RAVAN v. DAVIS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JOHN STEPHEN RAVAN, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-511 (MTT)
)
Sheriff DAVID DAVIS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
__________________ 	)
ORDER
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff John Ravan, proceeding pro se, filed his
complaint. ECF 1. That same day, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). ECF 2. For the following reasons, Ravan’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is
GRANTED. But Ravan’s complaint lacks important factual allegations that Ravan may
have omitted because of his pro se status. Thus, the Court ORDERS Ravan to amend
his complaint by January 9, 2026.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Proceed IFP
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) governs motions to proceed IFP. It provides:
[A]ny 	court 	of 	the 	United 	States 	may 	authorize 	the 	commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person
who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such
prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.1
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all
persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “the only
determination to be made by the court is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citation modified). A plaintiff is not required to show he is “absolutely
destitute.” Id. (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339
(1948)). Rather, “an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant,
because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and
provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. “A court may not deny an IFP
motion without first comparing the applicant’s assets and liabilities in order to determine
whether he has satisfied the poverty requirement.” Thomas v. Chattahoochee Jud. Cir.,
574 F. App’x 916, 917 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307–08).
However, § 1915(a) “should not be a broad highway into the federal courts.”
Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984). Rather, it “conveys only a
privilege to proceed without payment to only those litigants unable to pay costs without
undue hardship.” Mack v. Petty, 2014 WL 3845777, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2014)
(citations omitted). District courts have “wide discretion” in deciding whether a plaintiff
can proceed IFP, and “should grant the privilege sparingly,” especially in civil cases for
damages. Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306 (citation omitted).
The Court has reviewed Ravan’s IFP affidavit. Ravan’s affidavit establishes that
he cannot pay the court fees without undue hardship. ECF 2. Thus, Ravan’s motion to
proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED.
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B. Frivolity Review
Section 1915 does not create an absolute right to proceed IFP in civil actions.
“Where the IFP affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility, the
court should first docket the case and then proceed to the question of whether the
asserted claim is frivolous.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (citation modified). When
allowing a plaintiff to proceed IFP, the Court shall dismiss the case if the Court
determines that the complaint (1) “is frivolous or malicious;” (2) “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it
appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’
or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is
governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).”2 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). However, because Ravan is
proceeding pro se, his “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d
1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified). Even so, “the district court does not
2 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss,
“all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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have license to rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x
863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Ravan’s complaint has three counts: (1) cruel and unusual punishment against
all defendants; (2) deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against “Correct
Health, Nurse Vaughn, Nurse Balkom, and Intake Nurse”; (3) failure to protect against
“Sherif Davis, Lieutenant, and Correctional Officers.” ECF 1 at 3. While Ravan provides
some factual allegations in his complaint, many important allegations are lacking such
that the Court is unable to conduct a thorough frivolity review. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(b) (stating that a court is required to dismiss a case brought by a pro se
plaintiff if it (1) is frivolous, or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief). It is not clear whether this deficiency is because of the manner in which the
allegations have been pled, or whether they simply lack substance.
However, given Ravan’s pro se status, the Court will afford him an opportunity to
amend his complaint to state viable claims. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, if more
carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court should give the pro se plaintiff an
opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it.”).
For these reasons, Ravan is ORDERED to amend his complaint to include all
facts that he wishes to make a part of these proceedings and cite the appropriate
statutory or constitutional authority for bringing his claims. Ravan shall have until
January 9, 2026, to file his amended complaint.
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In the “statement of claims” section of his amended complaint, Ravan must link
any claims he makes to a named defendant. If Ravan fails to link a named defendant to
a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Ravan makes no allegations in the body of his
complaint against a named defendant, that defendant will be removed from the action.
Ravan must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate that each defendants’
actions or omissions resulted in the violation of his rights under a specific law. It is also
recommended that, when drafting his “statement of claims,” Ravan list numbered
responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with the name of
each defendant:
(1) What did each defendant do (or not do) to violate his rights?
(2) When did each action occur?
(3) How was Ravan injured as a result of each defendant’s actions?
The amended complaint will take the place of and supersede Ravan’s original
complaint. Schreane v. Middlebrooks, 522 F. App’x 845, 847-48 (11th Cir. 2013). Ravan
may not refer to, or incorporate by reference, his previous complaint. The Court will not
look back to the facts alleged in the original complaint once the amended complaint is
filed; the Court will only consider the facts in the amended complaint when it conducts
the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271,
1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading renders the
previous pleading a “legal nullity”).
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II. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and for the reasons set forth above, Ravan’s
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED, and Ravan is ORDERED to amend his
complaint no later than January 9, 2026.
SO ORDERED, this 19th day of December, 2025.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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