MANSON v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
LEONARDO MANSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-293 (MTT)
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
)
ORDER
Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff
Leonardo Manson’s amended complaint, which asserts claims under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and a defamation claim under Georgia law. ECF 12. For the
reasons explained below, Wells Fargo’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. The Court DISMISSES Manson’s federal claims without prejudice and REMANDS
Manson’s remaining defamation claim.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
A. Factual Background
Manson alleges he was a victim of a security breach, “the Equifax data breach,”
which exposed his personal information. ECF 11 ¶ 4. Subsequently, in 2019, an
account associated with Wells Fargo was fraudulently opened in Manson’s name. Id. ¶
3. Within eighteen months of discovering the fraudulent account, Manson disputed the
account with consumer reporting agencies and Wells Fargo. Id. ¶ 6. After investigation,
1 The Court takes the following facts from the well-pleaded allegations in the amended complaint,
construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v.
FindWhat.com., 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011).
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in 2023, the account was removed from Manson’s credit reports. Id. ¶ 8. But Wells
Fargo “reinserted” the same account in 2025. Id. ¶ 9. The reinsertion of this account
caused Manson’s credit score to drop by about sixty points. Id. ¶ 11. It also resulted in
the denial of three residential mortgage loans and in subprime auto loans. Id. ¶ 12.
Although Wells Fargo received notice of a dispute, it continues to publish the account
information to third parties. Id. ¶ 13.
B. Procedural Background
Wells Fargo removed this case to federal court in July 2025. ECF 1. Manson’s
complaint clearly failed to state a claim, but given Manson’s pro se status, the Court
allowed Manson to amend his complaint in response to Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss.
ECF 10. The Court further instructed that should Manson amend his complaint, he must
“expressly state that he has verified the accuracy of all facts alleged and all legal
authorities cited.” Id. at 3. Manson amended his complaint but did not comply with the
Court’s verification order. ECF 11. Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, and the Court issued a Griffith Notice. ECF 12, 13. Manson has not
responded to the motion to dismiss.
II. 	STANDARD
To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the court [can] draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Factual allegations that are
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merely consistent with a defendant’s liability fall short of being facially plausible.”
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012).
At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and
the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv’r Grp., 658 F.3d at 1296 (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.,
466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). But “conclusory allegations, unwarranted
deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent
dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, pleadings by pro se
litigants “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and
will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not have license to rewrite a
deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim
regardless of the alleged facts. Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d
1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA aims to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency
in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2205 (2007). “To achieve its purpose, the FCRA places distinct
obligations on three types of entities: consumer reporting agencies, users of consumer
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reports, and furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.” Chipka v. Bank
of America, 355 Fed. Appx. 380, 382 (11th Cir. 2009). Manson asserts FCRA claims
applicable to consumer reporting agencies and furnishers. See ECF 11 ¶¶ 22–24.
1. 	Consumer reporting agency claims
Manson asserts that Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B), by “illegally
reinserting deleted information without certification or consumer notice,” and § 1681e(b),
by “failing to maintain reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy.”
ECF 11 ¶¶ 23, 24. These provisions govern the conduct of consumer reporting
agencies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681i(a)(5)(B). Section 1681e(b) provides that
“[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information.” 15
U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (emphasis added). Section 1681i prescribes the terms and
procedures that consumer reporting agencies must follow when reinvestigation of
disputed information is required and states that “a consumer reporting agency . . . shall,
free of charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed
information is inaccurate.” Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
The amended complaint describes Wells Fargo as “a furnisher of information to
consumer reporting agencies,” not as a consumer reporting agency. ECF 11 ¶ 2. It also
distinguishes between Wells Fargo and consumer reporting agencies at least twice. Id.
¶¶ 6, 13. The amended complaint alleges Manson “filed disputes with consumer
reporting agencies and directly with Wells Fargo” after discovering the fraudulent 2019
account. Id. ¶ 6. It also alleges “Wells Fargo continued to publish the false information
to third parties (CRAs and lenders)”. Id. ¶ 13.
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In addition, the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege that Wells Fargo was
a consumer reporting agency in substance. The FCRA defines a “consumer reporting
agency” as “any person which . . . regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information . . . for the purpose of furnishing
consumer reports to third parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Notably, the FCRA’s definition
of “consumer report” excludes a “report containing information solely as to transactions
or experiences between the consumer and the person making the
report.” Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i); see also Smith v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 837 F.2d
1575, 1578 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here the Bank has reported information based solely
on its own experience with one of its customers, the Bank is not acting as a ‘consumer
reporting agency,’ within the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, because . . . it
has not furnished a ‘consumer report’ as that term is defined in the Act.”). The amended
complaint alleges that Wells Fargo shared information relating to a fraudulent Wells
Fargo account, but Wells Fargo does not act as a consumer reporting agency by
sharing information about a Wells Fargo account. ECF 11 ¶¶ 3, 9, 13; 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(d)(2)(A)(i).
Accordingly, Mansons’ claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(B) and § 1681e(b)
are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. 	Furnisher claim
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), “a furnisher of credit must undertake an
investigation and take other actions after the furnisher has been notified of inaccuracies
in a consumer's credit report.” Nawab v. Unifund CCR Partners, 553 F. App'x 856, 860–
61 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)); King v. Truist Bank, 2025 WL
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2814699, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (“[U]pon receipt of a notice from a credit
reporting agency that a consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of any
information provided by a furnisher, the furnisher has a duty under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(b) to conduct a reasonable investigation with respect to the disputed information.”
(citation modified)); Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir.
2018). But the Eleventh Circuit has recognized a private cause of action under § 1681s-
2(b) only “where the furnisher received notice of the consumer's dispute from a
consumer reporting agency.” Nawab, 553 F. App'x at 861 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(b)(1) (emphasis added); 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2); see also Milgram v. Chase Bank
USA, N.A., 72 F.4th 1212, 1218 n.3 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining the Eleventh Circuit has
recognized a cause of action for “indirect disputes––meaning disputes against
furnishers for not conducting a reasonable investigation after receiving notice of a
dispute from a credit reporting agency” and not considering whether there is a cause of
action for not conducting a reasonable investigation following a dispute filed directly by
the consumer).2
The amended complaint does not allege facts showing that Manson submitted a
dispute to a consumer reporting agency concerning the 2025 reinserted account. See
ECF 11. Although the amended complaint alleges Manson filed disputes with consumer
reporting agencies and directly with Wells Fargo concerning the account fraudulently
opened in his name in 2019, it does not allege that Manson filed similar disputes
concerning the 2025 reinsertion. Id. ¶ 6. And although the amended complaint asserts
2 Manson does not argue that there is a cause of action for direct disputes. Again, he has not responded
to the motion to dismiss at all.
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that Wells Fargo had notice of a dispute, it does not allege that a consumer reporting
agency notified Wells Fargo of the dispute, triggering a duty to investigate. Id. ¶¶ 13, 22.
Accordingly, Manson’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Manson’s remaining defamation claim does not provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Wells Fargo argues the Fair Credit Reporting Act
preempts Manson’s defamation claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). ECF 12 at 7–8.
However, Wells Fargo does not assert a “complete preemption” defense that would
support removal to federal court. See Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1353
(11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] federal law may substantively displace state law under ordinary
preemption but lack the extraordinary force to create federal removal jurisdiction under
the doctrine of complete preemption.”); Perry v. FirstKey Homes, LLC, 2025 WL
945601, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2025) (“Defendants have not demonstrated that the
FCRA falls into the narrow category of federal statutes that give rise to complete
preemption and allow removal of state law claims.”); Watkins v. Trans Union, L.L.C.,
118 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (“Because this court finds that Congress
did not intend to make state law causes of action defensively preempted by the FCRA
removable to federal court, it does not have removal jurisdiction over this action.”).
Thus, having dismissed without prejudice all of Manson’s federal claims, the
Court must consider whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
Manson’s defamation claim. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and “possess only
that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
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of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A district court may appropriately discontinue its
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when “the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). “[T]he district court . . . must
weigh . . . at every stage of the litigation, whether to dismiss the supplemental claims.”
Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labors, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 532 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation
modified). “A district court’s decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after
dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). “Indeed, if the federal
claims are dismissed prior to trial, [the Supreme Court] strongly encourages or even
requires dismissal of the state claims.” L.A. Draper & Son v. Wheelabrator-Frye, Inc.,
735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966)). Manson chose to begin this case in state court, and the Court, in its
discretion, will allow Manson to pursue his remaining state law claim in the forum he has
chosen. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Manson’s
defamation claim against Wells Fargo.
Accordingly, Manson’s defamation claim is REMANDED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss (ECF 12) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Court DISMISSES Manson’s FCRA claims without prejudice.
Manson’s defamation claim is REMANDED.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of April, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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