HOLLEY v. COOK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
COURTNEY HOLLEY, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CASE NO.: 7:25-CV-00041 (WLS)
:
COOK COUNTY SCHOOL 	:
DISTRICT, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
:
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Cook County School District’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 25) and Defendants Corkey Taylor, Joy Folsom, and Becky Ratts’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 26). For the reasons discussed below, the Motions are GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff Courtney Holley (“Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned
action. (Doc. 1). The operative complaint, the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)
(Doc. 24), was filed on October 11, 2025. The SAC alleges five (5) causes of action. Count I
alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 61–64). Count II alleges retaliatory
hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. (Id. ¶¶ 65–68). Count III alleges retaliation
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 69–73). Count IV alleges retaliatory hostile work
environment in violation of § 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 74–78). Count V alleges retaliation in violation of
the Georgia Whistleblower Act. (Id. ¶¶ 79–82). Count VI alleges a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law. (Id. ¶¶ 83–87). And Count VII alleges a
claim for litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89). Plaintiff also seeks to
recover attorney fees and expenses under other state and federal laws. (Id. at 12–14).
Defendant Cook County School District (the “District”) filed its Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 25) on October 27, 2025. Defendants Corkey Taylor, Joy Folsom, and Becky Ratts
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(collectively, “Individual Defendants”) filed their Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) that same
day. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 27) on November 10, 2025, which incorporates by
reference her arguments made in response to Defendants’ previous motions to dismiss.1 (See
Docs. 14, 15, & 20). Defendants filed a consolidated Reply (Doc. 28) on November 20, 2025.
As such, the Motions are fully briefed and ripe for resolution.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to assert by motion the defense
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted unless the plaintiff fails to plead enough
facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible, and not merely just conceivable, on its face.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Dismissal for failure to state a claim is
proper if the factual allegations are not ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.’” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rivell v. Priv. Health
Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)). “Stated differently, the factual allegations
in the complaint must ‘possess enough heft’ to set forth ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’”
Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500 F.3d 1276, 1282
(11th Cir. 2007)). The plausibility standard “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the defendant’s liability. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556. Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice”; rather, a complaint must make plausible, factual
assertions that allow the Court to draw the required connections from the alleged harm and
the requested relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
1 The Court, and other courts in this Circuit, generally disfavor the incorporation by reference of arguments
made in earlier filings on the Docket. The practice raises problems related to page limitations and “pawn[s] off
to the Court [ ] the party’s duty to make its own arguments[.]”Euclid Turnaround Opportunity Fund LP v. Amerant
Equip. Fin., No. 25-CV-20647, 2025 WL 3905174, at *7 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2025); see Biedermann v. Ehrhart,
No. 1:20-CV-01388, 2021 WL 1061794, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2021) (explaining that incorporation by
reference “is problematic” because “cross-referencing to another brief complicates the Court’s review and
understanding of the issues” and allows parties to “exceed[ ] the applicable page limits” and denying a motion
to dismiss on that basis). While the Court is under no obligation to search for a party’s arguments buried within
another brief, and parties who engage in this incorporation-by-reference-practice do so at their own peril, the
Court will, in this limited instance, accept Plaintiff’s arguments in her first response brief, given that Defendants’
earlier motions to dismiss are nearly identical to the motions presently before the Court.
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The Court must conduct its analysis “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true
and construing them in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334,
1335 (11th Cir. 2003). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court must
“make reasonable inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor, ‘but [is] not required to draw plaintiff’s
inference.’” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Aldana
v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)), abrogated on other
grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). The Supreme Court instructs that
while on a motion to dismiss “a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint,” this principle “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which “must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), for the proposition
that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”
in a complaint.
III. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
All Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), contending that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which the Court may grant relief. (Docs. 25-1 & 26-1);
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
As alleged, Plaintiff was the Human Resources Director and Title IX Coordinator for
the Cook County School District beginning in March of 2019. (Doc. 24 ¶ 15). In this position,
Plaintiff was responsible for overseeing personnel decisions to ensure compliance with District
policy and procedure as well as state law, including decisions related to retired employees
returning to work. (Id. ¶ 34). Plaintiff reported directly to the superintendent who made all
hiring, firing, and other related employment decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16).
Sometime in 2024, Plaintiff became aware of an alleged scheme perpetrated by District
employees to defraud Georgia’s Teacher Retirement System (TRS). (Id. ¶¶ 18, 33–35). Under
this scheme, employees, who were predominantly White, were offered the opportunity to
“retire” to trigger their TRS retirement benefits with an understanding and agreement that the
retiree would be re-hired into the now-vacant position. (Id. ¶ 19). This arrangement allowed
the District to save a percentage of the contemplated salary for that position and eliminated
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the District’s health care premium costs for the retirees by transferring those payments to the
TRS. (Id. ¶ 22). The TRS prohibits these types of agreements by requiring certification that a
retiree returning to work has not entered into any agreement with a TRS employer that allows
them to return to a TRS covered position, including as an independent contractor. (Id. ¶ 23).
The re-hiring school board must certify the same to the board of trustees. (Id. ¶ 24). Plaintiff
alleges that these agreements were illegal, that the District made false certifications that no
such agreements existed, and that these improper offers for “false retirement” were made
overwhelmingly in favor of White employees. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27). In fact, during the 2024–2025
school year, four White employees in the District’s central office retired under the fraudulent
scheme. (Id. ¶ 32). All fifteen employees who worked in the District’s central office were
White. (Id. ¶ 31). The District’s finance director allegedly facilitated the scheme by “run[ning]
the retirement numbers plus the return to work pay” for White employees considering
retirement so that those employees could discuss the tax consequences of the rehiring process
with their personal accountants. (Id. ¶ 33).
After discovering the allegedly unlawful scheme, Plaintiff informed Defendants
Folsom and Ratts, who were the Interim Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent,
respectively, that they, the District, and the Board of Education were violating state law and
defrauding the TRS. (Doc. 24 ¶ 35). The complaint would have been forwarded to Defendant
Taylor, the Chairman of the Board of Education, by the superintendent. (Id. ¶ 36). On April
15, 2024, Folsom and Ratts sent an email to the District’s elementary school principal stating
that all future communications related to human resources would now be coming from them
instead of Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 37). The following day, April 16, 2024, Plaintiff notified Folsom that
any employment positions the District intended to fill for the subsequent school year needed
to be posted as vacant and asked Folsom for information about vacant positions. (Id. ¶ 38).
Folsom told Plaintiff that she should not post any vacant positions, a decision Plaintiff alleges
was made (1) because the vacant positions had already been promised to “certain retirees” that
were “principally Caucasian” and (2) to prevent racial minority candidates from learning about
the vacancies. (Id. ¶¶ 40–42). District policy and state law require that job vacancies be posted
to ensure nondiscrimination in hiring. (Id. ¶¶ 28–30).
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Ten days later, on April 26, 2024, Folsom and Ratts, at the direction or with the
approval of Taylor, told Plaintiff that her job was “on the chopping block” and that she was
going to be demoted, which would result in a loss of responsibilities, pay, and prestige.
(Doc. 24 ¶¶ 43–45). Folsom and Ratts told Plaintiff that she should start looking for a new
job in another school district in light of the anticipated pay cut that would accompany the
demotion. (Id. ¶ 46). Ratts, who was set to retire at the end of the school year, stated she would
likely take over some of Plaintiff’s job duties. (Id. ¶ 47). Folsom and Ratts, at the direction or
with the approval of Taylor, “ostracized” Plaintiff and “froze her out of meetings.” (Id.
¶¶ 48–49).
Plaintiff sought assistance from an attorney with the Professional Association of
Georgia Educators, who informed the District’s counsel that Plaintiff could not be fired due
to a contract she had previously signed for the 2024–2025 school year. (Id. ¶¶ 50–51). Counsel
for the District stated that Plaintiff would not be offered a contract for the following school
year, 2025–2026, and that he could try to persuade the District to buy out Plaintiff’s contract
for the 2024–2025 year. (Id. ¶¶ 52, 54).
On May 7, 2024, Plaintiff again emailed Folsom, along with the District’s principals,
stating that vacancies needed to be posted if they intended to fill those positions. (Id. ¶ 55).
On June 19, 2024, Plaintiff was directed to post the vacancies as part-time positions. (Id. ¶ 58).
Plaintiff alleges that the posting of these full-time positions as part-time roles served as a “work
around” to ensure that primarily White and retiring employees would be the only applicants
since “few, if any applicants in the field of education are seeking part-time jobs[.]” (Id. ¶ 59).
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that recently her mother, who is a return-to-work employee in the
District, was the only employee who was not offered a contract renewal. (Id. ¶ 60).
B. Title VII and § 1981 Retaliation Claims Against the District
In Counts I and III, Plaintiff brings retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 against the District. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 61–64, 69–73). Because the retaliation claims do not
differ factually or in argument, the Court addresses them as stated in the SAC together. See
Edwards v. Tift Reg’l Health Sys., Inc., No. 7:20-CV-3 (WLS), 2022 WL 949897, at *6 (M.D. Ga.
Mar. 29, 2022) (noting that the analysis and remedies for retaliation claims under Title VII and
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§ 1981 are similar, and “courts may apply the same framework when analyzing claims under
both statutes”). Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee “because [s]he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing [thereunder].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), and “prohibits an employer
from retaliating against an employee in response to the employee’s complaint of race-based
discrimination.” Goolsby v. City of Monroe, No. 3:22-CV-82, 2023 WL 5672509, at *9 (M.D. Ga.
Sept. 1, 2023), aff’d, No. 24-13573, 2025 WL 3013403 (11th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (citing Andrews
v. Lakeshore Rehab. Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405, 1412–13 (11th Cir. 1998)); see Foster v. Echols Cnty. Sch.
Dist., No. 7:23-CV-00089 (WLS), 2024 WL 2979543, at *10 (M.D. Ga. June 13, 2024), aff’d,
169 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2026) (“Section 1981 also provides protection from retaliation for
opposing practices which violate § 1981 rights.”). The same legal standard applies to retaliation
claims under both Title VII and § 1981. See Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1215
(11th Cir. 2008); Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying
the same three-part test to retaliation claims under § 1981 and Title VII).
To state a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or § 1981, Plaintiff must allege
that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected conduct. Trask v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2016); Locascio v. BBDO Atlanta,
Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
1. 	Protected Conduct
As to the first element, Plaintiff must allege that she engaged in protected conduct.
Title VII recognizes two forms of statutorily protected conduct. An employee is protected
from retaliation if “(1) ‘[s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by [Title VII]’ (the opposition clause) or (2) ‘[s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]’ (the
participation clause).” Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999)
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(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that she engaged in any
conduct that could conceivably fall under the participation clause.2 Thus, any retaliation claim
advanced by Plaintiff must be based on the opposition clause.
“An employee engages in protected activity if [s]he opposes an employment practice
based on a good faith, reasonable belief that the practice violates Title VII or [§] 1981.”
Edwards, 2022 WL 949897, at *6 (quoting Canty v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-3508, 2012
WL 1038611, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2012)). “Such opposition must be conveyed to the
employer through a complaint or overt rejection of what the employee believes is an illegal,
discriminatory practice.” Id. (citing Canty, 2012 WL 1038611, at *5). “Thus, an employee may
engage in protected activity by ‘voicing complaints of [racial] discrimination’ to his employer,
or by ‘refusing to follow a supervisor’s order to [engage in a discriminatory practice][.]’”
Locascio, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 1364 (quoting first Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712,
715 n.2 (11th Cir. 2002); and then Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn.,
555 U.S. 271, 277 (2009)). “There is no requirement that the discriminatory practice opposed
by the plaintiff be directed at the plaintiff [her]self, but ‘[t]he opposition must be directed at
an unlawful employment practice of an employer, not an act of discrimination by a private
individual[.]’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103
F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997)).
Further, “[t]o establish ‘statutorily protected activity[,]’ a plaintiff claiming retaliation
for opposing an unlawful employment practice must demonstrate that she believed, in good
faith, that the challenged practice was unlawful and that this subjective belief was objectively
reasonable in view of the facts, as measured against existing substantive law.” Sanford v. SCA,
Inc., No. 3:13cv153, 2014 WL 1329277, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 28, 2014), (citation modified)
(citing Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010)). A plaintiff “need not
prove the underlying claim of discrimination . . . so long as she had a reasonable good faith
belief that the discrimination existed.” Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th
2 Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in protected activity by, among other things, “filing a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC[.]” (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 62, 70). However, the SAC does not allege any facts whatsoever regarding the
EEOC charge. For instance, Plaintiff does not allege when the charge was filed, whether Defendants knew
about the charge, or whether she was targeted for filing the charge. (See generally Doc. 24). Simply put, Plaintiff
alleges no facts that would implicate the participation clause.
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Cir. 1994) (quoting Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Com., 872 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir.
1989)). In other words, “the employer’s practice, which a plaintiff opposes does not in fact
have to be unlawful . . . rather, the employee need only have a reasonable belief that the
employer’s practices are discriminatory.” Danner v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 712-CV-02391,
2013 WL 754956, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 26, 2013); see Clover, 176 F.3d at 1351 (holding that the
conduct opposed need only be “close enough” to support an objectively reasonable belief of
unlawful discrimination).
Finally, “Title VII’s protections are not limited to individuals who file formal
complaints, but extend to those who voice informal complaints as well.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs.
Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Rollins v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Law Enf’t,
868 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989)). “[T]he statute’s protections only reach individuals who
explicitly 	or 	implicitly 	communicate[ 	] a 	belief 	that 	the 	practice 	constitutes unlawful
employment discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). The relevant question is “whether the
employee’s communications to the employer sufficiently convey the employee’s reasonable
concerns that the employer has acted or is acting in an unlawful discriminatory manner.”
Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1254 (M.D. Ala. 1999), aff’d, 213 F.3d
1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Garcia–Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547, 559–60 (D.
Kan. 1995)). So “to establish that a complaint was a protected activity, the employee must ‘at
the very least, communicate her belief that discrimination is occurring to the employer, and
cannot rely on the employer to infer that discrimination has occurred.’” Pinder v. John Marshall
L. Sch., LLC, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (quoting Demers v. Adams Homes of
Nw. Fla., Inc., 321 F. App’x 847, 852 (11th Cir. 2009)).
According to the District, Plaintiff at most alleges she complained to the Individual
Defendants about a violation of O.C.G.A. § 47-3-141, which provides penalties for defrauding
the TRS and has nothing to do with discrimination. (Doc. 25-1 at 6–7). To be protected from
retaliation, Plaintiff must have opposed conduct that is unlawful (i.e., racially discriminatory)
under Title VII. See Pinder, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1263. “Generalized complaints about unfair
treatment absent references to unlawful discrimination, however, do not constitute protected
opposition conduct.” Williams v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 1:19-CV-3382, 2019 WL 13273269, at *4
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(N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-3382, 2019 WL
13273266 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2019); see Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068,
1074 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that unfair treatment, absent discrimination based on race, sex,
or national origin, is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, and that a grievance
that is void of such allegations does not constitute statutorily protected activity). Here, the
Court agrees with the District that Plaintiff’s allegation that she told Folsom and Ratts that
they and the District were defrauding the TRS through the alleged scheme does not amount
to protected activity because, as alleged, Plaintiff did not tell Defendants that she thought the
re-hiring practices were racist or violated anti-discrimination laws during this specific
encounter. (Doc. 24 ¶ 35). Plaintiff, for her part, does not argue that her opposition to the
scheme during this encounter constitutes protected activity nor could she. (See Doc. 20
at 9–10). The SAC’s allegations show that Plaintiff opposed the re-hiring practice only on the
basis that it was illegal under Georgia laws pertaining to the TRS and not under any federal or
state anti-discrimination law.
That leaves Plaintiff’s April 16, 2024 email to Folsom in which she asked which
positions were vacant and whether the District intended to fill them. Plaintiff argues in
response to the District’s Motion that her email to Folsom “insist[ed] that the District abide
by its equal employment opportunity policies by posting the vacancies[,]” which constitutes
protected activity. (Doc. 20 at 10). On its face, the SAC’s allegation regarding the April 16
email— which email itself is not yet part of the record—does not specifically mention potential
racial discrimination. (See Doc. 24 ¶ 38 (“On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff asked Folsom which
positions were vacant and whether the District intended to fill them because open positions
needed to be posted.”)). However, Plaintiff, in her role as the Human Resources Director, was
responsible for overseeing the District’s compliance with hiring policies, which included the
posting of vacant job positions. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 29, 34). The posting of vacant positions was to
ensure that vacancies were filled in a manner that avoided discrimination “on the basis of sex,
race, religion, national origin, age, or disability.” (Id. ¶ 28). Both Georgia law and the District’s
own policies required posting. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30); see O.C.G.A. § 20-2-211(d) (providing that school
districts must implement hiring practices that “assure nondiscrimination on the basis of sex,
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race, religion, or national origin[,]” and provide for “the announcement in writing of the
availability of all certificated positions within the local school system”). Plaintiff alleges that
Folsom told her not to post any vacancies because the vacant positions had already been
promised to certain retirees under the TRS scheme, which, as alleged, benefited mostly White
retirees, and so that no racial minority candidates could apply for those positions. (Id.
¶¶ 41–42).
It is reasonable to infer that by insisting that the District comply with its posting policy,
Plaintiff was implying that if the jobs were not posted, the District would be violating equal
employment opportunity laws by engaging in unlawful and discriminatory hiring practices as
well as violating § 1981 by refusing the extend to minorities the “same opportunity to enter
into contracts” as is offered to Whites. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African American-Owned
Media, 589 U.S. 327, 336 (2020). This inference is supported by the allegation that Plaintiff
sent a second email to Folsom and the District’s school principals about the need for posting
vacancies on May 7, 2024. (Doc. 24 ¶ 55). And the allegation that Plaintiff was eventually
instructed to post the vacant positions. (Id. ¶ 58). Further, Plaintiff was the HR director for
the entire school district, and her job responsibilities included ensuring the District’s
compliance with policies and state law. (Doc. 24 ¶ 34). A supervisor receiving an email
regarding compliance with a state-mandated anti-discrimination policy from the employee
directly responsible for ensuring such compliance would reasonably recognize that they were
being advised of prohibitions against employment discrimination. Based on her subjective
belief that mostly White retirees were being rehired and that vacant jobs had already been
promised to those retirees, it was objectively reasonable for Plaintiff to believe that a practice
of not posting the vacancies was discriminatory. See Clover, 176 F.3d at 1351 (holding that the
conduct opposed need only be “close enough” to support an objectively reasonable belief of
unlawful discrimination).
The District argues that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that its rehiring practices
were implemented in a racially discriminatory manner because she has not alleged facts
showing how the practice (i.e, the alleged scheme) benefited mostly White employees.
(Doc. 25-1 at 7). The District points out, by way of example, that Plaintiff neither provides
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statistics comparing the racial demographics of retirees for the relevant years nor alleges that
a non-White retiree was denied reemployment. (Id.) As discussed above, however, Plaintiff
does not have to prove the underlying claim of discrimination “so long as she had a reasonable
good faith belief that the discrimination existed.” Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1021. And the Court, at
this stage of the case and without the benefit of testimony and other evidence, must rely on
Plaintiff’s allegations and draw every reasonable inference in her favor based on those
allegations. Those allegations are, to be sure, somewhat general in nature, and raise some
questions as to what the specific evidence will ultimately show. But general allegations of fact
are what Plaintiff is required to present at this juncture under Rule 8. These allegations are
sufficient to state a claim.
Indeed, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, without more evidence and context,
that a school district receiving multiple emails from its HR director insisting on compliance
with policies aimed to ensure nondiscriminatory hiring practices would not be on notice that
such insistence related at least in part to preventing unlawful discrimination. As discussed
above, the allegations of the disparate impact of the alleged scheme, coupled with Plaintiff’s
insistence on posting job vacancies to prevent such disparate impact, are enough to allow an
inference that Plaintiff’s statements related to job posting constituted “protected activity,” at
least to the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8. This issue will be ripe for re-evaluation based
on a more precise evidentiary record at summary judgment. But based on the factual summary
alleged in the SAC, the Court finds Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the first element.
2. 	Adverse Employment Action
As to 	the 	second 	element, 	Plaintiff 	must 	allege 	that 	she 	suffered 	an 	adverse
employment action. An action is adverse in the retaliation context if it is “harmful to the point
that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (“Burlington
Northern”); see Copeland v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 97 F.4th 766, 782 (11th Cir. 2024); Monaghan v.
Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th Cir. 2020). In applying this objective standard to
Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court looks at the surrounding circumstances and context. Id. at 69
(“We phrase the standard in general terms because the significance of any given act of
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retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.”). Here,
Plaintiff alleges that the District retaliated against her by (1) excluding her from meetings, (2)
not speaking to her, (3) removing her job duties, (4) telling her that her job was eliminated and
that she should leave the school district, (5) threatening the non-renewal of her employment
contract, and (6) demoting her. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 63, 71). Plaintiff contends that these actions
resulted in her constructive discharge. (Id.); (Doc. 20 at 11). She also alleges that the District
retaliated against her by refusing to renew her mother’s employment contract. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 60,
63, 71).
The District argues that the alleged demotion Plaintiff points to never came to fruition,
and a mere threat of a future demotion is not actionable. (Doc. 25-1 at 10 (citing Smith v. City
of Ft. Pierce, Fla., 565 F. App’x 774, 778 (11th Cir. 2014)). This argument is easily rejected for
two reasons. First, as Plaintiff points out, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. City of Ft.
Pierce, Fla. does not stand for the proposition that a threat of termination, without an actual
termination, can never constitute adverse action. (Doc. 20 at 11–12). In Smith, the plaintiff
claimed that she was threatened with termination when the city of Fort Pierce discussed
consolidating some of its departments, which would result in the elimination of plaintiff’s
position. 565 F. App’x at 778. But the consolidation never happened, and there was no express
threat of termination. Id. The facts alleged here are distinguishable from Smith in that there
were two express threats to Plaintiff’s employment: (1) when Ratts and Folsom told Plaintiff
on April 26, 2024, that her job was “on the chopping block” and she was going to be demoted,
(Doc. 24 ¶ 43), and (2) when counsel for the District told Plaintiff’s attorney that Plaintiff’s
contract would not be renewed for the following year. (Id. ¶ 52).
And 	second, 	the 	District’s 	argument 	mischaracterizes 	the 	nature 	of 	Plaintiff’s
allegations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants told her she was going to be demoted, and that
the only reason she was not demoted was because she had already signed her contract for the
upcoming school year. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 43, 51). Importantly, after Plaintiff’s attorney notified
counsel for the District of its contractual obligation to keep Plaintiff in its employ, the District,
through its counsel, responded that Plaintiff’s contract would not be renewed for the
subsequent year. (Id. ¶ 52). This was not merely a threat of non-renewal but an actual decision
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not to renew Plaintiff’s contract at the earliest opportunity, a decision which can constitute an
adverse employment action regardless of when it takes effect. See Thomas v. CVS/Pharmacy,
336 F. App’x 913, 915 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“An adverse employment action is
deemed to have occurred when the employer made the final decision and communicated it to
the employee.” (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 261–62 (1980))). And the
Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] School District’s refusal to renew [a plaintiff’s] contract [is]
clearly an adverse employment action.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1242
(11th Cir. 2016).
Even if the Court were to construe Ratts and Folsom’s communication to Plaintiff and
the comment made by the District’s counsel as mere threats, other courts in this Circuit have
found that a threat of termination can constitute an adverse employment action. See Huddleston
v. Atlanta, No. 1:23-CV-4552, 2026 WL 934198, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 6, 2026), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Huddleston v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. 1:23-CV-
04552, 2026 WL 910223 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2026) (“[T]he threat of termination can constitute
an adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim. A reasonable employee might be
dissuaded from filing a complaint or engaging in protected activity when doing so could mean
the loss of her job and the associated pay and benefits and could impact her career.”). And in
Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit applied similar reasoning to threats of
termination by a supervisor that occurred in connection with other misconduct to conclude
that the plaintiff suffered an adverse action. 955 F.3d 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2020) (“These
statements from a supervisor—which threatened both termination and possible physical
harm—‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.’” (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 70–72)).
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that she was subject to other retaliatory actions in
addition to being threatened with a demotion and termination—for example, she was excluded
from meetings, subjected to the proverbial cold shoulder by other employees, had some of
her job duties removed, which resulted in a loss of pay and prestige, and was constructively
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terminated through these and other actions.3 (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 63, 67). Standing alone, these other
alleged actions might well be considered trivial harms that would not rise to the level of an
adverse action. See Johnson v. AutoZone, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1154 (N.D. Ala. 2011)
(“Trivial harms and petty slights do not constitute adverse employment actions.” (quoting
Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68)). But considering the alleged actions together and construing
the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the District’s actions
might well have dissuaded a reasonable employee from engaging in statutorily protected
activity. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged adverse action for the
purposes of the retaliation claims.
3. 	Causation
As to the third element, Plaintiff must allege that the adverse action she suffered was
causally related to her protected conduct. To establish causation, Plaintiff must show “that the
decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the
adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 292 F.3d 712,
716 (11th Cir. 2002); see Bowers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 509 F. App’x 906, 911 (11th
Cir. 2013); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1998) (“To establish
the causal relation element . . . , [Plaintiff] need only show ‘that the protected activity and the
adverse action are not completely unrelated.’” (quoting Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Intern., 15 F.3d
1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994))). “If a form of protected activity and subsequent adverse action
occur ‘very close’ in time to one another, a jury may infer that the decisionmaker knew of the
protected activity and that it served as one motivation for the adverse action, establishing
causation.” Copeland, 97 F.4th at 783 (quoting Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160,
1182 (11th Cir. 2010)); see Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“Proximity in time is sufficient to raise an inference of causation.”); Robinson v. LaFarge N.
Am., Inc., 240 F. App’x 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding that causation was
sufficiently alleged where adverse action occurred about two months after protected activity).
3 The Court observes that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her separation from the District are vague and again
raise some questions as to what the specific evidence will show. However, as the Court noted in its analysis of
the first element, general allegations of fact are all that Plaintiff is required to present under Rule 8 at this stage
of litigation.
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Here, Plaintiff alleges that she first raised the issue of vacancy posting with Folsom on
April 16, 2024. (Doc. 24 ¶ 38). Ten days later, on April 26, 2024, Folsom and Ratts told Plaintiff
that Plaintiff was going to be demoted. (Id. ¶ 43). At some point between April 26 and June
19, 2024, the District’s counsel informed Plaintiff that her contract would not be renewed at
the earliest opportunity. (Id. ¶¶ 50–58). Plaintiff further alleges she was subjected to “a pattern
of antagonism” almost immediately after she made complaints about the fraudulent re-hiring
scheme and the District’s posting of job vacancies. (Doc. 20 at 14). And she alleges that the
Defendant Taylor, the Chairman of the Board of Education, was made aware of her
complaints. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 36, 39). The Court thus finds that the time frame alleged in the SAC
establishes sufficient temporal proximity to show a causal connection between the alleged
adverse actions and Plaintiff’s protected activity.4
In sum, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the SAC, taken as true and construed
in Plaintiff’s favor, are sufficient to state a plausible retaliation claim under Title VII and
§ 1981, in conformity with the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The District’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s
retaliation claims in Counts I and III.
C. Section 1981 Retaliation Claim Against the Individual Defendants
The Individual Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim in Count III,
asserting the defense of qualified immunity.5 (Doc. 26-1 at 13–16). “The doctrine of qualified
4 In its discussion of the third element, the District focus on Plaintiff’s allegation regarding its non-renewal of
her mother’s employment contract to argue that no temporal proximity exists to suggest a retaliatory motive.
(Doc. 25-1 at 12). However, the Court has found that Plaintiff’s other allegations establish the adverse action
element, and therefore, need not determine whether the non-renewal of the mother’s contract constitutes an
adverse action.
5 The Individual Defendants also contend that Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims against them should be dismissed
because she does not assert that the claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 26-1 at 5–6); see Davis v.
Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1983 provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of
rights, privileges or immunities protected by the constitution or the laws of the United States.”). This argument
is without merit for two reasons. First, although she does not specifically mention § 1983 as the method by
which she asserts her § 1981 claim, Plaintiff expressly references § 1983 in the SAC’s claims for relief. (Doc. 24
at 13). Even still, there is no requirement that she expressly invoke that provision to state a claim under § 1981.
See Ray v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 915 F.3d 689, 693 n.2 (11th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574
U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (holding that “no heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations
of constitutional rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim”). And second, Defendants admit
that earlier iterations of Plaintiff’s complaint did in fact invoke § 1983, meaning Defendants were on notice that
the § 1981 claims were brought pursuant to § 1983. (Doc. 26-1 at 5–6).
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immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The doctrine “balances two important
interests—the 	need 	to 	hold 	public 	officials 	accountable 	when 	they 	exercise 	power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Although qualified immunity is typically addressed
at the summary judgment phase, a defendant may raise it in a motion to dismiss. St. George v.
Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121
(11th Cir. 2001)).
1. 	Discretionary Function
“To be eligible for qualified immunity, the official must first establish that he was
performing a discretionary function at the time the alleged violation of federal law occurred.”
Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). An official performs a
discretionary function when that officer was “performing a legitimate job-related function
(that is, pursuing a job-related goal) . . . through means that were within his power to utilize.”
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Hill v.
Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 n.17 (11th Cir. 1994)). The nature of a
job-related function should be examined “at a general level rather than in a specific
application[.]” Smart v. England, 93 F.4th 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Holloman, 370
F.3d at 1288).
Here, 	the 	Individual 	Defendants contend 	that 	their 	actions of 	which 	Plaintiff
complains were all personnel-related decisions that fall within their discretionary duties as chair
of the School Board, superintendent, and assistant superintendent. (Doc. 26-1 at 14 n.5 (citing
Donald v. Norris, 131 F.4th 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2025)). The Court must look to the general
nature of Defendants’ actions, “temporarily putting aside the fact that [those actions] may have
been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an
unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.” Holloman, 370
F.3d at 1266. The Court agrees with Defendants that reassigning job duties, determining which
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employees should attend meetings, notifying employees of future demotions, and the
non-renewal of employment contracts “if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or
reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of [Defendants’] discretionary duties.” Harbert Int’l,
Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 594 (4th
Cir. 1997)). As such, Defendants were performing legitimate job-related functions, with
respect to their alleged retaliatory actions.6 The Court, therefore, finds that Defendants, as
alleged, were performing a discretionary function.
2. 	Qualified Immunity Analysis
Because the Individual Defendants have established that they were acting within their
discretionary authority, the burden now shifts to Plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity
is inappropriate. Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2022). To meet her burden,
Plaintiff must show that: (1) “the official’s alleged conduct violated a constitutionally protected
right[,]” and (2) “the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct.” Id. 	This
requires the Court to conduct a two-part analysis. First, the Court “consider[s] whether, taken
in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff], the facts alleged show [the Individual Defendants’]
conduct violated a constitutional right.” Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.
2016). Second, “[i]f a constitutional right would have been violated under [Plaintiff’s] version
of the facts,” the Court “must then determine ‘whether the right was clearly established.’” Lee
v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
a. 	Violation of § 1981
As discussed above, to state a claim for retaliation under § 1981, Plaintiff must allege
that: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected conduct. Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2009). “[I]ndividual liability may exist under [§] 1981 as a
result of an individual’s interference or participation in the allegedly unlawful act.” Lake v. 7037
Rest., LLC, No. 1:19-CV-5455, 2020 WL 13933562, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2020) (citing first
6 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were acting within their discretionary
authority. (See Doc. 20 at 16–17).
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Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1975); and then Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., 137 F.
App’x 205, 208 (11th Cir. 2005)). The Court has already determined that Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged the three elements of her retaliation claim with respect to the District but
now must determine whether she has done so as to Ratts, Folsom, and Taylor. Because each
Defendant is entitled to an independent qualified immunity claim, the Court must evaluate
each of their claims, “considering only the actions and omissions in which that particular
defendant engaged.” Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).
For many of the same reasons, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that Folsom, as the interim superintendent, and Ratts, as the assistant superintendent,
retaliated against her in violation of § 1981. As explained in the preceding section addressing
the retaliation claim against the District, the SAC identifies the protected activity Plaintiff
engaged in—namely, insisting on compliance with policies aimed to ensure nondiscriminatory
hiring practices. Further, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Ratts and Folsom knew of her
protected activity because she made her complaints to them, and that Ratts and Folsom
authorized and directly participated in the adverse employment actions to demote and
ultimately terminate her. (See Doc. 24 ¶¶ 37–38, 43, 46, 48, 53). Likewise, Plaintiff plausibly
alleges that Taylor, as chairman of the Board of Education, had knowledge of Plaintiff’s
protected conduct, (id. ¶ 39), and that the retaliatory actions taken against Plaintiff were made
at Taylor’s direction or with his approval. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 49, 53).
As for the third element, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the adverse actions taken
against her were casually related to her protected conduct. As discussed above, this is true
given the close temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s complaint regarding the posting of job
vacancies and the commencement of Ratts and Folsom’s retaliatory actions in excluding her
from meetings, directing other employees to refrain from speaking to her, reassigning her job
duties, and constructively terminating her through these actions—all of which were taken at
the direction or with the approval of Taylor. (See Doc. 24 ¶¶ 38–49, 53). In sum, construing
the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that the Individual Defendants violated § 1981 by retaliating against her for
objecting to the District’s unlawful race discrimination.
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b. Clearly Established Law
Having found that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Individual Defendants
unlawfully retaliated against her, the Court must determine whether they violated clearly
established law. “An official’s conduct violates clearly established law when ‘the contours of
[the] right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what
he is doing violates that right.’” Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). There are three ways a plaintiff can show that a
right was clearly established: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case
law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a
constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Perez, 809 F.3d
at 1222 (quoting Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009)). “The
‘salient question’ is whether the state of the law at the time of the incident gave [Defendants]
‘fair warning’ that [their] conduct was unlawful.” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002)). The second and third methods are generally known as “obvious clarity” cases. See
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 2002). “They exist where the words of
the federal statute or constitutional provision at issue are ‘so clear and the conduct so bad that
case law is not needed to establish that the conduct cannot be lawful,’ or where the case law
that does exist is so clear and broad (and ‘not tied to particularized facts’) that ‘every objectively
reasonable government official facing the circumstances would know that the official’s
conduct did violate federal law when the official acted.’” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203,
1209 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1350–51).
Here, Plaintiff uses the second method, pointing to the general principle that it is
unlawful to retaliate against an employee for making race-based complaints. (Doc. 20 at 16).
Defendants, in their motion to dismiss, make two arguments that the law was not clearly
established. First, they assert that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court has held
that a government official violates § 1981 by taking an adverse employment action against
somebody other than the person who engaged in the statutorily protected activity. (Doc. 26-1
at 15). And second, they contend more generally that their alleged acts were not unlawful. (Id.)
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As to Defendants’ first argument, which relates to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants
retaliated against her by refusing to renew her mother’s employment contract, the Court
agrees. Defendants are correct that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court have
recognized a third-party retaliation claim for an adverse employment action taken against
someone other than the plaintiff-employee. (Doc. 26-1 at 15). Plaintiff does not point to any
binding precedent which would establish a cause of action for third-party retaliation, and the
Court has found none. See Allen-Sherrod ex rel. Stallworth v. Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. CIVA
1:05CV0600, 2007 WL 1020843, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2007), aff’d sub nom. Allen-Sherrod v.
Henry Cnty. Sch. Dist., 248 F. App’x 145 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing cases to show that courts have
held that a claim for third-party retaliation is not actionable under § 1981 or other similar
retaliation statutes). Therefore, to the extent Defendants’ non-renewal of Plaintiff’s mother’s
employment contract could be seen as retaliation against Plaintiff, the law was not clearly
established.
As to Defendants’ second argument, the Court has already found that, as alleged,
Defendants’ actions were retaliatory and unlawful. While the Court acknowledges that
Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim is different from the typical § 1981 retaliation claim in that it alleges
retaliation based on Defendants’ alleged discrimination against others, rather than against
herself, this distinction is immaterial. See Tucker v. Talladega City Schs., 171 F. App’x 289, 294
(11th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff may bring a § 1981 claim not only for racial discrimination, but
also for retaliation due to his opposition to race discrimination.” (citing Pinkard v. Pullman-
Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1229 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982))).7 A retaliation claim under § 1981
“includes retaliation for a plaintiff’s opposition to race discrimination, whether or not he
personally is the victim of that race discrimination.” Id. at 295; see Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose,
Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that plaintiff employees who were retaliated
against when they refused to participate in their employer's discrimination against non-White
customers could proceed with a retaliation claim under § 1981(b)).
7 Decisions of Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, even those made after October 1, 1981, are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit. Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).
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It is well-established in this Circuit that race-based discrimination in employment is
prohibited by § 1981. See Foster v. Echols Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 7:23-CV-00089 (WLS), 2024 WL
2979543, at *14 (M.D. Ga. June 13, 2024), aff’d, 169 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2026) (collecting
cases). It is also well-established that retaliating against an employee for objecting to or
complaining about racial discrimination is unlawful under § 1981. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jones, 575
F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009); Whitcomb v. Sumter Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 453 F. App’x 879, 881 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“We have clearly established a person’s right to be free from retaliation after
complaining of racial discrimination.”); Martin v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 959 F.3d 1048, 1053
n.3 (11th Cir. 2020). Based on this principle, the Court finds that it would be clear to every
reasonable government official that to demote, terminate, or otherwise retaliate against an
employee who objects to or opposes racial discrimination would violate federal law. For this
reason, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the Individual Defendants
violated clearly established law based on general case principles. This finding is limited to
Defendants’ arguments based on the pleadings alone; not upon summary judgment or other
finding upon evidence in the Record. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1981 retaliation claim based on qualified immunity is DENIED, without
prejudice.8
D. Hostile Work Environment Claims
In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim of retaliatory hostile work environment under Title
VII against the District. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 65–68). “Title VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work
environment in retaliation for an employee’s engagement in protected activity.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y,
Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299,
1312 (11th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855
(11th Cir. 2020)). “[R]etaliatory hostile work environment claims, like retaliation claims based
on discrete acts, prevail if the conduct complained of ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable
8 Although entitlement to qualified immunity is usually made with the benefit of caselaw with facts which are
materially similar to the case at bar, see Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002), the Court is
satisfied that at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of clearly established
law relying on the statutory text and general principles.
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worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 836 (quoting Monaghan,
955 F.3d at 862–63).
The Court has already found that the alleged adverse actions Plaintiff suffered—
exclusion from meetings, receiving the cold shoulder from other employees, threats of
demotion and termination, removal of job duties resulting in a loss of pay and prestige—were
enough 	to 	dissuade 	a 	reasonable 	employee 	from 	making 	or 	supporting 	a 	charge 	of
discrimination. Thus, the Court finds that the SAC sufficiently alleges a claim for hostile work
environment under Title VII. The District’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim in Count II.
In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliatory hostile work environment under
§ 1981 against all Defendants. Like Title VII, § 1981 also recognizes a claim for hostile work
environment, but the claim must be based on allegations of a racially hostile environment. See,
e.g., Pate v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (noting that
“the classes of persons protected by [§ 1981] are limited to racial or ethnic discrimination”).
To succeed on a hostile work environment claim under § 1981, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) she
belongs to a protected class, (2) she experienced unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment
was based on her race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
of her employment, and (5) employer responsibility under a theory of vicarious or direct
liability.” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Smelter
v. S. Home Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1283 n.3, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018)).
Plaintiff’s claim fails on the first and third elements because she does not allege she is
a member of a protected class or that the alleged harassment she experienced was based on
her race. The SAC makes no mention of Plaintiff’s race. Thus, Plaintiff fails to allege a hostile
work environment claim under § 1981. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED with
respect to Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim in Count IV.
E. Georgia Whistleblower Act Retaliation
In Count V, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (GWA)
against the District. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 79–82). The GWA prohibits a public employer from
retaliating “against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a
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law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a government agency, unless the disclosure
was made with knowledge that the disclosure was false or with reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2). Employers are also prohibited from retaliating against an
employee for “objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the
public employer that the public employee has reasonable cause to believe is in violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.” Id. § 45-1-4(d)(3). The GWA defines
“retaliation” as
the discharge, suspension, or demotion by a public employer of a public
employee or any other adverse employment action taken by a public employer
against a public employee in the terms or conditions of employment for
disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to
either a supervisor or government agency.
Id. § 45-1-4(a)(5). To establish a claim for retaliation under the GWA, Plaintiff must show:
“(1) the employer is a public employer; (2) the employee disclosed a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to a supervisor or agency; (3) the employee
experienced retaliation; and (4) there is a causal relation between the disclosure and the adverse
employment decision.” Lamar v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 605 F. App’x 804, 806 (11th Cir. 2015)
(citing Forrester v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs., 708 S.E.2d 660, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)). There is
no dispute that Plaintiff was employed by a public employer. Thus, the Court addresses the
remaining elements.
1. 	Protected Disclosure or Objection
As noted above, the GWA prohibits employers from retaliating against an employee
for either disclosing a violation or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation, or for
objecting to or refusing to participate in a practice the employee believes is in violation of a
law, rule, or regulation. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2)–(3). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she engaged
in both protected activities by (1) disclosing a violation of O.C.G.A. § 47-3-141 (the alleged
scheme to defraud the TRS) to her supervisors, and (2) objecting to or refusing to participate
in the “unlawful direction” that the job vacancies not be posted. (Doc. 20 at 18–19).
As to Plaintiff’s disclosure of the alleged scheme to defraud the TRS, the Parties
disagree over the meaning of § 47-3-141 and what it prohibits. (See Doc. 25-1 at 15–16 &
Doc. 20 at 19–20). The District argues that Plaintiff’s disclosure of alleged violations of
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§ 47-3-141 does not constitute protected activity because the District did not in fact defraud
the TRS, and Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the statute makes her objection to the alleged
scheme objectively unreasonable. (Doc. 25-1 at 15–16). Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains
that the District violated the statute by allowing retirees to return to work in TRS covered
positions and falsely certifying that there were no agreements between the District and the
retirees it was rehiring. (Doc. 20 at 19–20). Whether the District did in fact violate § 47-3-141
is immaterial because the GWA only requires that Plaintiff disclose a violation of a law, and
that such disclosure “was [not] made with knowledge that the disclosure was false or with
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2); see Jordan v. City of Waycross,
Ga., No. 5:17-CV-33, 2018 WL 4089206, at *10 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2018) (“The language of
[§ 45-1-47(d)(2)] shows that a plaintiff need not be right that the defendant committed a
violation, but he cannot find protection in the statute if his disclosure was knowingly false[,]
or made with reckless disregard for the truth[.]”). Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that she disclosed
a violation of § 47-3-141 to her supervisors, Ratts and Folsom. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 15, 35–36); (see id.
¶ 35 (“Plaintiff informed Folsom and Ratts that they, [the District], and the [Board of
Education], were violating [] § 47-3-141 by making Return-to-Work provisions for retiring
employees and promising them positions in advance of retirement, and that they were
defrauding the TRS.”)). And viewing the allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot say
that this disclosure was made falsely or recklessly. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
disclosure of alleged violations of state law constitutes a protected disclosure under the GWA.
As to Plaintiff’s objection to the non-posting of job vacancies, the District argues that
this activity was not protected because Plaintiff’s belief that the non-posting was unlawful was
not reasonable, her objection constitutes a complaint about noncompliance with internal
policies, and an objection to violations of unspecified equal employment opportunity laws is
insufficient. (Doc. 25-1 at 13–14). The Court addresses each argument in turn.
First, the Court has already found Plaintiff’s belief that the District’s practice of not
posting job vacancies was discriminatory to be objectively reasonable based on her belief that
mostly White retirees were being rehired and that vacant jobs had already been promised to
those retirees. Second, while it is true that complaints arising under internal policies are not
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protected by the GWA, see Coward v. MCG Health, Inc., 802 S.E.2d 396, 400 (Ga. Ct. App.
2017), Plaintiff points to a specific provision of Georgia law which requires the District to
implement hiring practices that “assure nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion,
or national origin[,]” and provide for “the announcement in writing of the availability of all
certificated positions within the local school system[.]” O.C.G.A. § 20-2-211(d); (see Doc. 24
¶ 30 (citing id.)). Thus, as alleged, the District’s noncompliance with its own policies may
constitute a violation of state law. Third, the Court has found no requirement that Plaintiff
name the specific code section she believed the District violated when making her complaint
to receive protection under the GWA. See Jordan, 2018 WL 4089206, at *10; Coward, 802 S.E.2d
at 400 (“[W]e need not determine what terminology is required to trigger the protections of
the Whistleblower Statute, nor do we believe that the statute requires specific magic words.”).
Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that the non-posting of
vacancies was in violation of equal employment opportunity laws, as applied to the District
through state law. And therefore, Plaintiff’s objection to the District’s noncompliance with its
posting policy was a protected activity under the GWA.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that her disclosure regarding
the alleged TRS scheme and her objection to the non-posting of job vacancies were protected
under the GWA. Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the second element of her GWA
retaliation claim.
2. 	Adverse Employment Action
The 	GWA 	prohibits 	retaliation 	in 	the 	form 	of 	“discharge, 	suspension, 	or
demotion . . . or any other adverse employment action[.]” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5). The
Georgia Court of Appeals has defined the phrase “any other adverse employment action” to
mean an “employment action analogous to or of a similar kind or class as ‘discharge,
suspension, or demotion.’” Franklin v. Pitts, 826 S.E.2d 427, 436 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). “The
Title VII standard for adverse employment action provides guidance.” Anderson v. Sumter Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 449 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1344 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (citing Franklin, 826 S.E.2d at 437).
The Title VII standard requires that “an employee must show that [s]he suffered a serious and
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of h[er] employment.” Id. (quoting
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Franklin, 826 S.E.2d at 437); see Walker v. Indian River Transp. Co., 741 F. App’x 740, 749 (11th
Cir. 2018)). For the same reasons discussed in the analysis of the Title VII and § 1981 claims,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a demotion and termination, which
constitute adverse employment actions for the purposes of this claim. Thus, Plaintiff
sufficiently alleges the third element of a GWA retaliation claim.
3. 	Causation
“The causation element in a whistleblower case ‘is construed broadly so that a plaintiff
merely has to prove that the protected activity and the negative employment action are not
completely unrelated.’” Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 S.E.2d 520, 524 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Freeman v. Smith, 750 S.E.2d 739, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)). “All that
is needed is a ‘showing that the decision-maker was aware of the protected disclosure and that
the disclosure and action were not wholly unrelated.’” Anderson, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 1344
(quoting Forrester, 708 S.E.2d at 668). And even “mere temporal proximity between an
employer’s knowledge 	of protected activity and adverse employment action” may be
“sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case.” Forrester, 708 S.E.2d at 669
(quoting Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants were aware of her protected
disclosures. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 35–36, 38–39). Plaintiff first alerted Ratts and Folsom (and Taylor
through Folsom as the interim superintendent) of the alleged scheme to defraud the TRS, in
violation of state law, in April of 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 35–36). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff raised the
issue of vacancy posting with Folsom (and Taylor through Folsom) on April 16, 2024. (Id.
¶¶ 38–39). Then, over the course of just a few weeks, Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to “a
pattern of antagonism” which included Folsom and Ratts removing her job duties, (id. ¶ 37);
telling Plaintiff her job was on the “chopping block” and that she was going to be demoted,
(id. ¶ 43); ostracizing and excluding Plaintiff from meetings, (id. ¶ 48); and causing other
employees to stop speaking to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 81). Most significantly, at some point between
April 26 and June 19, 2024, the District’s counsel informed Plaintiff that her contract would
not be renewed at the earliest opportunity. (Id. ¶¶ 50–58). The “temporal proximity” between
Plaintiff’s alleged protected activities and the aforementioned adverse actions, namely the
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decision to demote Plaintiff, is sufficient, at this stage in the proceedings, to plead a causal
relationship for the purpose of Plaintiff’s GWA retaliation claim. See Jones v. Bd. of Regents, 585
S.E.2d 138, 144 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (finding circumstantial evidence of retaliation when
defendant 	requested 	plaintiff’s 	resignation 	two 	months 	after 	plaintiff’s 	protected
whistleblower activity); Anderson, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 1344 (finding close temporal proximity
between plaintiff’s alleged protected activities over the course of the 2017–2018 school year
and her constructive discharge in March of 2018). Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the
fourth element of a GWA retaliation claim.
In sum, the Court finds that the facts alleged in the SAC, taken as true and construed
in Plaintiff’s favor, are sufficient to state a plausible retaliation claim under the Georgia
Whistleblower Act. Accordingly, the District’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect
to Plaintiff’s whistleblower retaliation claim in Count V.
F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Count VI, Plaintiff brings a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the Individual Defendants. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 83–87). Plaintiff alleges that the
Individual Defendants’ retaliatory actions of freezing her out of meetings, causing other
employees to stop speaking to her, removing her job duties, telling her that her job was
eliminated, not renewing her employment contract for the following school year, demoting
her, telling her to leave the school district, refusing to renew her mother’s contract, and
constructively terminating her caused severe emotional distress. (Doc. 24 ¶ 86). The Individual
Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, and alternatively, that
they are entitled to official immunity because Plaintiff sues them in their individual capacities.
(Doc. 26-1 at 16–18).
1. 	Official Immunity
The doctrine of official immunity offers public officers and employees limited
protection from suits against them in their personal capacity. Todd v. Brooks, 665 S.E.2d 11, 12
(Ga. Ct. App. 2008). Official immunity protects individual employees from personal liability
for discretionary actions taken within the scope of their official authority, if such acts are done
without willfulness, malice, or corruption. Everson v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 811 S.E.2d 9, 12
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(Ga. Ct. App. 2018). “The rationale for this immunity is to preserve the public employee’s
independence of action without fear of lawsuits and to prevent a review of his or her judgment
in hindsight.” Id.
Plaintiff does not dispute that she sues the Individual Defendants over how they
performed discretionary acts. (See Doc. 20 at 21–22). So, to pierce the Individual Defendants’
official immunity for her state law claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that they acted with actual
malice or an intent to injure. Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1233 (11th Cir. 2006).
According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, “‘actual malice’ requires a deliberate intention to
do wrong and denotes ‘express malice or malice in fact.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Hazelwood, 520
S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1999)). “[A]ctual malice can be inferred from [a defendant's] conduct[,]”
Hart v. Logan, 664 F. App’x 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2016), but it “requires more than harboring
bad feelings about another.” Adams, 520 S.E.2d at 898. So “[w]hile ill will may be an element
of actual malice in many factual situations, its presence alone cannot pierce official immunity;
rather, ill will must also be combined with the intent to do something wrongful or illegal.” Id.
Further, federal pleading standards allow for malice and intent to “be alleged generally.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). However, “Rule 9 does not exempt Plaintiff[ ] from Rule 8’s requirement that
legal conclusions must be supported by plausible factual allegations to be considered by the
Court.” Gardner v. Bottoms, No. 1:21-CV-2798, 2023 WL 5596400, at *15 (N.D. Ga. July 21,
2023) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants set out to retaliate against her and did so through
the actions recounted above. (See Doc. 24 ¶ 85 (“The Individual Defendants deliberately set
out to retaliate against [Plaintiff] by subjecting her to abuse by her supervisors[.]”)). While this
allegation facially alleges intent, it is unsupported by factual allegations elsewhere in the SAC
that would create a reasonable inference that Defendants acted with actual malice. See, e.g.,
Puckett v. Ward, No. 2:24-CV-3, 2024 WL 6980526, at *13 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2024) (finding
that complaint’s conclusory allegations of “malice aforethought,” without more, were
insufficient to support an inference of actual malice); Lambert v. Williams, No. CV 124-133,
2025 WL 2042268, at *16 (S.D. Ga. July 21, 2025) (finding general allegations of intentional
conduct insufficient to establish actual malice to overcome official immunity); Malone v. Johnson,
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667 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1274–75 (N.D. Ga. 2023) (finding that complaint’s allegation of “willful
misconduct, malice, oppression, and the entire want of care” was “not enough to make
[plaintiff’s] claim of malice plausible”). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege actual
malice to overcome the Individual Defendants’ claim of official immunity.
2. 	Elements of IIED Claim
Even if the Individual Defendants were not entitled to official immunity, Plaintiff has
failed to sufficiently allege the elements of her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the conduct giving rise to the claim was
intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.” Frank v. Fleet Fin., Inc. of Ga.,
518 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Amstadter v. Liberty Healthcare Corp., 503 S.E.2d
877, 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)). Such conduct “must be so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” Id. (quoting Martin v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 485 S.E.2d 815, 818 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997)). Indeed, “[t]he tort is reserved for only the most egregious behavior, and a
plaintiff must meet a heavy burden to establish it.” Tidwell v. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, No.
113CV04100, 2014 WL 12845595, at *6 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2014) (citation modified), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:13-CV-4100, 2014 WL 12845611 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2014); see
Mears v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 484 S.E.2d 659, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (“Claimants bear a
heavy burden in establishing the type of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). “Whether a claim rises to the requisite
level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is a question of law[,]” Frank, 518 S.E.2d at 720, that may be decided upon
a motion to dismiss. Tidwell, 2014 WL 12845595, at *6; see Abdul-Malik v. Airtran Airways, Inc.,
678 S.E.2d 555, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“Whether severe emotional distress can be
found . . . is a question for the court to decide.”).
Defendants challenge the second and fourth elements, arguing that their conduct was
not extreme and outrageous and that Plaintiff’s emotional distress was not severe. (Doc. 26-1
at 16–18). As to the second element, in the employment context particularly, Georgia courts
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note that a “major outrage in the . . . conduct complained of is essential to the tort.” Metro.
Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Mosley, 634 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). To satisfy the
extreme or outrageous conduct element, an employer’s “actions must be ‘so terrifying or
insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.’” Beck v. Interstate Brands
Corp., 953 F.2d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Johnson, 274 S.E.2d 17, 18
(Ga. Ct. App. 1980)). Thus, courts in this Circuit have held that “[e]mployment related
activities by themselves are insufficient to establish that conduct is extreme and outrageous.”
Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1331–32 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (collecting
employment-related cases rejecting claims for intentional inflict of emotional distress); see also
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1229 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Georgia courts have held
that an employer’s termination of an employee—however stressful to the employee—
generally is not extreme and outrageous conduct.”). Even so, “[t]he existence of a special
relationship between the actor and victim, such as that of employer to employee, may make
otherwise non-egregious conduct outrageous.” Trimble v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 469 S.E.2d 776,
778 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
Here, without condoning Defendants’ alleged conduct, the Court finds that their
retaliatory actions do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous under the heightened
requirements of Georgia law. See, e.g., Bowers v. Estep, 420 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a supervisor who threatened, intimidated and humiliated employee did not
engage in outrageous conduct); Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Ga. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that hostile, intimidating and abusive behavior by a manager was not extreme);
Palmer v. Stewart Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:04-CV-21, 2005 WL 1676701, at *15–16 (M.D. Ga. June
17, 2005) (finding that defendant-school district’s conduct in accusing plaintiff of theft and
terminating her employment was not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law); Frazier v.
Smith, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (finding that defendant-employer’s conduct
in using racial slurs, verbally intimidating plaintiff, and undermining plaintiff’s authority as jail
administrator did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous); Pierri v. Cingular Wireless,
LLC, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (“Georgia law does not consider adverse
employment actions ‘extreme or outrageous.’”).
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In sum, the Court finds that the Individual Defendants are entitled to official immunity
on Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and alternatively, that Plaintiff
fails to sufficiently allege that their conduct was extreme and outrageous. Accordingly, the
Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s claim in
Count VI.9
G. Litigation Expenses Under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11
Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim for litigation expenses under state law against all
Defendants in Count VII. (Doc. 24 ¶¶ 88–89). The Defendants move to dismiss this claim,
arguing that it must necessarily fail because it is a derivative of Plaintiff’s substantive claims.
(Doc. 25-1 at 21); (Doc. 26-1 at 20).
Plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and expenses is based on a provision of Georgia law
which provides:
The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages;
but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and
where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has
caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. As a rule, “questions concerning bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or
unnecessary trouble and expense . . . are ‘generally questions for the jury to decide.’” Copeland v.
Home Grown Music, Inc., 856 S.E.2d 325, 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Garrett v. Women’s
Health Care of Gwinnett, P.C., 532 S.E.2d 164, 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)).
For bad faith to warrant an award of attorney fees under the statute, it “must have arisen
out of the transaction on which the cause of action is predicated.” Copeland, 856 S.E.2d at 334
(citation modified). The kind of bad faith sufficient to support such an award “is not simply bad
judgment or negligence, but it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity, and implies
conscious doing of wrong, and means breach of known duty through some motive of interest
or ill will.” Rapid Grp., Inc. v. Yellow Cab of Columbus, Inc., 557 S.E.2d 420, 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). “[B]ad faith—as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11—
does not encompass bad faith in defending a claim after a cause of action has already arisen[,]”
9 The District also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim at Count VI. (Doc. 25-1 at 17–21). However, the SAC
asserts this claim only against the Individual Defendants. (See Doc. 24 at 11). As such, the District’s Motion to
Dismiss as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is DENIED, as moot.
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Copeland, 856 S.E.2d at 333, and “cannot be prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights
or duties but must result from some interested or sinister motive.” Yellow Cab, 557 S.E.2d at 426
(citing Plemons v. Weaver, 533 S.E.2d 747, 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)).
When the asserted basis for a recovery of attorney fees is either stubborn litigiousness or
the causing of unnecessary trouble and expense, “there is not any evidence to support an
award . . . if a bona fide controversy clearly exists between the parties.” Brown v. Baker, 398 S.E.2d
797, 800 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). If a genuine dispute exists, “whether of law or
fact, on liability or amount of damages, or on any comparable issue[,]” an award of fees or
expenses is not authorized. Id. In that case, the defendant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on the plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and expenses of litigation . . . .” Copeland, 856 S.E.2d
at 334 (citing Choate Const. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 779 S.E.2d 465, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015));
see Horton v. Dennis, 750 S.E.2d 493, 497 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (“Although whether a bona fide
controversy exists is normally a question for the jury . . . if a bona fide controversy clearly exists
between the parties, there is not ‘any evidence’ to support an award based on stubborn
litigiousness or . . . unnecessary trouble and expense.”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support a reasonable inference of
bad faith on the part of Defendants. Further, the Parties’ pleadings and briefs demonstrate a
bona fide controversy as to at least two issues: liability and the amount of damages. As such,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for attorney fees and litigation expenses under § 13-6-11.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count VII are GRANTED.10
CONCLUSION
In sum, the District’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 25) is GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part. The Motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliatory hostile work
environment claim in Count IV and her claim for fees and expenses, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 13-6-11, in Count VII. The Motion is denied as to Counts I, II, III, and V. Additionally, the
District’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Count
VI is denied, as moot.
10 The Court makes no finding regarding Plaintiff’s potential recovery of expenses and fees under other statutes.
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Further, the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26) is GRANTED, in
part, and DENIED, in part. The Motion is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliatory
hostile work environment claim in Count IV, her claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Count VI, and her claim for fees and expenses, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, in
Count VII. The Motion is denied as to Count III.
Thus, the following claims remain against the District: Count I (Title VII retaliation),
Count II (Title VII retaliatory hostile work environment), Count III (§ 1981 retaliation), and
Count V (Georgia Whistleblower Act retaliation). As to the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff’s
claim in Count III (§ 1981 retaliation) remains.
SO ORDERED, this 25th day of June 2026.
/s/ W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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