional 	guardrails 	exist 	to 	prevent 	any 	branch 	of
government 	from 	steamrolling 	individuals 	based 	simply 	upon
unbridled power and the perceived unpopularity of the steamrolled
victim. 	As 	the 	Court 	has 	acknowledged 	in 	today’s 	Order, 	the
Judicial 	Branch’s 	jurisdiction 	is 	limited 	as 	to 	its 	authority 	to
interfere 	with 	individualized 	bond 	decisions. 	But 	the 	Executive
Branch may not design a system that reshapes the immigration review
process 	in 	a 	manner 	that 	tilts 	the 	delicate 	due 	process 	balance
against aliens. 	Systemically denying a meaningful opportunity for
release on a bond, when Congress has determined that detention is
not mandatory, makes detention de facto mandatory. 	Such a systemic
denial, 	if 	proven, 	not 	only 	disrespects 	Congress 	and 	the
Constitution, 	but 	it 	also 	violates 	this 	Court’s 	previous 	order
requiring Respondents to provide each Petitioner with a meaningful
bond 	hearing. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	grants 	Petitioners’ 	motion
for discovery (ECF Nos. 20-9, 21) to the following extent.3
Petitioners 	are 	permitted 	to 	propound 	the 	following 	narrow
and targeted discovery:
3 Petitioners argue in their briefing that the regulations improperly place the
burden of proof for a bond on the alien. Yet they seek to have the Court enforce
the judgment that ordered a hearing consistent with those very regulations, and
they ask the Court to hold Respondents in contempt for failing to follow the
Court’s order. If the regulations place the burden on the alien and if those
regulations 	regarding 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	were 	followed 	consistent 	with 	the
Court’s directive, there can be no contempt for placing the burden on the alien.
While Petitioners may ultimately be able to challenge the regulation, the Court
finds that the motion to enforce judgment/motion for contempt here is not the
proper procedure for doing so.
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1. Interrogatory: 	For the period January 1, 2025 to March 1,
2026, 	state 	the 	following: 	(a) 	the 	number 	of 	petitions
under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2241 	filed 	by 	alleged 	aliens 	in 	the
Middle 	District 	of 	Georgia 	broken 	down 	by 	Division; 	(b)
the 	number 	of 	bond/detention 	hearings 	held 	in 	the 	above
identified cases, indicating the dates of the hearings and
a 	brief 	summary 	of 	the 	disposition 	(i.e. 	bond
granted/amount of bond or bond denied and the stated reason
for 	denial); 	and 	(c) 	the 	number 	of 	cases 	in 	the 	above
identified 	group 	of 	cases 	in 	which 	the 	detainee 	was
released from detention on bond or some other form of pre-
removal 	release, 	including 	the 	date 	of 	the 	bond/release
decision.
2. Request 	for 	Production 	of 	Documents: 	For 	the 	period
January 	1, 	2025 	to 	March 	1, 	2026, 	produce 	the 	following:
any 	documents, 	electronic 	communications, 	and/or 	digital
data 	in 	which 	any 	employee, 	agent 	or 	official 	of
Respondents, including the Executive Office of Immigration
Review 	and 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security, 	describes
policy and/or guidance regarding bond decisions for aliens
who 	are 	arrested 	pending 	removal 	that 	was 	different 	from
the policy and/or guidance that existed during the calendar
year 	2024. 	This 	discovery 	request 	seeks 	any 	information
that 	shows 	any 	change 	in 	Executive 	Branch 	policy 	and/or
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guidance 	regarding 	bond 	decisions, 	which 	change 	occurred
after 	the 	current 	administration 	took 	office. 	To 	the
extent that Respondents claim that a legal privilege exists
protecting 	against 	the 	disclosure 	of 	any 	of 	the requested
evidence, 	Respondents 	shall 	submit 	the 	evidence 	to 	the
Court 	for 	its 	in 	camera 	review 	with 	a 	contemporaneously
filed privilege log filed on the public docket.
3. Depositions: 	Respondents shall make the following persons
available for Petitioners’ counsel to depose: (a) Mr. Daren
K. 	Margolin, 	who 	filed 	the 	affidavit 	on 	behalf 	of 	the
Executive 	Office 	of 	Immigration 	Review 	in 	opposition 	to
Petitioner’s 	motion, 	or 	some 	other 	designated 	witness 	who
has personal knowledge of the information contained in that
affidavit 	and 	has 	the 	authority 	to 	aver 	to 	the 	truth 	or
falsity of the statements in the 	affidavit. (b) 	A Federal
Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	30(b)(6) 	designated 	witness 	to
testify 	on 	the 	subjects 	the 	court 	has 	found 	discoverable
in 1 and 2 above.
The parties shall confer within seven days of today’s order in an
attempt 	to 	reach 	a 	schedule 	for 	completing 	the 	above 	authorized
discovery. 	The proposed scheduling order shall include the dates
that the discovery requests will be propounded by Petitioners, the
due date for the responses to the discovery requests, the date by
which any 30(b)(6) deponent shall be designated, the dates by which
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any 	depositions 	shall 	be 	taken, 	and 	the 	schedule 	for 	filing 	any
supplemental briefing after all discovery has been completed. 	That
jointly proposed scheduling order shall be submitted to the Court
by 	March 	24, 	2026. 	If 	the 	parties 	cannot 	agree 	on 	the 	schedule,
each 	party 	shall 	submit 	their 	separate 	proposed 	scheduling 	order
by March 24, 2026.
*****
Congress 	has 	trusted 	the 	Executive 	Branch 	to 	review 	the
legality 	of 	Executive 	Branch 	immigration 	removal 	decisions,
substantially restricting judicial review. 	Some may consider such
delegation to amount to “the fox guarding the henhouse.” But it is
allowed—assuming 	that 	the 	review 	process 	has 	certain 	minimal 	due
process 	protections. 	It 	is 	for 	the 	Judicial 	Branch 	to 	decide
whether 	(and 	to 	what 	extent) 	the 	Constitutional 	leash 	must 	be
fitted upon the fox. 	The Court intends to answer that question in
this case. 	The approved limited discovery should help it do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of March, 2026.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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