HAMILTON v. JESTER et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
STANLEY L. HAMILTON, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 5:24-cv-186-TES-CHW
:
Warden TEKETA JESTER, et al., 	: 	Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
: 	Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
Defendant. 	:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Stanley L. Hamilton, a state inmate, filed a pro se civil rights complaint seeking
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding his confinement at Central State Prison (CSP) in Macon,
Georgia. (Doc. 5).1 Defendant Vonteria Smith now moves for summary judgment. (Doc. 17).
Plaintiff has responded and opposes the motion. (Doc. 19). As discussed below, the undisputed
facts show that Defendant did not violate Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, it is
RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action in June 2024 alleging constitutional violations regarding his
incarceration at CSP. (Doc. 1). Following screening of Plaintiff’s recast complaint (Docs. 5, 6)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on his conditions of confinement
claim against multiple defendants. (Doc. 6). In his conditions of confinement claim, Plaintiff
1 Following review of Plaintiff’s initial complaint (Doc. 1), the Court ordered Plaintiff to recast his
complaint. (Doc. 4). Plaintiff was also notified that the recast complaint would supersede the original. (Id.,
pp. 8–11).
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alleges that Defendant Smith knew about the dangerous condition of his cell and failed to
immediately remove him from that cell. (Doc. 5).
Defendant Smith filed an answer which raised the defenses of failure to state a claim,
sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to exhaust, among others. (Doc. 15). The
parties then engaged in a period of discovery, including the deposition of Plaintiff. See (Doc. 17-2).
Defendant Smith has now filed a motion for summary judgment which Plaintiff opposes. (Docs.
17, 19).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,” that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–
24 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014).
Although Plaintiff responded to Defendant Smith’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.
145), he did not specifically respond to Defendant Smith’s statement of material facts as required
by Local Rule 56. See MDGA Local Rule 56. This failure could trigger consequences under both
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
56(e)(2) provides that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c),” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the
motion.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)(2). This Court’s Local Rule 56 similarly provides: “All material
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facts contained in the movant’s statement which are not specifically controverted by specific
citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless
otherwise inappropriate.” MDGA Local Rule 56. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the record
of evidence, which includes the deposition of Plaintiff, to determine whether the facts set forth in
Defendant Smith’s statement are undisputed.
Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that the Court may “grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered
undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to” summary judgment. F ED. R. C IV. P.. 56(e)(3); see
also Urdanetta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 F. App’x 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, because Defendant Smith properly supported her factual assertions with
specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond pursuant to Local Rule 56,
Defendant Smith’s facts may be accepted by the Court as undisputed. If evidence in the record
shows that a fact is disputed, the Court has drawn all justifiable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor for
purposes of summary judgment.
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff’s claim stems from his incarceration at CSP in September and October 2023. (Doc.
5, p. 6). Defendant Smith was a counselor at CSP during the relevant period. (Doc. 17-4, ¶ 3).
On September 22, 2023, Plaintiff was placed in Dormitory G-1, 206-B for quarantine due
to COVID-19. (Docs. 17-2, p. 2; 17-3, p. 1). Plaintiff testified in his deposition that when he was
moved into the cell, there was sewage on the floor. (Doc. 17-2, p. 7). The sewage was coming
from a toilet in the cell next door that would wash into Plaintiff’s cell. (Id.). This continued for the
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entire period Plaintiff was housed in this cell.2 (Id., pp. 3, 7). The sewage water would be two to
three inches deep in the back of the cell and roughly half an inch deep towards the door. (Id., p. 8).
On September 28, 2023, Defendant Smith visited Plaintiff’s cell for a wellness check. (Docs. 17-4,
¶ 6; 17-5). Plaintiff testified that he complained abiut the flooding and asked Defendant Smith for
a grievance form. (Doc. 17-2, pp. 5, 8–9). Defendant Smith returned with a form shortly thereafter
but did not enter the cell. (Id., pp. 5, 9, 10). Plaintiff did not discuss the condition of his cell when
he gave Defendant Smith the grievance form. (Id., p. 9). Defendant Smith has testified in her sworn
declaration that Plaintiff did not inform her of the sewage and that she did not observe the sewage
or flooding when she visited the cell. (Doc. 17-4, ¶¶ 7–8).
ANALYSIS
In her motion for summary judgment, Defendant Smith argues that (1) Plaintiff cannot
prove a constitutional violation, and (2) Defendant Smith is entitled to qualified immunity. As
discussed below, the record, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, fails to establish as
a genuine issue of material fact that Defendant Smith violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
Rights. Further, Defendant Smith is entitled to qualified immunity.
I. 	Conditions of Confinement
The 	Eighth 	Amendment, 	incorporated 	against 	the 	States 	through 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments” upon prisoners. U.S.
C ONST. amend. VIII. The conditions of confinement under which a prisoner is held become “cruel
2 Plaintiff testified repeatedly that he was housed in the cell for 23 days (Doc. 17-2, pp. 3, 4). At other times
during his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he moved into the cell on September 22, 2023, and moved out
on October 2, 2023. (Id., pp. 2, 3, 6, 7). Defendant Smith provided Plaintiff’s movement history which lists
Plaintiff as having stayed in the cell from September 22 to October 2, 2023. (Doc. 17-3, p. 1). The record
is construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
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and unusual” only when (1) they “involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,”
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347 (1981)); (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to those conditions, see LaMarca
v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); and (3) the plaintiff has shown
that the injury was caused by the defendants’ wrongful conduct, see Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510
F.3d 1312, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 2007).
A plaintiff establishes that prison conditions involved the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain through “an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently
serious’ to constitute a denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’” Thomas v.
Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994)). Only extreme conditions are sufficient to constitute an unconstitutional deprivation or
injury under this standard. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). A plaintiff can
establish deliberate indifference through “a subjective showing that the official had a ‘sufficiently
culpable state of mind.’” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A plaintiff
must show that the defendant “was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”
and that the defendant “acted ‘with subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law’” in
disregarding that risk. Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. at 839). Even if the risk was known, the defendant may still not be found liable, so long
as he acted reasonably. Id. at 1255 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 837). Finally, the defendant
must actually have been in a position to intervene for liability to attach. Terry v. Bailey, 376 F.
App’x 894, 896 (11th Cir. 2010).
Where the first two elements of a conditions of confinement claim are defined by the Eighth
Amendment, the third element is governed by Section 1983, which requires “proof of an
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affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state
law’ and the constitutional deprivation.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538 (citations omitted). In this
case, Plaintiff has not met his burden as to each element of his conditions of confinement claim.
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
inhumane ones.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Prolonged exposure to raw sewage “evokes both the
health concerns emphasized in Farmer and the more general standards of dignity embodied in the
Eighth Amendment.” Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases)
(quoting DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001). “In evaluating whether such
exposure satisfies the objective component of the conditions of confinement analysis, ‘the
frequency and duration of the condition, as well as the measures employed to alleviate the
condition, must be considered.’” Jones v. Ward, No. 520-cv-336-CAR-MSH, 2023 WL 4868550,
at *11 (M.D. Ga. July 31, 2023) (citations omitted).
The version of the facts most favorable to Plaintiff shows as follows. During a period of
twenty-three days, Plaintiff was placed in a cell that was flooded with sewage. (Doc. 17-2, p. 7).
Every time the inmate in the cell next door flushed, the sewage water washed into Plaintiff’s cell.
(Id.). There was no drain in Plaintiff’s cell, and there was nowhere for the sewage to go except
under or around the cell door. (Id.). Although Plaintiff did not have any cleaning supplies, an
orderly would come by every day and mop up the water outside of the door. (Id., pp. 7, 8). The
water was approximately two to three inches deep in the back of his cell and approximately half
an inch deep near the door, and Plaintiff had an old mattress that he placed on the floor to walk
across. (Id., p. 8). Plaintiff was able to use his own toilet during the relevant time period. (Id.). On
September 28, 2023, Defendant Smith completed a quarterly wellness check and visited Plaintiff’s
cell. (Docs. 17-4, ¶ 6; 17-5). During this visit, Plaintiff complained of the flooding and asked
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Defendant Smith for a grievance form. 3 (Doc. 17-2, pp. 5, 8–9). Defendant Smith complied and
returned shortly thereafter to pick up Plaintiff’s grievance. (Id.). Plaintiff had no further contact
with Defendant Smith until after he was moved out of this cell. (Id., p. 9). Plaintiff does not
contradict Defendant Smith’s statement in her sworn declaration that she did not have any role in
Plaintiff’s cell assignment. See (Doc. 17-4, ¶ 10).
As to the first element of his claim, Plaintiff arguably makes a showing that the condition
of his cell was “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency.” Chandler, 379 F.3d
at 1289; see Grimes v. Thomas, No. 2:12-CV-01909-LSC, 2014 WL 554700, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb.
12, 2014) (collecting cases). Plaintiff’s testimony that his cell was under half an inch to three
inches of sewage water and that he had to place down an old mattress to avoid the sewage is
sufficient to meet the objective prong.
Plaintiff is not able to meet the remaining elements of his conditions of confinement claim
against Defendant Smith, as he has not shown that she acted with deliberate indifference or was
responsible for the violation of his rights. He argues that he feels Defendant Smith should have
“done something more” in the grievance process. (Id.). The undisputed evidence in the record
establishes that Defendant Smith had no role in Plaintiff’s housing assignment. (Doc. 17-4, ¶ 10).
Plaintiff’s only contact with Defendant Smith was when he informed her of the condition of the
cell and requested a grievance, to which Defendant Smith complied. (Doc. 17-2, pp. 8–9). Plaintiff
has not shown that, even assuming Defendant Smith had subjective knowledge of the risk,
Defendant Smith acted with “recklessness as used in the criminal law” in disregarding that risk.
Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. His testimony that Defendant Smith should have “done something more”
3 Defendant Smith provided in her sworn declaration that Plaintiff never complained of any sewage and
that she did not observe any sewage. (Doc. 17-4, ¶¶ 7–8). The record is construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.
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is not sufficient to show deliberate indifference, especially in light of Plaintiff’s testimony that he
wanted to drop the lawsuit against Defendant Smith because he “only wanted her involved [] to
get her testimony.” (Doc. 17-2, pp. 4, 7). Moreover, Plaintiff has not made any showing that
Defendant Smith could have resolved the issue or had Plaintiff transferred sooner. As such,
Plaintiff fails to meet both the second and third elements of his conditions of confinement claim.
Because no reasonable jury could conclude on the record evidence that Defendant Smith was
deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff has failed to show
that Defendant Smith violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
II. 	Qualified immunity
When considering whether summary judgment is appropriate based on qualified immunity,
the Court “[draws] all inferences and [views] all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Jones v. Michael, 656 F. App'x 923, 925 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted). 	“The 	defense 	of 	qualified 	immunity 	completely 	protects 	government 	officials
performing discretionary functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1232 (internal quotations omitted). Defendant Smith “cannot
obtain qualified immunity unless [s]he establishes that [s]he was acting within [her] discretionary
authority.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021).
Once action under discretionary authority has been established, “the burden shifts to the
plaintiff, who must show [the defendant] is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 1328 (citation
omitted). “At [this] stage, [the Court asks] two questions: (1) ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) if so, ‘whether the right at
issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Id. at 1328
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(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). Both must be present for Plaintiff to prevail. Id. Thus, Plaintiff
must show a violation of a constitutional right to survive summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s allegation pertains to Defendant Smith’s actions in the course of her duties as a
counselor, in which she conducted a wellness check and was given a grievance. Plaintiff does not
rebut Defendant Smith’s assertion that she was acting within the scope of her discretionary
authority. Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant Smith has shown that she was acting
within the scope of her discretionary authority at the relevant times and is eligible to assert
qualified immunity.
Because she was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority, Plaintiff must show
that Defendant Smith violated his constitutional rights. As discussed above, Plaintiff has not met
his burden to show that Defendant Smith violated his constitutional rights as to his conditions of
confinement claim. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of a constitutional right,
there is no need to examine the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Defendant Smith
is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Because the undisputed facts do not support Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim
against Defendant Smith, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant Smith’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 17) be GRANTED.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY
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(20) PAGES. See MDGA Local Rule 7.1. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing
to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for
failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 28th day of October, 2025.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
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